An Analysis of Direct Effect and Judicial Review Pre- and Post-Lisbon by ZIPPERLE, NADINE
Durham E-Theses
An Analysis of Direct Eﬀect and Judicial Review Pre-
and Post-Lisbon
ZIPPERLE, NADINE
How to cite:
ZIPPERLE, NADINE (2016) An Analysis of Direct Eﬀect and Judicial Review Pre- and Post-Lisbon,
Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online:
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/11470/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oﬃce, Durham University, University Oﬃce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
2
Nadine Christine Zipperle
EU International Agreements
An Analysis of Direct Effect and Judicial Review Pre- and Post-Lisbon
Abstract
The  aim  of  this  dissertation  is  to  investigate  the  institutional  and  legal  effects  of  international
agreements. It is structured in three chapters. The first chapter will be concerned with the Court's
case  law on direct  effect  of  international  agreements (GATT/WTO, free trade  associations  with
EFTA and with non-EFTA countries, accession associations, development associations and EEA).
The  second  chapter  will  be  concerned  with  the  general  issues  and  practice  on  international
agreements in the CFSP and FSJ, and will integrate sections on direct and indirect effect. The chapter
will be thus organised as follows: Section 1 will deal with the international legal personality of the
Union;  Section  2  will  deal  with  the  practice  on  EU  agreements;  Sections  3  and  4  will  deal
respectively with direct effects and indirect effects and will address a vertical dimension (vis-à-vis
national legislation). The third chapter will give an overview of the jurisdiction of the Court on EU
international agreements. The chapter will be thus organised as follows: Section 1 will look at the
jurisdiction of the Court on EC agreements (by now EU) before and after the Lisbon Treaty reforms;
Section 2 will look at the jurisdiction of the Court on agreements concluded in the fields of CFSP
and PJC (by now FSJ) before and after the Lisbon Treaty reforms;  Section 3 will  consider the
standard of review in general.
The findings  of  this  study are that  the notion of  direct effect  as  applied by the  Court  in  cases
involving international law cannot be transposed to international agreements in the CFSP and FSJ;
arguments in favour of direct effect seem less thorough and less elaborated on. Article 40 TEU, as
one of the heads of the jurisdiction that the Court had and now has on a reformed basis, could be
relevant for giving the Court ex post jurisdiction on an international agreement, at least as far as the
competence  question  is  concerned.  Article  218 (11)  TFEU is  a  potential  inroad  into  the  CFSP
exemption. Article 275 (2) TFEU is again one of the potential inroads into the CFSP for the Court.
Overall, the interests and rights of private parties would be better served by a more extensive role of
the CJEU.
EU International Agreements
An Analysis of Direct Effect and Judicial Review Pre- and Post-Lisbon
Nadine Christine Zipperle
Submission for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Law
Durham University
2015
For my parents.
Table of Contents
List of Abbreviations..................................................................................................................... i
Statement of Copyright................................................................................................................. vi
Acknowledgements........................................................................................................................ vii
Table of Cases............................................................................................................................... viii
General Introduction.................................................................................................................. 1
Chapter I...................................................................................................................................... 12
The  Court's  case  law  on  direct  effect  of  international  agreements  (free  trade
associations, accession associations, development associations and EEA) and status of
WTO law...................................................................................................................................... 12
A. Introduction.............................................................................................................................. 12
B. Theoretical framework …........................................................................................................ 13
1. The concept of direct effect........................................................................................... 13
a) Constitutional situation in each Member State................................................. 13
b) The Union's dualistic /vs. monistic philosophy towards international law  
(Haegeman)........................................................................................................... 14
c) Direct effect vs. direct applicability.................................................................. 17
2. The formula for direct effect......................................................................................... 18
C. Asymmetry (variance) – the Court's different approaches to direct effect............................... 20
1. The (absence of) direct effect of GATT/WTO law in the Community legal order...... 21
a) International Fruit Company line of reasoning (GATT 1947)......................... 21
Why are provisions of GATT special in nature?....................................... 22
b) Transition from GATT 1947 to WTO agreement and GATT 1994................... 24
aa) Characteristics of the WTO system..................................................... 24
bb) Different views on the legal effects.................................................... 27
cc) Portugal v Council line of reasoning................................................... 30
dd) Grounds for denying direct effect in the case of WTO/ GATT........... 32
ee) Continuation of the Portugal v Council line of reasoning.................. 37
c) Rulings by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)..................................... 43
2. The possible  direct effect of provisions of FTAs (EFTA/non-EFTA), accession/  
development associations and the GC's case law on the EEA Agreement....................... 46
a) Effects of FTAs: Kupferberg line of reasoning (FTAs with EFTA countries).. 47
b) Continuation of the  Kupferberg line of reasoning (FTAs with non-EFTA 
countries, accession/ development associations and the GC's case law  
on the EEA Agreement)........................................................................................ 52
aa) Direct effect of provisions of non-EFTA free trade agreements.......... 54
bb) Direct effect of provisions of accession and development 
associations................................................................................................ 55
cc) Direct effect of provisions of the EEA Agreement.............................. 58
3. Concluding remarks on the apparent asymmetry.......................................................... 59
D. Symmetry (invariance) - the demarcation between relevant and irrelevant parameters for
the recognition of direct effect...................................................................................................... 61
1.  Intention  of  the  contracting  parties  in  absence  of  an  express  provision  in  the  
agreement.......................................................................................................................... 62
2. 'Wording, purpose and nature' component - relevant and irrelevant parameters for 
the recognition of direct effect.......................................................................................... 63
a) Similarity of terms............................................................................................ 63
b) Imbalance between obligations (non-reciprocity) and the ability of the 
contracting parties to preserve and pursue interests.............................................. 64
c) Degree of integration........................................................................................ 65
d) Safeguard clauses.............................................................................................. 66
3. Concluding remarks on the demarcation between relevant and irrelevant parameters 
for the recognition of direct effect.................................................................................... 67
E. The Court's case law on direct effect: a symmetrical phenomenon......................................... 68
F. Incurse: Technical aspects of indirect effects and limitations.................................................. 72
G. Conclusion............................................................................................................................... 84
Chapter II.................................................................................................................................... 87
General issues and practice on EU international agreements (CFSP and PJC (by now
FSJ) agreements)......................................................................................................................... 87
A. Introduction.............................................................................................................................. 87
B. International legal personality.................................................................................................. 88
C. Legal practice........................................................................................................................... 93
D. Direct effect.............................................................................................................................. 109
1. The area of CFSP and direct effect............................................................................... 109
a) Pre-Lisbon arguments for and against direct effect.......................................... 109
b) Post-Lisbon arguments for and against direct effect......................................... 113
2. The area of FSJ and direct effect................................................................................... 119
a) Pre-Lisbon arguments for and against direct effect.......................................... 119
b) Post-Lisbon arguments for and against direct effect......................................... 121
3. Contractual exclusions of direct effect.......................................................................... 123
E. Indirect effect............................................................................................................................ 126
1. Indirect effects: The significance of the doctrine of consistent interpretation.............. 126
2. Indirect effects of EU agreements (CFSP and PJC (by now FSJ) agreements)............ 131
F. Conclusion................................................................................................................................ 133
Chapter III................................................................................................................................... 135
Jurisdiction of the Court on EU international agreements..................................................... 135
A. Introduction............................................................................................................................. 135
B. Jurisdiction of the Court on  EC (by now EU) agreements before and after the Lisbon
Treaty reforms............................................................................................................................... 136
1. Control ex ante of legality of EC (by now EU) agreements......................................... 136
2. Control ex post of legality of EC (by now EU) agreements......................................... 138
a) The Court's jurisdiction in infringement proceedings....................................... 138
b) The Court's jurisdiction in annulment proceedings.......................................... 142
aa) Lack of competences........................................................................... 143
bb) Breach of essential procedural requirements...................................... 145
cc) Infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their 
application................................................................................................. 157
c) The Court's jurisdiction in preliminary rulings proceedings............................. 164
aa) The interpretative jurisdiction of the Court of Justice over 
provisions of international agreements concluded without the 
participation of Member States................................................................. 164
bb) The interpretative jurisdiction of the Court of Justice over 
provisions of international agreements concluded with the participation 
of Member States....................................................................................... 165
C. Jurisdiction of the Court on CFSP and PJC (by now FSJ) agreements.................................... 173
1. Institutional scheme of the Treaties and limitations on review before the Lisbon  
Treaty reforms.................................................................................................................. 173
2. Institutional  scheme of the Treaties and limitations on review after  the Lisbon  
Treaty reforms.................................................................................................................. 182
a) Control ex ante of legality of CFSP and FSJ agreements................................. 182
b) Control ex post of legality of CFSP and FSJ agreements................................. 183
D. The standard of assessment...................................................................................................... 191
1. National judicatures...................................................................................................... 191
2. Union judicature (intensity of judicial review)............................................................. 192
E. Conclusion................................................................................................................................ 198
General Conclusion..................................................................................................................... 200
Appendices  EU  Agreements  (CFSP  and  PJC  (by  now  FSJ)  agreements)  pre-
TL................................................................................................................................................. 206
Descriptive Repository................................................................................................................ 218
Select Bibliography..................................................................................................................... 278
iList of Abbreviations
General
AA - Association Agreement
Acc. - Accession 
ACP - African, Caribbean and Pacific countries
AG - Advocate General
ALTHEA - European Union military crisis management operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
AMM - Aceh Monitoring Mission
ATBT - Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
BiH - Bosnia and Herzegovina
CA - Cooperation Agreement
CCP - Common Commercial Policy
cf. - confer, compare
CFSP - Common Foreign and Security Policy
ch. - chapter
CISA - Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement
CJ – Court of Justice
CJEU - Court of Justice of the European Union
CJH - Justice and Home Affairs
CSDP - Common Security and Defence Policy
DA - Development Agreement
DCT - Draft Constitutional Treaty
DHS - United States Department of Homeland Security
DSB - Dispute Settlement Body (WTO)
DSU - Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
EA - Europe Agreement
EAC - European Atomic Energy
EC - European Community
ECHR - European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
ECJ – European Court of Justice (see also CJEU - Court of Justice of the European Union)
ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States
ii
ECSC - European Coal and Steel Community
ECtHR - European Court of Human Rights
ed(s) - edition, editor(s)
EEA - European Economic Area
EEC - European Economic Community
EFTA - European Free Trade Association
e.g. - exempli gratia, for example
ESA - European Space Agency
ESDP - European Security and Defence Policy
E.T.A. - Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
et al - et alii, and others
etc. - et cetera, and so forth
et seq - et sequens/sequentes, and following page/pages
EU - European Union 
EUF - European Union Forces
EUFOR - European Union`s Military Force
EUFOR RD Congo - European Union Force Democratic Republic of Congo
EUFOR Tchad/RCA - European Union Force Chad/Central African Republic
EUJUST THEMIS - EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia
EULEX - European Union Rule of Law Mission
EULEX KOSOVO - EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EUMM - European Union Monitoring Mission
EUNAVOR - European Union-led naval force
EUPM - European Union Police Mission
EUPOL - European Union Police Mission
EUPOL AFGHANISTAN - European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan
EUPOL Kinshasa - European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa
EUPOL Proxima - European Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
EU SSR - European Union Security Sector Reform
FRs - fundamental rights
FRY - Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FSJ - Area of Freedom Security and Justice
FTA - Free Trade Agreement
FYROM - Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
iii
GATT - General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GC - General Court
GOI - Government of Indonesia
ibid - ibidem, in the same location
ICC - International Criminal Court
ICCPR - International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICJ - International Court of Justice
id - idem, same author
IDA - International Dairy Arrangement
IHL - international humanitarian law
JHA - Justice and Home Affairs
MLA - mutual legal assistance
MONUC - United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
n (or fn) - footnote
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
no(s) - numbers
OECD - Organization for Economic Co-operation and development
OMPI - Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d'Iran 
PA - Partnership Agreement
para/paras - paragraph(s)
PJCC - Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters
PNR - Passenger Name Records
PNR I Agreement - Agreement between the European Community and the United States of 
America on the processing and transfer of PNR data by air carriers to the United States 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
PNR II Agreement - Following the ECJ judgment, the agreement was adopted under rules of the 
previous second and third pillars
RCA - Central African Republic
SIS - Schengen Information System
SOFA - Status of Forces Agreement
SOMA - Status of Mission Agreement
TEC - Treaty Establishing the European Community
TEU - Treaty on European Union
TFEU - Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
iv
TFTP - Terrorist Finance Tracking Program
TL - Treaty of Lisbon
TRIPs - Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
UK - United Kingdom
UNCLOS - United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
US - United States of America
VCLT - Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
vs. - versus, against
WTO - World Trade Organisation
Publications
AdV - Archiv des Völkerrechts
A.F.D.I. - Annuaire Français de Droit International
AJIL - American Journal of International Law
CJEL - Columbia Journal of European Law
CLJ - Cambridge Law Journal
C.L.S. Rev. - Computer Law & Security Review
CMLR - Common Market Law Review
Crim.L.F. - Criminal Law Forum
CUP - Cambridge University Press
DS - Recueil Dalloz Sirey
ECR - European Court Reports
Edward Elgar - Edward Elgar Publishing
E.F.A.Rev. - European Foreign Affairs Review 
EHRLR - European Human Rights Law Review
EHRR - European Human Rights Reports
E.J.I.L. - European Journal of International Law
ELJ - European Law Journal
ELRev. - European Law Review
EPL - European Public Law
ERA - ERA Forum
EuConst - European Constitutional Law Review
Eur.J.Migration&L - European Journal of Migration and Law
vEuropaR - Europarecht
Hart - Hart Publishing
HRL Rev. - Human Rights Law Review
ICLQ - International & Comparative Law Quarterly
ICON - International Journal of Constitutional Law
Int Economic Law - Journal of International Economic Law
IOLR - International Organizations Law Review
J.C.&S.L. - Journal of Conflict and Security Law
JCMS - Journal of Common Market Studies
JDE - Journal de droit européen
JECL - Journal of European Criminal Law
J.I.E.L. - Journal of International Economic Law
JLS - Journal of Legal Studies
JWT - Journal of World Trade
L.I.E.I. - Legal Issues of Economic Integration
Millenium J.Int'l Stud. - Millennium: Journal of International Studies
NQHR - Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights
NYIL - Netherlands Yearbook of International Law
OJ - Official Journal (EU)
OJLS - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
OUP - Oxford University Press
Publius - Publius: The Journal of Federalism
RIW - Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft
RMCUE - Revue du marché commun et de l'Union européenne
RTD eur. - Revue trimestrielle de droit européen
TMC - TMC Asser Press
YEL - Yearbook of European Law
ZaöRV - Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht
ZeuS - Zeitschrift für Europarechtliche Studien
ZöR - Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht
vi
Statement of Copyright
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without 
the author's prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.
vii
Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude and special thanks to my principal
supervisor, Professor Robert Schütze, for the continued support offered to me. I truly feel privileged
to have had a supervisor dedicating so much of his time and enthusiasm to the project.
Furthermore,  I  would  like  to  thank  my  second  supervisor,  Professor  Eleanor  Spaventa,  for
comments,  suggestions and constructive discussions,  which have been invaluable throughout  the
process of writing this dissertation.
I would also like to acknowledge the financial support of Durham University. In particular, the award
of the Doctoral Fellowship has enabled me to undertake the research for this project.
Durham Law School gave me a chance to be involved in teaching. This has provided me with the
necessary experience, which I would not have otherwise. I am very grateful for that.
In  addition,  I  am  indebted  to  many  friends  and  colleagues  for  their  valuable  support  and
encouragement.
Last, but certainly not least, I would also like to extend my appreciation and thanks to my family for
their love and unconditional support.
viii
Table of Cases
Court of Justice: Cases (numerical)
Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands 
Inland Revenue Administration EU:C:1963:1, [1963] ECR 1
Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L. EU:C:1964:66, [1964] ECR 585
Case 22/70 Commission v Council (European Road Transport Agreement) EU:C:1971:32, 
[1971] ECR 263
Joined Cases 21- 24/72 International Fruit Company NV and Others v Produktschap voor Groenten
en Fruit EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219
Case 9/73 Carl Schlüter v Hauptzollamt Lörrach EU:C:1973:110, [1973] ECR 1135 
Case 181/73 R. & V. Haegeman v Belgian State EU:C:1974:41, [1974] ECR 449 
Case 41/74 Yvonne van Duyn v Home Office EU:C:1974:133, [1974] ECR 1337 
Case 87/75 Conceria Daniele Bresciani v Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze 
EU:C:1976:18, [1976] ECR 129 
Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA EU:C:1978:49, 
[1978] ECR 629 
Case 148/78 Criminal proceedings against Tullio Ratti EU:C:1979:110, [1979] ECR 1629 
Case 270/80 Polydor Limited and RSO Records Inc. v Harlequin Records Shops Limited and 
Simons Records Limited EU:C:1982:43, [1982] ECR 329 
Case 17/81 Pabst & Richarz KG v Hauptzollamt Oldenburg EU:C:1982:129, [1982] ECR 1331 
Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, 
[1982] ECR 3641 
Case 266/81 Società Italiana per l'Oleodotto Transalpino (SIOT) v Ministero delle finanze, 
Ministero della marina mercantile, Circoscrizione doganale di Trieste and Ente autonomo 
del porto di Trieste EU:C:1983:77, [1983] ECR 731 
Joined Cases 267/81, 268/81 and 269/81 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Società 
Petrolifera Italiana SpA (SPI) and SpA Michelin Italiana (SAMI) EU:C:1983:78, 
[1983] ECR 801 
ix
Case 253/83 Sektkellerei C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. v Hauptzollamt Mainz EU:C:1985:8, 
[1985] ECR 157 
Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost EU:C:1987:452, [1987] ECR 4199 
Case 12/86 Meryem Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd EU:C:1987:400, [1987] ECR 3719 
Case 80/86 Criminal proceedings against Kolpinghuis Nijmegen BV EU:C:1987:431, 
[1987] ECR 3969 
Case 70/87 Fédération de l'industrie de l'huilerie de la CEE (Fediol) v Commission 
EU:C:1989:254, [1989] ECR 1781 
Case 30/88 Greece v Commission EU:C:1989:422, [1989] ECR 3711 
Case C-69/89 Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council EU:C:1991:186, [1991] ECR I-2069 
Case C-192/89 S. Z. Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie EU:C:1990:322, [1990] ECR I-3461 
Case C-234/89 Stergios Delimitis v Henninger Bräu AG EU:C:1991:91, [1991] ECR I-935 
Case C-18/90 Office national de l'emploi v Bahia Kziber EU:C:1991:36, [1991] ECR I-199 
Case C-163/90 Administration des Douanes et Droits Indirects v Léopold Legros and Others 
EU:C:1992:326, [1992] ECR I-4625 
Case C-286/90 Anklagemyndigheden v Peter Michael Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp 
EU:C:1992:453, [1992] ECR I-6019 
Case C-207/91 Eurim-Pharm GmbH v Bundesgesundheitsamt EU:C:1993:278, [1993] ECR I-3723 
Case C-237/91 Kazim Kus v Landeshauptstadt Wiesbaden EU:C:1992:527, [1992] ECR I-6781
Case C-312/91 Metalsa Srl. EU:C:1993:279, [1993] ECR I-3751 
Case C-327/91 France v Commission EU:C:1994:305, [1994] ECR I-3641
Case C-405/92 Etablissements Armand Mondiet SA v Armement Islais SARL EU:C:1993:906, 
[1993] ECR I-6133 
Case C-432/92 The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte S. P. Anastasiou 
(Pissouri) Ltd and Others EU:C:1994:277, [1994] ECR I-3087 
Case C-58/93 Zoubir Yousfi v Belgian State EU:C:1994:160, [1994] ECR I-1353 
Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973 
Case C-355/93 Hayriye Eroglu v Land Baden-Württemberg EU:C:1994:369, [1994] ECR I-5113 
Case C-360/93 Parliament v Council EU:C:1996:84, [1996] ECR I-1195 
Case C-434/93 Ahmet Bozkurt v Staatssecretaris van Justitie EU:C:1995:168, [1995] ECR I-1475 
Case C-469/93 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Chiquita Italia SpA EU:C:1995:435, 
[1995] ECR I-4533 
xCase C-61/94 Commission v Germany (International Dairy Arrangement) EU:C:1996:313, 
[1996] ECR I-3989 
Case C-268/94 Portugal v Council EU:C:1996:461, [1996] ECR I-6177 
Case C-277/94 Z. Taflan-Met, S. Altun-Baser, E. Andal-Bugdayci v Bestuur van de Sociale 
Verzekeringsbank and O. Akol v Bestuur van de Nieuwe Algemene Bedrijfsvereniging 
EU:C:1996:315, [1996] ECR I-4085 
Joined Cases C-114/95 and C-115/95 Texaco A/S v Middelfart Havn and Others EU:C:1997:371, 
[1997] ECR I-4263 
Case C-122/95 Germany v Council EU:C:1998:94, [1998] ECR I-973 
Case C-126/95 A. Hallouzi-Choho v Bestuur van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank EU:C:1996:368, 
[1996] ECR I-4807 
Case C-168/95 Criminal proceedings against Luciano Arcaro EU:C:1996:363, [1996] ECR I-4705 
Case C-171/95 Recep Tetik v Land Berlin EU:C:1997:31, [1997] ECR I-329 
Case C-285/95 Suat Kol v Land Berlin EU:C:1997:280, [1997] ECR I-3069 
Case C-351/95 Selma Kadiman v Freistaat Bayern EU:C:1997:205, [1997] ECR I-2133 
Case C-386/95 Süleyman Eker v Land Baden-Württemberg EU:C:1997:257, [1997] ECR I-2697 
Case C-36/96 Faik Günaydin, Hatice Günaydin, Günes Günaydin and Seda Günaydin v Freistaat 
Bayern EU:C:1997:445, [1997] ECR I-5143
Case C-53/96 Hermès International (a partnership limited by shares) v FHT Marketing Choice BV 
EU:C:1998:292, [1998] ECR I-3603 
Case C-98/96 Kasim Ertanir v Land Hessen EU:C:1997:446, [1997] ECR I-5179 
Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395 
Case C-162/96 A. Racke GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Mainz EU:C:1998:293, [1998] ECR I-3655 
Case C-170/96 Commission v Council EU:C:1998:219, [1998] ECR I-2763 
Case C-262/96 Sema Sürül v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit EU:C:1999:228, [1999] ECR I-2685 
Case C-416/96 Nour Eddline El-Yassini v Secretary of State for Home Department EU:C:1999:107, 
[1999] ECR I- 1209 
Case C-1/97 Mehmet Birden v Stadtgemeinde Bremen EU:C:1998:568, [1998] ECR I-7747 
Case C-2/97 Società italiana petroli SpA (IP) v Borsana Srl EU:C:1998:613, [1998] ECR I-8597 
Case C-104/97 P Atlanta AG and Others v Commission and Council EU:C:1999:498, 
[1999] ECR I- 6983
Case C-189/97 Parliament v Council EU:C:1999:366, [1999] ECR I-4741 
xi
Case C-210/97 Haydar Akman v Oberkreisdirektor des Rheinisch-Bergischen-Kreises 
EU:C:1998:555, [1998] ECR I-7519 
Case C-301/97 Netherlands v Council EU:C:2001:621, [2001] ECR I-8853 
Case C-321/97 Ulla-Brith Andersson and Susannne Wåkerås-Andersson v Svenska staten (Swedish 
State) EU:C:1999:307, [1999] ECR I-3551 
Case C-329/97 Sezgin Ergat v Stadt Ulm EU:C:2000:133, [2000] ECR I-1487 
Case C-340/97 Ömer Nazli, Caglar Nazli and Melike Nazli v Stadt Nürnberg EU:C:2000:77, 
[2000] ECR I-957 
Case C-36/98 Spain v Council EU:C:2001:64, [2001] ECR I-779 
Case C-37/98 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Abdulnasir Savas 
EU:C:2000:224, [2000] ECR I-2927 
Case C-65/98 Safet Eyüp v Landesgeschäftsstelle des Arbeitsmarktservice Vorarlberg 
EU:C:2000:336, [2000] ECR I-4747
Joined Cases C-102/98 and C-211/98 Ibrahim Kocak v Landesversicherungsanstalt Oberfranken 
und Mittelfranken (C-102/98) and Ramazan Örs v Bundesknappschaft (C-211/98) 
EU:C:2000:119, [2000] ECR I-1287 
Case C-179/98 Belgian State v Fatna Mesbah EU:C:1999:549, [1999] ECR I-7955 
Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98 Parfums Christian Dior SA v TUK Consultancy BV and Assco
Gerüste GmbH and Rob van Dijk v Wilhelm Layher GmbH & Co. KG and Layher BV 
EU:C:2000:688, [2000] ECR I-11307 
Case C-343/98 Renato Collino and Luisella Chiappero v Telecom Italia SpA EU:C:2000:441, 
[2000] ECR I-6659 
Case C-377/98 Netherlands v Parliament and Council EU:C:2001:523, [2001] ECR I-7079 
Case C-63/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Wieslaw 
Gloszczuk and Elzbieta Gloszczuk EU:C:2001:488, [2001] ECR I-6369 
Case C-89/99 Schieving-Nijstad vof and Others v Robert Groeneveld EU:C:2001:438, 
[2001] ECR I-5851
Case C-235/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Eleanora 
Ivanova Kondova EU:C:2001:489, [2001] ECR I-6427 
Case C-257/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Julius Barkoci 
and Marcel Malik EU:C:2001:491, [2001] ECR I-6557 
Case C-268/99 Aldona Malgorzata Jany and Others v Staatssecretaris van Justitie 
EU:C:2001:616, [2001] ECR I- 8615 
xii
Case C-307/99 OGT Fruchthandelsgesellschaft mbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen 
EU:C:2001:228, [2001] ECR I-3159 
Case C-13/00 Commission v Ireland (Berne Convention) EU:C:2002:184, [2002] ECR I-2943 
Joined Cases C-27/00 and C-122/00 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport 
and the Regions, ex parte Omega Air Ltd (C-27/00) and Omega Air Ltd , Aero Engines 
Ireland Ltd and Omega Aviation Services Ltd v Irish Aviation Authority EU:C:2002:161, 
[2002] ECR I-2569 
Case C-76/00 P Petrotub SA and Republica SA v Council EU:C:2003:4, [2003] ECR I-79 
Case C-162/00 Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Beata Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer EU:C:2002:57, 
[2002] ECR I-1049 
Case C-188/00 Bülent Kurz, né Yüce v Land Baden-Württemberg EU:C:2002:694, 
[2002] ECR I-10691 
Case C-438/00 Deutscher Handballbund eV v Maros Kolpak EU:C:2003:255, [2003] ECR I-4135 
Case C-171/01 Wählergruppe "Gemeinsam Zajedno/Birlikte Alternative und Grüne 
GewerkschafterInnen/UG", and Bundesminister für Wirtschaft und Arbeit and Others 
EU:C:2003:260, [2003] ECR I-4301 
Case C-211/01 Commission v Council EU:C:2003:452, [2003] ECR I-8913 
Case C-281/01 Commission v Council EU:C:2002:761, [2002] ECR I-12049 
Joined Cases C-317/01 and C-369/01 Eran Abatay and Others (C-317/01) and Nadi Sahin 
(C- 369/01) v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit EU:C:2003:572, [2003] ECR I-12301 
Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Bernhard Pfeiffer (C-397/01), Wilhelm Roith (C-398/01), 
Albert Süß (C-399/01), Michael Winter (C-400/01), Klaus Nestvogel (C-401/01), Roswitha 
Zeller (C-402/01) and Matthias Döbele (C-403/01) v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband 
Waldshut eV EU:C:2004:584, [2004] ECR I-8835 
Case C-491/01 The Queen v Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco 
(Investments) Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd EU:C:2002:741, [2002] ECR I-11453 
Case C-23/02 Office national de l'emploi v Mohamed Alami EU:C:2003:89, [2003] ECR I-1399 
Case C-93/02 P Biret International SA v Council EU:C:2003:517, [2003] ECR I-10497 
Case C-275/02 Engin Ayaz v Land Baden-Württemberg EU:C:2004:570, [2004] ECR I-8765 
Case C-327/02 Lili Georgieva Panayotova and Others v Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en 
Integratie EU:C:2004:718, [2004] ECR I-11055 
Case C-373/02 Sakir Öztürk v Pensionsversicherungsanstalt der Arbeiter EU:C:2004:232, 
[2004] ECR I-3605 
Case C-377/02 Léon Van Parys NV v Belgisch Interventie- en Restitutiebureau (BIRB) 
xiii
EU:C:2005:121, [2005] ECR I-1465
Joined Cases C-387/02, C-391/02 and C-403/02 Criminal proceedings against Silvio Berlusconi 
(C-387/02), Sergio Adelchi (C-391/02) and Marcello Dell'Utri and Others (C-403/02) 
EU:C:2005:270, [2005] ECR I-3565 
Case C-467/02 Inan Cetinkaya v Land Baden-Württemberg EU:C:2004:708, [2004] ECR I-10895 
Case C-94/03 Commission v Council EU:C:2006:2, [2006] ECR I-1
Case C-105/03 Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino EU:C:2005:386, [2005] ECR I-5285 
Case C-136/03 Georg Dörr v Sicherheitsdirektion für das Bundesland Kärnten and Ibrahim Ünal v 
Sicherheitsdirektion für das Bundesland Vorarlberg EU:C:2005:340, [2005] ECR I-4759 
Case C-176/03 Commission v Council EU:C:2005:542, [2005] ECR I-7879 
Case C-230/03 Mehmet Sedef v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg EU:C:2006:5, [2006] ECR I-157 
Case C-239/03 Commission v France (Étang de Berre) EU:C:2004:598, [2004] ECR I-9325 
Case C-265/03 Igor Simutenkov v Ministerio de Educación y Cultura and Real Federación 
Española de Fútbol EU:C:2005:213, [2005] ECR I-2579 
Case C-350/03 Elisabeth Schulte and Wolfgang Schulte v Deutsche Bausparkasse Badenia AG 
EU:C:2005:637, [2005] ECR I-9215 
Case C-374/03 Gaye Gürol v Bezirksregierung Köln EU:C:2005:435, [2005] ECR I-6199 
Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland EU:C:2006:345, [2006] ECR I-4635 
Case C-142/04 Maria Aslanidou v Ypourgos Ygeias & Pronoias EU:C:2005:473, 
[2005] ECR I-7181 
Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04 Parliament v Council (C-317/04) and Commission 
(C- 318/04) (PNR) EU:C:2006:346, [2006] ECR I-4721 
Case C-344/04 The Queen, on the application of International Air Transport Association and 
European Low Fares Airline Association v Department for Transport EU:C:2006:10, 
[2006] ECR I-403 
Case C-351/04 Ikea Wholesale Ltd v Commissioners of Customs & Excise EU:C:2007:547, 
[2007] ECR I-7723 
Case C-354/04 P Gestoras Pro Amnistía, Juan Mari Olano Olano and Julen Zelarain Errasti v 
Council EU:C:2007:115, [2007] ECR I-1579 
Case C-355/04 P Segi, Araitz Zubimendi Izaga and Aritza Galarraga v Council EU:C:2007:116, 
[2007] ECR I-1657 
Case C-502/04 Ergün Torun v Stadt Augsburg EU:C:2006:112, [2006] ECR I-1563 
Case C-91/05 Commission v Council (ECOWAS) EU:C:2008:288, [2008] ECR I-3651 
xiv
Case C-97/05 Mohamed Gattoussi v Stadt Rüsselsheim EU:C:2006:780, [2006] ECR I-11917 
Case C-150/05 Jean Leon Van Straaten v Staat der Nederlanden and Republiek Italië 
EU:C:2006:614, [2006] ECR I- 9327 
Case C-321/05 Hans Markus Kofoed v Skatteministeriet EU:C:2007:408, [2007] ECR I-5795 
Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council and Commission EU:C:2008:461, [2008] ECR I-6351 
Case C-431/05 Merck Genéricos - Produtos Farmacêuticos Ldª v Merck & Co. Inc. and Merck 
Sharp & Dohme Ldª EU:C:2007:496, [2007] ECR I-7001 
Case C-440/05 Commission v Council EU:C:2007:625, [2007] ECR I-9097 
Joined Cases C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P Fabbrica italiana accumulatori motocarri Montecchio 
SpA (FIAMM) and Fabbrica italiana accumulatori motocarri Montecchio Technologies 
LLC (C-120/06 P), Giorgio Fedon & Figli SpA and Fedon America, Inc. (C-121/06 P) v 
Council and Commission EU:C:2008:476, [2008] ECR I-6513 
Case C-308/06 The Queen, on the application of International Association of Independent Tanker 
Owners (Intertanko) and Others v Secretary of State for Transport EU:C:2008:312, 
[2008] ECR I-4057 
Case C-386/08 Firma Brita GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen EU:C:2010:91, 
[2010] ECR I-1289 
Case C-240/09 Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK v Ministerstvo životného prostredia Slovenskej 
republiky EU:C:2011:125, [2011] ECR I-1255 
Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America and Others v Secretary of State for Energy 
and Climate Change EU:C:2011:864, [2011] ECR I-13755
Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Commission and Others v Yassin Abdullah 
Kadi EU:C:2013:518
Case C-658/11 Parliament v Council (EU-Mauritius Agreement) EU:C:2014:2025
Joined Cases C-401/12 P, C-402/12 P and C-403/12 P Council and Others v Vereniging 
Milieudefensie and Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht EU:C:2015:4
Joined Cases C-404/12 P and C-405/12 P Council and Commission v Stichting Natuur en Milieu 
and Pesticide Action Network Europe EU:C:2015:5
Case C-306/13 LVP NV v Belgische Staat EU:C:2014:2465
xv
Court of Justice: Opinions (numerical)
Opinion 1/75 (Local Cost Standard) EU:C:1975:145, [1975] ECR 1355 
Opinion 1/76 (European laying-up fund) EU:C:1977:63, [1977] ECR 741 
Opinion 1/78 (Natural Rubber Agreement) EU:C:1979:224, [1979] ECR 2871
Opinion 1/91 (EEA Draft Agreement) EU:C:1991:490, [1991] ECR I-6079 
Opinion 2/91 (ILO Convention 170) EU:C:1993:106, [1993] ECR I-1061 
Opinion 1/92 (EFTA Agreement II) EU:C:1992:189, [1992] ECR I-2821 
Opinion 2/92 (Third Revised OECD Decision) EU:C:1995:83, [1995] ECR I-521 
Opinion 1/94 (WTO Agreement) EU:C:1994:384, [1994] ECR I-5267 
Opinion 2/94 (Accession of the Community to the ECHR) EU:C:1996:140, [1996] ECR I-1759 
Opinion 3/94 (Banana Framework Agreement) EU:C:1995:436, [1995] ECR I-4577 
Opinion 1/00 (European Common Aviation Area) EU:C:2002:231, [2002] ECR I-3493 
Opinion 2/00 (Cartagena Protocol) EU:C:2001:664, [2001] ECR I-9713 
Opinion 1/03 (Lugano Convention) EU:C:2006:81, [2006] ECR I-1145 
Opinion 1/08 (General Agreement on Trade in Services) EU:C:2009:739, [2009] ECR I-11129 
Opinion 1/09 (European Patent Court) EU:C:2011:123, [2011] ECR I-1137 
Opinion 2/13 (Accession of the European Union to the ECHR) EU:C:2014:2454
General Court: Cases (numerical)
Case T-115/94 Opel Austria GmbH v Council EU:T:1997:3, [1997] ECR II-39
Case T-174/00 Biret International SA v Council EU:T:2002:2, [2002] ECR II-17 
Case T-19/01 Chiquita Brands International Inc v Commission EU:T:2005:31, [2005] ECR II-315 
Case T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council and Commission EU:T:2005:332, 
[2005] ECR II- 3649 
Case T-338/02 Segi and Others v Council EU:T:2004:171, [2004] ECR II-1647 
Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d'Iran v Council EU:T:2006:384, 
[2006] ECR II-4665 
Case T-85/09 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Commission EU:T:2010:418, [2010] ECR II-5177 
xvi
Other jurisdictions
European Court of Human Rights
Application no. 14038/88 Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439
National Courts
German Constitutional Court
Brunner v European Union Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR 57 (Maastricht)
2 BvE 2/08 Gauweiler v Treaty of Lisbon (Judgment of 30 June 2009)
United States Supreme Court
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)
Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829)
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)
General Introduction
  GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
A.  Setting the problem
In  recent  years  the  European  Union  (EU)  has  entered  into  an  increasing  number  of
international  agreements.  Due  to  lack  of  parliamentary  and  judicial  scrutiny,  EU
international agreements raise serious human rights concerns. This may be illustrated by
reference to the agreements on extradition/mutual legal assistance between the EU-US,1
the treaty on the transfer of Passenger-Name-Record data to Homeland Security2 or the
agreement  on  the  transfer  of  persons  suspected of  piracy  off  the  Somali  coast.3 The
framework is complex:4 following the de-pillaristaion of the Treaty of Lisbon (TL), and
the  assimilation  of  Police  and  Judicial  Co-operation  in  Criminal  Matters  to  the
“Community” model of the former first pillar, the acquis that has been built up under
Police  and  Judicial  Co-operation  in  Criminal  Matters  merges  with  that  of  the
1  Agreements on mutual legal assistance between the European Union and the United States of
America  [2003] OJ L181/34 and on extradition  between the  European Union and the United
States of America [2003] OJ L181/27.
2  Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and
transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) (2007 PNR Agreement) [2007] OJ L204/18.
3  Exchange  of  Letters  between  the  European  Union  and  the  Government  of  Kenya  on  the
conditions and modalities for the transfer of persons suspected of having committed acts of piracy
and detained by the European Union-led naval force (EUNAVFOR), and seized property in the
possession  of  EUNAVFOR,  from EUNAVFOR  to  Kenya  and  for  their  treatment  after  such
transfer [2009] OJ L79/49 and the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of
Croatia on the participation of the Republic of Croatia in the European Union military operation
to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off
the Somali coast (Operation Atalanta) [2009] OJ L202/84.
4  Intergovernmentalism/supranationality  and  consequences  of  international  co-operation  for
individuals, Bernd Meyring, ‘Intergovernmentalism and supranationality: two stereotypes for a
complex reality’ (1997) 22 ELRev. 221, 242.
1
General Introduction
“Community”, changing the structure of the Treaties,5 and turning Police and Judicial Co-
operation in Criminal  Matters  into an entirely supranational  affair.6 In  contrast  to  the
integration logic (supranational model), decision-making in the area of Common Foreign
and Security Policy is  “subject to specific rules and procedures” (Article 24 TEU),  a
manifestation  of  executive  politics,7 and  remains dominated  by  intergovernmental
elements,8 with the use of an intergovernmental method of cooperation.9
Despite  their  growing  importance,10 EU  agreements  (CFSP and  PJC  (by  now  FSJ)
agreements)  and  their  tendency  to  generate  derogations  from  fundamental  rights
safeguards  have received surprisingly little academic attention.11 Their legal effects are
largely unknown;12 while the amount of studies exploring fundamental rights and Police
and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters has seen an enormous increase in the past
years,13 less academic attention has been paid to the notion of fundamental rights in the
external policies of the European Union.14
5  See, generally, Steve Peers, ‘EU criminal law and the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2008) 33 ELRev. 507
and  id., ‘Finally 'Fit for Purpose'? The Treaty of Lisbon and the End of the Third Pillar Legal
Order’ (2008) 27 YEL 47. 
6  Member States may invoke fundamental aspects of their national systems, e.g. criminal matters
and social security, known as the emergency-brake procedure to accommodate national diversity.
Articles 48, 82 and 83 TFEU and Article 31 TEU. See, generally, Estella Baker and Christopher
Harding, ‘From past imperfect to future perfect? A longitudinal study of the third pillar’ (2009) 34
ELRev. 25, 26 and 44.
7  To a certain extent supranationalised, '(...) A “sellout of the state’s very own competences” is
alleged  to  have  taken  place.  The  Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy  is  alleged  to  be
supranationalised because measures in this area are assigned to the European Union, which is
vested with its own legal personality and is no longer represented on the international level by the
foreign ministers of the Member States but by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy (...)'. 2 BvE 2/08 Gauweiler v Treaty of Lisbon (Judgment of 30 June
2009), para 103.
8  Please note that the abolition of the possibility of constitutional reservations (Article 24 (5) TEU)
challenges the notion of a purely intergovernmental co-operation in CFSP.
9  Paul Craig, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon, process, architecture and substance’ (2008) 33 ELRev. 137,
149; Laurent Pech, ‘ ''A Union Founded on the Rule of Law'': Meaning and Reality of the Rule of
Law as a Constitutional Principle of EU Law’ (2010) 6 EuConst 359, 389.
10  Editorial Comments,  ‘The Union, the Member States and international  agreements’ (2011) 48
CMLR 1 and the synthesis by Christine Kaddous, ‘Effects of International Agreements in the EU
Legal  Order’  in  Marise  Cremona  and  Bruno  de  Witte  (eds),  EU  Foreign  Relations  Law:
Constitutional Fundamentals (Essays in European law, Hart, Oxford 2008) 291.
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The research aims therefore at investigating the institutional and constitutional effects of
EU agreements (CFSP and PJC (by now FSJ) agreements) with a particular focus on their
potential effects on individuals.  This doctoral thesis addresses these issues also having
regard to the developments contained in the TL, it focuses on primary and secondary
sources, including German/French scholarship, and EU and national case law.15
11  The  literature  on  direct  effect  (self-executing  nature)  of  WTO  rules  is  voluminous.  For
comprehensive studies:  Judson Osterhoudt Berkey, ‘The European Court  of  Justice and direct
effect  for  the  GATT: a question  worth  revisiting’ (1998)  9 E.J.I.L.  626-657;  Thomas Cottier,
‘Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization: Characteristics and Structural Implications
for  the  European Union’ (1998) 35 CMLR 325, 367-369; Piet  Eeckhout,  ‘The domestic  legal
status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting legal systems’ (1997) 34 CMLR 11, 29-32; Miquel
Montañá I  Mora, ‘Equilibrium: A Rediscovered Basis for the Court of Justice of the European
Communities to Refuse Direct Effect to the Uruguay Round Agreements?’ (1996) 30 JWT 43-59;
Philp  Lee  and  Brian  Kennedy,  ‘The  Potential  Direct  Effect  of  GATT  1994  in  European
Community Law’ (1996) 30 JWT 67-89; Pieter Jan Kuijper, ‘The New WTO Dispute Settlement
System—The Impact on the European Community’(1995) 29 JWT 49, 62-65.  The problem of
direct effect of EU agreements (CFSP and PJC (by now FSJ) agreements) is  well known, yet
unresolved. For a general analysis (direct effect and interpretation): Robert Schütze, ‘European
Community  and  Union,  Decision-Making  and  Competences  on  International  Law  Issues’ in
Wolfrum, Rüdiger (et al, eds),  Encyclopedia of Public International Law  (OUP, Oxford  2011),
paras  22-23 and id.,  ‘European Community and Union,  Party to  International  Agreements’ in
Wolfrum, Rüdiger (et al, eds),  Encyclopedia of Public International Law  (OUP, Oxford 2011),
paras 36-39. Francis G. Jacobs, ‘Direct effect and interpretation of international agreements in the
recent case law of the European Court of Justice’ in Alan Dashwood and Marc Maresceau (eds),
Law and  practice  of  EU external  relations:  salient  features  of  a  changing  landscape  (CUP,
Cambridge  2008)  13-33  for  a  constitutional  evaluation  that  the  Court  is  favourably  disposed
towards direct effect. In his study, Francis G. Jacobs examines the following cases: Case C-63/99
Gloszczuk  EU:C:2001:488, [2001] ECR I-6369 (Europe Agreement (EA) with Poland);  Case C-
235/99 Kondova EU:C:2001:489, [2001] ECR I-6427 (EA with Bulgaria); Case C-257/99 Barkoci
and Malik  EU:C:2001:491, [2001] ECR I-6557 (EA with the Czech Republic); Case C-268/99
Jany and Others EU:C:2001:616, [2001] ECR I-8615 (EA with Poland and the Czech Republic);
Case C-162/00 Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer EU:C:2002:57, [2002] ECR I-1049 (EA with Poland); Case
C-502/04 Torun EU:C:2006:112, [2006] ECR I-1563 (EEC-Turkey Association);  Case C-265/03
Simutenkov  EU:C:2005:213, [2005] ECR I-2579 (Communities-Russia Partnership Agreement);
Case C-23/02 Alami EU:C:2003:89, [2003] ECR I-1399 (EEC-Morocco Cooperation Agreement);
Case  C-97/05  Gattoussi  EU:C:2006:780,  [2006] ECR  I-11917  (Association  Agreement  with
Tunisia). His analysis relies most heavily on Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer and Simutenkov.
12  Christine Kaddous (n 10) 299 '[t]he legal effects of such agreements are largely unknown because
of the lack of relevant case law. The Court has not rendered rulings similar to those of Haegeman
or  Commission  v  Ireland';  Thym  does  provide  a  useful  insight  when  states  that:  'rechtliche
Parallele besteht nur dahin gehend, dass Verträge der Gemeinschaft und der Union gleichermaßen
ein integrierender Bestandteil der Gemeinschafts- bzw. Unionsrechtsordnung sind [legal parallel
exists only to the extent that agreements concluded by the Community and the Union equally
form  an  integral  part  of  the  Community,  or  Union  legal  order]'  Daniel  Thym,  ‘Die
völkerrechtlichen Verträge der Europäischen Union’ (2006) 66 ZaöRV 863, 900-01.
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13  For a detailed analysis, Steve Peers, ‘Human Rights and the third pillar’ in Philip Alston (ed), The
EU and Human Rights (OUP, Oxford 1999) 167. The question of the bite of fundamental rights –
the institutional scheme of the Treaties and a critical view of the judicial arrangements in pre-
Lisbon's  third  pillar: Eleanor  Spaventa,  ‘Opening  Pandora’s  Box:  Some  Reflections  on  the
Constitutional  Effects  of  the  Decision  in  Pupino’ (2007) 3 EuConst 5,  6-8;  and  Steve  Peers,
‘Salvation outside the Church: Judicial protection in the third Pillar after the  Pupino and  Segi
judgments’ (2007) 44 CMLR 883, 885-902. The status of fundamental rights in EU law, before
and after  Lisbon,  Dorota  Leczykiewicz,  ‘"Effective  judicial  protection"  of  human  rights  after
Lisbon: should national courts be empowered to review EU secondary law?’ (2010)  35 ELRev.
326-348. Fundamental  rights  gap(s)  created by the exercise of  powers  by executives,  Eleanor
Spaventa, ‘Counter-terrorism and Fundamental Rights: judicial challenges and legislative changes
after  the  rulings  in  Kadi and  PMOI’ in  A Antoniadis,  R  Schütze  &  E  Spaventa  (eds),  The
European Union and Global Emergencies:  A Law and Policy Analysis (Hart,  Oxford/Portland
2011) 105-123 with a focus on the EU regimes (both the UN-derived and the EU-own). See,
further,  Alicia Hinarejos, ‘Recent human rights development in the EU courts: the Charter  of
Fundamental Rights, the European Arrest warrant and terror lists’ (2007) 7 HRL Rev. 793, 795-
811.
14  E.g.  Barbara  Brandtner  and  Allan  Rosas,  ‘Human Rights  and  the  External  Relations  of  the
European Community: An Analysis of Doctrine and Practice’ (1998) 9 E.J.I.L. 468, 469. For a
general analysis, Martine Fouwels, ‘The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy
and Human Rights’ (1997) 15 NQHR 291.
15  The selection of languages (English, German, French) mirrors those the author is able to read.
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B.  Incurse
This  Incurse applies a comparative law approach. The United States, like the European
Union, has different types of agreements. It distinguishes in treaties (Article II, s. 2 of the
US Constitution provides that the President has the power by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate to make treaties) and Executive Agreements. Some are made by
joint authority of the President and Congress and some are made on his own authority.
Two main conclusions are drawn. Firstly, treaties with requiring Senate consent (Article
II,  s.  2  of  the  US  Constitution  referred  to  as  “Article  II  treaties”),  'Congressional-
Executive agreements' made by joint authority of the President and Congress and sole
Executive agreements follow same constitutional principles. Secondly, CFSP agreements
are  similar  to  sole  executive  agreements  concluded  by the  executive  branch  and not
submitted to the Senate.
1.  Typology of the existing agreements
Issues  in  treaty-making  are  between  the  President  and  the  Senate  (one  chamber  of
Congress), acting in an executive capacity. For agreements that qualify as 'treaties' the
President  needs  the  consent  of  the  Senate.  International  agreements  exist  in  two
categories:
a) Treaties with requiring Senate consent (Article II, s. 2 of the US Constitution
referred to as “Article II treaties”), and
b) Executive agreements (Congressional-Executive agreements and sole Executive
agreements).
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Treaties with requiring Senate consent; that is, the President can make (bind the US to) the
international agreement if the Senate has consented to it (serves to limit and diffuse the
treaty power).16
Congressional-Executive  agreements;  that  is,  agreements  made  by  the  President  if
authorised (or approved) by both houses of Congress (approval by simple majority of both
houses),  are  available for  wide use.  For  instance,  used regularly  for  trade and postal
agreements.  Congressional-Executive  agreements  give  both  houses  equal  authority  to
advise and consent, thus to veto or modify the agreement. In the case of a treaty made
with Senate consent both houses are obligated to enact required implementing legislation
and to appropriate the necessary funds for implementation.17
Sole  Executive  agreements;  that  is,  the  President  can  make  (bind  the  US to)  some
international  agreements  on  his  own  authority,  without  consent  of  the  Senate.  For
instance, used at least for agreements related to recognition of a foreign government, or
establishing  or  resuming  diplomatic  relations,  or  agreements  to  settle  claims.  Such
agreements do not engage executive responsibility.18 
16  Article 2, Section 2, of the Constitution (that is, the constitutional provision conferring power to
make  international  agreements)  provides:  '[The  President]  shall  have  power,  by and  with the
advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur.'  The  U.S  Constitution  entrusted  making  agreements  with  other  states  –  bilateral  or
multilateral  –  to  the  President  (that  is,  a  principal  Presidential  power  to  make  international
agreements).
17  See  Louis  Henkin,  Constitutionalism,  Democracy,  and  Foreign  Affairs  “Essays  … from the
Cooley lectures delivered at the University of Michigan Law School in November 1988” – Pref.
(Columbia University Press, New York 1990) 60. 
18  See Louis Henkin,  Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution (2nd edn OUP, Oxford
1996) 219-224. As indicated by Henkin, the President's power to make sole executive agreements
is not without limits – Limits are difficult to determine and to state: 'The Supreme Court has not
held any sole executive agreement to be  ultra vires  the President and, as indicated, has upheld
several agreements of particular character, but it has not laid down principles or given general
guidance to define the President's power to act alone' (at 222).
6
General Introduction
2.  Status of International Agreement in the US legal order
a) The place and the effect of treaties in the law of the US
Article VI, clause 2 reads as follows:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be supreme Law of the Land; and
the  Judges  in  every  State  shall  be  bound  thereby,  any  Thing  in  the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Article VI, clause 2 assures the supremacy of treaties to state law. As indicated by Henkin,
treaties and other agreements and arrangements are generally the law of the land; they are
also  subject  to  the  US  Constitution,  a  non-self-executing  promise  is  exceptional.19
Tendencies in the Executive and the courts to interpret treaties and treaty provisions as
non-self-executing run counter to Article VI, clause 2 and the language of Chief Justice
John Marshall  (doctrine  of  the  self-executing treaty).  He wrote  in  his  opinion in  the
Foster & Elam v. Neilson case:
A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a legislative
act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished,
especially  so far  as  its  operation  is  infra-territorial;  but  is  carried  into
execution  by  the  sovereign  power  of  the  respective  parties  to  the
instrument.  In the United Sates a different principle is established. Our
constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently,
to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature,
whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision.
But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of the
parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to
the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute
the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.20
19  Louis Henkin (n 18) 198-204. Henkin discusses the difference between self-executing (that is, a
treaty that 'operates of itself'. Executive and the courts give effect to the treaty without awaiting
Congressional action) and non-self-executing treaties; whether a treaty is self-executing or not, it
is legally binding on the US and it is supreme law of the land (see at 203).
20  Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
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John Marshall read an exception into Article VI, clause 2 in respect of treaties that by their
character cannot be self-executing.21
b) The place and the effect of Congressional-Executive agreements in the law of the 
US
Like treaties, Congressional-Executive agreements are the law of the land, superseding
inconsistent  state  laws  and  inconsistent  provisions  in  earlier  or  other  international
agreements or in acts of Congress.22 Such agreements also eliminate issues about self-
executing and non-self-executing agreements; that is, whether an agreement is in itself
law or is promising to enact law, and about the consequences of inconsistency between
international agreements and statutes.
c) The place and the effect of sole Executive agreements in the law of the US
As Henkin has described, in a sense – and in principle – sole Executive agreements have
been less  controversial  than  agreements  made by joint  authority of  the  President  and
Congress  (Congressional-Executive  agreements).  Issues  arise  only  as  to  whether  a
particular international agreement is within the President's sole authority. For instance,
agreements to settle claims and agreements related to recognition of a foreign government
or  establishing  or  resuming  diplomatic  relations  can  be  concluded  as  sole  Executive
agreements.23
The issue of whether sole Executive agreements, like treaties, are self-executing; that is,
they  can  be  given effect  by  the  courts  and they  do supersede  inconsistent  state  law,
remains unresolved; it has been argued that “check by the Senate” is no compelling reason
for  giving less  effect  to  agreements  that  President  has  authority to  make without  the
21  Louis Henkin (n 18) 202.
22  Ibid, at 215-218.
23  Ibid, at 219-224.
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Senate.24
d) Limitations on the international obligations which the US has assumed
Over two hundred years, there have been tensions between the President and the Senate
over international agreements.25
The Constitution itself does not prescribe or expressly impose limits on the treaty-power.
Justice Black resolved.
no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or
on any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of
the Constitution. (…) The prohibitions of the Constitution were designed
to apply to all branches of the National Government and they cannot be
nullified by the Executive or by the Executive and the Senate combined.26
It  is  now  settled  case  law  that  treaty-power  is  subject  to  constitutional  limitations,
principally the prohibitions of the Bill of Rights.27
24  Ibid,  at 225.  Henkin  deals  here  with  suggested  limitations  on the  power  to  make executive
agreements  (related  limitations  on  the  status  of  executive  agreements  in  national  law  are
considered at 177, 226-8).
25  Louis Henkin (n 17) 51.
26  Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957).
27  Louis  Henkin  (n  18)  185-189  (that  is,  'Limitations  on  Treaties').  The  role  of  the  Court  in
Constitutional interpretation was firmly established in Marbury v.  Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137,  177-178  (1803).  See  Michael  A.  Genovese,  The  Supreme  Court,  the  Constitution  and
Presidential Power (University Press of America, 1980 Washington) 45-82. Marbury v. Madison
rested on two principles. The first principle which the Court tried to establish was the Court's duty
to  interpret  the  law.  The  second  principle  which  the  Court  tried  to  establish  was  that  the
Constitution was the supreme law of the land, see at 45-51.
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C.  Laying out the structure
The  aim  of  this  dissertation  is  to  investigate  the  institutional  and  legal  effects  of
international agreements. In the first chapter, I start with an analysis of the Court's case
law on direct  effect  of international  agreements (GATT/WTO, free trade associations
with  EFTA  and  with  non-EFTA  countries,  accession  associations,  development
associations and EEA). This part primarily serves the aim of providing an overview. The
Court denied direct effect of the GATT. This is because, GATT-obligations are imprecise
and not 'capable of conferring on citizens of the Community rights which they can invoke
before the courts' (International Fruit Company, para 27). The Court continued to follow
its  approach set  out  in  the  International  Fruit  Company  case  in  Portugal  v  Council.
Portugal v Council has settled the question of the reception of WTO rules within the EC.
Further, in this chapter, I look at the technical aspects of the question of indirect effects –
which will be an Incurse in Chapter 1.
In the second chapter, I then turn to the general issues and practice on EU agreements
(CFSP and  PJC  (by  now  FSJ) agreements).  First  I  consider  the  international  legal
personality of the Union. The Maastricht provisions did not explicitly grant international
legal  personality  to  the  Union.  Neither  did  the  Amsterdam  provisions  nor  the  Nice
provisions. Article 47 TEU makes the legal personality of the European Union explicit
and designates the Union as a contracting party; as such the debate on the question of
whether ex-Article 24 TEU conferred implicitly legal personality to the European Union
becomes  obsolete.  Further,  I  consider the  practice  on  EU  agreements.  I  then  turn
respectively to the direct effects and indirect effects of EU agreements (CFSP and PJC (by
now  FSJ) agreements)  and  will  address  a  vertical  dimension  (vis-à-vis national
legislation). The purpose is to give an overview of arguments against and in favour of
direct effects pre- and post TL. In analysing direct effects two dimensions have to be
distinguished.  The  first  dimension  concerns  CFSP and  individual  enforcement.  The
second dimension is related to FSJ and individual enforcement.  Arguments in favour of
individual enforcement seem less thorough and less elaborated on.
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In the third chapter, I give an overview of the jurisdiction of the Court on EU international
agreements  before  and  after  the  TL reforms  and  consider  the  standard  of  review  in
general. I conclude that, Article 40 TEU is one of the heads of the jurisdiction that the
Court had and now has (on a reformed basis). This could be relevant for giving it ex post
jurisdiction – at least as the competence question is concerned. Article 218 (11) TFEU is a
potentially revolutionary inroad into the CFSP exemption. Article 275 (2) TFEU again is
one of the potentially revolutionary inroads into the CFSP for the Court. The inclusion of
Article 275 (2) TFEU indicates that the Constitution-makers wanted to reinforce judicial
review and this can be taken as a break with the pre-TL status quo.
Purpose  and scope of  the  appendices  is  to  provide  an overview of  the treaty-making
activity of the EU pre-Lisbon. The descriptive repository establishes that a number of EU
agreements incorporate fundamental rights guarantees.
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  CHAPTER I: THE COURT'S CASE LAW ON DIRECT EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS (FREE TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, ACCESSION ASSOCIATIONS, 
DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATIONS AND EEA) AND STATUS OF WTO LAW
A. Introduction
This chapter aims at investigating the symmetries and invariances of the Court's case law
on direct effect in order to suggest a conceptual framework for the recognition or denial
of the possibility of direct effect of international agreements in the EU legal order. The
chapter is divided into five sections. Section 1 examines the concept of direct effect, and
deals  with  the  formula  for  direct  effect.  Section  2  considers  the  Court's  different
approaches  towards the (absence of) direct effect of GATT rules and WTO agreements
and towards the possible direct effect of provisions of free trade associations, accession
associations,  development  associations,  and  of  provisions  of  the  EEA Agreement.1
Section 3 establishes that the 'wording, purpose and nature' component of the two-fold
test for direct effect is a method to interpret the objective intention of the contracting
parties, which is  relevant when considering whether an agreement is capable of having
direct effect. Also, the section establishes that the European Courts distinguish between
relevant  and  irrelevant  parameters  when  interpreting  the  objective  intention  of  the
contracting  parties.  Section  4  suggests  that  only  a  holistic  approach  is  adequate  to
identify the objective intention of the contracting parties, and argues that the Court's case
law on direct effect is a symmetrical phenomenon, as the Court's different approaches on
direct effect can be reconciled. Section 5 turns to the technical aspects of the question of
indirect effects – which is an Incurse in Chapter 1.
1  For  a  recent  contribution  see  Nicolas  Rennuy and Peter  van  Elsuwege,  ‘Integration without
membership and the dynamic development of EU law: United Kingdom v. Council (EEA)’ (2014)
51 CMLR 935-954.
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B. Theoretical framework
1. The concept of direct effect
Before considering the Court's case law on direct effect, the concept of direct effect will
be  explored.  It  is  argued  that  there is  neither  a  nexus  between direct  effect  and the
constitutional situation in each Member State, nor a nexus between direct effect and the
dualistic /vs. monsistic philosophy towards international law. It is, moreover, highlighted
that direct effect and direct applicability are two distinct and different legal concepts.
a)  Constitutional situation in each Member State
At the start, direct effect was established in a monist context (that is, the Dutch Court that
made the reference was operating in a monist country) to ensure uniform application of
Union law:
(…) a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the
States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and
the  subjects of  which  comprise  not  only Member States  but  also their
nationals.
Independently of the legislation of Member States, [Union] law therefore
not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer
upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage. These rights
arise not only where they are expressly granted by the Treaty, but also by
reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way
upon  individuals  as  well  as  upon  the  Member  States  and  upon  the
institutions of the [Union].2
2  Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands
Inland Revenue Administration EU:C:1963:1, [1963] ECR 1.
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Van Gend en Loos seems to indicate that the application of direct effect does not depend
on the constitutional situation in each Member State (monism vs. dualism).3 That has
been cleared by the Court in subsequent case law.
The extension of the concept of direct effect to EU international agreements implies that
there is no nexus between direct effect and the constitutional situation in each Member
State; that is, direct effect applies regardless of national constitutional systems, both in
monistic and dualistic Member States of the European Union.4
b)  The Union's dualistic /vs. monistic philosophy towards international law 
(Haegeman)
The  correlation  between  the  Unions's  dualistic  /vs.  monsistic  philosophy  towards
international law and direct effect needs consideration. In this regard  Haegeman5 may
indicate jurisprudential orientation.6
In the main action, Haegeman, a Belgian wine importer, sought to recover countervailing
charges paid for the import of Greek wine (when Greece was not an EEC member) into
the  Belgium-Luxembourg  Economic  Union.  The  Tribunal  de  Première  Instance  of
3  See, however: Case 87/75 Conceria Daniele Bresciani v Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze
EU:C:1976:3, [1976] ECR 129, Opinion of AG Trabucchi, para 5, who was reluctant to accept,
without  reservation,  the  extension  of  the  concept  of  direct  effect  (Van  Gend  en  Loos)  and
supremacy (ENEL) to any international agreement.
4  For the opposite view: Pieter Jan Kuijper, ‘Epilogue: Symbiosis?’ in Jolande M Prinssen and
Annette Schrauwen (eds), Direct Effect: Rethinking a Classic of EC Legal Doctrine; Proceedings
of the Annual Colloquium of the G. K. van Hogendorp Centre for European Constitutional Studies
(The Hogendorp Papers, Europa Law Publ. Groningen 2002) 255.
5  Under Lisbon pillar three merged with pillar one. Please note, however, that Haegeman was a
first pillar case  pre-Lisbon: Case 181/73  Haegeman v Belgian State  EU:C:1974:41,[1974] ECR
449.
6  Transformation and implementation of international agreements are two different legal terms that
need to be distinguished. I. MacLeod, I.D. Hendry and Stephen Hyett The External Relations of
the European Communities: A Manual of Law and Practice (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1996) 128
Haegeman is linked to the term 'transformation'.
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Brussels  asked for  a  preliminary ruling from the  Court.  The Court  was requested to
interpret  certain  provisions  of  the  Association  Agreement  with  Greece  (the  Athens
agreement)  to  which  the  EEC was  then  party.  Further,  the  Court  was  asked  for  an
interpretation on the validity of the countervailing charge7 paid for the import of Greek
wines into Benelux territory.
In Haegeman the Court addressed the question of jurisdiction. It held that:
The Athens agreement was concluded by the Council under Articles 228
and 238 of the Treaty [now Articles 217 and 218 TFEU] as appears from
the terms of the decision dated 25 September 1961.
This agreement is therefore, in so far as concerns the Community, an act
of  one  of  the  institutions  of  the  Community  within  the  meaning  of
subparagraph (b) of the first paragraph of Article 177 [now Article 267
TFEU].
The provisions of the agreement, from the coming into force thereof, form
an integral part of Community law.8
The Athens agreement was concluded by the Council under Articles 217 and 218 TFEU.
This agreement was therefore an act of one of the institutions of the Community within
the meaning of Article 267 TFEU. The Court held that provisions of the agreement, from
the coming into force thereof, constituted an integral part of Community law and the
Court  had  jurisdiction  to  give  preliminary  rulings  concerning  the  interpretation.  In
subsequent judgments the Court has consistently held that the provisions of international 
7  Imposed by Article 9 ( 3 ) of Regulation (EEC) No 816/70 of the Council of 28 April 1970 laying
down additional provisions for the common organisation of the market in wine [1970] OJ L99.
8  Case 181/73 Haegeman v Belgian State EU:C:1974:41, [1974] ECR 449, paras 3-5.
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agreements 'form an integral part of [Union] law'.9
'Integral  part  of  Union  law'10 is  synonymous  with  'part  of  the  EU  legal  order'.11
'Incorporated  into  the  Union's  legal  order'  (Haegeman doctrine)  is  a  necessary  pre-
condition for direct applicability.12 The fact  that an agreement formed integral part13 of
the internal legal order of the European Union 'reveals [however] little as to whether or
not it is capable of conferring rights on individuals';14 hence, there seems to be no nexus
between the dualistic /vs. monistic philosophy towards international law and the question
9  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR
3641,  para  13;  Case 12/86  Demirel  v  Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd EU:C:1987:400,  [1987] ECR
3719, para 7; Case 30/88 Greece v Commission EU:C:1989:422, [1989] ECR 3711, para 12; Case
C-162/96 Racke GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Mainz EU:C:1998:293, [1998] ECR I-3655, para
41; Case C-321/97  Andersson v Svenska staten EU:C:1999:307, [1999] ECR I-3551, para 26;
Case C-459/03  Commission v Ireland EU:C:2006:345,  [2006] ECR I-4635, para 82; Case C-
344/04 The Queen, on the application of International Air Transport Association and European
Low Fares Airline Association v Department for Transport EU:C:2006:10,  [2006] ECR I-403,
para 36; Case C-431/05 Merck Genéricos - Produtos Farmacêuticos Ldª v Merck & Co. Inc. and
Merck Sharp & Dohme Ldª EU:C:2007:496, [2007] ECR I-7001, para 31.
10  There is a debate on whether the Court adopted a dualistic /or a monsistic philosophy towards
international law, e.g. Jacques H.J. Bourgeois  Trade Law Experienced: Pottering about in the
GATT and WTO (Cameron May, London 2005) 171–172. Jacques Bourgeois argues that the Court
adopted from  Haegeman (Case 181/73  Haegeman v Belgian State EU:C:1974:41, [1974] ECR
449) to Racke (Case C-162/96 Racke GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Mainz EU:C:1998:293, [1998]
ECR I-3655) a monistic approach.  In the same vein, Robert Schütze, ‘On 'Middle Ground' The
European Community and Public International Law’ (2007) EUI Working Paper No. 2007/13.
11  Further there is a debate in literature on what 'integral part' means (monism vs. dualism): Olivier
Jacot-Guillarmod  Droit  communautaire  et  droit  international  public:  Etudes  des  sources
internationales de l'ordre juridique des Communautés européennes (Georg, Genève 1979) 104–
106 and  Ramses A. Wessel ‘Reconsidering the relationship between international and EU law:
towards a content-based approach?’ in Enzo Cannizzaro, Paolo Palchetti and Ramses A. Wessel
(eds)  International Law as Law of the European Union (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 2011) 7-33
extensively consider the notions of monism and dualism.
12  An international agreement incorporated into the Union's legal  order is,  however,  not  per se
directly  applicable.  Cf. J.A.  Winter,  ‘Direct  Applicability  and  Direct  Effect-Two Distinct  and
Different Concepts in Community Law’ (1972) 9 CMLR 425, 427.
13  Case 181/73 Haegeman v Belgian State EU:C:1974:41, [1974] ECR 449, para 5; Case C-321/97
Andersson v Svenska staten EU:C:1999:307, [1999] ECR I-3551, para 26; Case C-431/05 Merck
Genéricos - Produtos Farmacêuticos Ldª v Merck & Co. Inc. and Merck Sharp & Dohme Ldª
EU:C:2007:496, [2007] ECR I-7001, para 31.
14  Gerhard Bebr, ‘Agreements Concluded by the Community and their Possible Direct Effect: from
International Fruit Company to Kupferberg’ (1983) 20 CMLR 35, 40.
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of direct effect of international agreements.
c)  Direct effect vs. direct applicability
Semantic issues. J.A. Winter has argued that direct effect and direct applicability are two
distinct and different legal concepts:15
As the various notions denote different legal phenomena, it will readily
appear that it is dangerous and unwarranted to use them indiscriminately.
(…) the term “direct applicability” should be reserved for the method of
incorporation (...) . The problem as to when a (...) provision is susceptible
of  receiving  judicial  enforcement  is  best  described  as  the  question  of
“direct effect”.16
The  concept  of  direct  applicability  addresses  the  fundamental  question  of  how  an
international agreement is incorporated into the municipal legal order so as to become
'the law of the land'.17 According to Hinarejos,  the EU meaning of direct applicability
refers to the substance of the legal instrument: whether the measure in question requires
further  legislative  development  to  be  properly  enforced  or  applied,  or  whether  its
contents are detailed enough to make further legislative implementation unnecessary. 18
15  Occasionally, the Court used the terms interchangeably. On direct applicability and direct effect
e.g. Jörg  Gerkrath,  ‘Direct  Effect  in  Germany  and  France;  a  Constitutional  Comparison’ in
Jolande M Prinssen and Annette  Schrauwen (eds),  Direct  Effect:  Rethinking  a Classic of  EC
Legal Doctrine; Proceedings of the Annual Colloquium of the G. K. van Hogendorp Centre for
European Constitutional Studies (The Hogendorp Papers, Europa Law Publ. Groningen 2002)
131–133.
16  J.A. Winter (n 12) 425.
17  Ibid.
18  Alicia  Hinarejos,  ‘On  the  Legal  Effects  of  Framework  Decisions  and  Decisions:  Directly
Applicable,  Directly  Effective,  Self-Executing,  Supreme?’  (2008)  14  ELJ  620,  625.  This
distinction between direct applicability and direct effect has been backed by the Court in its case
law e.g. Case 41/74 van Duyn v Home Office EU:C:1974:133, [1974] ECR 1337.
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The answer to the question if agreements are directly applicable19 is therefore related to
the  issue  of  'transformation/adoption'.20 The  concept  of  direct  effect  addresses,  in
contrast,  the  problem of  the  conditions  under  which  a  private  individual  can invoke
provisions of an international agreement before national courts. Having direct effect is
therefore synonymous to enforceability;21 the concept of direct effect is, thus, separated
from the question of 'transformation/adoption'. The chapter will focus on direct effect as
defined above and will leave the question of direct applicability aside.
2. The formula for direct effect
After having set out the concept of direct effect the section now turns to the formula for
direct  effect.  It  is  settled  case  law  that  a  provision  of  a  free  trade,  accession  or
19  Direct applicability in cases where the agreement is implemented through national  legislation
seems problematic: the direct applicability of international treaties may lead the national courts to
modify  the  scope  of  the  implementing  legislation  by  extending  or  restricting  their  scope  of
application;  any  such  extension  or  restriction  might  affect  the  manner  in  which  the  national
parliament exercises its legislative competences:  Case C-234/89 Stergios Delimitis v Henninger
Bräu AG EU:C:1991:91, [1991] ECR I-935, para 46 (impact of the notion of direct applicability
on the division of powers).
20  On the  domestic  applicability  of  international  treaties  (with  GATT and the  European  Social
Charter  as  examples):  Albert  Bleckmann,  Begriff  und  Kriterien  der  innerstaatlichen
Anwendbarkeit völkerrechtlicher Verträge: Versuch einer allgemeinen Theorie des self-executing
treaty  auf  rechtsvergleichender  Grundlage (Schriften  zum  Öffentlichen  Recht,  Duncker  &
Humblot,  Berlin  1970);  Arnold  Koller,  Die  unmittelbare  Anwendbarkeit  völkerrechtlicher
Verträge  und  des  EWG-Vertrages  im  innerstaatlichen  Bereich (Schweizerische  Beiträge  zum
Europarecht,  Stämpfli,  Bern  1971);  Manfred  Zuleeg,  ‘Die  innerstaatliche  Anwendbarkeit
völkerrechtlicher Verträge am Beispiel des GATT und der europäischen Sozialcharta’ (1975) 35
ZaöRV 341, 341–361.
21  “Enforceability” is broader than the notion of creating rights, and allows to successfully rely upon
provisions, which do not as such create rights. See Sacha Prechal, ‘Does direct effect still matter?’
(2000)  37  CMLR 1050–51.  For  further  discussion,  Thomas  Eilmansberger,  ‘The  relationship
between rights and remedies in EC Law: In search of the missing link’ (2004) 41 CMLR 1199,
1202-06; W. van Gerven, ‘Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures’ (2000) 37 CMLR 501; Matthias
Ruffert, ‘Rights and Remedies in European Community Law: A Comparative View’ (1997) 34
CMLR 307, 312.  See also, for example, Case C-128/92  Banks v British Coal  EU:C:1993:860,
[1994] ECR I-1237, Opinion of AG Van Gerven, para 27. According to Advocate General van
Gerven the 'direct effect' test is whether the provision is 'sufficiently operational in itself to be
applied by a court.' 
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development association agreement must be regarded as being directly effective when,
regard  being  had  to  its  wording  and  the  purpose  and  nature  of  the
agreement  itself,  the  provision  contains  a  clear  and  precise  obligation
which is not subject, in its implementation or effects, to the adoption of
any subsequent measure.22
The Court has therefore adopted a two-fold test which consists of a 'wording, purpose
and nature' component and a 'clear, precise and unconditional' component; the two-tier
test applies to  provisions of free trade, accession or development associations, and to
provisions of GATT/ WTO law.23
22  Cf. Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982]
ECR 3641, paras 22-23 (FTA with Portugal). The quotation stems from:  Case 12/86 Demirel v
Stadt  Schwäbisch  Gmünd EU:C:1987:400, [1987]  ECR  3719,  para  14  (EEC-Turkey  AA).
Confirmed in:  Case C-18/90 Office national de l'emploi v Kziber EU:C:1991:36, [1991] ECR I-
199, para 15 (EEC-Morocco CA); Case C-432/92 The Queen v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries
and Food, ex parte S. P. Anastasiou (Pissouri) Ltd and others  EU:C:1994:277, [1994] ECR I-
3087, para 23 (EEC-Cyprus AA); Case C-162/96  Racke GmbH & Co. v  Hauptzollamt Mainz
EU:C:1998:293, [1998]  ECR I-3655,  para  31 (EEC-Yugoslavia  CA);  Case C-262/96  Sürül  v
Bundesanstalt für Arbeit EU:C:1999:228, [1999] ECR I-2685, para 60  (EEC-Turkey AA); Case
C-416/96  El-Yassini v Secretary of State for Home Department  EU:C:1999:107, [1999] ECR I-
1209, para 25 (EEC-Morocco CA); Case C-37/98 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home
Department,  ex  parte  Abdulnasir  Savas  EU:C:2000:224, [2000]  ECR I-2927,  para  39  (EEC-
Turkey AA);  Case C-63/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte
Gloszczuk EU:C:2001:488, [2001] ECR I-6369, para 30  (EA with Poland); Case C-235/99  The
Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Kondova EU:C:2001:489, [2001]
ECR I-6427, para 31 (EA with Bulgaria); Case C-257/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for the
Home Department, ex parte Barkoci and Malik EU:C:2001:491, [2001] ECR I-6557, para 31 (EA
with  the  Czech  Republic);  Case  C-162/00  Nordrhein-Westfalen  v  Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer
EU:C:2002:57, [2002] ECR I-1049, para 19 (EA with Poland).
23  Joined Cases  21 to 24/72  International Fruit  Company NV and others  v  Produktschap voor
Groenten  en  Fruit  EU:C:1972:115, [1972]  ECR  1219,  para  20;  Case  C-280/93  Germany  v
Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, para 110 (spirit, general scheme and terms of GATT
agreements);  Case C-149/96  Portugal  v Council  EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395,  para 47
(nature and structure of WTO agreements).
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C. Asymmetry (variance) – the Court's different approaches to direct effect
The Court has consistently refused to recognise the direct effect of  GATT rules24 and
WTO agreements.25 The possibility of direct effect was, however, accepted for provisions
of  free  trade  associations,26 accession  associations,27 development  associations28 and
EEA29 agreements.  The  concern  of  this  section  is  the  investigation  of  the  Court's
approach towards direct effect of international agreements.
24  Joined Cases  21 to 24/72  International Fruit  Company NV and others  v  Produktschap voor
Groenten  en  Fruit EU:C:1972:115,  [1972]  ECR  1219,  para  27;  Case  C-280/93  Germany  v
Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, para 110.
25  Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 48.
26  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR
3641, para 26.
27  Case 17/81 Pabst & Richarz KG v Hauptzollamt Oldenburg EU:C:1982:129, [1982] ECR 1331,
paras 25-27; Case C-37/98  The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte
Abdulnasir  Savas EU:C:2000:224,  [2000]  ECR I-2927,  para  54;  Case  C-63/99  The Queen  v
Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Gloszczuk EU:C:2001:488, [2001] ECR I-
6369, para 38; Case C-235/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte
Kondova EU:C:2001:489, [2001] ECR I-6427, para 39; Case C-257/99 The Queen v Secretary of
State for the Home Department, ex parte Barkoci and Malik EU:C:2001:491, [2001] ECR I-6557,
para 39; Case C-268/99 Jany and Others v Staatssecretaris van Justitie EU:C:2001:616, [2001]
ECR  I-8615,  paras  26  and  28;  Case  C-162/00  Nordrhein-Westfalen  v  Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer
EU:C:2002:57,  [2002]  ECR  I-1049,  para  30;  Case  C-438/00  Deutscher  Handballbund  eV  v
Kolpak EU:C:2003:255, [2003] ECR I-4135, para 30; Case C-327/02 Panayotova and Others v
Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie EU:C:2004:718, [2004] ECR I-11055, para 18.
28  Case 87/75 Conceria Daniele Bresciani v Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze EU:C:1976:18,
[1976] ECR  129, para  25;  Case C-18/90  Office  national de l'emploi  v  Kziber  EU:C:1991:36,
[1991] ECR I-199, para 23; Case C-58/93 Yousfi v Belgian State EU:C:1994:160, [1994] ECR I-
1353, paras 16-19;  Case C-469/93  Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Chiquita Italia
EU:C:1995:435, [1995] ECR I-4533, paras 34-35; Case C-126/95 Hallouzi-Choho v Bestuur van
de Sociale  Verzekeringsbank EU:C:1996:368,[1996] ECR I-4807, paras  19-20;  Case C-162/96
Racke GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Mainz EU:C:1998:293, [1998] ECR I-3655, para 34; Case C-
416/96 El-Yassini v Secretary of State for Home Department EU:C:1999:107, [1999] ECR I-1209,
para 32; Case C-179/98 Belgian State v Fatna Mesbah EU:C:1999:549, [1999] ECR I-7955, para
14;  Case  C-265/03  Simutenkov  v  Ministerio  de  Educación  y  Cultura  and  Real  Federación
Española de Fútbol EU:C:2005:213, [2005] ECR I-2579, para 29.
29  Case T-115/94 Opel Austria GmbH v Council EU:T:1997:3, [1997] ECR II-39, paras 100-102.
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1. The (absence of) direct effect of GATT/WTO law in the Community legal order
This section aims to explore the Court of Justice's approach towards the (absence of)
direct effect of GATT and WTO law.  First, spirit, wording and scheme of the  General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947) will be explored. Then, the transition from
GATT 1947 to WTO agreement and GATT 1994 will be ascertained, to deal with the
legal  effects  of  the  provisions  of  the  Agreement  Establishing  the  World  Trade
Organization and of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994).
a)  International Fruit Company line of reasoning (GATT 1947)
In International Fruit Company30 the Court established the legal effects of GATT 1947 in
the legal order of the Community.  In issue was the compatibility of EEC Regulations31
which restricted the import of apples into the Netherlands with Article XI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
In deciding whether the applicant  could rely  on  the  incompatibility  of a Community
measure,  with  a  provision  of  GATT  international  law,  the  Court  held  that  (i)  the
Community must be bound by the provisions of GATT, and (ii) that the provision must
be capable of conferring rights on individuals. The Court found that the Community was
(and is) bound by the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,32 as the
Community had assumed, under the EEC Treaty, the powers previously exercised by the
30  Joined Cases  21 to 24/72 International Fruit  Company NV and others  v Produktschap voor
Groenten en Fruit EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219.
31  Commission Regulations (EEC) Nos 459/70 [1970] OJ L57/20, 565/70 [1970] OJ L69/33 and
686/70 [1970] OJ L84/21, respectively.
32  Before the establishment of the WTO system only the Member States of the Community were
formal GATT contracting parties.
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Member States in the area governed by GATT 1947.33 When the Court considered 'the
spirit,  the  general  scheme  and  the  terms  of  the  General  Agreement'34 to  determine
whether the provisions of the GATT were capable of having direct effect, it found that
the  provisions  of  GATT  are  'special'  in  nature  and  are,  therefore,  not  capable  of
conferring rights on individuals.  The Court  concluded that Article  XI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) could, thus, have no direct effect and could not
be invoked before the national court.35
  Why are provisions of GATT special in nature?
The Court of Justice denied direct effect of GATT and WTO Law due to their special
nature. But why are provisions of GATT special in nature?
GATT 1947 agreements are based on the principle of negotiations undertaken on the
basis  of  'reciprocal  and  mutually  advantageous  arrangements'.  Great  flexibility,  the
possibility of derogation, safeguard measures and the settlement of disputes are features
of the provisions of GATT.36 GATT 1947 agreements are, due to these features, special
and not unconditional in nature.37 A further indication of the special, not unconditional,
nature of GATT decisions is the fact that  (only)  'sympathetic consideration'  has to be
given  to  recommendations  or  proposals  and  contracting  parties  are  empowered  to
33  Reaffirmed in: Case C-280/93  Germany v Council  EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, para
105.
34  Joined Cases  21 to 24/72 International Fruit  Company NV and others  v Produktschap voor
Groenten en Fruit EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219, paras 19 and 20.
35  Joined Cases  21 to 24/72 International Fruit  Company NV and others  v Produktschap voor
Groenten en Fruit EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219, para 27.
36  Joined Cases  21 to 24/72 International Fruit  Company NV and others  v Produktschap voor
Groenten en Fruit EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219, para 21; Joined Cases 267/81, 268/81 and
269/81  Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v SPI and SAMI EU:C:1983:78,[1983] ECR
801, para 23; Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, para 106;
Case C-469/93 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Chiquita Italia SpA EU:C:1995:435,
[1995] ECR I-4533, para 26.
37  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, para 110.
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suspend certain obligations assumed under GATT unilaterally.38 Depending on the case,
the settlement of conflicts includes:
(...)  written  recommendations  or  proposals  which  are  to  be  "given
sympathetic  consideration",  investigations  possibly  followed  by
recommendations, consultations between or decisions of the contracting
parties, including that of authorizing certain contracting parties to suspend
the  application  to  any  others  of  any  obligations  or  concessions  under
GATT and, finally, in the event of such suspension, the power of the party
concerned to withdraw from that agreement. 
(…)  where,  by  reason  of  an  obligation  assumed  under  GATT or  of  a
concession  relating  to  a  preference,  some  producers  suffer  or  are
threatened with  serious  damage,  Article  XIX gives  a  contracting  party
power unilaterally to suspend the obligation and to withdraw or modify
the concession, either after consulting the contracting parties jointly and
failing agreement between the contracting parties concerned, or even, if
the matter is urgent and on a temporary basis, without prior consultation.39
38  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, paras 107 and 108. Cf.
Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-
3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 26 fn 42.
39  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, paras 107 and 108 those
features preclude individuals from invoking provisions of the GATT 47 before the national courts;
and reaffirms as to why the GATT 47 should not be given direct effect.
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Since  International Fruit the Court has consistently held that the provisions of GATT
1947 have no direct effect.40
According to Advocate General  Tesauro  in  Hermès,  the content  of the provision had
never been investigated, in that the Court had not taken steps to ascertain whether the
provision at issue was clear, precise and unconditional, in accordance with the traditional
criteria  the  Court  had  used  in  deciding  whether  or  not  to  attribute  direct  effect  to
measures or to provisions contained in international  agreements.  This is  because,  the
Court  had never gone beyond its  initial  investigation,  which was concerned with the
principal features of the GATT system, with the result that it  had always come down
against direct effect.41
b)  Transition from GATT 1947 to WTO agreement and GATT 1994
The  Agreement  Establishing  the  World  Trade  Organization  and  the  new  General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994) introduced a new system. Thus it has to
be considered whether the  International Fruit Company line of reasoning continues to
apply to provisions of the WTO Agreement and GATT 1994.
  aa) Characteristics of the WTO system
The  flexibility  characterising  all  the  provisions  of  GATT and  the  excessively  loose,
40  Joined Cases  21 to 24/72 International Fruit  Company NV and others  v Produktschap voor
Groenten en Fruit  EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219, paras 19-27;  Case 9/73  Carl Schlüter v
Hauptzollamt  Lörrach EU:C:1973:110,  [1973]  ECR 1135,  paras  28-30;  Case  266/81  SIOT v
Ministero delle finanze, Ministero della marina mercantile,  Circoscrizione doganale di Trieste
and Ente autonomo del porto di Trieste EU:C:1983:77,  [1983] ECR 731, para 28; Joined Cases
267/81,  268/81  and  269/81  Amministrazione  delle  Finanze  dello  Stato  v  SPI  and  SAMI
EU:C:1983:78, [1983] ECR 801, para 26.
41  Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-
3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 26.
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negotiated, mechanism for the settlement of disputes are characteristics attributed to the
old GATT system.42 Waivers, exceptional measures and measures of a similar sort were
'loopholes' in the old GATT system.43 The new WTO system, which has the structure of
an international  organisation,  is  however  different  from GATT 1947:  the  relationship
between rules and exceptions (waivers, exceptional measures etc.) has been reversed and
the  procedural  and substantive  conditions  for  granting waivers  are  now very  strict.44
Moreover, the dispute settlement system45 has improved:
(…) the new GATT 1994 contains a new system for the settlement of
disputes between Members along the lines of the judicial model, which
offers more certainty in the sphere of application of the recommendations
and decisions of the Dispute Settlement Body …46
The reversal of the consensus requirement for approving panel reports in the General
Council has changed the mechanism for the settlement of disputes significantly. In cases
where the panel suggests a solution to the General Council,47 which needs approval, the
veto by the unsuccessful party accused of breaching a WTO provision is no longer able
to block the adoption of panel reports.48
42  Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-
3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 28.
43  Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-
3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 29.
44  Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-
3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 29.
45  The new system for the settlement of disputes is set out in: Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations (1986- 1994) - Annex 2 - Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (WTO) [1994] OJ L336/234.
46  Case C-183/95 Affish BV v Rijksdienst voor de keuring van Vee en Vlees EU:C:1996:480, [1997]
ECR I-4315, Opinion of AG Cosmas, para 119 fn 92.
47  Responsible for dispute settlement: Article IV(3) WTO Agreement.
48  Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-
3603,  Opinion of AG Tesauro,  para 29. On the adoption of panel reports: Article 16 (4) of the
Understanding on the Settlement of Disputes.
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However,  in  terms  of  flexibility  the  possibility  to  modify  or  withdraw commitments
continues  to  be  available.49 Further,  the  possibility  of  adopting  provisional  safeguard
measures  is  maintained50 and there is  still  the  possibility  of  compensation instead of
compliance.51 Pursuant to Article 22 (1) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement)52 compensation
is 'available in the event that the recommendations and rulings [of the dispute settlement
body]  are not implemented within a reasonable period of time'.  There is however the
preference for full implementation of the recommendation of the dispute settlement body
to bring the measure, found to be inconsistent with a WTO agreement, into compliance
with the WTO agreement.53
In  cases  where  the  Member  concerned  fails  to  bring  the  inconsistent  measure  into
compliance with the WTO agreement, within a reasonable period of time, there is the
requirement  to enter into negotiations with a view to developing mutually acceptable
compensation.54 Compensation  and  the  suspension  of  concessions  are  temporary
measures. Temporary instruments are not a method of settling disputes and  shall, said
Advocate  General  Tesauro in  Hermès, therefore,  not  encourage  the  contracting  party
(defaulting party) to persist indefinitely in its failure to comply.55
49  Article  XXI  of  the  General  Agreement  on  Trade  in  Services  (GATTS),  Uruguay  Round  of
Multilateral  Trade Negotiations (1986- 1994) - Annex 1 - Annex 1B - General Agreement on
Trade in Services (WTO) [1994] OJ L336/191.
50  Article 6 of the Agreement on Safeguards, Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(1986- 1994) - Annex 1 - Annex 1A - Agreement on Safeguards (WTO-GATT 1994) [1994] OJ
L336/184. The total period of application of a safeguard measure shall not exceed eight years,
Article 7 (3) of the Agreement on Safeguards.
51  Compensation and the suspension of concessions continue to be available: see Article 22 (1) of
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Annex 2 to the
WTO)  and  Article  22  (2)  for  the  possibility  to  conclude  agreements  on  mutually  acceptable
compensation.
52  Abbreviated: DSU.
53  Article 22 (1) DSU.
54  Article 22 (2) DSU.
55  Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-
3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 29.
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  bb) Different views on the legal effects
After the WTO Agreement had entered into force, Advocate General Cosmas,56 Advocate
General Elmer57 and Advocate General Tesauro58 offered their views on the legal effects
of the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and those
of  the  new  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT 1994).  The  Advocates
General disagreed on whether the  International Fruit  Company line of reasoning had
ceased to apply following the conclusion of the WTO Agreement and GATT 1994.
Advocates General Cosmas and Elmer both argued that the International Fruit Company
line of reasoning continued to apply to provisions of those agreements. Whilst Advocate
General Tesauro argued that provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization are different in nature from GATT 1947 and recommended that the Court
should reconsider its GATT 1947 case law.
In his  Opinion in  Affish Advocate General Cosmas addressed the new system and its
modifications. He highlighted that great flexibility is still a feature of the provisions of
the WTO Agreement and GATT 199459 and argued that 'the weighty reasons which led
the Court to hold that no direct effect could be conferred on GATT 1947 (...) have not
ceased to apply with the conclusion of GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement'60:
56  Case C-183/95 Affish BV v Rijksdienst voor de keuring van Vee en Vlees EU:C:1996:480, [1997]
ECR I-4315, Opinion of AG Cosmas, paras 119-128.
57  Joined Cases  C-364/95 and C-365/95  T. Port  GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas
EU:C:1997:312, [1998] ECR I-1023, Opinion of AG Elmer, paras 27-30.
58  Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-
3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, paras 22-37.
59  Case C-183/95 Affish BV v Rijksdienst voor de keuring van Vee en Vlees EU:C:1996:480, [1997]
ECR I-4315, Opinion of AG Cosmas, para 119.
60  Case C-183/95 Affish BV v Rijksdienst voor de keuring van Vee en Vlees EU:C:1996:480, [1997]
ECR I-4315, Opinion of AG Cosmas, para 127.
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(...) the spirit of negotiations, which characterized the old GATT, is not
altogether absent from the new GATT (…) That spirit of flexibility is (...)
exemplified by Article XX of the Agreement, under which each Member
may set out in a schedule the specific commitments which it undertakes
with regard to market access for services and service suppliers of another
Member (…)61
Moreover, Advocate General Cosmas argued that provisions of the WTO Agreement and
GATT 1994 are not capable of producing direct effect (not sufficiently precise), in his
opinion, most of the provisions of the contested articles were addressed to the Members
of the WTO and although they contained obligations to act or to refrain from acting, they
also required supplementary implementing measures.62
Hence Advocate General Cosmas suggested that provisions of the WTO Agreement and
GATT 1994 are not capable of producing direct effect and recommended a continuation
of the GATT 1947 case law.
Likewise, Advocate General Elmer argued that the International Fruit Company line of
reasoning had not ceased to apply with the conclusion of the WTO Agreement and GATT
1994.63 The Advocate General referred to the eleventh recital in the preamble to Council
Decision 94/800/EC,64 which is worded as follows:
(...)  by  its  nature,  the  Agreement  establishing  the  World  Trade
Organization, including the Annexes thereto, is not susceptible to being
directly invoked in Community or Member State courts.
61  Case C-183/95 Affish BV v Rijksdienst voor de keuring van Vee en Vlees EU:C:1996:480, [1997]
ECR I-4315, Opinion of AG Cosmas, para 119 fn 92.
62  Case C-183/95 Affish BV v Rijksdienst voor de keuring van Vee en Vlees EU:C:1996:480, [1997]
ECR I-4315, Opinion of AG Cosmas, para 120.
63  Joined Cases  C-364/95 and C-365/95  T. Port  GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas
EU:C:1997:312, [1998] ECR I-1023, Opinion of AG Elmer, paras 27-30.
64  Council Decision  94/800 concerning the conclusion on behalf of the European Community, as
regards  matters  within  its  competence,  of  the  agreements  reached  in  the  Uruguay  Round
multilateral negotiations (1986-1994) [1994] OJ L336/1.
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In the light of this recital, Advocate General Elmer argued that the WTO Agreement and
GATT 1994 are not capable of producing direct effect and recommended that the GATT
1947 case law should be transposed to GATT 1994.65
In  contrast  to  the  previous  opinions,  Advocate  General  Tesauro  took  a  different
approach.66 The Advocate General reviewed the GATT 1947 case law on direct effect,
and considered  whether the grounds on which the  International Fruit Company line of
reasoning is based are equally valid.67 The Advocate General argued that scale and scope
of  the  system and  nature  and  effectiveness  of  the  mechanism  for  the  settlement  of
disputes have changed from the GATT 1947 system. Differences that have occurred are
in particular:  the reversed relationship between rules and exceptions (the relationship
between rules and exceptions appears to be functional), the mechanism for the settlement
of  disputes  showed  improvement  in  that  the  results  have  more  binding  force,  strict
substantive and procedural  conditions  for  granting waivers,  and panel  reports,  which
formerly required a consensus in favour in order to be approved by the Council (under
GATT 1947), now require a consensus against acceptance in order to be rejected; that is,
65  Joined Cases  C-364/95 and C-365/95  T. Port  GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas
EU:C:1997:312, [1998] ECR I-1023,  Opinion of AG Elmer,  para 29. Critics have argued that
Advocate General Elmer did not examine the possible reasons for reconsidering the pre-Uruguay
case law, or acknowledged that such reasons existed; e.g. Steve Peers, ‘Constitutional principles
and international trade’ (1999) 24 ELRev. 185, 191 and 192; an issue which has been extensively
discussed – e.g. Judson Osterhoudt Berkey, ‘The European Court of Justice and direct effect for
the GATT: a question worth revisiting’ (1998) 9 E.J.I.L. 626-657 -a thorough exploration of the
legal, political and economic issues involved in analysing the issue of direct effect and attempt to
illustrate  the competing considerations facing the  Court  (that  is,  opposing  views of  Advocate
General  Cosmas and Advocate General  Tesauro) in deciding whether  to grant direct  effect  to
GATT 94; its purpose is not to advocate a particular position.
66  Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-
3603,  Opinion of AG Tesauro, paras 22-37. In issue was the direct effect of a provision of the
TRIPs Agreement.
67  Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-
3603,  Opinion of AG Tesauro,  para 25. In this context the Advocate General could not refrain
from criticising the GATT 1947 case law. In his opinion the characteristics of GATT are not very
different from those provisions of agreements to which the Court has attributed direct effect (para
27).
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previously, the unsuccessful party could block the adoption, now it can not.68 Advocate
General  Tesauro  concluded  that  these  perceptible  differences,  between  provisions  of
GATT 1947 and provisions of the WTO agreements, changed the factors on which the
Court  based  its  decision  that  the  GATT  provisions  are  not  directly  effective
(International Fruit Company line of reasoning). He recommended, therefore, that the
Court should reconsider its GATT 1947 case law.69
  cc) Portugal v Council line of reasoning
After the transition from GATT 1947 to the WTO agreement and GATT 1994 the Court
of Justice has dealt with the legal effects of the new system.
In  Portugal  v  Council,70 Portugal  brought  an action for annulment  against  a  Council
decision  on  the  conclusion  of  Memoranda  of  Understanding  between  the  European
Community  and  Pakistan  and  between  the  European  Community  and  India  on
arrangements  in  the  area  of  market  access  for  textile  products.71 In  its  action  for
annulment Portugal relied on breach of fundamental principles of the Community legal
order  and  on  breach  of  rules  and  fundamental  principles  of  the  WTO.  The  WTO
68  Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-
3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, paras 28-29.
69  Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-
3603,  Opinion of AG Tesauro,  para 30.  This approach is also reflected in literature: Pieter Jan
Kuijper, ‘The New WTO Dispute Settlement System—The Impact on the European Community’
(1995) 29 JWT 49, 63; Miquel Montañá I Mora, ‘Equilibrium: A Rediscovered Basis for the Court
of  Justice  of  the  European  Communities  to  Refuse  Direct  Effect  to  the  Uruguay  Round
Agreements?’ (1996) 30 JWT 43, 51; and Philp Lee and Brian Kennedy, ‘The Potential Direct
Effect of GATT 1994 in European Community Law’(1996) 30 JWT 67, 78. Philp Lee and Brian
Kennedy provide a thorough examination of the changes concerning the provisions relied upon to
deny direct effect in International Fruit.
70  Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395.
71  Council Decision 96/386 concerning the conclusion of Memoranda of Understanding between the
European  Community  and  the  Islamic  Republic  of  Pakistan  and  between  the  European
Community and the Republic of India on arrangements in the area of market access for textile
products [1996] OJ L153/47.
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agreements in issue included GATT 1994, the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing and
the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures.
The Advocate General persuasively argued in his Opinion that the Court has to be careful
to  distinguish  between  the  criteria  for  direct  effect  and  the  general  question  of  an
objective legality review:
(…) in principle, the right to review the legality of a Community act does
not depend on whether the rules invoked as a criterion for determining the
legality of that act have direct effect, in cases where it is claimed that the
Community act infringes rules of international law other than the GATT.
(…)  privileged  persons,  such  as  Member  States,  may  not  invoke  the
provisions of the GATT as a criterion of legality in direct actions (...). It is
not clear why the functioning of an international agreement, as a criterion
of  legality  for  Community  acts,  should  be  subject  to  the  conditions
normally  required,  in  a  specifically  Community  context,  for  the  direct
effect  of  the  provisions  of  international  agreements  concluded  by  the
Community to be recognised. (...) [A]n international agreement, by virtue
of its clear, precise and unconditional terms, can in principle constitute a
criterion of legality for Community acts. This does not mean (…) that a
rule  displaying  those  characteristics  necessarily  confers  on  individuals
rights on which they may rely in actions before the courts. For this result
to  be  achieved (...),  this  is,  for  individuals  to  be entitled  to  rely  on a
provision in an agreement  before the courts,  it  must be implicit  in the
general  context  of  the  agreement  that  its  provisions  may  be  invoked
before the courts. That being so, (...) a provision of an agreement may be
held not to have direct effect but that does not justify failing to recognise
it as binding on the Community institutions and thence excluding it as a
criterion of legality (for the Community).72
The case would therefore not raise the problem of direct effect. The Court did not follow
its Advocate General.
72  Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:92, [1999] ECR I-8395, Opinion of AG Saggio,
para 18.
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Instead the Court confirmed its International Fruit Company line of reasoning,73 when it
held that:
(…) having regard to their nature and structure, the WTO agreements are
not  in  principle  among the  rules  in  the  light  of  which the  Court  is  to
review the legality of measures adopted by the Community institutions.74
This interpretation corresponds, also, with the eleventh recital in the preamble to Council
Decision 94/80075 concerning the conclusion on behalf of the European Community, as
regards matters within its competence, of the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round
multilateral negotiations (1986-1994), according to which 'by its nature, the Agreement
establishing  the  World  Trade  Organisation,  including  the  Annexes  thereto,  is  not
susceptible to being directly invoked in Community or Member State courts.'76
  dd) Grounds for denying direct effect in the case of WTO/ GATT
The (old) GATT 1947 and the WTO agreement and GATT 1994 do not confer rights on
73  Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, paras 34-48.
74  Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574,  [1999] ECR I-8395, para 47, as referred to
by:  Case C-301/97 Netherlands v Council EU:C:2001:621, [2001] ECR I-8853, para 53; Joined
Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98 Parfums Christian Dior SA v TUK Consultancy BV and Assco
Gerüste  GmbH  and  Rob  van  Dijk  v  Wilhelm  Layher  GmbH  &  Co.  KG  and  Layher  BV
EU:C:2000:688,  [2000]  ECR  I-11307,  para  44;  Case  C-377/98  Netherlands  v  European
Parliament  and  Council  EU:C:2001:523, [2001]  ECR  I-7079,  para  52  (the  Rio  de  Janeiro
Convention on Biological  Diversity was contrasted with WTO law); Case C-89/99 Schieving-
Nijstad vof and Others v Robert Groeneveld EU:C:2001:438, [2001] ECR I-5851, para 53; Case
C-307/99 OGT  Fruchthandelsgesellschaft  mbH  v  Hauptzollamt  Hamburg-St.  Annen
EU:C:2001:228, [2001] ECR I-3159, para 24; Joined Cases C-27/00 and C-122/00 The Queen v
Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions, ex parte Omega Air Ltd and
Omega Air Ltd , Aero Engines Ireland Ltd and Omega Aviation Services  Ltd v Irish Aviation
Authority EU:C:2002:161,  [2002]  ECR  I-2569,  para  93;  Case  C-76/00  P Petrotub  SA  and
Republica SA v Council EU:C:2003:4, [2003] ECR I-79, para 53;  Case C-491/01 The Queen v
Secretary of State for Health, ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd and Imperial
Tobacco Ltd EU:C:2002:741, [2002] ECR I-11453, para 154.
75  [1994] OJ L336/1.
76  Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 48.
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citizens: there is no right to rely directly on such provisions.77 There are several grounds
for denying direct effect:
In Portugal v Council the Court argued that although the transition from GATT 1947 to
the  WTO agreement  and  GATT 1994 has  strengthened the  mechanism for  resolving
disputes  and the system of  safeguards,  the  negotiation between the  parties  is  still  of
considerable importance.78
The Court, then, turned to the mechanism of resolving disputes. It argued that in cases
where judicial  organs are required to refrain from applying the rules of national law,
which are inconsistent with the WTO agreements, there would be no possibility to enter
into negotiated arrangements even on a temporary basis. The requirement to refrain from
applying the rules of national law, which are inconsistent with the WTO agreements,
would therefore render the possibility of entering into negotiated arrangements, afforded
by Article 22 DSU, inapplicable.79
Moreover,  the Court  addressed  the possibility of  disuniform application of the WTO
rules. This issue has already been addressed by Advocate General Tesauro in Hermès.80
77  The Court has attracted criticism for denying direct effect to WTO rules:  Nikolaos Lavranos,
‘The  Chiquita and  Van Parys Judgments: An Exception to the Rule of Law’ (2005) 32 L.I.E.I.
449, 462.
78  Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 36.
79  Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 40.
80  Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-
3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro.
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The Advocate General argued that there is lack of reciprocity among the WTO members.
The United States, Canada and Japan declared, for instance, that provisions of the WTO
agreements may not have direct effect.81 This absence of reciprocity may have serious
consequences.  Foreign  competitors  would  be  able  to  invoke  provisions  of  the  WTO
agreements before the courts of the EC Member States. In cases where WTO members
do not  recognise direct  effect,  EU traders would however  not  be able to do so.  The
absence of reciprocity would therefore place EU traders at a disadvantage.82 In Portugal
v Council the Court was singing from the same hymn sheet: it argued that the absence of
reciprocity may lead to disuniform application of the WTO rules.83 One further reason for
the denial of direct effect was the impact of the notion of direct effect on the division of
powers:
To accept that the role of ensuring that Community law complies with
those rules devolves directly on the Community judicature would deprive
the legislative or  executive  organs  of the  Community of  the scope for
manoeuvre  enjoyed  by  their  counterparts  in  the  Community's  trading
partners.84
Omega,85 was a reference for a preliminary ruling on the validity of a provision of an EC
regulation. That EC regulation concerned noise emissions from airplanes. Omega alleged
the incompatibility with the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (ATBT) of the EC
81  Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-
3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 31.
82  Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-
3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 31. Moreover, the Advocate General considered if the lack of
reciprocity  in  the  recognition  of  direct  effect  leads  to  an  absence  of  reciprocity  in  the
implementation of WTO agreements, but left it to  the Court to undertake an abstract evaluation
(paras 34 and 35). On that issue see further: Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574,
[1999] ECR I-8395, para 44.
83  Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 45.
84  Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 46.
85  Joined  Cases  C-27/00  and  C-122/00 The  Queen  v  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Environment,
Transport and the Regions, ex parte Omega Air Ltd and Omega Air Ltd , Aero Engines Ireland
Ltd and Omega Aviation Services Ltd v Irish Aviation Authority EU:C:2002:161,  [2002] ECR I-
2569.
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regulation.  According  to  Advocate  General  Alber,  the  decisive  point  was  that  legal
disputes on the content  of  the law of  the WTO were based on negotiations between
governments. In his view, the withdrawal of unlawful measures was indeed the solution
given preference in WTO law. Yet the law of the WTO did also authorise other solutions.
For instance, settlement, payment of compensation or suspension of concessions.  The
Court set this out in detail in its judgment in  Portugal v Council. He argued that the
position of the EC in those negotiations would be seriously affected if EC law recognised
a unilateral direct effect of obligations under the law of the WTO. He further argued that
direct  reliance  on  rules  of  the  law of  the  WTO as  against  measures  taken by WTO
members  appeared  not  appropriate  from the  point  of  view of  the  law of  the  WTO.
Regardless of their  wording, all provisions of the law of the WTO were subject to a
general reservation, which accorded the States affected different possibilities of reacting
to a breach. According to Advocate General Alber, it was thus not for the Court but for
the WTO, or its members, to ensure observance of the law of the WTO in the legal
systems affected.  Direct  effect  of WTO rules was clearly not part  of their  legislative
content. Such content, in his view, may not be ascribed, at EU level, to the law of WTO
in its original form but in the form of transposition measures. In that context the law of
WTO became indirectly significant. In his opinion, direct effect of the law of the WTO in
the legal systems of its members could not, on the other hand, sensibly be brought about
by individual legal systems, but only at the level of the WTO. He suggested that the
reasoning in Portugal v Council, namely that the WTO agreements were not in principle
among the rules in the light of which the Court was to review the lawfulness of measures
adopted by EC institutions,  should be maintained. He explained that the fact that the
provisions  of  the  ATBT were  perhaps  sufficiently  precise  and unconditional  in  their
wording to be amenable to direct effect did not lead to another conclusion. They were
subject to the general condition of WTO law that WTO members were to comply with
their obligations not by direct effect in their legal systems but exclusively by specific
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transposition of those obligations.86
Snyder described that Advocate General Alber's Opinion placed the earlier case law on
direct effect of GATT/WTO law in a new context and can be regarded as having altered
the terms of the debate. The Advocate General made original contributions to the direct
effect  debate.  First,  he  broadened  the  terms  of  the  debate  beyond  the  ambit  of  the
Community. He took account of the standpoint of the WTO (para 94 of his Opinion in
Omega) and repeated the long-standing view of the Court about the flexibility of the
GATT/WTO  system.  In  analysing  the  relation  between  the  EU  and  the  WTO  he
purported to express the perspective of the other side.  Second,  he suggested that the
decision  of  direct  effect  of  WTO  law  should  not  be  taken  by  each  WTO  member
unilaterally but instead on a multilateral basis (para 95). Third, he placed the issue of
institutional choice on a different plane by focusing not only on Community institutions
inter se but also on relations between sites. Fourth, he contributed to changing the terms
of the debate about what impact WTO law should have in Community law and how.87
Koutrakos described that the judgment in Omega was interesting for the direct attack on
the line of reasoning underpinning the ruling in Portugal v Council by the applicant.88 In
Omega, the applicant attacked the Portugal v Council line of reasoning, arguing that the
distinction of whether an agreement is based on reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements  or  not  (paragraph 42 of  Portugal  v  Council)  is  unhelpful.89 The  Court
86  Joined  Cases  C-27/00  and  C-122/00 The  Queen  v  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Environment,
Transport and the Regions, ex parte Omega Air Ltd and Omega Air Ltd , Aero Engines Ireland
Ltd and Omega Aviation Services Ltd v Irish Aviation Authority  EU:C:2001:470, [2002] ECR I-
2569, Opinion of AG Alber, paras 92-96.
87  See  Francis Snyder, ‘The gatekeepers: The European courts and WTO law’ (2003) 40 CMLR
313-367, at 329-335.
88  See Panos Koutrakos, EU international relations law (Hart, Oxford/Portland 2006) 271. 
89  Joined  Cases  C-27/00  and  C-122/00 The  Queen  v  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Environment,
Transport and the Regions, ex parte Omega Air Ltd and Omega Air Ltd , Aero Engines Ireland
Ltd and Omega Aviation Services Ltd v Irish Aviation Authority  EU:C:2002:161, [2002] ECR I-
2569, para 86.
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answered that Omega misunderstood the basis of the Court's case law and held that:
(…) The decisive factor here is that the resolution of disputes concerning
WTO  law  is  based,  in  part,  on  negotiations  between  the  contracting
parties.  Withdrawal  of  unlawful  measures  is  indeed  the  solution
recommended by WTO law, but other solutions are also authorised, for
example  settlement,  payment  of  compensation  or  suspension  of
concessions  (see,  to  that  effect,  Portugal  v  Council,  paragraphs  36  to
39).90
The  Court  repeated  the  arguments  in  Case  C-149/96  and  reiterated  the  Portugal  v
Council holdings, in line with the submissions of the United Kingdom Government, the
Irish Aviation Authority, the Commission and the Council, according to which a possible
conflict with WTO law cannot affect the validity of an EC regulation (it was submitted in
the  alternative  that  provisions  of  the  ATBT were  not  infringed),  and  the  Advocate
General's Opinion. The Court further reiterated that the WTO agreements, interpreted in
the  light  of  their  subject-matter  and purpose,  do not  determine  the  appropriate  legal
means to be applied in good faith in the national legal order of the contracting parties. 91
  ee) Continuation of the Portugal v Council line of reasoning
The reasoning of the Court in  Portugal v Council has provoked a lively debate in legal
doctrine.
90  Joined  Cases  C-27/00  and  C-122/00 The  Queen  v  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Environment,
Transport and the Regions, ex parte Omega Air Ltd and Omega Air Ltd , Aero Engines Ireland
Ltd and Omega Aviation Services Ltd v Irish Aviation Authority  EU:C:2002:161, [2002] ECR I-
2569, para 89.
91  Joined  Cases  C-27/00  and  C-122/00 The  Queen  v  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Environment,
Transport and the Regions, ex parte Omega Air Ltd and Omega Air Ltd , Aero Engines Ireland
Ltd and Omega Aviation Services Ltd v Irish Aviation Authority  EU:C:2002:161, [2002] ECR I-
2569, para 91.
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Views  were  expressed  on  both  sides.  Criticism emerged  with  Griller's  contribution.92
Griller suggested that the Court has misinterpreted the DSU provisions. In view of Griller,
the  alleged  lack  of  a  categorial  obligation  flowing  from a  WTO  Dispute  Settlement
Decision was the cornerstone for the denial of judicial enforceability and of WTO law as
such. This argument, in view of Griller, implied that there is an alternative to immediate
compliance with adopted panel reports. The insinuation was that there is an option for an
alternative arrangement. Griller's critique is that by interpreting DSU provisions the Court
wrongly  concluded  that  compensation  as  well  as  retaliation  are,  at  least  temporary,
alternatives to full compliance.93
The lack of reciprocity was, along with the contended alternative of compensation the
second cornerstone for the denial of judicial enforceability and of WTO law as such.94 The
WTO agreement, according to its preamble, is founded, like GATT 1947, on the principle
of  negotiations  with  a  view  to  'entering  into  reciprocal  and  mutually  advantageous
arrangements'.95 Griller  put  forward  that  every  interpretation of  the  judicial  reasoning
advanced for precluding review has to face the regrettable fact that the Court did not
elaborate on the underlying concept of reciprocity.96 
92  Stefan Griller, ‘Judicial Enforceability of WTO Law in the European Union. Annotation to Case
C-149/96,  Portugal v. Council’ (2000) 3 J.I.E.L. 441-472, at 450-467. Similar arguments have
been  brought  forward  by  others.  See  especially Naboth  van  den  Broek,  ‘Legal  Persuasion,
Political Realism, and Legitimacy: the European Court's Recent Treatment of the Effect of WTO
Agreements in the EC Legal Order’ (2001) 4 J.I.E.L. 411-440; Geert A. Zonnekeyn, ‘The status of
WTO Law in  the  Community  Legal  Order:  Some Comments  in  the  Light  of  the  Portuguese
Textiles Case’ (2000) 25 ELRev. 293-302.
93  See Griller, above (n 92), at 450-54. The DSU provides that retaliation as well as compensation
are mere temporary measures in cases of non-implementation of recommendations and rulings
within a reasonable time.
94  AG Saggio in  para 23 of his conclusions  in  Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:92,
[1999]  ECR I-8395 referred to  the reciprocity  principle  also there  is  a  detailed reasoning on
reciprocity in paras 31-35 of AG Tesauro's conclusion in Case C-53/96  Hermès International v
FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-3603.
95  Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 42.
96  See Griller, above (n 92), at 458.
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Griller argued that the reasoning leading to the denial of internal enforceability of WTO
law seemed not only inevitably to imply elements not consistent with the rule of law, but
also to include an option to break WTO law. This seemed irreconcilable with Article 300
(7) of the then EC Treaty, according to which agreements concluded by the Community
are binding on the Community institutions and on the Member States.97 In his opinion the
Court was not consistent in its approach to the question of direct effect of international
agreements, in particular that the Court did not succeed in establishing a differentiation
between agreements which are 'reciprocal and mutually advantageous', such as the WTO
Agreement, and the agreements to which the Court had accorded direct effect.98 
Cremona's  analysis  of  the  Court's  approach  is  that  the  relationship  between  the
multilateral obligations under the WTO Agreements and subsequent bilateral agreements
between WTO Members was not discussed by the Court. This is because of the position it
had taken on the legal status of the WTO agreements with respect to the legality of EC
acts. This question was considered by the Advocate General. He pointed to the fact that
there was no hindrance to two parties to a multilateral agreement to conclude between
themselves  a  subsequent  bilateral  treaty,  which  alters  their  respective  bilateral
commitments (in that case, the EC with India and Pakistan, respectively), as long as the
conclusion  of  the  subsequent  bilateral  agreement  does  not  affect  the  rights  of  other
contracting parties to the earlier multilateral agreement or makes it impossible to fulfil the
aims or objectives of that agreement. Conforming to Cremona, Saggio raised the question,
but did not follow through the consequences of a real conflict, understandably, since there
was no third country interest at issue in that case.99
97  Ibid, at 462.
98  Ibid. 
99  See Marise Cremona, ‘Rhetoric and Reticence: EU External Commercial Policy in a Multilateral
Context’ (2001) 38 CMLR 359-396, at 371-377.
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Rosas described, compared to International Fruit Company (paragraph 21) and Germany
v Council, there was in the Court's reasoning a shift of emphasis from the flexibility of
GATT provisions in general; that is, the substantive contents of the GATT (possibilities of
derogation and safeguard measures), and the system for the settlement of disputes towards
the nature of the WTO as a system of reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements.
The Court did neither refer (but in Rosas' view could have done so) to the additional fact
that the Dispute Settlement Understanding favoured solutions mutually acceptable to the
parties (even as a preference to the withdrawal of WTO-incompatible measures) nor did
the Court refer to the possibility for the member whose measure had been found to be
incompatible with the WTO to accept the suspension of concessions instigated by the
other party. The Court,  apparently  as an answer to the criticism that it had treated the
GATT differently  from other  international  agreements,  had emphasised that  the WTO
Agreements are distinct from those agreements which implied a certain asymmetry of
obligations (Lomé Convention) or established special relations of integration like the Free
Trade Agreement between the Community and Portugal interpreted in Kupferberg. In the
view of Rosas, this comparison made between the WTO and cooperation agreements was
not  useful  as  the  special  nature  of  the  WTO  system  (in  particular,  stricter  rules  on
safeguard measures and the improvements in the dispute settlement mechanism) would
have sufficed as a reasoning.100
Perhaps the most sustainable defences apart from those of Rosas came from Mendez and
Eeckhout.  Mendez pointed to  the  fact  that  the core of  the reasoning of  the Court  in
Portugal v Council was premised on the proposition the DSU permitted at least temporary
alternatives other than full implementation and that judicial intervention (ensuring that EC
law complies with rules of WTO) deprived the Community of the DSU sanctioned room
for  manoeuvre  enjoyed by their  counterparts.  Mendez  submitted  that  the  core  of  the
100  See  Allan  Rosas,  ‘Case  C-149/96,  Portugal  v.  Council. Judgment  of  the  Full  Court  of  23
November 1999, nyr.’ (2000) 37 CMLR 797-816, at 808-815.
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reasoning of the Court in Portugal v Council for precluding review was sound.101
Eeckhout  took  issue  with  the  critiques  of  that  reasoning  and  defended  the  Court's
exclusion of full direct effect. He described that reciprocity was at the centre of the Court's
concerns (para 45), but in his view ultimately it was not reciprocity as such which led the
Court to deny direct effect, rather it was the impact of this type of effect on the EU's
political institutions. The room for manoeuvre for the EU's political institutions which
they currently have with respect to the implementation of the law of the WTO, especially
in the context of disputes with other WTO Members, would be much reduced if the direct
effects of WTO law were accepted.102
Koutrakos  also  offered  an analysis  of  the  Court's  approach  and defended the Court's
reasoning against full-scale direct effect. According to him it is not the binding character
of WTO obligations which have lain at the core of the reasoning, but rather the extent to
which the contracting parties were allowed to choose the method of enforcement of WTO
obligations; that is, the discretion enjoyed by the EU's executive and legislative bodies
and its Member States to negotiate mutually acceptable arrangements according to the
DSU that the Court seeks to ensure.103
101  See  Mario Mendez,  The Legal Effects of EU Agreements. Maximalist Treaty Enforcement and
Judicial Avoidance Techniques. (Oxford Studies in European Law, OUP, Oxford 2013) 203-217;
id., ‘The Enforcement of EU Agreements: Bolstering the effectiveness of Treaty law?’ (2010) 47
CMLR 1719-1756, at 1743-1747; id., ‘The Legal Effect of Community Agreements: Maximalist
Treaty Enforcement and Judicial Avoidance Techniques’ (2010) 21 E.J.I.L. 83-104, at 95-97. 
102  See Piet Eeckhout, ‘Judicial Enforcement of WTO Law in the European Union – Some Further
Reflections’ (2002) 5 J.I.E.L. 91-110 at 92-101 and id. ‘The domestic legal status of the WTO
Agreement: Interconnecting legal systems’ (1997) 34 CMLR 11-58;  id.,  EU External Relations
Law (2nd edn OUP, Oxford 2011) 323-383, at 343-350 and 375-378. UNCLOS was a second case
of  an  important  multilateral  agreement  which  cannot  be  relied  upon  in  EU  litigation.  The
Advocate General's arguments in the discussion of the direct effect of UNCLOS were derived
from WTO case  law.  Eeckhout  described  that  the  case  law  of  the  Court  continued  to  show
openness towards international law, but in his view less than before (the majority of cases which
had come before the Courts had been recognised as capable of being directly effective; and were
indeed effectively applied in litigation). See at 350-355.
103  See Koutrakos, above (n 88), 271-280, in particular at 274.
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After Portugal v Council the Court was concerned with the direct effect of WTO law in
Schieving-Nijstad104 and Dior.105 In Dior national courts asked whether Article 50 (6) of
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)106 has
direct effect. The Court  held that TRIPs does not have direct effect and  confirmed the
Portugal  v  Council  line of  reasoning.107 The  same question was  raised in  Schieving-
Nijstad. The Court took the same approach and held that Article 50 (6) of TRIPs is not
capable of having direct effect.108 Hence, one may conclude that, in the light of their
nature  and  structure,  the  WTO  Agreement  and  the  agreements  and  understandings
annexed to it do not have direct effect.109
104  Case C-89/99 Schieving-Nijstad vof and Others  v Robert Groeneveld EU:C:2001:438,  [2001]
ECR I-5851.
105  Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98 Parfums Christian Dior SA v TUK Consultancy BV and
Assco Gerüste GmbH and Rob van Dijk v Wilhelm Layher GmbH & Co. KG and Layher BV
EU:C:2000:688, [2000] ECR I-11307.
106  The provisions of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights are an
annex to the WTO agreements.
107  Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98 Parfums Christian Dior SA v TUK Consultancy BV and
Assco Gerüste GmbH and Rob van Dijk v Wilhelm Layher GmbH & Co. KG and Layher BV
EU:C:2000:688, [2000] ECR I-11307, paras 44 and 45. Please note that the German Government
found that TRIPS may have direct effect: Deutscher Bundestag 12. Wahlperiode BT-Drucksache
12/7655 (neu), 344.
108  Case C-89/99 Schieving-Nijstad vof and Others  v Robert Groeneveld  EU:C:2001:438, [2001]
ECR I-5851, paras 51-55.
109  Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, paras 42-47. This line of
reasoning  has  since  been  repeated  in:  Case  C-307/99 OGT Fruchthandelsgesellschaft  mbH v
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen EU:C:2001:228,  [2001] ECR I-3159, paras 22-26 (as regards
GATT 1994). As regards the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (ATBT): Joined Cases C-
27/00 and C-122/00  The Queen v  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Environment,  Transport  and the
Regions, ex parte Omega Air Ltd and Omega Air Ltd , Aero Engines Ireland Ltd and Omega
Aviation Services Ltd v Irish Aviation Authority EU:C:2002:161, [2002] ECR I-2569, para 93. As
regards the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS): Joined
Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98 Parfums Christian Dior SA v TUK Consultancy BV and Assco
Gerüste  GmbH  and  Rob  van  Dijk  v  Wilhelm  Layher  GmbH  &  Co.  KG  and  Layher  BV
EU:C:2000:688,  [2000]  ECR I-11307,  para  44  and Case  C-89/99 Schieving-Nijstad  vof  and
Others v Robert Groeneveld EU:C:2001:438, [2001] ECR I-5851, para 53.
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c)  Rulings by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)
A different issue is the question of whether the Portugal v Council line of reasoning may
also apply to WTO panel or Appellate Body reports. The Court has not ruled on the legal
significance of DSB decisions in Community law for long.110 Advocate General Alber
provided  arguments  for  recognising  the  direct  effect  of  DSB  decisions,111 e.g.  the
fundamental right of freedom to pursue an economic activity.112
However,  as  the  errors  of  law made  by  the  General  Court113 did  not  invalidate  the
contested judgment,114 the Court did not rule on the matter and addressed the issue of
direct effect of DSB decisions only in form of an obiter dictum:
(…) the Community (...) stated that it intended to comply with its WTO
obligations  but  that  it  needed  a  reasonable  time  to  do  so,  under
Article 21(3) of the Understanding it was granted a period of 15 months
for that purpose, which expired on 13 May 1999. 
(...) for the period prior to 13 May 1999, the Community Courts cannot, in
any event, carry out a review of the legality of the Community measures
in question, (...)  without rendering ineffective the grant of a reasonable
110  Case C-93/02 P Biret International SA v Council EU:C:2003:291, [2003] ECR I-10497, Opinion
of AG Alber, para 72.
111  Case C-93/02 P Biret International SA v Council EU:C:2003:291, [2003] ECR I-10497, Opinion
of AG Alber, paras 70-119.
112  Case C-93/02 P Biret International SA v Council EU:C:2003:291, [2003] ECR I-10497, Opinion
of AG Alber, para 110.
113  With regard to direct effect the General Court held that: 'The purpose of the WTO agreements is
to govern relations between States or regional organisations for economic integration and not to
protect individuals.' Case T-174/00 Biret International SA v Council EU:T:2002:2, [2002] ECR II-
17, para 62.
114  '[E]rrors of law (…) [made by the GC] as regards the duty to state reasons and the scope of the
judgment  in  Atlanta v European Community  do not invalidate the  contested judgment,  if  the
operative part thereof and in particular the rejection of the plea at first instance concerning the
SPS Agreement, appears founded on other legal grounds (...)' Case C-93/02 P Biret International
SA v Council EU:C:2003:517, [2003] ECR I-10497, para 60.
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period  for  compliance  with  the  DSB  recommendations  or  rulings,  as
provided for in the dispute settlement system put in place by the WTO
agreements.115
The Court thus held that only for the period prior to 13 May 1999 there is no direct
effect.
However, for the period thereafter, the Court left open the possibility of direct effect,
which may indicate that direct effect might apply to DSB decisions. From the point of
view of  Union law,  there are  generally  persuasive  arguments  against  direct  effect  of
WTO law embodied in DSB recommendations or rulings after the expiry of the period of
time allowed to comply with them:
• WTO  Members  are  accorded  discretion  in  complying  with  DSB
recommendations and rulings (power to agree a waiver).116
• Direct effect would be contrary to the notion of reciprocity, a feature of WTO
relations; that is, WTO rules would acquire an effect not accorded to them in the
legal orders of the Union's trading partners.117
• The purpose of  the WTO agreements;  WTO agreements -primarily  concerned
with interests of a general nature, to govern relations between WTO Members-
are by their nature not intended to establish rights for individuals.118
115  Case C-93/02 P Biret International SA v Council EU:C:2003:517, [2003] ECR I-10497, paras 61
and 62.
116  Case C-93/02 P Biret International SA v Council EU:C:2003:291, [2003] ECR I-10497, Opinion
of AG Alber, para 82.
117  Case C-93/02 P Biret International SA v Council EU:C:2003:291, [2003] ECR I-10497, Opinion
of AG Alber, para 97.
118  Case C-93/02 P Biret International SA v Council EU:C:2003:291, [2003] ECR I-10497, Opinion
of AG Alber, para 115.
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As mentioned above, the Court has not ruled on this point of law for long. In Atlanta the
Court has not been able to pronounce on the issue of the internal effect of the WTO DSB
decisions on factual grounds.119 The possibility to address the issue of the internal effect
of the WTO DSB decisions came with  Chiquita and  Van Parys.120 In  Chiquita the GC
dismissed the applicant’s use of the Nakajima case law.121 The following Van Parys case
has put an end to this insecurity with regard to the scope of the Nakajima principle that
would have afforded direct effect to the WTO DSB decisions in pre-Lisbon’s Community
legal order. In Van Parys the Court repeated its foregoing settled case law that the WTO
law in general did not have direct effect in pre-Lisbon’s Community legal order except
for the  Nakajima and  Fediol  principles and determined the applicability of the afore-
mentioned  principles.  The  Court,  did  not  follow Advocate  General  Tizzano's  views,
concluding that the Nakajima principle was not applicable in Van Parys. In its judgment,
the Court  reiterated the  arguments that were presented in  Portugal  v  Council.122 The
implications left by the Court in Biret were not confirmed in FIAMM and Fedon. In that
case the Court confirmed the above constant line of jurisprudence,  finding that WTO
substantial rules and WTO DSB decisions lack direct effect.123
119  Case C-104/97 P  Atlanta AG and Others v Commission and Council EU:C:1999:498, [1999]
ECR I-6983.
120  Case T-19/01  Chiquita Brands International Inc v Commission EU:T:2005:31, [2005] ECR II-
315  and  the  following  Case  C-377/02  Léon  Van  Parys  NV  v  Belgisch  Interventie-  en
Restitutiebureau (BIRB) EU:C:2005:121, [2005] ECR I-1465.
121  Case T-19/01  Chiquita Brands International Inc v Commission EU:T:2005:31, [2005] ECR II-
315, para 167.
122  Case  C-377/02 Léon  Van  Parys  NV  v  Belgisch  Interventie-  en  Restitutiebureau  (BIRB)
EU:C:2005:121, [2005] ECR I-1465, para 53. For detailed analyses of the relevant case law see,
for example, Oksana Tsymbrivska, ‘WTO DSB Decisions in the EC Legal Order: Approach of the
Community Courts’ (2010) 37 L.I.E.I. 185-202, at 189-196. This article, inter alia, examined the
internal effect and status of the WTO DSB decisions within the EU legal order and the relevant
case law from the Biret cases to Van Parys as well as the arguments that were accepted as a basis
for it.
123  Joined Cases C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P Fabbrica italiana accumulatori motocarri Montecchio
SpA (FIAMM) and Fabbrica italiana accumulatori motocarri Montecchio Technologies LLC (C-
120/06 P), Giorgio Fedon & Figli SpA and Fedon America, Inc.  (C-121/06 P) v Council and
Commission EU:C:2008:476, [2008] ECR I-6513, paras 128 and 129.
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2. The possible direct effect of provisions of FTAs (EFTA/non-EFTA), accession/ 
development associations and the GC's case law on the EEA Agreement
The previous survey of the case law has made clear that, having regard to their nature
and structure,  provisions  of  the  WTO agreement  and GATT 1994  have,  due to  their
special features, not an unconditional nature.124 The Court reached the conclusion that
there is no right to rely directly on such provisions. We will now see from the survey of
the case law presented below that provisions of association agreements and provisions of
the EEA Agreement are, in contrast, potentially directly effective.
Before considering the possible direct effect of provisions of association agreements it is
necessary to reflect on the concept of association. The concept of association has a very
wide  scope and embraces  various  forms  of  relationship.125 Free  trade,  accession  and
development  associations  are  association  agreements  that  pursue  different  aims:  free
trade associations provide for the liberalisation of trade; development associations seek
to promote the development of the associated States; and accession associations prepare
the associating State for an EU membership. The survey of the case law will categorise
the cases according to their aim.126
124  Case C-149/96  Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574,  [1999] ECR I-8395, para 47. In a GATT
1947 context Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, para 110.
125  Report for the Hearing Case 12/86 Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd EU:C:1987:400, [1987]
ECR 3719, 3730.
126  See  also: Andrea  Ott,  ‘Thirty  Years  of  Case-Law  by  the  European  Court  of  Justice  on
International Law – a Pragmatic Approach towards its Integration’ in Vincent Kronenberger (ed),
The European Union and the  International  Legal  Order: Discord or  Harmony? (TMC Asser
Press, The Hague 2001) 113 et seq. On the different types of association agreements see: Kirsten
Schmalenbauch, ‘Article 310 EC’ in Christian Calliess and Matthias Ruffert (eds),  EUV/EGV:
Das Verfassungsrecht der Europäischen Union mit Europäischer Grundrechtecharta; Kommentar
(3rd  edn  Beck,  München  2007),  para  35.  See  further,  Paul  Craig,  The  Lisbon  Treaty:  Law,
Politics, and Treaty Reform (OUP, Oxford 2010) 402-04.
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It  will  distinguish  between  the  possible  direct  effect  of  provisions  of  free  trade
associations (subdivided in provisions of free trade agreements with EFTA127 and with
non-EFTA  countries128); accession  associations; development  associations;  and
provisions of the EEA Agreement.
a)  Effects of FTAs: Kupferberg line of reasoning (FTAs with EFTA countries)
Free trade agreements with EFTA countries. In Kupferberg129 the Court addressed, for the
127  The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was established in 1960 (Stockholm Convention)
as  a  reaction against  the formation of  the  EEC. Founding members  were:  Austria,  Denmark,
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. Finland became an associate member (1961)
and later a full member of EFTA (1986). Iceland became a member of EFTA (1970). Liechtenstein
acceded in 1991. Denmark and the UK (1972), Portugal (1985), Austria,  Finland and Sweden
(1995) left EFTA to join the EEC/EU. Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland remain
members of EFTA. Three EFTA members - Liechtenstein, Iceland and Norway- join the EEA. On
1 June 2002 the updated EFTA Convention  (Vaduz Convention) entered into force.  For more
information: <http://www.efta.int/>. When the UK and Denmark left EFTA to become a Member
of the EEC (1972) bilateral free trade agreements with the remaining EFTA States were concluded
to maintain trade  liberalisation  (Agreement  between the  EEC and Austria  [1972] OJ L300/2;
Sweden [1972] OJ L300/97; Switzerland [1972] OJ L300/189; Liechtenstein [1972] OJ L300/281;
Iceland [1972] OJ L301/2; Portugal [1972] OJ L301/165; Norway [1973] OJ L171/2; Finland
[1973]  OJ  L328/2).  For  a  comprehensive  review  see:  E.P.  Wellenstein,  ‘The  Free  Trade
Agreements between the Enlarged European Communities and the EFTA-Countries’ (1973) 10
CMLR 137.
128  E.g.  the  former  free  trade  Agreement  with  Spain  [1970]  OJ  L182/2;  with  accession  to  the
EEC/European Union the free trade agreements with Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland, Sweden
were terminated; End of validity: 31/12/1985 (Spain and Portugal); 31/12/1994 (Austria, Finland,
Sweden).  The  Agreement  between  the  EEC  and  Switzerland  likewise  became  applicable  to
Liechtenstein: Article 1 of the Additional Agreement concerning the validity, for the Principality
of Liechtenstein, of the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Swiss
Confederation of  22 July 1972 [1972] OJ L300/281. Free trade agreements  with Switzerland,
Liechtenstein, Iceland and Norway remain in force. Article 120 EEA limits the scope of the FTAs
with EEA countries, as provisions of the EEA Agreement 'shall prevail over provisions in existing
bilateral or multilateral agreements binding the European Economic Community, on the one hand,
and one or more EFTA States, on the other, to the extent that the same subject matter is governed
by this Agreement'.
129  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR
3641.
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very first time,130 the issue of whether provisions of free trade agreements with EFTA
countries  are  directly  effective.  Kupferberg concerned  an  international  agreement
between the EEC and Portugal (then not a Member State). The German Bundesfinanzhof
referred questions to the Court asking it to interpret Article 21 of the Portuguese free
trade agreement. The Court held that Article 21 of the Portuguese free trade agreement
had direct effect,131 even though  Advocate General Rozès and several  Member States
suggested to transpose the International Fruit Company line of reasoning (GATT/WTO
law)132 to free trade agreements.  When considering whether the free trade Agreement
between the EEC and Portugal was directly effective, Advocate General Rozès pointed in
Kupferberg to the different structure, content and objectives of the agreement, compared
to the EEC Treaty. The Advocate General argued that the wording of Article 21 (1) of the
Portuguese  free  trade  agreement  would  differ  'appreciably'  from  the  corresponding
provisions of Article 95 (1) of the then EEC Treaty (now Article 110 TFEU) so that the
reasons for recognising direct effect of Article 95 (1) of the then EEC Treaty could not
apply mutatis mutandis to Article 21 (1) of the Portuguese free trade agreement.133
After having considered a mutatis mutandis application of the reasons for recognising
direct effect in the context of the EEC Treaty, she drew a comparison between provisions
of the free trade Agreement with Portugal and those of GATT. The free trade Agreement
130  In Case 270/80 Polydor Limited v Harlequin Records Shops Limited and Simons Records Limited
EU:C:1982:43, [1982] ECR 329, which concerned  the protection of industrial  and commercial
property rights, the Court was asked whether Article 14 (2) of the FTA with Portugal (at that time
not a Member State but a Member of EFTA) was directly effective within the Community. In view
of the replies given to the other questions of substance the Court considered it not necessary to
reply to this question (see para 23).
131  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR
3641, para 26.
132  Joined Cases  21 to 24/72  International Fruit  Company NV and others  v  Produktschap voor
Groenten en Fruit EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219.
133  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:137, [1982] ECR
3641, Opinion of AG Rozès, 3673. The EUR-Lex database refers to her as Mr.!
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between  the  EEC  and  Portugal,  which  aimed  at  creating  a  free  trade  area,134 had
established an autonomous framework in order to settle disputes.135 Hence provisions of
the FTA were:
(...) like those of GATT, (…) less rigid than those of the EEC Treaty; (…)
[and contain] a number of derogating clauses of wide scope and finally it
may be denounced, whereupon the Agreement ceases to be in force 12
months after the date of notification …136
In the light of the similarities to GATT, and taking into consideration that the free trade
Agreement  with  Portugal  was  based  on  the  principle  of  strict  equality,137 Advocate
General  Rozès  suggested  to  transpose  the  International  Fruit  Company line  of
reasoning138 to free trade agreements based on reciprocity.139 Her overall conclusion was,
therefore,  that  Article  21  (1)  of  the  free  trade  Agreement  with  Portugal  was,  like
provisions of GATT, not capable of having direct effect.140
The  governments  of  Denmark,  Germany,  France  and  the  UK argued  equally  against
direct effect. They argued that the distribution of powers between Community organs in
external matters; the institutional framework established for settling disputes between the
134  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:137, [1982] ECR
3641, Opinion of AG Rozès, 3675.
135  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:137, [1982] ECR
3641, Opinion of AG Rozès, 3674.
136  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:137, [1982] ECR
3641, Opinion of AG Rozès, 3674.
137  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:137, [1982] ECR
3641, Opinion of AG Rozès, 3673.
138  Joined Cases  21 to 24/72  International Fruit  Company NV and others  v  Produktschap voor
Groenten en Fruit EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219.
139  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:137, [1982] ECR
3641, Opinion of AG Rozès, 3674.
140  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:137, [1982] ECR
3641, Opinion of AG Rozès, 3673.
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contracting parties; the principle of reciprocity; and the provision for safeguard clauses,
permitting derogations from the agreement, would prevent free trade agreements from
having direct effect.141
As said above, the Court did not follow Advocate General Rozè's suggestion to transpose
the  GATT 1947  case  law to  free  trade  agreements,  which  are  based,  as  GATT,  on
reciprocity.  Nor did it  agree with the Member States governments'  arguments against
direct effect.
The Court applied its two-fold test for direct effect:142 after first examining the nature and
structure of the free trade Agreement with Portugal, the Court held that provisions of the
free trade agreement were capable of being applied directly.143 In the light of object and
purpose  of  the  agreement,  which  aimed  at  eliminating  rules  restricting  commerce,144
Article 21 (1) of the Portuguese free trade agreement was held to be a clear, precise and
unconditional  rule  against  discrimination  in  taxation  matters  and  could  be  relied  on
before the national courts.145
When examining the nature and structure of the free trade agreement the Court addressed
the question of whether judicial reciprocity, the institutional framework and safeguard
clauses of the agreement may prevent direct effect.
141  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR
3641, paras 15-16.
142  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR
3641, paras 17-22 (nature and structure of the FTA with Portugal) and paras 23-27 (clear, precise
and unconditional).
143  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR
3641, para 22.
144  In  particular  the  abolition  of  customs  duties  and  charges  of  an  equivalent  effect  and  the
elimination  of  quantitative  restrictions  and  measures  of  equivalent  effect. Case  104/81
Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR 3641, para
24.
145  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR
3641, paras 23-27.
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First, the Court pointed to judicial reciprocity. The Court stressed that the fact  that the
courts of one of the contracting parties may recognise direct effect, whereas the courts of
the other contracting party deny direct effect, does not constitute a lack of reciprocity in
the implementation  of the agreement;  nor does  it  preclude provisions of a free trade
agreement from having direct effect.146
Second, the Court considered whether the autonomous institutional framework to settle
disputes may prevent direct effect: Article 32 et seq of the free trade agreement did not
provide for the possibility of submitting the matter to any kind of court. Instead, there
was  only  a  political  procedure  of  a  Joint  Committee.147 These  Committees  were
responsible  for  the  proper  implementation  and  administration  of  agreements,  made
recommendations and could, where expressly provided for, take decisions.148 The Court
made clear that the application of an unconditional and precise obligation by a national
court of one of the contracting parties without any prior intervention on the part of the
Joint Committee would not affect the powers conferred on the Joint Committees.149 The
Court's  answer  was,  therefore,  that  the  autonomous  institutional  framework  to  settle
disputes does not prevent direct effect.
Third, the Court pointed to the provision of safeguard clauses. Safeguard clauses enable
the contracting parties to derogate from certain provisions of the free trade agreements.
The  Court  emphasised  that  they  apply  only  in  specific  situations  and  only  'after
consideration within the Joint Committee in the presence of both parties', and did  not
146  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR
3641, para 18.
147  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:137, [1982] ECR
3641, Opinion of AG Rozès, 3674.
148  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR
3641, para 19.
149  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR
3641, para 20.
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affect the provisions prohibiting tax discrimination. It held, therefore, that the existence
of safeguard clauses was not 'sufficient  in itself'  to affect the direct  enforceability  of
certain provisions of free trade agreements.150
It  appears  from the foregoing that,  in  the given instance,  neither the lack of judicial
reciprocity nor the establishment of a special institutional framework; nor the provision
for  safeguard  clauses,  may  prevent  the  possibility  of  direct  effect  of  free  trade
agreements. With regard to WTO law the Court arrived at a different conclusion. There,
the Court considered the flexibility of the provisions: the provision for safeguard clauses
and  measures  in  the  event  of  exceptional  difficulties,  lack  of  reciprocity  and  the
establishment of an autonomous institutional framework to settle disputes by consultation
and negotiation, sufficient to prevent the possibility of direct effect.151
b)  Continuation of the Kupferberg line of reasoning (FTAs with non-EFTA 
countries, accession/ development associations and the GC's case law on the 
EEA Agreement)
More than twenty years later, Kuijper and Bronckers argue that the Kupferberg case law
is inconsistent,
(…)  where  the  problem  of  the  balance  between  the  Community
institutions  is  swept  aside  with  the  comment  that  the  Community
institutions are free to reach an agreement with the institutions of a third
150  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362,[1982] ECR
3641, para 21.
151  It is argued that this is the most striking aspect of  Kupferberg:  Christian Tietje, ‘The Status of
International  Law in  the  European  Legal  Order:  the  Case  of  International  Treaties  and  Non-
binding International Instruments’ in Jan Wouters, Andre Nollkaemper and Wet Erika de (eds),
The Europeanisation of International Law: The Status of International Law in the EU and its
Member States (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 2008) 61. On the question of why Kupferberg is
so different from  International Fruit  see also: Gerhard Bebr (n 14); Sara Dillon,  International
Trade and Economic Law and the European Union (Hart, Oxford 2003) 363–365.
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State as to what effect the provisions of a treaty will have in the internal
legal order of the contracting parties. That might have been possible for
the first and second generation of judges in Luxembourg, some of whom
had  laid  down  in  the  EC  Treaty  that  regulations  would  be  directly
applicable  in  every  Member  State,  but  anyone  who has  negotiated  an
ordinary international treaty, knows that the question of the effect in the
internal  legal  order  does  not  normally  play  an  important  part  in  the
negotiations (…).152
However, there is -beyond WTO law (that is, rejection of direct effect in relation to WTO
agreements)- no indication in the Court's case law that Kupferberg is no longer good case
law.153
In fact there are, post Kupferberg, several cases where the Court presumed direct effect
without  discussing  the  issue.154 This  may  be  seen  as  a  'silent'  continuation  of  the
Kupferberg line of reasoning.
Moreover,  Kupferberg was also the first case that accepted that association agreements
are potentially directly effective. In this connexion one may argue, that the Court's case
law on the possible direct effect of provisions of (i) non-EFTA free trade agreements; (ii)
accession and development associations; and (iii) the General Court's case law  on the
EEA Agreement, continue to build upon Kupferberg.
152  Pieter Jan Kuijper and Marco Bronckers, ‘WTO Law in the European Court of Justice’ (2005) 42
CMLR 1313, 1320.
153  Christian  Tietje (n 151) 62,  who also argues that  Case C-265/03  Simutenkov v Ministerio de
Educación y Cultura and Real Federación Española de Fútbol  EU:C:2005:213, [2005] ECR I-
2579 (Communities-Russia PA) builds upon Kupferberg.
154  Case C-163/90  Administration des Douanes et  Droits Indirects v Léopold Legros and others
EU:C:1992:326,  [1992] ECR I-4625,  paras 26-27 (Article 6 of the FTA EEC-Sweden);  Case C-
207/91 Eurim-Pharm GmbH v Bundesgesundheitsamt EU:C:1993:278,  [1993] ECR I-3723, para
21 et seq (Articles 13 and 20 of the FTA EEC-Austria);  Joined Cases C-114/95 and C-115/95
Texaco A/S v Middelfart Havn EU:C:1997:371,  [1997] ECR I-4263, para 33 (Article 18 of the
FTA EEC-Sweden).
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  aa) Direct effect of provisions of non-EFTA free trade agreements
The wording of Article 3 of the former free trade Agreement between the EEC and Spain
is identical to Article 21 (1) of the former free trade Agreement with Portugal,
The considerations set out above also apply to Article 3 of the Agreement
between the EEC and Spain since the wording of that Article is identical
to  that  of  the  first  paragraph of  Article  21 of  the Agreement  with  the
Portuguese  Republic  and  the  subject-matter  and  the  scope  of  the  two
Agreements are comparable.155
The interpretation of Article 21 (1) of the free trade Agreement with Portugal likewise
became applicable to Article 3 of the free trade Agreement with Spain. This interpretation
implies direct effect.
The Community was also a signatory to agreements establishing an Association between
the EEC and Cyprus156 and Malta157 with the aim to eliminate obstacles to trade. The
Court held that provisions of the 1977 Protocol, annexed to the Additional Protocol to the
Agreement establishing an Association between the EEC and the Cyprus, lay down clear,
precise and unconditional obligations and may have direct effect,
The relevant rules in the 1977 Protocol concerning the origin of products
play an essential role in determining which products can be covered by the
Agreement  and thus  benefit  from preferential  treatment.  In  that  regard
they lay down clear, precise and unconditional obligations. (…) It follows
that the relevant provisions in the 1977 Protocol have direct effect and
may be relied upon in proceedings before a national court.158
155  Case 253/83 Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. v Hauptzollamt Mainz EU:C:1985:8  [1985] ECR 157,
para 20.
156  [1973] OJ L133/2.
157  [1971] OJ L61/2.
158  Case  C-432/92 The  Queen  v  Minister  of  Agriculture,  Fisheries  and  Food,  ex  parte  S.  P.
Anastasiou (Pissouri) Ltd and others EU:C:1994:277, [1994] ECR I-3087, paras 25 and 27.
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In sum, the nature of non-EFTA free trade agreements seems to allow for direct effect;
that is, the Court's case law on the possible direct effect of provisions of non-EFTA free
trade agreements continues to build upon Kupferberg.
  bb) Direct effect of provisions of accession and development associations
It is settled case law that provisions of accession associations are capable of conferring
rights on individuals.159 In Pabst & Richarz KG e.g. the Court applied mutatis mutandis
the  reasons for  recognising  direct  effect  of  Article  95  of  the  then EEC Treaty  (now
Article 110 TFEU) to Article 53 (1) of the former Association Agreement with Greece
159  Case 17/81 Pabst & Richarz KG v Hauptzollamt Oldenburg EU:C:1982:129, [1982] ECR 1331,
paras 25-27.  In Case 12/86  Demirel  v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd  EU:C:1987:400, [1987] ECR
3719, paras 16, 23 and 25 the Court pointed to the programmatic nature of provisions of the EEC-
Turkey AA with the final objective of acceding to the EU, [1964] OJ 217/3687 Recital 3 of the
Preamble, and denied direct effect, as the provisions in question, were neither sufficiently precise
nor unconditional. In Case C-37/98 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex
parte Abdulnasir Savas EU:C:2000:224, [2000] ECR I-2927, para 42 the Court held that Article
13  of  the  EEC-Turkey  AA did  not  establish  precise  rules.  However,  Article  41 (1)  of  the
Additional  Protocol was sufficiently precise and unconditional  to have direct effect  (para 54).
Also,  certain  provisions  of  the  Europe  Agreements  (EAs)  establishing  an  association  with
countries of  Central and Eastern Europe with the final  objective  to become a member of the
Community (Hungary [1993] OJ L347/2 (Recital 15 of the Preamble); Poland [1993] OJ L348/2
(Recital 15); Romania [1994] OJ L357/2 (Recital 17); Bulgaria [1994] OJ L358/3 (Recital 17);
Slovak Republic [1994] OJ L359/2 (Recital 18); Czech Republic [1994] OJ L360/2 (Recital 18);
Latvia [1998] OJ L26/3 (Recital 22); Lithuania [1998] OJ L51/3 (Recital 22); Estonia [1998] OJ
L68/3 (Recital 22); Slovenia [1999] OJ L51/3 (Recital 21) ) were sufficiently clear, precise and
unconditional to be applied by national courts: Case C-63/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for
the Home Department, ex parte Gloszczuk EU:C:2001:488, [2001] ECR I-6369, para 38 (EA with
Poland);  Case  C-235/99  The Queen v Secretary  of  State  for  the Home Department,  ex  parte
Kondova EU:C:2001:489, [2001] ECR I-6427, para 39 (EA with  Bulgaria); Case C-257/99 The
Queen  v  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Home  Department,  ex  parte  Barkoci  and  Malik
EU:C:2001:491, [2001] ECR I-6557, para 39 (EA with the Czech Republic); Case C-268/99 Jany
and Others v Staatssecretaris van Justitie  EU:C:2001:616, [2001] ECR I-8615, paras 26 and 28
(EA with Poland and the Czech Republic); Case C-162/00 Nordrhein-Westfalen v Pokrzeptowicz-
Meyer EU:C:2002:57, [2002] ECR I-1049, para 30 (EA with Poland); Case C-438/00 Deutscher
Handballbund eV v Kolpak  EU:C:2003:255, [2003] ECR I-4135, para 30 (EA with Slovakia);
Case  C-327/02  Panayotova  and  Others  v  Minister  voor  Vreemdelingenzaken  en  Integratie
EU:C:2004:718, [2004] ECR I-11055, para 18 (EA between the Communities and, respectively,
Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia).
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with the final objective of acceding to the Community:160
(...)  [Article  53  (1)  of  the  Association  Agreement  with  Greece],  the
wording of which is similar to that of Article 95 of the Treaty [now Article
110 TFEU], fulfils  (…) the same function as that of [now Article 110
TFEU]. It forms part of a group of provisions the purpose of which was to
prepare for the entry of Greece into the Community by the establishment
of a Customs Union, by the harmonization of agricultural policies, by the
introduction of freedom of movement for workers and by other measures
for the gradual adjustment to the requirements of Community law.
It accordingly follows from the wording of Article 53 (1) (…) and from
the objective and nature of the Association Agreement of which it forms
part  that  that  provision  precludes  a  national  system  of  relief  from
providing  more  favourable  tax  treatment  for  domestic  spirits  than  for
those imported  from Greece.  It  contains  a  clear  and precise obligation
(…). In those circumstances Article 53 (1) must be considered as directly
[effective] (…).161
Measures adopted by a body provided for by an accession agreement are, in so far as
they  implement  the  objectives  set  by  the  agreement,  'directly  connected'  with  the
agreement.162 Provisions  of a decision of the Council  of Association must  satisfy the
same requirements as those applicable to the provisions of association agreements,163 and
might therefore be directly effective. The Court recognised direct effect of Articles 2 (1)
(b) and 7 of Decision No 2/76164, of Articles 6 (1), 7, 9, 10 (1) and 13 of Decision No
160  [1963] OJ 26/294 Recital 4 of the Preamble.
161  Case 17/81 Pabst & Richarz KG v Hauptzollamt Oldenburg EU:C:1982:129, [1982] ECR 1331,
paras 26 and 27.
162  Case C-277/94 Taflan-Met and Others EU:C:1996:315, [1996] ECR I-4085, paras 17 and 18.
163  Case C-192/89 Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie EU:C:1990:322, [1990] ECR I-3461, para
14. Confirmed in Case C-277/94  Taflan-Met and Others  EU:C:1996:315, [1996] ECR I-4085,
para 25.
164  Case C-192/89 Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie EU:C:1990:322, [1990] ECR I-3461, para
26.
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1/80165 and  of  Article  3  (1)  of  Decision  No  3/80166 of  the  EEC-Turkey  Association
Council.  Since  obligations  are  specific,  and  not  subject  to  any  implied  or  express
reservation,  development  associations  are  also  capable  of  conferring  rights  on
individuals.167 The  case  law  on  the  direct  effect  of  accession  and  development
associations builds upon Kupferberg.
165  Direct effect of Article 6 (1) of Decision No 1/80: Case C-192/89 Sevince v Staatssecretaris van
Justitie  EU:C:1990:322, [1990] ECR I-3461, para 26; Case C-237/91  Kus v Landeshauptstadt
WiesbadeEU:C:1992:527,  [1992] ECR I-6781, paras 28 and 36; Case C-355/93  Eroglu v Land
Baden-Württemberg  EU:C:1994:369, [1994]  ECR  I-5113,  para  11;  Case  C-434/93  Bozkurt  v
Staatssecretaris van Justitie EU:C:1995:168, [1995] ECR I-1475, para 31; Case C-171/95 Tetik v
Land Berlin EU:C:1997:31, [1997] ECR I-329, paras 22, 24 and 48; Case C-285/95 Kol v Land
Berlin EU:C:1997:280, [1997] ECR I-3069, paras 21 and 29; Case C-386/95 Eker v Land Baden-
Württemberg EU:C:1997:257,  [1997] ECR I-2697, para 18; Case C-36/96 Günaydin v Freistaat
Bayern  EU:C:1997:445, [1997]  ECR I-5143,  paras  24 and 61;  Case C-98/96  Ertanir  v  Land
Hessen EU:C:1997:446,  [1997]  ECR  I-5179,  para  24;  Case  C-1/97  Birden  v  Stadtgemeinde
Bremen EU:C:1998:568,  [1998]  ECR I-7747,  paras  19 and  67;  Case  C-340/97  Nazli  v  Stadt
Nürnberg  EU:C:2000:77, [2000] ECR I-957,  para 28; Case C-188/00  Bülent Kurz, né Yüce v
Land Baden-Württemberg EU:C:2002:694, [2002] ECR I-10691, para 26; Joined Cases C-317/01
and C-369/01  Abatay and Others and Nadi Sahin v Bundesanstalt  für Arbeit  EU:C:2003:572,
[2003] ECR I-12301, para 78; Case C-136/03 Dörr v Sicherheitsdirektion Kärnten and Ibrahim
Ünal v Sicherheitsdirektion Vorarlberg  EU:C:2005:340, [2005] ECR I-4759, para 66; Case C-
230/03 Sedef v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg EU:C:2006:5, [2006] ECR I-157, para 33. On the
interpretation of Article 6 (2) of Decision No 1/80: Case C-434/93 Bozkurt v Staatssecretaris van
Justitie  EU:C:1995:168, [1995]  ECR  I-1475,  para  38;  Case  C-171/95  Tetik  v  Land  Berlin
EU:C:1997:31, [1997] ECR I-329, para 35. Direct effect of Article 7 of Decision 1/80:  Case C-
355/93 Eroglu v Land Baden-Württemberg EU:C:1994:369, [1994] ECR I-5113, para 17; Case C-
351/95 Kadiman v Freistaat Bayern EU:C:1997:205, [1997] ECR I-2133, para 28; Case C-210/97
Akman v  Oberkreisdirektor  des  Rheinisch-Bergischen-Kreises  EU:C:1998:555, [1998]  ECR I-
7519, para 23;  Case C-329/97 Ergat v Stadt Ulm EU:C:2000:133, [2000] ECR I-1487, para 34;
Case C-65/98 Eyüp v Landesgeschäftsstelle des Arbeitsmarktservice Vorarlberg EU:C:2000:336,
[2000] ECR I-4747, para 25;  Case C-275/02 Ayaz v Land Baden-Württemberg EU:C:2004:570,
[2004]  ECR  I-8765,  para  48;  Case  C-467/02 Cetinkaya  v  Land  Baden-Württemberg
EU:C:2004:708, [2004] ECR I-10895, para 31. Direct effect of Article 9 of Decision No 1/80:
Case C-374/03 Gürol v Bezirksregierung Köln EU:C:2005:435, [2005] ECR I-6199, paras 26 and
43. Direct effect of Article 10 (1) of Decision No 1/80: Case C-171/01 Wählergruppe Gemeinsam
EU:C:2003:260, [2003] ECR I-4301, paras 66 and 94. Direct effect of Article 13 of Decision No
1/80: Case C-192/89 Sevince v Staatssecretaris van Justitie EU:C:1990:322, [1990] ECR I-3461,
para 26. In Case C-277/94 Taflan-Met and Others  EU:C:1996:315, [1996] ECR I-4085, para 30
the Court held that Decision No 3/80 of the EEC-Turkey Association Council does 'not contain a
large number of precise, detailed provisions'. By its nature, supplementary rules were needed. As
the Council had, at the time of the ruling, not adopted such supplementary measures, the Court
has  held  that  Articles  12  and  13  of  Decision  No  3/80  lacked  direct  effect  (paras  23-38,  in
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  cc) Direct effect of provisions of the EEA Agreement
The European Economic Area (EEA) promotes a strengthening of trade and economic
relations with Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. The EEA Agreement168 creates rights
and  obligations  (participation  in  the  single  market),  but  does  not  restrict  the  treaty-
making power or decision-making autonomy of the contracting parties.169 Provisions of
the EEA Agreement form an integral part of the Community legal order, and are capable
particular paras 33, 37 and 38).
166  Case C-262/96  Sürül v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit EU:C:1999:228,  [1999] ECR I-2685, para 74;
Joined  Cases  C-102/98  and  C-211/98  Kocak  v  Landesversicherungsanstalt  Oberfranken  und
Mittelfranken and Ramazan Örs v Bundesknappschaft EU:C:2000:119, [2000] ECR I-1287, para
35; Case C-373/02  Öztürk v Pensionsversicherungsanstalt der Arbeiter  EU:C:2004:232, [2004]
ECR I-3605, para 60.
167  In  Case  87/75  Conceria  Daniele  Bresciani  v  Amministrazione  Italiana  delle  Finanze
EU:C:1976:18, [1976] ECR 129, para 25 the Court reached the conclusion that Article 2 (1) of the
Yaoundé Convention (association with the African States and Madagascar) conferred the right on
individuals not to pay to a Member State a charge having an effect equivalent to customs duties.
In Case C-469/93  Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Chiquita Italia  EU:C:1995:435,
[1995] ECR I-4533, paras 34-35 the Court held that  the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention  (Lomé
Convention),  which  promotes  economic,  social  and  cultural  development  of  the  ACP States,
confers, like the Second AA between the EEC and the African States and Madagascar (Yaoundé),
rights  on individuals.  Provisions  of  the  former  EEC-Morocco  [1978]  OJ  L264/2 and  Algeria
[1978] OJ L263/2 CAs also had direct effect (the Euro-Mediterranean AAs with Algeria [2005]
OJ L265/2 and with Morocco [2000] OJ L70/2 replaced the 1970s CAs). Direct effect of Article
41  (1)  of  the  EEC-Morocco  CA:  Case  C-18/90  Office  national  de  l'emploi  v  Kziber
EU:C:1991:36, [1991] ECR I-199, para 23; Case C-58/93 Yousfi v Belgian State EU:C:1994:160,
[1994]  ECR  I-1353,  paras  16-19;  Case  C-126/95  Hallouzi-Choho  v  Bestuur  van  de  Sociale
Verzekeringsbank EU:C:1996:368,[1996] ECR I-4807, paras 19-20; Case C-179/98 Belgian State
v Fatna Mesbah EU:C:1999:549,[1999] ECR I-7955, para 14. Direct effect of Article 40 (1) of the
EEC-Morocco  CA:  Case  C-416/96 El-Yassini  v  Secretary  of  State  for  Home  Department
EU:C:1999:107, [1999] ECR I-1209, para 32. See further: Case C-162/96 Racke GmbH & Co. v
Hauptzollamt Mainz  EU:C:1998:293,  [1998] ECR I-3655, para 34 (Article 22 (4) of the  EEC-
Yugoslavia CA is directly effective);  Case C-265/03  Simutenkov v Ministerio de Educación y
Cultura and Real Federación Española de Fútbol  EU:C:2005:213, [2005] ECR I-2579, para 29
(Article 23 (1) of the Communities-Russia PA is directly effective).
168  [1994] OJ L1/3 as adjusted by [1994] OJ L1/572 (Protocol adjusting the Agreement on the EEA).
On the compatibility of the EEA Agreement with the Treaty:  Opinion 1/91 re EEA Agreement
EU:C:1991:490, [1991] ECR I-6079 (negative Opinion);  Opinion 1/92  EU:C:1992:189, [1992]
ECR I-2821 (positive Opinion on the revised EEA Agreement). 
169  See the Preamble of the Agreement on the European Economic Area.
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of having direct effect, if unconditional and sufficiently precise:170
(...) the Court observes that nothing in the case-file suggests that the EEA
Agreement  (...)  was  not  concluded  in  conformity  with  the  Treaty.  It
follows that since the Agreement entered into force on 1 January 1994 the
provisions of the Agreement form an integral part of the Community legal
order. It should also be borne in mind that the first sentence of Article 10
of  the  EEA Agreement  provides  that  customs  duties  on  imports  and
exports and any charges having equivalent effect are prohibited between
the Contracting Parties. The second sentence of that article provides that,
without prejudice to the arrangements set out in Protocol 5, customs duties
of a fiscal nature are likewise prohibited. Article 10 thus lays down an
unconditional and precise rule, subject to a single exception which is itself
unconditional and precise. It follows that ever since the EEA Agreement
entered into force Article 10 has had direct effect.171
The General Court expressly refers to Kupferberg,172 so that the General Court's case law
on the possible direct effect of provisions of the  EEA Agreement might be seen as a
continuation of the Kupferberg line of reasoning.
3. Concluding remarks on the apparent asymmetry
As seen above, the Court dealt  with different kinds of agreements and seems to take
different approaches. The Court referred to the nature and structure of WTO agreements
and drew a comparison to agreements concluded by the Community. It held that WTO
agreements  are  reciprocal  and  mutually  advantageous  arrangements  and  need  to  be
distinguished  from  Community  agreements  which  introduce  a  certain  asymmetry  of
170  Case T-115/94  Opel Austria GmbH v Council EU:T:1997:3,  [1997] ECR II-39, paras 100-102
(Article 10 of the EEA Agreement has direct effect). See also: Walter van Gerven, ‘The Genesis of
EEA Law and the Principles of Primacy and Direct Effect’ (1992-1993) 16 Fordham Int'l L.J. 955,
955–989.
171  Case T-115/94 Opel Austria GmbH v Council EU:T:1997:3, [1997] ECR II-39, para 102.
172  Case T-115/94 Opel Austria GmbH v Council EU:T:1997:3, [1997] ECR II-39, para 101.
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obligations, or create special relations of integration with the Community:
(…) the agreement establishing the WTO, including the annexes, is still
founded, like GATT 1947, on the principle of negotiations with a view to
'entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements' and is
thus  distinguished,  from  the  viewpoint  of  the  Community,  from  the
agreements  concluded  between  the  Community  and  non-member
countries which introduce a certain asymmetry of obligations, or create
special  relations  of  integration  with  the  Community,  such  as  the
agreement which the Court was required to interpret in Kupferberg.173
The Court's different approaches; that is, creation of a certain dualism (denying direct
effect in respect of WTO agreements), have been criticised severely:
(…) I cannot refrain from observing in this connection that it  does not
seem to me that  the characteristics  of GATT were very different  from
those  of  other  agreements,  with  regard  to  which  the  Court  has  ruled,
without  much  explanation  and  despite  the  flexibility  of  some  of  their
provisions and the element of negotiation involved in the mechanism for
the settlement of disputes, that individuals could rely on them directly in
proceedings  before  the  national  courts,  as  their  provisions  were
sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional.174, 175
However, if the structural differences between WTO law and other agreements may not
justify recognition or denial of direct effect, what is then the decisive parameter for direct
effect of the respective agreements in question?
173  Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 42.
174  For critique:  Jan Wouters and Dries van Eeckhoutte, ‘Giving Effect to Customary International
Law Through European Community Law,  (2002) K.U. Leuven Institute  for  International  Law
Working Paper No. 2002/25, 37 (note 155 and references therein) and 40-41. See also: Naboth
van  den  Broek,  ‘Legal  Persuasion,  Political  Realism,  and  Legitimacy:  the  European  Court's
Recent Treatment of the Effect of WTO Agreements in the EC Legal Order’ (2001) 4 J.I.E.L. 411,
411 who argues that the structural  differences between WTO law and other agreements do not
justify denial of direct effect.
175  Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-
3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 27.
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D. Symmetry (invariance) - the demarcation between relevant and irrelevant 
parameters for the recognition of direct effect
After having considered the Court's different approaches (dualism) towards the possible
direct effect of provisions of GATT rules and WTO agreements, free trade associations,
accession  associations,  development  associations,  and  of  provisions  of  the  EEA
Agreement,  this  section  turns  the spotlight  on the demarcation between relevant  and
irrelevant parameters for the recognition of direct effect.
It is argued that the Court's reasoning for denying direct effect of GATT/WTO law, and
the  case  law on the  possible  direct  effect  of  provisions  of  free  trade,  accession  and
development associations and the EEA Agreement, indicates that there are relevant, and
irrelevant, parameters for the recognition of direct effect.176 That is, the 'wording, purpose
and nature' component of the two-fold test for direct effect is a method to interpret the
(objective) intention of the contracting parties,177 relevant when considering whether an
agreement is  capable of having direct effect; this method of interpretation,  where the
Court  seeks  to  establish the “objective”  intention of  the  contracting  parties  relies  on
relevant and irrelevant parameters that are used to identify the “objective” intention of
the contracting parties with regard to direct effect.
After  the  identification  of  relevant  and  irrelevant  parameters,  it  is  argued  that  the
selection  of  relevant  parameters  facilitates  the  general  assessment  of  international
agreements. However, the relevant parameters as such do not offer a framework that is
adequate to identify whether an international agreement is capable of having direct effect.
It is, therefore, argued that a hidden symmetry provides, firstly, an answer to the question
176  The  case  law seems  not  conclusive  with  regard  to  reciprocity  on  the  implementation  of  an
agreement  (lack  of  judicial  reciprocity)  and  the  autonomous  institutional  framework  to  settle
disputes (International Fruit Company line of reasoning vs. Kupferberg line of reasoning).
177  In absence of an express provision in the agreement.
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why the Court's case law on direct effect seems inconsistent and provides, secondly, a
conceptual framework for the possible direct effect of international agreements.
1. Intention of the contracting parties in absence of an express provision in the 
agreement
In the light of public international law, contracting parties are free to decide what legal
effect the provisions of an international agreement shall have in the domestic order of the
contracting  parties;  only  in  cases  where  that  question  has  not  been  settled  by  the
agreement it  is for the courts to determine the legal effect within their jurisdiction.178
Therefore, the Court may address, in absence of an express provision in the agreement
and after having taken the international origin of the provisions into account, the question
of direct effect.
As mentioned above,179 the Court has adopted a two-fold test  for direct  effect which
consists  of  a  'wording,  purpose  and  nature'  component  and  a  'clear,  precise  and
unconditional' component. The 'wording, purpose and nature' component of the two-fold
test for direct effect is a method to interpret the objective intention of the contracting
parties.180 The intention of the contracting parties is, therefore, relevant when considering
whether an agreement is capable of having direct effect.
178  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR
3641, para 17; Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 35.
179  Section 1 (the formula for direct effect).
180  Jörg Gerkrath (n 15) 132.
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2. 'Wording, purpose and nature' component - relevant and irrelevant parameters 
for the recognition of direct effect
For the identification of the (objective) intention of the contracting parties the European
Courts seem to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant parameters.
a)  Similarity of terms
The similarity of terms might be relevant when considering the (objective)  intention of
the  contracting  parties.  The  Court  has  considered  in  several  cases  whether  it  is
appropriate to apply the interpretations given in the context of the Treaty,  by way of
analogy, to provisions of international agreements worded in a similar way.181 According
to the Court's case law the similarity of terms is not a sufficient reason for applying the
interpretation given in the context of the Treaty to similar provisions.182
181  In Case 270/80 Polydor Limited and RSO Records Inc. v Harlequin Records Shops Limited and
Simons Records Limited EU:C:1982:43, [1982] ECR 329, para 18 and Case C-312/91 Procedural
issue relating to a seizure of goods belonging to Metalsa Srl.  EU:C:1993:279,[1993] ECR I-3751,
para 21 the Court has considered it not appropriate to transpose the interpretation given in the
context EEC Treaty to provisions of free trade agreements with Portugal and Austria respectively
(because the agreement on free trade and the EEC Treaty pursue different objectives).  In Case
17/81 Pabst & Richarz KG v Hauptzollamt Oldenburg EU:C:1982:129, [1982] ECR 1331, paras
26-27 (accession association EEC - Greece) and  Case C-163/90 Administration des Douanes et
Droits Indirects v Léopold Legros and others  EU:C:1992:326, [1992] ECR I-4625, paras 23-27
(free  trade  agreement  EEC-Sweden)  the  Court  has  considered  it  appropriate  to  transpose  the
interpretation given  in the  context EEC Treaty to  similar provisions of agreements  concluded
between the Community and non-Member countries.
182  Case 270/80  Polydor Limited and RSO Records Inc. v Harlequin Records Shops Limited and
Simons  Records  Limited EU:C:1982:43,  [1982]  ECR  329,  para  15:  'The  provisions  of  the
Agreement on the elimination of trade between the Community and Portugal are expressed in
terms  which  in  several  respects  are  similar  to  those  of  the  EEC Treaty  on  the  abolition  of
restrictions on intra-Community trade. (…) However, such similarity of terms is not a sufficient
reason for transposing to the provisions of the Agreement the above-mentioned case-law, which
determines in the context of the Community the relationship between the protection of industrial
and commercial property rights and the rules on the free movement of goods. The scope of that
case-law must indeed be determined in the light of the Community's objectives (…)'.
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Provisions of agreements must rather be interpreted according to their terms and in the
light of their objectives.183 Hence the similarity of terms is irrelevant when considering
direct effect.
b)  Imbalance between obligations (non-reciprocity) and the ability of the 
contracting parties to preserve and pursue interests
In Bresciani, a case of conflict between a national law of a Member State and Article 2
(1) of the Yaoundé Convention of 1963, the Court pointed to the imbalance between the
obligations assumed and stated emphatically that:
(…) the Convention was not concluded in order to ensure equality in the
obligations (…), but in order to promote (…) development (…)
This imbalance between the obligations assumed (…), which is inherent
in the special nature of the Convention, does not prevent recognition by
the Community that some of its provisions have a direct effect.184
It would appear therefore that the imbalance between the obligations assumed does not
prevent  provisions  from having direct  effect;  this  interpretation is  also  confirmed by
later case law of the Court.185
Closely linked with the question of the imbalance between the obligations assumed is the
ability of the contracting parties to preserve and pursue their interests. In examining the
183  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR
3641, paras 30-31.
184  Case 87/75 Conceria Daniele Bresciani v Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze EU:C:1976:18,
[1976] ECR 129, paras 22-23.
185  Case C-18/90  Office national de l'emploi v Kziber EU:C:1991:36,  [1991] ECR I-199, para 21;
Case  C-469/93  Amministrazione  delle  Finanze  dello  Stato  v  Chiquita  Italia  EU:C:1995:435,
[1995] ECR I-4533, para 34; Case C-262/96  Sürül v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit  EU:C:1999:228,
[1999]  ECR  I-2685,  para  72;  Case  C-37/98  The  Queen  v  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Home
Department, ex parte Abdulnasir Savas EU:C:2000:224, [2000] ECR I-2927, para 53.
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question of whether the Union's ability to preserve and pursue its interests (that is, the
question of whether the Union is in a position to dominate the framing of the agreement
or not)186 is relevant when considering the (objective) intention of the contracting parties,
it must  be borne in mind that the “position to dominate the framing of the agreement”
might lead to a “certain imbalance” between obligations assumed.187 
Imbalance between obligations, as mentioned above, is in itself not a conclusive factor to
recognise  direct  effect.  It  would  appear  therefore  that  the  position  to  dominate  the
framing of the agreement is  irrelevant  when considering direct  effect (argumentum a
fortiori).
c)  Degree of integration
Moreover, the degree of integration might be relevant when considering the (objective)
intention of the contracting parties.  In  Kupferberg188 the degree of integration was not
decisive: the Court recognised direct effect without any 'special link' with the European
Community.189 Also, the integrative nature was not decisive in  Kziber and  Simutenkov
where the Court granted direct effect  to provisions of the  EEC-Morocco Cooperation
186  Christian Tietje (n 151) 64. This parameter would not only be legal but also very political; it has
been argued that 'whether or not to accept … the direct effectiveness of a legal rule is political and
not legal' Jan Wouters and Dries van Eeckhoutte (n 174) 41.
187  Association agreements, for instance, are not necessarily unequal treaties, but are, at least to a
certain extent, to the advantage of the Community, which dominates, due to its political and legal
power,  the  negotiation  and  conclusion  of  the  treaties.  Within  the  world  trading  system  the
Community is not in a position to dominate the framing of the agreements: the WTO Members
pursue their interests by way of compromise. Christian Tietje (n 151) 63.
188  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR
3641.
189  Gerhard Bebr (n 14) 63.
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Agreement and to provisions of the Communities-Russia Partnership Agreement.190 The
Court made clear that neither the fact that an agreement with third States is:
(…) intended essentially to promote (...) economic development (…) and
that  (…)  confines  itself  to  instituting  cooperation  between  the  Parties
without referring to (…) association (…) or future accession (…),191
nor the fact that an agreement with third States is 'limited to establishing a partnership
between the parties'192 may prevent certain of its provisions from having direct effect.
The Court  seems to imply that  the fact  that the relationship between the contracting
parties is only loose does not prevent provisions from being directly effective.
d)  Safeguard clauses
Unilaterally and non-unilaterally applied safeguard clauses, permitting derogations from
the  agreement, may  affect  the  direct  enforceability  of  provisions  of  international
agreements.  Safeguard  clauses  might,  therefore,  be  relevant  when  considering  the
objective  intention of the contracting parties.  In this  regard  Kupferberg may indicate
jurisprudential orientation. In Kupferberg it was held that safeguard clauses, which only
apply  to  specific  situations,  are  not  'sufficient  in  themselves'  to  affect  the  direct
enforceability  of  certain  provisions  of  free  trade  agreements.193 The  most  important
aspect is, however, that the safeguard clauses applied 'after consideration within the Joint
190  Case C-18/90  Office national de l'emploi v Kziber EU:C:1991:36,  [1991] ECR I-199, para 23
(Article  41(1)  of  the  EEC-Morocco  CA is  capable  of  having  direct  effect);  Case  C-265/03
Simutenkov  v  Ministerio  de  Educación  y  Cultura  and  Real  Federación  Española  de  Fútbol
EU:C:2005:213, [2005] ECR I-2579, para 29 (Article 23 (1) of the Communities-Russia PA has
direct effect).
191  Case C-18/90 Office national de l'emploi v Kziber EU:C:1991:36, [1991] ECR I-199, para 21.
192  Case C-265/03 Simutenkov v Ministerio de Educación y Cultura and Real Federación Española
de Fútbol EU:C:2005:213, [2005] ECR I-2579, para 28.
193  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR
3641,  para  21;  confirmed  in:  Case  C-192/89  Sevince  v  Staatssecretaris  van  Justitie
EU:C:1990:322, [1990] ECR I-3461, para 25.
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Committee in the presence of both parties' (emphasis added).194
The Court seems to imply that the distinguishing factor is whether or not a contracting
party may apply the safeguard clauses unilaterally. In cases where a contracting party
may apply safeguard clauses unilaterally, obligations assumed under the agreement are
not sufficiently unconditional. Jointly applied safeguard clauses, in contrast, seem not to
affect the direct enforceability.195
It follows that only unilaterally applied safeguard clauses are an obstacle to direct effect.
So that one may conclude that unilaterally applied safeguard clauses  indicate that the
contracting parties did not intend direct effect.
3. Concluding remarks on the demarcation between relevant and irrelevant 
parameters for the recognition of direct effect
The  objective  intention  of  the  contracting  parties  seems relevant  to  the  Court  when
considering whether direct effect is possible. As seen, there are  relevant and irrelevant
parameters for the identification of the objective intention of the contracting parties.
The similarity of terms, the imbalance between the obligations assumed (that is,  certain
asymmetry of obligations/  non-reciprocity), the ability to preserve and pursue interests
194  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR
3641, para 21.
195  On the other  hand, one may take the view that any possibility of derogation, which is to be
negotiated within a political body, may prevent provisions from being directly effective: they are
not sufficiently  unconditional to have direct  effect.  See: Gerhard Bebr (n 14) 64 and 70  who
argues that it remains doubtful to what extent the obligations under the free trade agreement in
Kupferberg were 'really unconditional'. The latter view is, however, not in line with the case law
of  the  Court  (in  Kupferberg the  jointly  applied  safeguard  clause  did  not  affect  the  direct
enforceability).
67
Chapter I
(that is,  position to dominate the framing of the agreement), the degree of integration
and/ or jointly applied safeguard clauses seem irrelevant when considering the objective
intention of the contracting parties. To put it differently, they do not affect, in themselves,
the  direct  effect/enforceability  of  provisions  of  international  agreements.  Unilaterally
applied safeguard clauses, in contrast, seem to indicate that the contracting parties did not
intend to grant direct effect (objective intent).
However, a static application of the irrelevant and relevant parameters as such seems too
schematic and seems inadequate to  identify the objective intention of the contracting
parties. Instead, it seems that only a holistic approach is adequate to identify the objective
intention. The next section tries to conceptualise such an approach.
E. The Court's case law on direct effect: a symmetrical phenomenon
As the  selection  of  relevant  parameters  as  such  does  not  offer  a  framework  that  is
adequate to identify the constitutional effects of international agreements, the question is:
what symmetry, if any, exists? - Is there a symmetry (invariance) underlying the apparent
asymmetry (the Court's different approaches on direct effect196)?
196  For further jurisprudential reflections, see Pieter Jan Kuijper ‘The New WTO Dispute Settlement
System—The Impact  on the  European Community’(1995)  29 JWT 49-71;  Miquel Montañá  I
Mora, ‘Equilibrium: A Rediscovered Basis for the Court of Justice of the European Communities
to Refuse Direct Effect to the Uruguay Round Agreements?’ (1996) 30 JWT 43-59; Philp Lee and
Brian Kennedy, ‘The Potential Direct Effect of GATT 1994 in European Community Law’ (1996)
30 JWT 67-89, cited supra note 69.
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The concept of pacta sunt servanda is based on bona fide and forms a basic principle of
international  law.  The principle  pacta sunt servanda has been codified in  the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties and is a rule of customary197 international law:
Every  treaty  in  force is  binding  upon  the  parties  to  it  and  must  be
performed by them in good faith.198 (emphasis added)
The Court confirmed in Portugal v Council the principle of good faith:
(…) according to the general rules of international law there must be bona
fide performance of every agreement.199
However, in the light of their subject-matter and purpose:
(...) WTO agreements (...) do not determine the appropriate legal means of
ensuring  that  they  are  applied  in  good  faith  in  the  legal  order  of  the
contracting parties.200
This finding is essential for understanding the Court's case law on direct effect. Thinking
from an external perspective, it goes without saying that the principle of international law
197  The European Union respects international law in the exercise of its powers (compliance with
rules  of  customary  international  law by virtue of  an international  agreement):  Case C-286/90
Anklagemyndigheden v Peter Michael Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp EU:C:1992:453,[1992]
ECR I-6019, para 9; Case C-405/92 Etablissements Armand Mondiet SA v Armement Islais SARL
EU:C:1993:906,  [1993]  ECR I-6133,  paras  13-15;  Case  C-162/96  A.  Racke  GmbH & Co.  v
Hauptzollamt Mainz EU:C:1998:293, [1998] ECR I-3655, para 45; Case C-308/06 The Queen, on
the  application  of  International  Association  of  Independent  Tanker  Owners  (Intertanko)  and
Others v Secretary of State for Transport EU:C:2008:312, [2008] ECR I-4057, para 51; Case C-
386/08 Firma Brita GmbH v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen EU:C:2010:91, [2010] ECR I-1289,
paras 40-42; Case T-115/94 Opel Austria GmbH v Council EU:T:1997:3, [1997] ECR II-39, para
90; confirmed by Article 3 (5) TEU ('strict observance and the development of international law');
Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America and Others v Secretary of State for Energy
and Climate Change EU:C:2011:864, [2011] ECR I-13755, para 101.
198  Article 26 VCLT 1969.
199  Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 35.
200  Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 41.
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cannot, as the international and EU internal spheres are to be distinguished, determine the
legal effects in the internal legal order of the European Union.
Given the contractual nature of WTO/ and obligations of other agreements,  one may,
however, argue, from an internal perspective, that the efficient breach (that is, breach of
contract to make a net profit from the opportunities created by the breach)201 and pacta
sunt servanda  (that is, agreements must be observed) methodology is the symmetry or
invariance underlying the Court's different approaches on direct effect.202
The WTO system, even though governed by international law and therefore subject to the
pacta sunt servanda principle, sets up internally; that is, within its boundaries, a system
where pacta sunt servanda is not the dominant rule. The WTO law system, merely with
the preference of compliance, permits efficient breach.203 Therefore, the WTO system has
to  be  distinguished  from  other  agreements  concluded  between  the  Union  and  non-
member countries.
Due to  the contractual  nature of obligations  of international  agreements,  the  efficient
breach  and  pacta sunt servanda methodology provides therefore a possible conceptual
framework for the recognition or denial of direct effect of international agreements.
It seems that agreements which are designed to permit efficient breach are by nature not
capable of conferring rights on individuals, as they do not determine the appropriate legal
201  On the concept of  efficient breach see e.g.: Donald Harris, David Campbell and Roger Halson
Remedies in Contract and Tort (Law in Context, 2nd edn CUP, Cambridge 2005) 11.
202  Adheres to the fiction that international treaties, e.g. WTO law, as a contract between members;
that is, unitary entities, can be compared to contracts between individuals.
203  The WTO modelled as an efficient breach contract (clausula rebus sic stantibus): Manfred Elsig,
‘The World trade Organization's Legitimacy Crisis: what does the beast look like?’ (2007) 41 JWT
75,  91  with  further  references;  and  the  views  of  Warren  F.  Schwartz  and  Alan  O.  Sykes,
‘Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization’
(2002)  31  JLS  179,  179–204  (advocates  of  the  efficient  breach reading  of  the  DSU);  the
application of efficient breach to international treaties is undeveloped when compared to national
law (contract theory).
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means of ensuring that they are applied in the European legal order (that is, individual
rights would undermine the efficient breach system). Agreements which do determine the
appropriate legal means of ensuring that they are applied in good faith in the European
legal  order  (pacta  sunt  servanda)  are,  in  contrast,  capable  of  conferring  rights  on
individuals, as pacta sunt servanda is the dominant rule.
Within this framework, we can find an answer to the question why the Court's case law
on direct effect seems, at first glance, inconsistent. The idea of efficient breach vs. pacta
sunt servanda seems to be the underlying symmetry. One may therefore argue that the
Court's case law on direct effect is a symmetrical phenomenon; that is, consistent as the
Court's different approaches on direct effect can be reconciled.
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F. Incurse: Technical aspects of indirect effects and limitations
The Agreement  Establishing the World Trade Organization and the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994) does not confer rights on citizens. There is no right to
rely directly on such provisions.204 As Eeckhout has described, consistency required that
only two replies to the question of direct effect were permitted: either an international
agreement had direct effect, and then it should be possible to rely on it in all types of
cases, or it did not have such effect, and then it cannot be relied upon at all. Such an
approach would have had the merit of clarity, but in the case of GATT it had not been
followed by the Court – in Eeckhout's submission, with good reason. Given the fact that
the Court had been unwilling to grant direct  effect to GATT, a black-white approach
204  In terms of GATT rules (Joined Cases 21 to 24/72 International Fruit Company NV and others v
Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219, para 27; Case C-280/93
Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, para 110) and WTO agreements (Case
C-149/96 Portugal v Council  EU:C:1999:574,  [1999] ECR I-8395, para 48) direct  effect  was
denied.  The  possibility  of  direct  effect  was  accepted  for  provisions  of  FTAs  (Case  104/81
Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR 3641, para
26);  acc.  associations  (Case  17/81  Pabst  &  Richarz  KG  v  Hauptzollamt  Oldenburg
EU:C:1982:129, [1982] ECR 1331, paras 25-27; Case C-37/98 The Queen v Secretary of State for
the Home Department, ex parte Abdulnasir Savas EU:C:2000:224, [2000] ECR I-2927, para 54;
Case C-63/99  The Queen v Secretary  of  State for  the Home Department,  ex parte Gloszczuk
EU:C:2001:488, [2001] ECR I-6369, para 38; Case C-235/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for
the Home Department, ex parte Kondova EU:C:2001:489, [2001] ECR I-6427, para 39; Case C-
257/99  The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Barkoci and Malik
EU:C:2001:491, [2001] ECR I-6557, para 39; Case C-268/99 Jany and Others v Staatssecretaris
van Justitie  EU:C:2001:616,  [2001] ECR I-8615, paras 26 and 28; Case C-162/00  Nordrhein-
Westfalen v Pokrzeptowicz-Meyer EU:C:2002:57,  [2002] ECR I-1049, para 30; Case C-438/00
Deutscher Handballbund eV v Kolpak  EU:C:2003:255, [2003] ECR I-4135, para 30; Case C-
327/02  Panayotova  and  Others  v  Minister  voor  Vreemdelingenzaken  en  Integratie
EU:C:2004:718, [2004] ECR I-11055, para 18); DAs (Case 87/75 Conceria Daniele Bresciani v
Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze EU:C:1976:18,[1976] ECR 129, para 25; Case C-18/90
Office national de l'emploi v Kziber EU:C:1991:36,  [1991] ECR I-199, para 23; Case C-58/93
Yousfi  v  Belgian  State  EU:C:1994:160, [1994]  ECR  I-1353,  paras  16-19;  Case  C-469/93
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Chiquita Italia EU:C:1995:435, [1995] ECR I-4533,
paras  34-35;  Case  C-126/95  Hallouzi-Choho  v  Bestuur  van  de  Sociale  Verzekeringsbank
EU:C:1996:368, [1996]  ECR  I-4807,  paras  19-20;  Case  C-162/96  Racke  GmbH  &  Co.  v
Hauptzollamt Mainz EU:C:1998:293,  [1998] ECR I-3655, para 34; Case C-416/96  El-Yassini v
Secretary of State for Home Department  EU:C:1999:107, [1999] ECR I-1209, para 32; Case C-
179/98  Belgian State v Fatna Mesbah EU:C:1999:549,  [1999] ECR I-7955, para 14; Case C-
265/03 Simutenkov v Ministerio de Educación y Cultura and Real Federación Española de Fútbol
EU:C:2005:213,  [2005]  ECR I-2579,  para  29) and the  EEA Agreement  (Case  T-115/94  Opel
Austria GmbH v Council EU:T:1997:3, [1997] ECR II-39, paras 100-102).
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would have stood in the way of useful effects of GATT resulting from the application of
the principle of consistent interpretation and from the principle of implementation. 205
In Fediol206 and Nakajima207 the Court addressed the issue of the indirect effects of GATT
rules.208 Fediol (EEC Seed Crushers' and Oil Processors' Federation), a trade association,
sought  the  annulment  of  the  Commission's  (unpublished)  Decision  No  2506  of  22
December 1986209 refusing to examine Argentinian trade practices asserted to  violate
Council Regulation No 2641/84 of 17 September 1984210 (“the New Commercial Policy
Instrument”),  to  deny  initiation  of  an  examination  of  two  practices  on  the  part  of
Argentina  which  Fediol  described  as  “illicit  commercial  practices”;  that  is,  these
practices violated the GATT and were thus injurious to the Community's soy-bean oil
industry,  namely  a  scheme  of  differential  charges  (differential  tax  regime)  and
quantitative  restrictions,  inter  alia  in  the  form  of  export  registrations  and  sporadic
suspension of exports. The Commission argued that the appeal was inadmissible.211 The
205  Piet Eeckhout, ‘The domestic legal status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting legal systems’
(1997) 34 CMLR 11, 58.
206  Case 70/87 Fediol v Commission EU:C:1989:254, [1989] ECR 1781 (GATT 1947).
207  Case C-69/89  Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council EU:C:1991:186,  [1991] ECR I-2069
(GATT 1947). See amongst others, Hans-Peter Folz and Barbara Brandtrer, ‘Nakajima’ (1993) 4
E.J.I.L. 430-432; Geert A. Zonnekeyn, ‘The latest on indirect effect of WTO law in the EC legal
order:  the  Nakajima case  law  misjudged’ (2001)  4  Int  Economic  Law  597-608;  Geert  A.
Zonnekeyn, ‘The ECJ's Petrotub judgment: towards a revival of the "Nakajima doctrine"?’ (2003)
30  L.I.E.I.  249-266.  For  critical  analysis  of  the  Fediol  and  Nakajima  case-law,  e.g.  Francis
Snyder, ‘The gatekeepers: The European courts and WTO law’ (2003) 40 CMLR 313-367.
208  Referred to as indirect effect, by analogy with the rule of consistent interpretation, Nanette A.
Neuwahl, ‘Individuals and the GATT: Direct effect and indirect effects of the General Agreement
of Tariffs and Trade in Community Law’ in N. Emiliou and D. O'Keeffe (eds),  The European
Union and World Trade Law (John Wiley & Sons, Chichester 1996) 313-328.
209  Commission Decision (EEC) No 2506/86 of 22 December 1986 (unpublished).
210  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2641/84  of  17  September  1984  on  the  strengthening  of  the
common commercial  policy  with  regard  in  particular  to  protection  against  illicit  commercial
practices [1984] OJ L252/1.
211  Case 70/87 Fediol v Commission EU:C:1989:254, [1989] ECR 1781, para 13.
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Court found that the tax regime violated none of the GATT provisions relied on.212
Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd,  a  company incorporated under  Japanese  law,  which
manufactured  typewriters  and  dot-matrix  printers,  contested  Council  Regulation  No
3651/88213 imposing definitive anti-dumping duties on serial-impact dot-matrix printers
originating in Japan. Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd whose goods sold for export to the
Community were subjected to definitive anti-dumping duties, fixed at 12 %, was one of
the manufacturers named in Article 1 (2) of the contested Regulation.214 Nakajima raised
the plea of inapplicability with regard to the basic EC's anti-dumping regulation. The
Court held that it was necessary to examine whether the Council went beyond the legal
framework  laid  down  in  adopting  the  disputed  provision,  as  Nakajima  claimed.
Nakajima and Fediol lead in the same direction. Nakajima and Fediol type of cases are
manifestation of the judicial application of GATT rules.  Nakajima allows the Court to
review the legality of the Community measures in the light of the GATT rules where the
Community intended implementation of a particular obligation assumed in the context of
the  GATT215 and  Fediol  where  the  measure  makes  explicit  reference  to  a  specific
provision of the GATT agreement.216
212  Case 70/87  Fediol v Commission  EU:C:1989:254, [1989] ECR 1781. See for analysis  of the
judgment:  Arthur  E.  Appleton,  ‘Fédération  de  l'industrie  de  l'huilerie  de  la  CEE (Fediol)  v.
Commission des Communautés Européennes. Case No. 70/87. Court of Justice of the European
Communities, June 22, 1989.’ (1990) 84 AJIL 258-262.
213  Council Regulation (EEC) No 3651/88 of 23 November 1988 imposing a definitive anti-dumping
duty on imports of serial-impact dot-matrix printers originating in Japan [1988] OJ L317/33.
214  See for analysis of the judgment: Fernando Castillo de la Torre, ‘Anti-dumping policy and private
interest’(1992) 17 ELRev. 346-348.
215  Case C-69/89  Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council EU:C:1991:186,  [1991] ECR I-2069,
para 31. As regards GATT 1947 (Community rules, adopted for the purpose of implementing
GATT).
216  Case 70/87 Fediol v Commission EU:C:1989:254, [1989] ECR 1781, paras 19-20 (GATT 1947.
Community rules referred to the provisions of GATT).
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Further  crucial  manifestation  of  the  judicial  application  of  GATT  norms  is  the
“International  Dairy  Arrangement  (IDA)”  decision.217 In  its  setting,  the  Commission
brought Germany before the Court for failing to implement (correctly) its obligations
under the IDA, a self-standing international agreement, creating stable market conditions
for trade in dairy products. The Court engaged in a interpretation of the IDA. The Court
in IDA held that, in cases where the wording of secondary EC legislation is open to more
than one interpretation, preference should be given as far as possible to the interpretation
which renders the provision consistent with the Treaty. The Court further held that an
implementing regulation must, if possible, be given an interpretation consistent with the
basic regulation. Likewise, the primacy of EC international agreements over provisions
of secondary EC legislation means that such provisions must, so far as is possible, be
interpreted in a manner that is consistent with those agreements.218 IDA provides insights
into the relationship between EC and GATT (WTO) law; that is, division of horizontal
powers.
Post-Fediol and Nakajima jurisprudence. In Portugal v Council the Court maintained its
Fediol219 and Nakajima220 line of reasoning:
It  is  only  where  the  Community  intended  to  implement  a  particular
obligation assumed in the context of the WTO, or where the Community
measure  refers  expressly  to  the  precise  provisions  of  the  WTO
agreements,  that  it  is  for  the  Court  to  review  the  legality  of  the
217  Case C-61/94 Commission v Germany (International Dairy Arrangement) EU:C:1996:313,[1996]
ECR I-3989. See for analyses of the judgment: Piet Eeckhout, ‘Case C-61/94,  Commission v.
Germany,  [1996]  ECRI-3989’ (1998)  35  CMLR 557-566;  Noreen  Burrows,  ‘Interpreting  the
International Dairy Agreement’ (1997) 22 ELRev. 263-264.
218  Case  C-61/94  Commission  v  Germany (International  Dairy  Arrangement)  EU:C:1996:313,
[1996] ECR I-3989, para 52.
219  Case 70/87 Fediol v Commission EU:C:1989:254, [1989] ECR 1781.
220  Case C-69/89 Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council EU:C:1991:186, [1991] ECR I-2069.
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Community measure in question in the light of the WTO rules (…).221
The Court furthermore confirmed this case law in Ikea222 and FIAMM.223 In all such cases
the Court confirmed the Fediol224 and Nakajima225 exceptions to the general principle that
Community measures may not be reviewed for compliance with WTO law as expressed
in  Opinion  of  Advocate  General  Geelhoed  in  Egenberger  GmbH  Molkerei  und
Trockenwerk v Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung.226
221  Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 49.
222  Case  C-351/04  Ikea  Wholesale  Ltd  v  Commissioners  of  Customs  & Excise EU:C:2007:547,
[2007] ECR I-7723, para 30. In Hermann's view, given the settled case-law, '(…) from Portugal v.
Council to  Van  Parys,  the  treatment  of  the  ADA in  the  present  case  is  hardly  surprising.
Nevertheless, it begs the question whether there is any situation at all in which the use of the
Nakajima principle can in fact be made. If not in the case of anti-dumping, where else could we
speak  of  the  EC  having  intended  to  implement  specific  obligations  arising  under  the  WTO
agreements?  (…).'  See Christoph  Hermann,  ‘Case  C-351/04,  Ikea  Wholesale  Ltd  v.
Commissioners of Customs & Excise, Judgment of the Court of Justice of 27 September 2007,
Second Chamber [2007] ECR I-7723’ (2008) 45 CMLR 1507, 1515.
223  Joined Cases  C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P  FIAMM and FIAMM Technologies v Council  and
Commission EU:C:2008:476, [2008] ECR I-6513, para 114.
224  Case 70/87 Fediol v Commission EU:C:1989:254, [1989] ECR 1781, paras 19-22.
225  Case C-69/89  Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council EU:C:1991:186,  [1991] ECR I-2069,
para 31.
226  'On this point, however, I would observe that the Commission has not, in my view, given any
convincing  reasons  why  the  Court  should  review  (or  remove)  the  longstanding  Nakajima
exception  in  the  present  case.  To  begin,  it  is  clear  that  the  Court  was  fully  aware  of,  and
considered,  the  implications  of  the  reciprocal  nature  of  the  WTO  agreements  in  its  leading
judgments setting out the circumstances in which WTO rules may form a ground of review of
Community measures. Thus, for example, in Portugal v Council, the Court recalled that the WTO
agreement is  (…) founded,  like GATT 1947,  on the principle  of  negotiations with a  view to
“entering  into  reciprocal  and  mutually  advantageous  arrangements”  (…).  In  all  such  cases,
however, the Court none the less confirmed the  Fediol  and  Nakajima  exceptions to the general
principle  that  Community  measures  may  not  be  reviewed  for  compliance  with  WTO  law.
Moreover,  the existence of  these exceptions does not,  to  my mind,  conflict  with what  was a
primary rationale for the general  principle;  namely, that  according direct  effect  to WTO rules
would 'deprive the legislative or executive organs of the Community of the scope for manoeuvre
enjoyed by their counterparts in the Community's trading partners.' (…) In a case where it is clear
that a Community measure was specifically intended to implement a particular obligation of WTO
law, the Community legislature has essentially chosen to limit its own scope of manoeuvre in
negotiations by itself  'incorporating'  that  obligation into Community  law.'  See  Case  C-313/04
Egenberger GmbH Molkerei und Trockenwerk v Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft und Ernährung
EU:C:2005:733, [2006] ECR I-6331, Opinion of AG Geelhoed, para 64.
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According to Advocate General Geelhoed there are principal difficulties with defining the
scope  of  the  Nakajima227 exception.  First,  the  meaning  of  the  requirement  that  the
measure  should  implement  a  particular  obligation  of  GATT,  in  Advocate  General
Geelhoed's view this requirement referred only to implementation of one specific, or a
specific group of, provisions of GATT. Advocate General Geelhoed did not agree with
the interpretation of the General Court in  Chiquita  that a distinction should be made
between GATT provisions that are general (in that case, the Article XIII of the GATT
obligation of non-discriminatory application of quantitative restrictions) and particular in
nature. Aside from the fact that it seemed difficult to draw a consistent line between types
of obligation in this manner (the General Court did not define how this should be done),
it seemed to Advocate General Geelhoed that the rationale of the Nakajima exception
would also apply to an obligation implemented into EC but, for instance, not confined to
just  one  individual  area  such  as anti-dumping.  Second,  the  principal  difficulty  with
defining the scope of the Nakajima exception was setting out how to assess whether the
EC legislator's 'intention' in taking the contested measure was to implement a particular
obligation of GATT. On this point, while it seemed initially attractive to interpret this test
as  simply  requiring  an  assessment  of  the  EC  legislator's  subjective  intention,  this
approach was in Advocate General Geelhoed's view inherently flawed. Advocate General
Geelhoed has argued that  it was almost impossible for the Court – and for individuals
seeking to ascertain the scope of their  rights – to be certain what the EC legislator's
subjective intention was at the time of passing legislation and also the Court has been
inconsistent in assessing the relevance of direct evidence of the EC's legislator subjective
intention, thus, in cases such as  Van Parys, the Court rejected the applicability of the
Nakajima doctrine in circumstances where the subjective intention of the EC legislator
was, as expressed in the preamble and in comments of the Commissioner at the time, to
227  Case C-69/89 Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council EU:C:1991:186, [1991] ECR I-2069.
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implement a WTO obligation.228
According  to  Gáspár-Szilágyi,  recently,  in  LVP  NV v  Belgische  Staat,229 the  Court
declined  to  extend  the  Fediol and  Nakajima principles  to  the  compatibility  of  the
European  Union's  banana  regime  with  WTO  law. Council  and  Others  v  Vereniging
Milieudefensie  and  Stichting  Stop  Luchtverontreiniging  Utrecht230 and  Council  and
Commission  v  Stichting  Natuur  en  Milieu  and  Pesticide  Action  Network  Europe231
concerned  the  application  of  the  Fediol and  Nakajima  principles  to  the  Aarhus
Convention. It has been suggested that, as a result of the two judgments, it seems that the
afore-mentioned  principles  will  remain  confined  to  WTO  law  (anti-dumping,  anti-
subsidies and trade barriers).232
228  Case C-313/04 Egenberger GmbH Molkerei und Trockenwerk v Bundesanstalt für Landwirtschaft
und Ernährung EU:C:2005:733, [2006] ECR I-6331, Opinion of AG Geelhoed, paras 72-76. The
General Court points to the fact that applications of the Nakajima case law is not, a priori, limited
to areas of anti-dumping. See, Case T-19/01 Chiquita Brands International, Inc., Chiquita Banana
Co. BV and Chiquita Italia, SpA v Commission EU:T:2005:31, [2005] ECR II-315, para 124.
229  Case C-306/13 LVP NV v Belgische Staat EU:C:2014:2465.
230  Joined  Cases  C-401/12 P,  C-402/12  P  and  C-403/12 P  Council  and  Others  v  Vereniging
Milieudefensie and Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht EU:C:2015:4.
231  Joined Cases C-404/12 P and C-405/12 P Council and Commission v Stichting Natuur en Milieu
and Pesticide Action Network Europe EU:C:2015:5.
232  For  further  discussion,  see  Szilárd  Gáspár-Szilágyi,  ‘The  relationship  between  EU law  and
international agreements: Restricting the application of the  Fediol and  Nakajima exceptions in
Vereniging Milieudefensie’ (2015) 52 CMLR 1059-1077, in particular at 1074-1077.
78
Chapter I
Doctrinal (in)coherence. Fediol233 and Nakajima234 and the 'monistic' (in)coherence of the
Court's case law.  International Fruit Company235 suggests a monistic conception of the
relationship  between  international  and  European  law and  seems  to  indicate  that  the
Unions' legal order stands in a monistic tradition towards international law. That is,
(…) desire to observe the Undertakings of the General Agreement follows
as  much  from  the  very  provisions  of  the  EEC  Treaty  as  from  the
Declarations made by Member States on the presentation of the Treaty to
the contracting parties of the General Agreement in accordance with the
obligation under Article XXIV thereof.
That intention was made clear in particular by Article 110 of the EEC
Treaty  [now  Article  206  TFEU],  which  seeks  the  adherence  of  the
Community to the same aims as those sought by the General Agreement,
as well as by the first paragraph of Article 234 [now Article 351 TFEU]
which provides that the rights and obligations arising from agreements
concluded  before  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty,  and  in  particular
multilateral  agreements  concluded  with  the  participation  of  Member
States, are not affected by the provisions of the Treaty.
The  Community  has  assumed  the  functions  inherent  in  the  Tariff  and
Trade  Policy,  progressively  during  the  transitional  period  and  in  their
entirety on the expiry of that period, by virtue of Articles [111] and 113 of
the Treaty [now Article 207 TFEU].
By  conferring  those  powers  on  the  Community,  the  Member  States
showed their wish to  bind it  by the obligations entered into under  the
General Agreement.236
As confirmed in Haegeman, '[t]he provisions of the Agreement [Association Agreement
233  Case 70/87 Fediol v Commission EU:C:1989:254, [1989] ECR 1781.
234  Case C-69/89 Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council EU:C:1991:186, [1991] ECR I-2069.
235  Joined Cases  21 to 24/72  International Fruit  Company NV and others  v  Produktschap voor
Groenten en Fruit EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219.
236  Joined Cases  21 to 24/72  International Fruit  Company NV and others  v  Produktschap voor
Groenten en Fruit EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219, paras 12-15 (GATT 1947).
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with Greece], from the coming into force thereof, form an integral part of Community
law.'237 This 'monistic'  consistency of the Court's case law is openly at odds with the
approach  in  Portugal  v  Council,238 inspired  by  dualism;  that  is,  denial  of  automatic
effects within the Union's legal order.
The judgments in Case 70/87 Fediol v Commission [1989] ECR 1781 and
Case  C-69/89  Nakajima  v  Council  [1991]  ECR  I-2069  are  only
apparently,  or  at  any  rate  only  partly,  inconsistent  with  this  general
tendency.  The  implication  of  those  judgments  is  that  whenever  a
Community rule refers to the provisions of GATT (as in  Fediol) or has
been adopted for the purpose of implementing them (as in Nakajima), the
Court accepts that individuals may rely on those provisions as a measure
of the legality of the Community act in question.  It is true that in such
cases the option of invoking the GATT provisions is  not  based on the
direct effect of those provisions but on the fact that there is a Community
act which has implemented them or at  least  expressed the intention of
implementing them. The fact that the provision may serve as a measure of
the validity of a Community act only in cases where the act refers to or
implements the GATT provision clearly means that it may do so only if
and when the international provision has been transposed into Community
law. This in turn raises further questions about the 'monist' consistency of
the  Court's  case-law,  which  is  openly  at  odds  with  the  approach  in
Nakajima (…).239
Indeed, Fediol240 and Nakajima241 seem to deny, in line with Kupferberg,242 that WTO law
is automatically integrated into the legal order of the European Community:
237  Case 181/73 Haegeman v Belgian State EU:C:1974:41, [1974] ECR 449, para 5. Cf. Case 12/86
Demirel  v  Stadt  Schwäbisch Gmünd  EU:C:1987:400,  [1987]  ECR 3719,  para 7.  For a  recent
discussion, Armin von Bogdandy and Maja Smrkolj ‘European Community and Union Law and
International Law’ in Wolfrum, Rüdiger (et al, eds),  Encyclopedia of Public International Law
(OUP, Oxford 2011), para 9 with further references; or H. G. Schermers, ‘Community Law and
International Law’ (1975) 12 CMLR 77, 83-84.
238  Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395.
239  Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-
3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 27 fn 45.
240  Case 70/87 Fediol v Commission EU:C:1989:254, [1989] ECR 1781.
241  Case C-69/89 Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council EU:C:1991:186, [1991] ECR I-2069.
242  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR
3641.
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It follows from the Community nature of such provisions that their effect
in the Community may not be allowed to vary according to whether their
application is in practice the responsibility of the Community institutions
or of the Member States and, in the latter case, according to the effects in
the internal legal order of each Member State which the law of that state
assigns to international agreements concluded by it. Therefore it is for the
Court,  within  the  framework  of  its  jurisdiction  in  interpreting  the
provisions of agreements, to ensure their uniform application throughout
the Community.
The governments which have submitted observations to the Court do not
deny the Community nature of the provisions of agreements concluded by
the  Community.  They contend,  however,  that  the  generally  recognized
criteria for determining the effects of provisions of a purely Community
origin  may  not  be  applied  to  provisions  of  a  Free-Trade  Agreement
concluded by the Community with a non-Member country.243
The European Parliament's resolution on the relationships between international law and
the constitutional law of the Member States. This reasoning, stating that:
Calls for a clear statement of the relationship between international law
and European law to be written into the EC Treaty, in terms of the EC
being equated with nation states, which means that international law is
applicable not directly but only after it has been declared applicable by an
internal legal act of the EC or after its substance has been transposed into
EC legislation.244
This dualistic approach may be seen as a shift from monism to dualism and indicates a
dualistic conception of the relationship between international and European Union law.245
243  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR
3641, paras 14-15.
244  The  European  Parliament,  Resolution on the relationships  between international  law and the
constitutional law of the Member States [1997] OJ C325/26, para 14.
245  See Robert Uerpmann-Wittzack, ‘The Constitutional Role of International Law’ in Armin von
Bogdandy and Jürgen Bast (eds),  Principles of European Constitutional Law (2nd revised edn
Hart, Oxford 2011) 137-147.
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In  line  with  International  Fruit  Company246 and  Haegeman,247 the  General  Court
suggested a monistic approach in Kadi:248
It  has to be added that,  with particular  regard to Article  307 EC [now
Article  351  TFEU]  and  to  Article  103  of  the  Charter  of  the  United
Nations,  reference  to  infringements  either  of  fundamental  rights  as
protected by the Community legal order or of the principles of that legal
order cannot affect the validity of a Security Council measure or its effect
in the territory of the Community (…).249
In contrast, Advocate General Maduro, adopted a dualistic/or pluralistic approach, rather
than a monistic one. According to him the relationship between international law and the
Community  legal  order  was  governed  by  the  Community  legal  order  itself,  and
international law could permeate that legal order only under the conditions set by the
constitutional principles of the Community.250
In  turn,  the  Court  highlighted  the  autonomy  of  the  Union's  legal  order,  without
addressing the monism/dualism dichotomy,
It follows from all these considerations that the obligations imposed by an
international  agreement  cannot  have  the  effect  of  prejudicing  the
constitutional principles of the EC Treaty, which include the principle that
all  Community  acts  must  respect  fundamental  rights,  that  respect
constituting a condition of their lawfulness which it is for the Court to
246  Joined Cases  21 to 24/72  International Fruit  Company NV and others  v  Produktschap voor
Groenten en Fruit EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219.
247  Case 181/73 Haegeman v Belgian State EU:C:1974:41, [1974] ECR 449.
248  Case T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council and Commission EU:T:2005:332, [2005] ECR II-
3649.
249  Case T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council and Commission EU:T:2005:332, [2005] ECR II-
3649, para 224.
250  Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v
Council and Commission EU:C:2008:11, [2008] ECR I-6351, Opinion of AG Maduro, para 24.
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review  in  the  framework  of  the  complete  system  of  legal  remedies
established by the Treaty.251
In the light of the Court rulings mentioned above and considering the inconsistency of
the Court's case law there seems no doctrinal support to convey a consistent dualistic
approach.252 The doctrinal inconsistencies still leave unexplained whether the descriptors
'monistic'  and  'dualistic'  imply  the  emergence  of  differences  in  fundamental  rights
251  Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P  Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v
Council and Commission EU:C:2008:461, [2008] ECR I-6351, para 285. The Court's attitude has
been widely discussed  in  the literature: Rory Stephen Brown,  ‘Executive  Power  and  Judicial
Supervision at European Level:  Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the
European  Communities’  (2006)  4  EHRLR  456;  Helmut  Philipp  Aust  and  Nina  Naske,
‘Rechtsschutz gegen den UN-Sicherheitsrat durch europäische Gerichte? Die Rechtsprechung des
EuG zur  Umsetzung  ''gezielter  Sanktionen''  aus  dem Blickwinkel  des  Völkerrechts’(2006)  61
ZÖR  587;  Sebastian  Steinbarth, ‘Individualrechtsschutz  gegen  Maßnahmen  der  EG  zur
Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus, Die Entscheidungen des EuG in den Rs. "Yusuf
u.a."  sowie  "Kadi"’  (2006)  ZeuS  269;  Andreas  von  Arnauld,  ‘UN-Sanktionen  und
gemeinschaftsrechtlicher Grundrechtsschutz’ (2006) 44 AdV 201; Christoph Möllers, ‘Das EuG
konstitutionalisiert  die  Vereinten  Nationen  –  Anmerkungen  zu  den  Urteilen  des  EuG  vom
21.09.2005, Rs. T-315-01 und T-306/01’ (2006) 3 EuropaR 426; Luis M. Hinojosa Martínez, ‘Bad
Law for Good Reasons: The Contradictions of the  Kadi Judgment’ (2008) 5 IOLR 339; Stefan
Griller, ‘International Law, Human Rights and the Community's Autonomous Legal Order: Notes
on the European Court of Justice Decision in  Kadi’ (2008) 4  EuConst 528; Deirdre Curtin and
Christina  Eckes,  ‘The  Kadi Case:  Mapping  the  Boundaries  between  the  Executive  and  the
Judiciary in Europe’ (2008) 5 IOLR 365; Pierre D'Argent, ‘Arrêt "Kadi": le droit communautaire
comme droit interne’ (2008) 153 JDE 265; Nikolaus Graf Vitzthum, ‘Les compétences législatives
et juridictionnelles de la Communauté européenne dans la lutte contre le terrorisme - L’affaire
«Kadi»’ (2008) ZeuS 375; Guy Harpaz, ‘Judicial Review by the European Court of Justice of UN
‘Smart  Sanctions’ Against  Terror  in  the  Kadi Dispute’ (2009)  14  E.F.A.Rev.  65;  Paul  James
Cardwell, Duncan French and Nigel White, ‘European Court of Justice, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and
Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission (Joined Cases C-402/05 P and
C-415/05 P) Judgment of 3 September 2008’ (2009) 58 ICLQ 229; Marjorie Beulay, ‘Les arrêts
Kadi et Al Barakaat International Foundation -Réaffirmation par la Cour de justice de l'autonomie
de  l'ordre  juridique  communautaire  vis-à-vis  du  droit  international’ (2009)  524  RMCUE 32;
Gráinne de Búrca, ‘The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order after Kadi’
(2009) Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 1/09 <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org>. Review of
the comments on the General Court's and the Court's Kadi rulings: Sara Poli and Maria Tzanou,
‘The Kadi Rulings: A Survey of the Literature’ (2009) 28 YEL 533.
252  In Hinarejos's view the Court took a decidedly dualistic approach. See Alicia Hinarejos, Judicial
Control in the European Union: Reforming Jurisdiction in the Intergovernmental Pillars (OUP,
Oxford 2009) 143. In De Witte's view it is hard to conclude, as some authors have done, that the
Kadi judgment conveys a consistent dualistic approach, Bruno de Witte, ‘European Union Law:
How Autonomous is its Legal Order?’ (2010) 65 ZÖR 141, 154.
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protection.  Halberstam  and  Stein,  intentionally  avoid  the  descriptors  'monistic'  and
'dualistic' as neither of the theoretical notions is apt to capture the interactions among
multiple  legal  systems.253 Von  Bogdandy  argued  in  the  same  vein  that  the  general
understanding of the relationship between international and internal law should be placed
on another conceptual basis, a theory of legal pluralism.254
G. Conclusion
This  chapter  investigated  the symmetries and invariances  of  the  Court's  case  law on
direct effect in order to suggest a conceptual framework for the recognition or denial of
the possibility of direct effect of international agreements.
Section 1 examined the concept of direct effect and dealt  with the formula for direct
effect.  It  demonstrated  that there  is  neither  a  nexus  between  direct  effect  and  the
constitutional situation in each Member State; nor is there a nexus between direct effect
and the dualist/monsistic philosophy towards international law. The section highlighted
that direct effect and direct applicability are two distinct and different legal concepts, and
that the formula of direct effect is two-fold consisting of a 'wording, purpose and nature'
component and a 'clear, precise and unconditional' component.
Section 2 considered the Court's  different  approaches towards the (absence of)  direct
effect  of GATT rules and WTO agreements and towards the possible direct effect  of
provisions of free trade associations, accession associations, development associations
and  of  provisions  of  the  EEA Agreement.  It  highlighted  the  structural  differences
253  Daniel Halberstam and Eric Stein, ‘The United Nations, the European Union, and the King of
Sweden: Economic sanctions and individual rights in a plural world order’ (2009) 46 CMLR 13,
43.
254  Armin von Bogdandy, ‘Pluralism, direct effect, and the ultimate say: On the relationship between
international and domestic constitutional law’ (2008) 6 I.J.C.L. 397, 400.
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between WTO law and other agreements.255
After  having considered  the  Court's  different  approaches  towards  the  possible  direct
effect of international agreements; that is, dualism (denying direct effect in respect of
WTO agreements), Section 3  turned the spotlight on the demarcation between relevant
and irrelevant parameters for the recognition of direct effect.
The section established that the 'wording, purpose and nature' component of the two-fold
test for direct effect is a method to interpret the objective intention of the contracting
parties, which is  relevant when considering whether an agreement is capable of having
direct effect. Also, the section established that the Court distinguishes between relevant
and irrelevant  parameters when  interpreting  the objective intention of the contracting
parties.
The similarity of terms (that is, provisions of the agreement/ provisions of the Treaty), the
imbalance between obligations assumed (that is, a certain asymmetry of obligations/ non-
reciprocity), the position to dominate the framing of an agreement (that is, the ability to
preserve  and  pursue  interests)  and  the  degree  of  integration  (that  is,  the  question  of
whether  there  is  any  'special  link'  with  the  European  Union),  and  (jointly)  applied
safeguard clauses, are criteria unlikely to affect the direct enforceability.
Unilaterally applied safeguard clauses indicate that the contracting parties did not intend
direct effect (that is, obligations assumed are not sufficiently unconditional).
A static application of the relevant and irrelevant parameters as such seemed, however,
too  schematic  and  is  therefore  inadequate  to  identify  the  objective  intention  of  the
255  For a recent contribution see Szilárd Gáspár-Szilágyi, ‘EU international agreements through a US
lens: different methods of interpretation, tests and the issue of “rights”’ (2014) 39 ELRev. 601-
625. 
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contracting parties.
Section 4  suggested that only a holistic approach is adequate to identify the objective
intention of the contracting parties,  and conceptualised such an approach. Due to the
contractual nature of obligations of international  agreements,  the  efficient  breach  and
pacta  sunt  servanda methodology  provides  a  possible  conceptual  framework  for  the
denial or recognition of direct effect of international agreements.
Section 5 turned to the technical aspects of the question of indirect effects – which was
an Incurse in Chapter 1.
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  CHAPTER II: GENERAL ISSUES AND PRACTICE ON EU INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS (CFSP AND PJC (BY NOW FSJ) AGREEMENTS)
A. Introduction
The pre-Lisbon Union has been endowed with the capacity to inaugurate CFSP and PJC
(by now FSJ) agreements in conformity with Articles 24 and 38 TEU which enabled the
EU to conclude agreements in implementation of Title V and VI TEU. With the entry into
force of the Lisbon Treaty Article 218 TFEU has become the general legal basis for the
Union's treaty-making.
This chapter focuses on the general issues and practice on EU agreements (CFSP and
PJC (by now FSJ) agreements), and integrates sections on direct and indirect effect.
The chapter is divided into four sections. Section 1 deals with the international legal
personality  of  the  Union.  There  was  debate  as  to  whether  the  Union had  implicitly
acquired international legal personality. Treaty provisions did not expressly provide on
whose  behalf  such  agreements  were  concluded.  According  to  one  school  of  thought
powers rested with the Member States and the Council acted on behalf of the Member
States. By contrast, according to another school of thought the Council acted on behalf of
the European Union and not on behalf of the Member States. The entry into force of the
Lisbon Treaty has rendered the debate on whether such agreements were concluded by
the Council on behalf of the EU or on behalf of the Member States obsolete. Article 47
TEU designates the Union as a contracting party. Section 2 subsequently deals with the
practice  on EU agreements.  Sections  3 and 4  consider  respectively direct  effect  and
indirect effect and address a vertical dimension (vis-à-vis national legislation).
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B. International legal personality
Article  J.14 and K.10 TEU,  text  of  the Treaty of  Amsterdam,  for  which  there is  no
precedent in the Treaty of Maastricht, stated that:
When it is necessary to conclude an agreement with one or more States or
international organisations in implementation of this Title,  the Council,
acting  unanimously,  may  authorise  the  Presidency,  assisted  by  the
Commission  as  appropriate,  to  open  negotiations  to  that  effect.  Such
agreements shall be concluded by the Council acting unanimously on a
recommendation from the Presidency. No agreement shall be binding on a
Member State whose representative in the Council  states that it  has to
comply  with  the  requirements  of  its  own constitutional  procedure;  the
other members of the Council may agree that the agreement shall apply
provisionally to them.
(…) Agreements referred to in Article J.14 [CFSP title] may cover matters
falling under this Title [JHA].
This  provision  provided  for  the  Council  to  conclude  agreements  on  matters  of  the
Common Foreign and Security Policy and Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal
Matters.
An appended Declaration stated that:
The provisions of Articles J.14 [37 new] and K.10 [repealed] of the Treaty
on European Union and any agreements  resulting from them shall  not
imply  any  transfer  of  competence  from  the  Member  States  to  the
European Union.1
The Amsterdam provisions  did  not point to the existence of a legal personality for the
1  Declaration no. 4 on Articles J.14 and K.10 of the Treaty on European Union, annexed to the
Final Act of the Amsterdam Treaty.
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Union,2 distinct from the Community.
The Nice Treaty had continued filling out the initially meagre provisions of Articles J.14
and K.10 TEU begun at Amsterdam. The new Articles J.14 and K.10 TEU, renumbered
Articles 24 and 38 TEU, read as follows:
When it is necessary to conclude an agreement with one or more States or
international organisations in implementation of this title, the Council may
authorise the Presidency, assisted by the Commission as appropriate, to
open negotiations to that effect. Such agreements shall be concluded by
the Council on a recommendation from the Presidency. (…) No agreement
shall be binding on a Member State whose representative in the Council
states that it has to comply with the requirements of its own constitutional
procedure;  the  other  members  of  the  Council  may  agree  that  the
agreement shall nevertheless apply provisionally (…).
(…) Agreements referred to in Article 24 may cover matters falling under
this title [Title VI].
The  TEU in  its  Nice  version  did  not  include  a  provision  explicitly  conferring  legal
personality to the Union. The Nice provisions did not explicitly provide on whose behalf
the agreements are concluded or who is bound by agreements on matters of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy  or  Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters –
questions with no certain answers available presently.
According  to  one  school  of  thought,  the  European  Union  was  not  a  subject  of
international law; that is, powers rested with the Member States and the Council acted on
behalf of the Member States which were the contracting parties. That is, rather than the
Member States creating an independent capacity of the Union to conclude international
treaties, it seemed to be a case of them wanting to borrow the EU institutions to act on
their behalf. There seemed to be little prospect of the Union emerging as a fully fledged
2  Union is a convenient label to use in general terms. Historical developments explain the necessity
of being precise on legal terminology.
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international treaty-making partner, as distinct from the Member States. In the areas of
CFSP and JHA, the Council acted on behalf of the Member States. That was a limited
move away from individual action by the Member States.3
By contrast, according to another school of thought, the European Union had implicitly
acquired  international  legal  personality;  that  is,  the  Council  acted  on  behalf  of  the
European Union and not on behalf of the Member States. That followed from the text of
(old)  Article  24 of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union  read  in  its  context:  that  is,  the
concluding power, the Council, is an EU institution (the agreements were negotiated by
the  Presidency  which  pursuant  to  Article  18  (1)  represented  the  Union  and  not  its
Member States). The CFSP had its own objectives and its own legal instruments laid
down in (old) Article 11 and Article 12 of the Treaty on European Union, and the right of
abstention by the Member States in (old) Article 23 of the Treaty on European Union –
which applied to agreements concluded under ex-Article 24 (old) EU – required that the
abstaining Member State “would accept that the decision commits the Union”. This was
confirmed  by  the  subsequent  practice.  The  more  than  fifty  agreements  concluded
between the EU and third countries or international organisations explicitly provided that
such agreements  were  concluded  by  the  Council  on  behalf  of  the  EU.  Finally,  the
addition of paragraph 6 of Article 24 by the Treaty of Nice to the effect that agreements
“would be binding on the institutions of the Union” indicated clearly that the Union as
3  Nanette A.E.M. Neuwahl, ‘A Partner with a Troubled Personality: EU Treaty-Making in Matters
of CFSP and JHA after Amsterdam’ (1998) 3 E.F.A.Rev. 177, 186.  Amongst others, Christiane
Trüe,  ‘Rechtspersönlichkeit  der  Europäischen  Union  nach  den  Vertragsänderungen  von
Amsterdam: Wer handelt in GASP und PJZ?’ (2000) ZeuS 127, 163-65;  K Lenaerts and E de
Smijter, ‘The European Union as an Actor under International Law’ (1999-2000) 19 YEL 95, 130;
Jaap  W.  de  Zwaan,  ‘The  Legal  Personality  of  the  European  Communities  and  the  European
Union’ (1999) 30 NYIL 75,  103;  Marise  Cremona,  ‘The European  Union as  an International
Actor:  The Issues  of  Flexibility  and Linkage’ (1998) 3  E.F.A.Rev. 67,  70;  Jörg Monar,  ‘The
European  Union's  Foreign  Affairs  System  after  the  Treaty  of  Amsterdam:  A Strengthened
Capacity  for  External  Action?’  (1997)  2  E.F.A.Rev.  413,  427;  Eileen  Denza,  The
Intergovernmental Pillars of the European Union (OUP, Oxford 2002) 176 have argued that the
Council acts on behalf of the Member States.
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such was bound by  the agreements.  The European Union was acting as having legal
personality.4 
According to Dashwood, applying the criteria enunciated by the International Court of
Justice in the Reparation for Injuries suffered in the Service of the United Nations case
(leading authority for the implicit  attribution of legal personality [1949] ICJ Rep 174
where the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion considered the international legal personality of
the United Nations), there were solid grounds for regarding the Union as possessing of
legal personality, capable of incurring rights and obligations, confirmed by the central
role of the Union's organs and institutions, at least as regarding the functions assigned to
it under Title V of the Treaty on European Union. The main indications could be found in
the ambitious scope and objectives of the CFSP as defined by Article J.1, which could
only be realised effectively through action on the international plane, and the fact that, in
the Council, the Presidency and the Commission, the Union was equipped with organs
well qualified to pursue such action. Practice since the entry into force of the Treaty on
4  Ricardo Gosalbo Bono, ‘Some Reflections on the CFSP Legal Order’ (2006) 43 CMLR 337, 356-
57. Amongst others,  Theodore Georgopoulos, ‘What kind of treaty making power for the EU?
Constitutional problems related to the conclusion of the EU-US agreements on extradition and
mutual legal assistance’ (2005) 30 ELRev. 190, 193; Gilles de Kerchove and Stephan Marquardt,
Stephan ‘Les accords internationaux conclus par l'Union européenne’ (2004) 50 A.F.D.I. 803, 809
et suiv; Alan Dashwood, ‘The European Union – A new international actor (Editorial Comment)’
(2001)  38  CMLR  825,  826; Ramses  A.  Wessel,  ‘The  inside  looking  out:  consistency  and
delimitation  in  EU  external  relations’  (2000)  37  CMLR  1135,  1142; Ramses  A.  Wessel,
‘Revisiting the International Legal Status of the EU’ (2000) 5 E.F.A.Rev. 507, 535; Ingolf Pernice,
‘Multilevel  Constitutionalism  and  the  Treaty  of  Amsterdam:  European  Constitution-Making
Revisited?’ (1999)  36  CMLR 703,  745;  Sally  Langrish,  ‘The  Treaty  of  Amsterdam:  selected
highlights’ (1998) 23 ELRev. 3, 14; Frederik Naert, ‘The International Legal Status of the EU’ in
International Law Aspects of the EU's Security and Defence Policy, with a Particular Focus on
the Law of Armed Conflict and Human Rights (Intersentia, Antwerp 2010) 340-41; Ramses A.
Wessel,  ‘The  EU  as  a  party  to  international  agreements:  shared  competences,  mixed
responsibilities’ in Alan Dashwood and Marc Maresceau (eds), Law and practice of EU external
relations:  salient  features  of  a  changing  landscape (CUP,  Cambridge  2008)  159;  Nicholas
Tsagourias,  ‘EU Peacekeeping Operations: Legal and Theoretical Issues’ in Martin Trybus and
Nigel D White (ed), European Security Law (OUP, Oxford 2007) 116-17 and 122; Piet Eeckhout,
External Relations of the European Union: Legal and Constitutional Foundations (OUP, Oxford
2005) 159; Delano Verwey, The European Community, the European Union and the International
Law of the Treaties – A comparative Analysis of the Community and Union's External Treaty-
Making Practice (TMC Asser Press, The Hague 2004) 60  have argued that the Council acts on
behalf of the Union.
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European Union has provided a measure of confirmation.5
A similar  argument was  advanced  by  Koutrakos,  who  suggested  that  treaty-making
practices by the Union in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Police
and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters, under ex-Articles 24 and 38 TEU, would
have suggested  that the Union had  legal personality, albeit impliedly.6 Sari carried this
thought further, using an analysis of subsequent practice in the context of the ESDP (now
CSDP) to demonstrate that the Council had acted on behalf of the Union when entering
into these agreements, and that the Union had become a contracting party to them. In his
view, it seemed that a consensus was then emerging in the literature to the effect that the
international agreements concluded by the Council since 2001 in the context of the ESDP
demonstrated that the Council acted on behalf of the EU under Article 24 TEU, rather
than on behalf of the Member States. One of the key arguments put forward in support of
this view was that both the internal Council acts adopting international agreements as
well as the agreements themselves name the 'European Union' as one of the contracting
parties. The Council consistently approved the agreements negotiated by the Presidency
under Article 24 TEU 'on behalf of the European Union', and specifically authorised the
Presidency  to  designate  the  person  empowered  to  sign  them  'in  order  to  bind  the
European  Union'.  The  titles  and preambles  of  agreements  concluded by the  Council
referred to the 'European Union' as one of their parties.7
5  Alan  Dashwood,  ‘External  Relations Provisions  of the Amsterdam Treaty’ (1998) 35 CMLR
1019, 1040.
6  Panos Koutrakos,  ‘Primary law and policy in EU external relations: moving away from the big
picture’ (2008) 33 ELRev. 666, 675. Earlier assessments, Stephan Marquardt, ‘The Conclusion of
International  Agreements  under  Article  24  of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union’  in  Vincent
Kronenberger  (ed),  The  European  Union  and  the  International  Legal  Order:  Discord  or
Harmony? (TMC Asser Press, The Hague 2001) 340-44.
7  Aurel Sari, ‘The Conclusion of International Agreements in the Context of the ESDP’ (2008) 57
ICLQ 53, 69-85, at 80.
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C. Legal practice
Discussions  on  contracting  practices  and political  activities  of  the  Union in  areas  of
international cooperation initially were taken forward in Daniel Thym's contribution in
the  international  treaties  of  the European Union8 and Aurel  Sari's  contribution in  the
conclusion  of  international  agreements  in  the  context  of  the  ESDP.9 Daniel  Thym's
contribution concentrated on consensual international law. A large number of quantitative
contracts related to the conduct of civilian and military operations in CSDP, as an integral
part of the CFSP.10 Thym presented the international practices of the European Union and
placed  them  in  the  context  of  jurisprudential  debate.  Aurel  Sari's  contribution  (an
overview of international agreements concluded in the context of the CSDP) examined
the Council's practice in the implementation of CFSP agreements and assessed the widely
held view that CFSP agreements offered conclusive proof of the Union's status as an
independent subject of international law.11 Existing agreements relating to the conduct of
CSDP operations  may  be  classified  into  three  types:  Status  of  forces  and  status  of
mission agreements with host States to determine the legal status of CSDP operations and
their members during their presence in the territory of host States concerned, agreements
contributing personnel and assets to CSDP operations in order to define the modalities of
8  See Daniel Thym, ‘Die völkerrechtlichen Verträge der Europäischen Union’ (2006) 66 ZaöRV
863-925, at 875-899.
9  See Aurel Sari, ‘The Conclusion of International Agreements in the Context of the ESDP’ (2008)
57 ICLQ 53-86, at 55-59.
10  Marise  Cremona,  ‘The  EU  and  Global  Emergencies  –  Competence  and  Instruments’ in  A
Antoniadis, R Schütze & E Spaventa (eds), The European Union and Global Emergencies: A Law
and Policy Analysis (Hart, Oxford/Portland 2011) 11-31 addresses the Union's competences and
the instruments it may use in global emergency situations (crisis management missions within the
framework  of  CSDP);  Alan  Dashwood,  ‘Conflicts  of  competence  in  responding  to  global
emergencies’ in A Antoniadis, R Schütze & E Spaventa (eds),  The European Union and Global
Emergencies:  A Law and Policy  Analysis  (Hart,  Oxford/Portland 2011)  33-48; Gilles Marhic,
‘Common Security and Defence Policy Crisis Management Missions: an Effective Tool for EU
Response to Emergencies’  in A Antoniadis, R Schütze & E Spaventa (eds), The European Union
and Global  Emergencies:  A Law and Policy  Analysis  (Hart,  Oxford/Portland  2011)  247-260;
Stefan Olsson (ed), The Future of Crisis Management within the European Union – cooperation
in the face of emergencies (Springer, Berlin-Heidelberg 2009).
11  Cf. Editorial, ‘The European Union – A new international actor’ (2001) 38 CMLR 825, 825 (e.g.
the agreement on EUMM activity in the FRY).
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respective  contributions  and  agreements  to  regulate  the  exchange  of  classified
information between the Union and third parties.12
The  pre-Lisbon practice13 of  the  European  Union  was manifest.  The  Union had
concluded treaties with various third States –  EU agreements (CFSP and PJC (by now
FSJ) agreements) –   complemented by treaties with international organisations (NATO
and the International Criminal Court).
EU agreements  (CFSP and PJC (by now FSJ)  agreements)  classified  into  agreement
type14 (pre-Lisbon practice):
I.) Status and activities of the European Union with host States (CSDP): Status of
mission (SOMA) and status of forces (SOFA) Agreements; a gradual expansion of the
12  For example,  Panos Koutrakos,  ‘International  Agreements  in  the  Area  of  the EU's  Common
Security and Defence Policy’ in Enzo Cannizzaro, Paolo Palchetti and Ramses A. Wessel (eds),
International Law as Law of the European Union (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 2011)  167 et seq
provides an overview of the Union's treaty-making activity in the area of CSDP (procedural and
substantive issues) and typology.
13  See,  amongst  others,  Marise  Cremona,  ‘Coherence  in  European  Union foreign  relations law
(Coherence in Foreign Policy – the Legal Dimension)’ in P Koutrakos (ed),  European Foreign
Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives  (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2011) 55-92; Simon Duke,
‘Consistency, coherence and European Union external action: The path to Lisbon and beyond’ in
P Koutrakos  (ed),  European Foreign Policy:  Legal and Political  Perspectives  (Edward Elgar,
Cheltenham 2011) 15-54.
14  Cf. Ramses A.  Wessel,‘The EU as  a  party  to  international  agreements:  shared  competences,
mixed responsibilities’ in Alan Dashwood and Marc Maresceau (eds),  Law and practice of EU
external relations: salient features of a changing landscape (CUP, Cambridge 2008), cited above,
at 160 categorises agreements to which the Union has become a party, as follows: 1. agreements
between  the  EU  and  a  third  State  on  the  participation  of  that  State  in  an  EU  operation;
2. agreements  between  the  EU  and  a  third  State  on  the  status  or  activities  of  EU  forces;
3. agreements between the EU and a third State in the area of PJCC; 4. agreements between the
EU and a third State on the exchange of classified information; 5. agreements between the EU and
other international organisations; 6. agreements between the EU and a third State in the form of an
Exchange  of  Letters;  7.  joint  declarations  and  Memoranda  of  Understanding  between  the
European Union and a third State; 8. agreements concluded by European Union agencies.
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military component;
II.) Participation in European Union Missions (CSDP): The Union has entered into
agreements with third States in order to determine the conditions of their participation in
CSDP missions;
III.) Exchange of classified information (CSDP /Justice, Freedom and Security); e.g.
division of labour with NATO;
IV.) Processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union
to the United States for the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP)
(Justice, Freedom and Security);
V.) Enhanced cooperation  in  the  field  of  extradition  and mutual  legal  assistance
(MLA) (Justice, Freedom and Security);
VI.) The processing  and transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data  (Justice,
Freedom and Security);
VII.) The Schengen acquis. Agreements, concluded by the Council of the Union and
Iceland/Norway and  Swiss Confederation, concerning the latters' association with the
implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (Justice, Freedom
and Security).
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I. Status and activities of the European Union with host States.  Status of mission
(SOMA)  and  status  of  forces  (SOFA)  Agreements15 with  a  host  country were bi-or
multilateral; they addressed legal matters relating to the conduct of CSDP missions and
determined the  legal  status  of  their  members;  that  is,  military  forces  and  civilian
personnel, during their presence in the host States concerned  (Appendix I).16 Status of
mission  (SOMA)  and  forces  (SOFA)  agreements  included  provisions  governing  the
mandate, status and composition, entry and departure of personnel, personnel employed
locally, access to borders and border crossing, entry/exit points and movement within the
host  State's  territory,  chain  of  responsibilities,  means  of  transport,  cooperation/  and
access to information and media in the territory of the host State, host party support/
contracting/  privileges  and  immunities,  accommodation  and  practical  arrangements,
change  to  facilities,  military  police  and  mutual  assistance.  Status  agreements  further
included provisions  governing the settlement  of claims (e.g.  claims  for  death,  injury,
15  For an excellent overview of the evolution of the Union's practice of concluding status of forces
and status of mission agreements in the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy:
Aurel Sari, ‘Status of forces and status of mission agreements under the ESDP: the EU's evolving
practice’ (2008) 19 E.J.I.L. 67-100, with further references; Sari's article examines key provisions
of the two model status agreements adopted by the Council of the European Union in 2005 to
serve as a basis for negotiations with prospective host states in future operations; the conclusion
of status agreements has had a profound impact on the visibility of the Union on the international
legal  scene.  Liability  of  the  Union,  e.g.  for  the  personal  injuries  suffered  by  officers  of  the
Member  States  while  serving  in  such  operations:  Maria-Gisella  Garbagnati  Ketvel,  ‘The
jurisdiction  of  the  European  Court  of  Justice  in  respect  of  the  common foreign  and  security
policy’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 77, 116-117. See also  Frederik Naert, ‘ESDP in Practice: Increasingly
Varied and Ambitious EU Security and Defence Operations’ in Martin Trybus and Nigel White
(ed),  European  Security  Law  (OUP,  Oxford  2007)  61-101;  Antonio  Missiroli,  ‘The  European
Union:  Just  a  Regional  Peacekeeper?’ (2003)  8  E.F.A.Rev.  493-503;  Eileen  Denza,  ‘External
relations’ (2002) 51 ICLQ 990, 995; that is, the conclusion of CFSP agreements e.g. the agreement
on EUMM activity in the FRY, and addresses the problem of how non-member parties to any
agreement might secure redress.
16  Agreements on the activities and on the tasks, status, privileges and immunities of the European
Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) (Appendix I-1), Agreements on the status and activities of the
European  Union  Police  Mission  (EUPM)  (Appendix  I-2),  Agreements  on  the  status  of  the
European  Union-led  forces  (Appendix  I- 3),  Agreements  on  the  status  and  activities  of  the
European Union Rule of Law Mission (Appendix I-4), Agreements on the status of the European
Union Special Representative and his/her support team (Appendix I-5), Agreements on the Status
of  the  European  Union  Missions  in  Support  of  Security  Sector  Reforms  (Appendix  I-6),  for
instance, determine the legal status of certain CSDP operations.
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damage or loss, and the exercise of civil and criminal jurisdiction) and provisions on the
protection of the environment and cultural heritages.17
In addition, operational, administrative, technical18 and financial19 arrangements had been
drawn up. Implementing arrangements addressed specific questions; such as, status of
local staff and contractors, visits of officials, communication and information systems,
coordination  of  information  activities,  exchange  of  information,  medical  services,
protection  of  the  environment,  host-nation  support,  procedures  for  addressing/settling
claims,  modalities  and  procedures  for  the  Joint  Coordination  Group and/or  transport
arrangements.20 Implementing measures required that they were concluded by the EU
Force/Mission Commander/Head of Mission, appointed by the Council of the European
Union, and the Host State’s administrative authorities.
In response to growing international concern,21 the Union had entered into agreements
with  third  States  to  define  the  conditions  and modalities  for  the  transfer  of  persons
suspected of attempting to commit, committing or having committed acts of piracy on the
high seas and detained by the European Union-led naval force (EUNAVFOR), and seized
17  E.g. Article 9 of the Agreement between the European Union and the Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia on the status of the European Union-led forces in the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia [2003] OJ L82/46.
18  E.g. Article 18 Seychelles (EUF) [2009] OJ L323/14; Article 20 Georgia (EUMM) [2008] OJ
L310/31; Article 19 Guinea-Bissau (Mission in Support of Security Sector Reform) [2008] OJ
L219/66; Article 18 CAR (EUF) [2008] OJ L136/46; Article 18 Chad (EUF) [2008] OJ L83/40;
Article 18 Cameroon (EUF) [2008] OJ L57/31; Article 18 (EUF) Gabon [2006] OJ L187/43.
19  E.g. Article 18 of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Djibouti on
the status of the European Union-led forces in the Republic of Djibouti in the framework of the
EU military operation Atalanta [2009] OJ L33/43.
20  E.g. Article 16 of the Agreement between the European Union and the Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia on the status of the European Union-led forces in the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia [2003] OJ L82/46.
21  Douglas Guilfoyle, ‘Counter-piracy law enforcement and human rights’ (2010) 59 ICLQ 141-69
outlines the general legal framework surrounding Somali piracy before returning to specific FRs
issues  raised by the arrest/detention of pirates,  e.g.  the protection of  suspects'  rights to a fair
trial/effective remedy, and potential ways forward; Tullio Treves, ‘Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use
of  Force:  Developments  off  the  Coast  of  Somalia’ (2009)  20  E.J.I.L.  399,  407  and  408-12
addresses the protection of fundamental rights of captured individuals, and Operation Atlanta.
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property in the possession of EUNAVFOR, from EUNAVFOR to host States, and for
their treatment after such transfer  (Appendix I- 7);22 these included detailed provisions
for the protection of fundamental rights of pirates and armed robbers captured by the
Union's naval force and transferred to the host State.23
Implementing arrangements,24 on technical and other assistance, to enable the transfer,
investigation,  prosecution  and trial  of  transferred  individuals  covered,  inter  alia,  the
identification  of competent  law enforcement  authorities,  detention facilities,  points of
contact for notifications, forms to be used for transfers, technical and logistical assistance
in  the  fields  of  revision  of  legislation,  training  of  investigators/prosecutors,
investigative/judicial  procedures,  handling  of  documents  (storage/handing-over  of
22  Efthymios Papastavridis,  'EUNAVFOR Operation Atlanta off  Somalia: the EU in unchartered
legal waters?' (2015) 64 ICLQ 533-568 looks at the basis under international law and EU law of
the  EUNAVFOR  Operation  Atalanta,  combating  piracy  off  Somalia.  Firstly,  Papastavridis
analyses,  the  application  of  the  UN  Convention  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea  1982.  Second,
Papastavridis examines if any breaches of international law would be attributable to the EU or to
the contributing State and addresses the responsibility gap of the EU in the context  of CSDP
operations. He emphasises that claims arising from the conduct of the EU in the course of the
Operation Atlanta can only be submitted to Member States courts. According to him that is surely
conclusive in holding the Member States primarily liable for wrongful conduct committed in the
course of  the Operation Atlanta.  The EU finally  acceding  to the ECHR would induce a new
situation. It  would then be possible that  both the  Member State involved, and the EU, might
become co-respondents in a case before the ECtHR. As provided for in the draft agreement on the
accession of the EU to the ECHR, the relevant application would have to be filed against the
Member State concerned, and the EU could then join as co-respondent. Yet,  Opinion 2/13 has
delayed progression towards the EU acceding to the Convention (at 566-567).
23  Articles 3 and 4 of the Agreement between the European Union and the Government of Kenya on
the conditions and modalities for the transfer of persons suspected of having committed acts of
piracy and detained by the European Union-led naval force (EUNAVFOR), and seized property in
the possession of EUNAVFOR, from EUNAVFOR to Kenya and for their treatment after such
transfer [2009] OJ L79/49.
24  Para 9 of the Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the Government of Kenya on
the conditions and modalities for the transfer of persons suspected of having committed acts of
piracy and detained by the European Union-led naval force (EUNAVFOR), and seized property in
the possession of EUNAVFOR, from EUNAVFOR to Kenya and for their treatment after such
transfer [2009] OJ L79/49; and Article 10 of the Agreement between the European Union and the
Republic of Mauritius on the conditions of transfer of suspected pirates and associated seized
property  from the  European  Union-led  naval  force  to  the  Republic  of  Mauritius  and  on  the
conditions of suspected pirates after transfer [2011] OJ L254/3.
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evidence  to  the  competent  law  enforcement  authorities)  and  appeal  procedures.  In
addition,  implementing  arrangements  provided  for  the  repatriation  of  transferred
individuals in case of acquittal/ or non-prosecution, transfer for completion of sentence in
another State, or their repatriation after serving a prison sentence.
Parliament  v  Council25 concerned  inter-institutional  practice.  Firstly,  the  Parliament
sought  the  annulment  of  the  Council  Decision  on the  signing and conclusion  of  the
Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Mauritius on the conditions
of transfer of suspected pirates and associated seized property from the European Union-
led naval force to the Republic of Mauritius and on the conditions of suspected pirates
after transfer. Secondly, it sought the maintenance of the effects of that decision until it
will be replaced.26 The Parliament put forward two pleas in law in support of the action,
alleging a violation of the second subparagraph of Article 218 (6) TFEU (choice of the
substantive  legal  basis)  and  of  Article  218 (10)  TFEU (information  obligation).  The
CJEU's analysis showed that the substantive legal basis of the contested decision was
appropriate and therefore could be adopted without the consent or consultation of the
Parliament  and  the  Court  further  showed  that  the  Council  violated  Article  218  (10)
TFEU.27 The CJEU emphasised that Article 218 (10) TFEU was prescribed in order to
ensure that the Parliament is in a position to exercise democratic scrutiny of the EU’s
external action, and more specifically, to verify that its powers were respected precisely
in consequence of the choice of legal basis for a decision concluding an agreement.28 The
CJEU explained that the information requirement laid down in Article 218 (10) TFEU
applies  to  any  procedure  for  concluding  an  international  agreement.  This  includes
agreements relating only to the CFSP.29 The CJEU further held that if the Parliament was
25  Case C-658/11 Parliament v Council (EU-Mauritius Agreement) EU:C:2014:2025.
26  [2011] OJ L254/1.
27  Case C-658/11  Parliament v Council (EU-Mauritius Agreement)  EU:C:2014:2025, paras 43-63
and paras 69-87.
28  Case C-658/11 Parliament v Council (EU-Mauritius Agreement) EU:C:2014:2025, para 79.
29  Case C-658/11 Parliament v Council (EU-Mauritius Agreement) EU:C:2014:2025, para 85.
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not immediately and fully informed at all stages of the EU treaty-making procedure in
accordance with Article 218 (10) TFEU, including that preceding the conclusion of the
agreement. It was not in a position to exercise the right of scrutiny.30
II. Participation  in  European  Union  Missions.  The  Union  had  entered  into
agreements with third States in order to determine the conditions of their participation in
CSDP missions. Agreements on the participation in European Union Missions (Appendix
II)31 defined the modalities of respective contributions. Agreements on the participation
of States in  European Union missions  included provisions  governing personnel32 and
assets  to  EU  crisis  management  missions;  for  example,  costs  associated  with  the
participation  in  the  operation  apart  from  the  costs  which  were  subject  to  common
funding, or contributions to the operational budget.33
30  Case C-658/11 Parliament v Council (EU-Mauritius Agreement) EU:C:2014:2025, para 86.
31  Like the Agreements  on the participation of States in  the European Union Police Mission in
Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN) (Appendix II-1), Agreements on the participation in the
European  Union  Police  Mission  in  the  former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia  (EUPOL
‘Proxima’)  (Appendix  II-2),  Agreements  on  the  participation  in  the  European  Union  Police
Mission  (EUPM)  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  (BiH)  (Appendix  II-3),  Agreements  on  the
participation in the European Union Forces (EUF) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Annex
II-4)  /and in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia  (Appendix II-5),  Agreements on  the
participation in the European Union Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia) (Aceh Monitoring
Mission  —  AMM) (Appendix  II-6), Agreements  on  the  participation  in  the  military  crisis
management  operation  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  (Operation  ALTHEA)  (Appendix  II-7),
Agreements on the participation in the European Union military operation in support of the United
Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the
election process (Operation EUFOR RD Congo) (Appendix II-8), Agreements on the participation
in the European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central  African
Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA) (Appendix II-9), Agreements on the participation in the European
Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX KOSOVO) (Appendix II-10), and Agreements
establishing a framework for the participation in the EU crisis management operations (Appendix
II-11).
32  E.g. Article 2 (status  of personnel)  of the Agreement between the European Union and New
Zealand  on  the  participation  of  New  Zealand  in  the  European  Union  Police  Mission  in
Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN) [2007] OJ L274/18.
33  E.g. Articles 5 (financial aspects) and 6 (contribution to operational budget) of the Agreement
between the  European  Union  and  New Zealand  on  the  participation  of  New Zealand  in  the
European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN) [2007] OJ L274/18.
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A number  of  agreements  provided  for  the  adoption  of  technical  and  administrative
modalities and required that  they were concluded by the High Representative for the
Common Foreign and Security Policy and the appropriate authorities of the participating
State.34
In response to growing international concern, the Union had entered into Agreements to
regulate the conditions under which third States shall participate in the EU-led military
operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and
armed  robbery  off  the  Somali  coast  (Operation  Atalanta)  (Appendix  II-12);  these
provided  for  the  adoption  of  further  implementing  measures,  technical  and
administrative.35 Implementing arrangements addressed specific questions; such as, the
identification of competent law enforcement authorities, detention facilities, handling of
documents, including those related to the gathering of evidence, points of contacts for
notifications and forms to be used for transfers. Implementing measures required that
they  were  concluded  by  the  the  Secretary-General  of  the  Council  of  the  European
Union/High  Representative  for  the  Common  Foreign  and Security  Policy  or  the  EU
Operation Commander and the appropriate authorities of the participating State.
34  E.g. EUPOL Afghanistan: Article 7 [2007] OJ L274/18 participation of New Zealand; Article 7
[2007] OJ L270/28 participation of Croatia. Aceh Monitoring Mission – AMM: Article 7 [2005]
OJ L349/31 participation of the Swiss Confederation. Operation ALTHEA: Article 6 [2006] OJ
L188/10 participation of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM); Article 6 [2005]
OJ L202/40 participation of the Republic of Chile; Article 6 [2005] OJ L156/22 participation of
the Argentine Republic;  Article 6 [2005] OJ L127/28 participation of New Zealand; Article  6
[2005]  OJ  L65/35  participation  of  the  Republic  of  Albania;  Article  6  [2005]  OJ  L34/47
participation of the Kingdom of Morocco; Article 6 [2005] OJ L20/42 participation of the Swiss
Confederation. EUFOR Tchad/RCA: Article 6 [2008] OJ L307/16 participation of the Russian
Federation; Article 7 [2008] OJ L268/33 participation of Croatia; Article 6 [2008] OJ L217/19
participation  of  Albania.  EULEX  KOSOVO:  Article  6  [2008]  OJ  L317/20  participation  of
Croatia;  Article  6  [2008]  OJ L282/33 participation  of  the  United  States;  Article  6  [2008]  OJ
L217/24  participation  of  the  Swiss  Confederation.  Framework  for  the  participation  in  the
European Union crisis  management operations:  Article 13 [2005] OJ L315/21 participation of
Canada; Article 13 [2006] OJ L189/17 participation of Turkey; Article 13 [2005] OJ L182/29
participation of Ukraine; Article 13 [2005] OJ L67/14 participation of Romania; Article 13 [2005]
OJ L67/8 participation of the Kingdom of Norway; Article 13 [2005] OJ L46/50 participation of
the Republic of Bulgaria; Article 13 [2005] OJ L67/2 participation of the Republic of Iceland.
35  Article 7 [2009] OJ L202/84 participation of the Republic of Croatia.
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III. Exchange of classified information and safeguarding classified information from
unauthorized disclosure.  The Union had undertaken to protect and safeguard classified
information provided or exchanged.36 This occurred in one of two ways:
a.) The conduct of the security and defence policy required the provision of information
to third States which was sensitive; the Council had entered into agreements on security
procedures for the exchange of classified information to regulate the exchange of such
information between the Union and third parties and to protect and safeguard classified
information provided or exchanged (Appendix III-1), in the most appropriate way, by
adequate measures (definition of reciprocal rules on the protection of the information
exchanged).
Agreements on Security Procedures for the Exchange of Classified Information provided
for  further  implementing  arrangements  to  be  concluded  in  order  to  lay  down  the
standards  for  the  reciprocal  security  protection.37 Technical  security  arrangements
included practical  measures  for  the  handling,  storage,  reproduction,  transmission  and
destruction  of  such  information.  Responsibility for  developing  arrangements  for  the
protection and safeguarding of classified information provided to or exchanged with the
EU fell, for the EU side, on the General Secretariat of the Council Security Office and
the European Commission Security Directorate.
36  See generally, Aurel Sari (n 7) 59; and Panos Koutrakos, ‘International Agreements in the Area of
the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy’ in Enzo Cannizzaro, Paolo Palchetti and Ramses
A. Wessel  (eds),  International Law as Law of the European Union (Martinus Nijhoff,  Leiden
2011) 180 et seq.
37  Article 10 Russia [2010] OJ L155/57; Article 12 Australia [2010] OJ L26/31; Article 12 Israel
[2009] OJ L192/64; Article 11 Switzerland [2008] OJ L181/58; Article 13 United States [2007] OJ
L115/30; Article 11 Iceland [2006] OJ L184/35; Article 11 Croatia [2006] OJ L116/74; Article 11
Ukraine [2005] OJ L172/84; Article 11 Bulgaria [2005] OJ L118/53; Article 11 Romania [2005]
OJ  L118/48;  Article  11  FYROM [2005]  OJ  L94/39;  Article  11  Norway  [2004]  OJ  L362/29;
Article 11 Bosnia and Herzegovina [2004] OJ L324/16.
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b.)  The European Union had established relationships  with the North Atlantic  Treaty
Organisation  (NATO)  and  had  signed  an  Agreement  with  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty
Organisation on the Security of Information. Further, it had established relationships with
the  International  Criminal  Court  (ICC),  signing  an  Agreement  with  the  International
Criminal Court on cooperation and assistance on the release of classified information. In
addition, the European Union had signed an Agreement with the European Space Agency
(ESA) on the security and exchange of classified information, to strengthen the security
of  each of  the  Parties  by  setting  out  the rules  on  the  security/exchange of  classified
information (Appendix III-2).  Agreements on Security Procedures for the Exchange of
Classified  Information  imposed  the  duty  on  the  parties  (i)  to  protect  and  safeguard
classified information or material; (ii) to ensure that such information or material keeps
the  security  classification  given  to  it  by  the  providing  party  in  accordance  with  the
provisions set out in its own security regulations; (iii) not to use classified information
provided or exchanged for purposes other than those established by the originator and
those for which the information or material was provided or exchanged; and (iv) not to
disclose  such  information  or  material  to  third  parties  without  the  consent  of  the
originator;38 and  provide  for  further  implementing  arrangements  to  be  concluded.39
Responsible  for  overseeing  the  implementation  were  the  Secretaries-General  of  the
Council and the European Commission.
IV. Processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data.  The Union had entered
into Agreements on the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the
European Union to the United States for the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking
38  E.g. Article 4 (a-d) of the Agreement between the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation on the Security of Information [2003] OJ L80/36.
39  Article 11 of the Agreement between the European Union and the European Space Agency on the
security and exchange of classified information [2008] OJ L219/59; Article 11 of the Agreement
between the European Union and the International Criminal Court on cooperation and assistance
[2006]  OJ  L115/50;  Agreement  between  the  European  Union  and  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty
Organisation on the Security of Information [2003] OJ L80/36.
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Program (TFTP)40 to ensure the continuation of the TFTP (Appendix IV). The TFTP was
set up by the United States Treasury in order to allow United States counter-terrorism
authorities  access  to  financial  data,  by  having  made  available  to  the  United  States
Treasury  Department  financial  messaging data  stored  in  the  European Union for  the
purposes of the TFTP. To ensure protection of personal data, as stipulated in Article 16
TFEU and Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
were applied. The TFTP Agreement provided for transparency of the use of data; that is,
access, blocking and rectification of data, administrative redress, and the availability of a
process for seeking judicial redress.
V. Enhanced cooperation in the field of extradition and mutual legal assistance. The
Union had undertaken to provide for enhanced cooperation in the field of extradition and
mutual  legal  assistance  (MLA).  The  Extradition  and  Mutual  Legal  Assistance
Agreements, binding on Member States as a matter of international law following their
signature,  provided  for  assistance  in  the  investigation  and  prosecution  of  criminal
offences, and involved intrusions into the personal liberty of individuals; several Member
States,  e.g.  Germany,41 sought  parliamentary  approval  for  their  binding  effect.42 A
disparity in fundamental rights protection between two jurisdictions might leave States in
the difficult position of being unable or unwilling to co-operate in international criminal
40  Sylvia Kierkegaard, ‘US war on terror EU SWIFT(ly) signs blank cheque on EU data’ (2011) 27
C.L.S.Rev. 451, 452-57 addresses the tension between the protection of fundamental rights of
individuals and ensuring safety from terrorist attacks.
41  Gesetz  zu  dem Abkommen  vom 25.  Juni  2003 zwischen  der  Europäischen  Union  und  den
Vereinigten  Staaten  von Amerika  über  Auslieferung,  zu  dem Abkommen  vom 25.  Juni  2003
zwischen der Europäischen Union und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika über Rechtshilfe, zu
dem  Vertrag  vom  14.  Oktober  2003  zwischen  der  Bundesrepublik  Deutschland  und  den
Vereinigten  Staaten  von  Amerika  über  die  Rechtshilfe  in  Strafsachen,  zu  dem  Zweiten
Zusatzvertrag  vom  18.  April  2006  zum  Auslieferungsvertrag  zwischen  der  Bundesrepublik
Deutschland und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika sowie zu dem Zusatzvertrag vom 18. April
2006 zum Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und den Vereinigten Staaten von
Amerika über die Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen (innerstaatliche Anwendbarkeit).
42  Aurel Sari (n 7) 86, with further references.
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investigations.43
a.) The Norway-Iceland participation Agreement created rights and obligations between
Norway,  Iceland  and  those  EU  Member  States  in  respect  of  which  the  EU  Mutual
Assistance Protocol had entered into force44 to improve judicial cooperation in criminal
matters by applying certain provisions of the Convention of 29 May 2000 on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters45 between the Member States of the European Union and
the 2001 Protocol thereto to Iceland and Norway; that is,  substantive provisions of the
EU  Mutual  Assistance  Convention  and  Protocol became  applicable  to  Iceland and
Norway in their mutual relations and in their relations with the Member States of the
European Union (Appendix V-1). The Treaty on European Union (TEU) had no claim as
to  the  constitutional  effects  of  conventions;  that  is,  the  constitutional  effects  of  the
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters remained undefined.
b.)  Agreements  on enhanced cooperation in  the  field of  extradition and mutual  legal
assistance  (Appendix  V-2).46 The  contracting  parties  undertook  to  provide  for
43  John Dugard and Christine van den Wyngaert,  ‘Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights’
(1998) 92 AJIL 187-212;  Christine van den Wyngaert, ‘Applying the European Convention on
Human Rights to Extradition: Opening Pandora's Box?’ (1990) 39 ICLQ 757-779; and Robert J.
Currie,  ‘Human rights and mutual legal  assistance:  resolving the tension’ (2000) 11 Crim.L.F.
143-181 address the interaction of fundamental rights and extradition/ mutual legal assistance.
44  Article 6 (3) of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the
Kingdom of Norway on the application of certain provisions of the Convention of 29 May 2000
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union and
the 2001 Protocol thereto [2004] OJ L26/3.
45  Convention established by the Council in accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty on European
Union, on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European
Union - Council Declaration on Article 10 (9) - Declaration by the United Kingdom on Article 20
[2000] OJ C197/3; Council Act of 16 October 2001 establishing, in accordance with Article 34 of
the Treaty on European Union, the Protocol to the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters between the Member States of the European Union [2001] OJ C326/1.
46  For an excellent review of the EU-US Agreements' on extradition and mutual legal assistance
provisions on capital punishment, the protection of personal data, the powers of joint teams of
investigators,  the  exchange  of  bank information  and  special  and  military  tribunals:  Theodore
Georgopoulos, ‘What kind of treaty making power for the EU? Constitutional problems related to
the conclusion of the EU-US agreements on extradition and mutual legal assistance’ (2005) 30
ELRev. 190-208.
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enhancements  to  cooperation  in  the  context  of  applicable  extradition  relations  and
provided mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, in accordance with the provisions of
the Agreements, as displayed in Article 1, and initiated a legal framework and established
principles  and  mechanisms  for  cooperation.47 The  Agreement  between  the  European
Union  and  the  Republic  of  Iceland  and  the  Kingdom  of  Norway  on  the  surrender
procedure between the Member States of the European Union and Iceland and Norway
was  aimed  at  improving judicial  cooperation  in  criminal  matters,  with  regard  to  the
surrender procedure for the purpose of prosecution or execution of sentences, between,
on the one hand, the Member States and, on the other hand, Norway and Iceland. The
extradition system was based on a mechanism of surrender pursuant to an arrest warrant;
in contrast to the European Arrest Warrant, dual criminality was required.48
VI. The processing and transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data.  Personal
data49 was  collected  every  time  individuals  travelled  by  air  from the  Union  to  third
countries, via PNR Agreements50 with the United States and Australia  (Appendix VI).
47  As displayed in Articles 3 and 14 of the Agreement on mutual legal assistance between the EU
and the US; Articles 3 and 27 of the Agreement on mutual legal assistance between the EU and
Japan; Articles 3 and 18 of the Agreement on extradition between the EU and the US; Articles 3
and 34 of the Agreement on the surrender procedure between the Member States of the EU and
Iceland and Norway.
48  Article 3 (2) of the Agreement on the surrender procedure between the Member States of the EU
and Iceland and Norway.
49  Including the date of reservation/issue of ticket, date(s) intended to travel, passenger's name(s),
frequent  flier/benefit  information,  contact/payment/billing  information,  travel  itinerary,  travel
agency/agent,  ticketing/baggage/seat  information  (seating  preferences/requests)  and  the  travel
status of passenger. E.g. DHS letter 2007, Ch III, attached to the Agreement between the European
Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Passenger Name Record
(PNR) data  by air  carriers  to  the  United States  Department of  Homeland Security [2007]  OJ
L204/21.
50  For excellent review, e.g. Mario Mendez, ‘Passenger Name Record Agreement – European Court
of  Justice’ (2007)  3  EuConst  127;  Paul  de  Hert  and  Vagelis  Papakonstantinou,  ‘The  PNR
Agreement  and Transatlantic  anti-terrorism Cooperation: No firm human rights framework on
either side of the Atlantic’ (2009) 46 CMLR 885.
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This data was felt to be an important tool for addressing terrorist threats, 51 and related
crimes,  including organized  crime,  that  were  transnational  in  nature,  in  the  spirit  of
transnational partnership.
VII. The Schengen acquis and Association (Title V, TFEU). The Council had entered
into  several  Agreements  concerning  the  latters'  association  with  the  implementation,
application  and  development  of  the  Schengen  acquis;52 measures  building  upon  the
Schengen acquis  also  applied to  Norway, Iceland,  Switzerland and Liechtenstein and
their  relations  with  each  other  (Appendix  VII).53 These  agreements  enabled  certain
obstacles to the free movement of persons, resulting from the geographical positions, to
be eliminated.
Association  Agreements  set  up  an  organisational  structure,  outside  the  institutional
framework of the Union, ensuring the association of EU non-Member States with the
decision making process in these fields and enabling their participation in these activities
through a Mixed Committee54 with representatives of the associated Governments and
Members of the Council and Commission.
51  Fernando Mendez and Mario Mendez, ‘Comparing Privacy Regimes: Federal Theory and the
Politics of Privacy Regulation in the European Union and the United States’ (2009) 40 Publius
617,  624.  Definition  and  application  of  PNR,  Ruwantissa  Abeyratne,  Aviation  Security  Law
(Springer, Heidelberg 2010) 122-125.
52  Inter alia, the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of
Iceland  and the  Kingdom of  Norway on the establishment  of  rights  and  obligations  between
Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, on the one hand, and the
Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway, on the other, in areas of the Schengen acquis
which apply to these States [2000] OJ L15/2 (Agreement on free movement of persons).
53  Article 16 of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the
Swiss  Confederation  on  the Swiss  Confederation's  association  with  the implementation,
application and development of the Schengen acquis [2008] OJ L53/52, and the Protocol to the
Agreement, Council doc. 16462/06 (Brussels, 28 February 2008).
54  Preamble of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of
Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latters' association with the implementation,
application  and  development  of  the  Schengen  acquis  [1999]  OJ  L176/36;  Preamble  of  the
Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation
on the Swiss Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of
the Schengen acquis [2008] OJ L53/52.
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Pre-Lisbon,  the  procedure  to  be  followed  for  the  negotiation  and  conclusion  of
international agreements was not limited to autonomous agreements, and applied also to
cross-pillar agreements,55 which had been concluded within both the EC and EU pillars.
From  a  theoretical  perspective  (pre  Lisbon),  agreements  with  non-Member  States,
involving EC and EU matters, e.g. co-operation or trade matters and arms proliferation or
political dialogue, could trigger a combined application56 of Article 300 former TEC and
Article  24 former  TEU. In practice,  there  are  barely any cross-pillar  agreements.  An
international  agreement,  based  on  both  the  EU  /and  EC  Treaties,  and  a  combined
application of Article 300 former TEC and Article 24 former TEU, was the Agreement
between the European Union,57 the European Community58 and the Swiss Confederation
concerning the Swiss Confederation's  association with the implementation,  application
and development of the Schengen acquis,59 which entered into force on 1 March 2008;60
Article 16 of that Agreement concerns the association of Liechtenstein.
55  Stephan Marquardt, ‘The Conclusion of International Agreements under Article 24 of the Treaty
on European Union’ in Vincent Kronenberger (ed),  The European Union and the International
Legal Order: Discord or Harmony? (TMC Asser Press, The Hague 2001) 339.
56  Piet Eeckhout (n 4) 184.
57  Council Decision 2004/849/EC of 25 October 2004 on the signing, on behalf of the European
Union, and on the provisional application of certain provisions of the Agreement between the
European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation concerning the Swiss
Confederation's  association  with  the  implementation,  application  and  development  of  the
Schengen acquis [2004] OJ L368/26. Having regard to the EU Treaty, in particular  ex-Articles 24
and 38 TEU.
58  Council Decision 2004/860/EC of 25 October 2004 on the signing, on behalf of the European
Community, and on the provisional  application of certain provisions of the Agreement between
the European Union,  the European  Community and the Swiss  Confederation,  concerning the
Swiss  Confederation’s association with the implementation,  application  and development of the
Schengen  acquis  [2004]  OJ L370/78.  Having  regard to the EC  Treaty, in particular Article 62,
point 3 of the first sub-paragraph of Article 63 and the Articles 66 and 95 in  conjunction Article
300 (2) TEC.
59  Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation
on the Swiss  Confederation's  association with the implementation,  application and development
of the Schengen acquis [2008] OJ L53/52.
60  Council Decision 2008/903/EC of 27 November 2008,  [2008] OJ L327/15; Council Decision
2008/146/EC  of 28  January  2008,  [2008]  OJ L53/1;  Council  Decision  2008/149/JHA of 28
January 2008, [2008] OJ L53/50.
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D. Direct effect 
1. The area of CFSP and direct effect 
a)  Pre-Lisbon arguments for and against direct effect 
There are a couple general pre-Lisbon arguments that might be raised in favour of direct
effect.
According  to  von  Bogdandy  and  Nettesheim,  Union  law  acts  issued  under  the
competences of the CFSP and CJH directly applied in all legal systems and indeed with
supremacy if a Union norm conflicted with a national norm. However, the unity thesis
did not lead to an automatic and general extension of all characteristics of the law valid
under E(E)C. EAC and ECSC treaties to the CFSP and CJH. The new forms of action
(common position, joint action, measures) had to be developed in a differentiated system
according to their own logic. Therefore the question of whether they were to be accorded
immediate  applicability  could only be answered after  analysing any specific  form of
action.61
The  unity  of  the  European  legal  system (thesis  of  the  unitary  legal  system)  and  the
recognition of the unitary nature of the Union system did not lead to an automatic and
general extension of constitutional doctrines elaborated in the context of the EC to the
area of CFSP.
61  Armin  von Bogdandy and  Martin  Nettesheim,  ‘Ex  Pluribus  Unum:  Fusion  of  the  European
Communities into the European Union’ (1996) 2 ELJ 267, 283 and 284. The Treaty of Maastricht
gave  rise  to  the  thesis  of  the  unitary  legal  system.  The  Treaty  of  Amsterdam  added  further
evidence for the development and substantiation of  the thesis.  See  Armin von Bogdandy and
Martin Nettesheim, ‘Ex Pluribus Unum: Fusion of the European Communities into the European
Union’ (1996) 2 ELJ 267 et seq.
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According to Spaventa,  in some instances, the recognition of the unitary nature of the
Union system and of the binding nature of its constitutional principles was vital not only
to safeguard individual rights but also ensured the legitimacy of Union action by imposing
a reviewable fundamental rights limit on Union law. That was especially the case when
the European Union acted by means of non-reviewable instruments and its action directly
or indirectly affected individual rights.62 That is, in light of the unitary nature of the Union
system and of the binding nature of its constitutional principles, there was the possibility
of providing for (at least some) individual enforcement, in areas with limited integrationist
potential. As seen above, to safeguard individual rights.63
In a similar vein, Gosalbo Bono, the CFSP legal order, although it was a distinct field of
activity  of the European Union in  comparison with the rest  of  the Union’s  activities
(Arts. I-14 and I-16 DCT), remained part of the unified EU legal system64
According to de Baere, extensive interpretation; that is,  enforcement, in an area with
limited integrationist  potential,  assumed that the differences between measures falling
within PJCC and CFSP were not sufficient in themselves to exclude conclusively the duty
of consistent interpretation (and direct effect) from CFSP.65
Lenaerts and Corthaut argued that the bulk of international law is intergovernmental in
nature.  Yet,  that  has  never  been a  reason to  deny that  those instruments  might  have
important consequences in the legal order of the Member States and even the European
62  Eleanor Spaventa, ‘Opening Pandora’s Box: Some Reflections on the Constitutional Effects of
the Decision in Pupino’ (2007) 3 EuConst 5, 23.
63  Ricardo Gosalbo Bono (n 4) 378. As indicated by Gosalbo Bono: 'Nowadays, even the sacrosanct
Community principles of direct effect and primacy over the law of the Member States cannot be
said to be completely alien to the CFSP legal order.'
64  Ricardo Gosalbo Bono (n 4) 378.
65  Geert de Baere, Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations (OUP, Oxford 2008) 205-209
and 259.
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Community, consequences which could be brought about by individuals relying on those
norms.66 
There  are  also  pre-Lisbon  arguments  against  direct  effect.  A  first  argument  against
extensive  interpretation  (that  is,  enforcement  in  an  area  with  limited  integrationist
potential) was that it would be contrary to the system of the Treaty (with no guidance in
CFSP from the Court) that constitutional doctrines elaborated in the context of the EC
would apply to the European Union acts in the field of CFSP.
The Member States' court would be left entirely to its own devices, with no possibility of
obtaining guidance in the matter from the ECJ. For Member States'  courts directly to
apply CFSP provisions under such conditions would be contrary to the system of the
Treaty, as this could lead to an uncontrolled proliferation of conflicting interpretations. It
would also be impossible to maintain the rule in Foto-Frost (Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v
Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199), that only the Court of Justice has authority
to declare acts of EU institutions unlawful, as, without being able to seek a ruling on
validity from the ECJ, domestic courts could not be expected to accept the validity of
CFSP acts as beyond question.67
66  Koen Lenaerts and Tim Corthaut, ‘Of Birds and Hedges: the Role of Primacy in Invoking Norms
of EU Law’ (2006) 31 ELRev. 287, 288.
67  Editorial Comments, ‘The CFSP under the EU Constitutional Treaty? Issues of depillarization’
(2005) 42 CMLR 325, 327.
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A second argument involved an assumption that equal application of the law is essential
for direct effect – not for the duty of consistent interpretation.68
As indicated by Peers, the importance of the preliminary ruling jurisdiction was confirmed
by the van Gend & Loos and the Pupino judgment, the latter in effect a variation upon this
theme.69 As he has put it, the Court referred to the existence of the jurisdiction of the
Court over preliminary rulings as a secondary argument for concluding that EC law “has
an authority which could be invoked by Member States' nationals before domestic courts
and tribunals”. The Pupino judgment in effect was a variation upon this theme, when it
concluded that the effectiveness of the Court's third pillar jurisdiction over preliminary
rulings would be nullified in the absence of indirect effects. The limits on the Court's
jurisdiction  (that  is,  national  opt-outs)  were  explained  away  by  concluding  that  the
importance  of  the  preliminary  ruling  jurisdiction  was  confirmed  by  the  ability  of  all
Member States to submit observations in third pillar references before the Court. This line
of reasoning was also convincing as far as it went, as it was hard to see what the point of
the Court's jurisdiction would be in the absence of direct or indirect effects.70
68  Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands
Inland Revenue Administration EU:C:1963:1, [1963] ECR 1; Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v
C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR 3641, para 14. The Court stated: 'It
follows from the Community nature of such provisions that their effect in the Community may not
be allowed to vary according to whether their application is in practice the responsibility of the
Community institutions or of the Member States and, in the latter case, according to the effects in
the internal legal order of each Member State which the law of that state assigns to international
agreements concluded by it. Therefore it is for the Court, within the framework of its jurisdiction
in interpreting the provisions of agreements, to ensure their uniform application throughout the
Community.'  See amongst others, Steve Peers, ‘Salvation outside the Church: Judicial protection
in the third Pillar after the Pupino and Segi judgments’ (2007) 44 CMLR 883, 916; and Armin von
Bogdandy,  ‘Pluralism,  direct  effect,  and  the  ultimate  say:  On  the  relationship  between
international and domestic constitutional law’(2008) 6 ICON 397, 407-10; that is, at least, in the
constellation  of  competition  between  private  economic  operators,  the  preliminary-ruling
procedure (equal application of the law) is essential for direct effect.
69  Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands
Inland  Revenue  Administration  EU:C:1963:1, [1963]  ECR  1;  Case  C-105/03  Criminal
proceedings against Maria Pupino EU:C:2005:386, [2005] ECR I-5285.
70  Steve Peers (n 68) 915-16.
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A third argument was that national governments have objected to the communitarisation
of CFSP to preserve their intergovernmental character. Denza  phrases this as follows:
Germany  was  the  last  Member  State  to  deposit  its  ratification  and  thus  bring  the
Maastricht Treaty into force. The Bundestag and the Bundesrat had decided to adapt a
new Article 23 into the German Constitution as a basis for Germany's participation in the
European Union. Public debate in Germany had focused on possible threats from the
Treaty  to  the  constitutional  rights  of  German  citizens  and  on  the  need  for  greater
involvement by national parliaments in the process of European integration. Even after
the constitutional amendment became law, Germany had delayed its ratification of the
Maastricht  Treaty  until  its  Federal  Constitutional  Court  in  the  case  of  Brunner  v
European Union Treaty71 ruled on complaints by a German citizen that the Treaty would
breach his constitutional rights and guarantees.72
b)  Post-Lisbon arguments for and against direct effect
A first  argument in favour of an extensive interpretation is  the unified treaty-making
procedure (Part V of the TFEU on the Union's external action). According to Article 37
TEU,
[t]he  Union  may  conclude  agreements  with  one  or  more  States  or
international  organisations  in  areas  covered  by  this  Chapter  [Common
Foreign and Security Policy].
Article  37 TEU provides for  Union competence  to  conclude  agreements  with one or
more States or international organisations in the area of Common Foreign and Security
Policy.  Article  37  TEU does  not  lay down a  specific  procedure  applicable  to  CFSP
agreements (that is, Articles 216, 218 TFEU – the unified treaty-making procedure (Part
71  [1994] 1 CMLR 57. The German Constitutional Court drew a careful distinction between central
areas of exercise (customs union, free movement, internal market) and areas where cooperation
remains on an intergovernmental basis (foreign and security policy).
72  Eileen Denza, The Intergovernmental Pillars of the European Union (OUP, Oxford 2002) 60.
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V of the TFEU on the Union's external action) – applies).
A second argument is the existence of a provision corresponding to Article 4 (3) TEU,
namely Article 24 (2) TEU. Article 4 (3) TEU states that 'the Union and the Member
States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow
from the Treaties'. In the same vein, Article 24 (2) TEU states that,
[w]ithin the framework of  the  principles  and objectives  of  its  external
action, the Union shall conduct, define and implement a common foreign
and  security  policy,  based  on  the  development  of  mutual  political
solidarity among Member States, the identification of questions of general
interest and the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence
of Member States' actions.
Given that the principle of sincere cooperation also operates within CFSP, the CFSP legal
order,  although  a  distinct  field  of  activity,  remains  part  of  a  unified  legal  system.
This  points  to  the  conclusion that  the  duty of  consistent  interpretation  may apply to
CFSP.73
A third argument is Article 47 TEU, express provision for international legal personality.
The Working Group of the Convention for the Future of Europe on Legal Personality
expressed that the European Union should have a single legal personality, concluding
that, explicit conferral of a single legal personality on the Union did not per se entail any
amendment, either to the allocation of competences between the Union and the Member
States or to the allocation of competences between the Union and Community at that
time. Nor did it involve any amendments to the respective procedures and powers of the
institutions  regarding  in  particular  the  opening,  negotiation  and  conclusion  of
73  This argument makes only sense once we have identified Article 4 (3) TEU as the source of the
duty of consistent interpretation. Apparently dissenting, Jan Wouters, Dominic Coppens and Bart
de Meester, ‘The European Union's External Relations after the Lisbon Treaty’ in Stefan Griller and
Jacques Ziller (eds),  The Lisbon Treaty: EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty?
(Springer, Vienna 2008) 191; Steve Peers (n 68) 919-920.
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international agreements.74
This reasoning is confirmed by the Treaty of Lisbon, which contains allusion to the legal
personality  of  the  Union.  Article  47  TEU  provides  that  the  ‘Union  shall  have
[international] legal personality’. Thym perceives Article 47 TEU as a drafting technique
which designates the Union as an international organisation, noting that the significance
of  the  EU's  express  international  legal  personality  (Article  47  TEU)  should  not  be
overstated. It did not imply that the EU moved closer to statehood, as legal personality
was a common feature of contemporary international organisations. It rather seemed that
the protracted dispute about the EU's legal status in the 1990s wrongly had equated legal
personality  with  supranationalisation,  which  would  explain  the  quasi-ideological
objection of EU legal personality by some authors. That was not the case because bodies
such as the International Criminal Court or the WTO possess legal personality- without
being a state (one might on the contrary perceive Article 47 TEU as a drafting technique
which  designated  the  EU  as  an  international  organisation).  Also,  international
organisations exercised their own competences, whose exercise resulted in international
legal obligations.75
Article  47  TEU  makes  the  legal  personality  of  the  European  Union  explicit  and
designates  the  Union  as  a  contracting  party;  as  such the  debate  on  the  question  of
whether ex-Article 24 TEU confers implicitly legal personality to the European Union
becomes obsolete.76
74  CONV 305/02, Final Report of Working Group III on Legal Personality, Brussels,  1 October
2002 [IV.] [20].
75  Daniel  Thym, ‘The intergovernmental  constitution  of  the EU's  foreign,  security  and defence
executive’ (2011) 7 EuConst 453-480, at 472-73.
76  See,  amongst  others,  Panos  Koutrakos,  ‘International  Agreements  in  the  Area  of  the  EU's
Common  Security  and  Defence  Policy’ in  Enzo  Cannizzaro,  Paolo  Palchetti  and  Ramses  A.
Wessel (eds), International Law as Law of the European Union (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 2011)
161. In the view of the writer, the debate/reasoning is still relevant, even though the question is
settled.
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An appended Declaration states that:
The fact that the European Union has a legal personality will not in any
way authorise the Union to legislate or to act beyond the competences
conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties.77
As indicated by Craig, there is no reason why Article 47 TEU should have any impact on
the competences of the European Union.78 
Article 47 TEU, as indicated by de Baere, in a point perhaps only of academic interest
regarding  the  Union,  does  not  in  itself  actually  grant  the  Union  international  legal
personality. This is because, whether an entity possessed international legal personality
was a conclusion that had to be drawn within international law. When the founders of an
international organisation explicitly endowed it with international legal personality, this
merely  indicated  that  the  founders  wished  to  create  an  entity  distinct  from  their
aggregate, and this would be of evidentiary value when deciding on the existence of a
legal  person  under  international  law.  An  explicit  grant  of  personality  would  be
immediately valid among the Member States of the organisation, but one could think of
hypothetical circumstances in which it would not have any effect vis-à-vis non-Member
States, for instance if in reality the organisation had no independent organs at all.79
As indicated by Naert,  challenges in the field of external relations to result from the
explicit  grant  of  legal  personality  to  the  Union  are  questions  of  mostly  theoretical
importance. As regards human rights law the TEU does not specifically refer to IHL, but
IHL is covered by provisions of the TEU on international law and is arguably covered to
some extent by the human rights provisions of the TEU, according to Naert, the main
77  Declaration no. 24 concerning the legal personality of the European Union.
78  Paul Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform (OUP, Oxford 2010) 387.
79  Geert de Baere (n 65) 144.
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source of IHL obligations of the EU itself was customary international humanitarian law.
Yet, there were few indications so far of a recognition that the EU itself could have IHL
obligations, although it remains to be seen whether the explicit grant of legal personality
to the EU will change this. In addition, the application of IHL to the EU did raise some
difficult questions of mostly theoretical importance, even though most of its rules could
readily  be  applied  by  the  EU  in  its  CSDP  operations.  On  the  basis  of  those
considerations, it could seem that the IHL and human rights law obligations of the EU
and its Member States in CSDP operations were to a significant extent similar, although
not fully identical.80
There are also post-Lisbon arguments against direct effect. A first argument is that the
ability  of a  norm to be self-executing or justiciable  is,  even after the de-pillarisation
following the Treaty of Lisbon, severely limited under the CFSP.
According to Schütze,  unlike ordinary EU law, however, the direct effect of CFSP law
will be exceptional. The notion of direct effect stands for the ability of a norm to be self-
executing  or  justiciable.  That  quality  will  be  severely  limited  within  the  CFSP.  The
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is excluded with respect to CFSP provisions and acts
adopted on the basis of those provisions (European Union, Court of Justice and General
Court). There are only two express exceptions. CFSP law can be reviewed under Article
40 TEU and the  Court  of  Justice  has  jurisdiction  to  review the  legality  of  decisions
providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons adopted on the basis of
Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union under Article 275 TFEU.81
The Court continues to lack jurisdiction under Article 267 TFEU with regard to CFSP
80  Frederik Naert, ‘The application of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in
CSDP Operations’ in Enzo Cannizzaro, Paolo Palchetti and Ramses A. Wessel (eds), International
Law as Law of the European Union (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 2011) 211-12.
81  Robert  Schütze,  ‘European  Community  and  Union,  Decision-Making  and  Competences  on
International Law Issues’ in Wolfrum, Rüdiger (et al, eds), Encyclopedia of Public International
Law (OUP, Oxford 2011), para 22.
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measures; that is, there is no preliminary reference mechanism for the CFSP.
This  results  in  a  second  argument.  The  distinct  nature  of  CFSP competences;  an
additional  reason  for  being  careful  with  the  Union-wide  application  of  Community
concepts. Elsuwege phrases this as follows: In contrast to other EU competences, CFSP
competence does not fall within one of the three categories set out in Article 2 TFEU
(making  reference  to  exclusive  competence,  shared  competence  and  supporting  or
complementary competence). Arguably, the drafters of the treaty did intend to provide for
a non-defined, sui generis category of competences to underline the specific nature of the
CFSP as a distinct policy area of the Union, which is not subject to pre-emption and not
merely complementary to activities of the Member States.82
The intergovernmental, institutional framework of CFSP is characterised by the consensus
principle (Article 24 (1) TEU). National governments act within the framework of the
Council; due to national sovereignty (individual, national interests) cooperation cannot
develop into integration.83
The specificities of the CFSP, and its distinctive nature (Article 24 TEU), are reflected in
the continued exclusion84 of  the Court in these matters,85 with a different institutional
balance  and decision-making procedure,  militating  against  an extensive  interpretation;
82  Peter van Elsuwege, ‘EU External Action after the Collapse of the Pillar Structure: In search of a
New Balance between Delimitation and Consistency’ (2010) 47 CMLR 987, 991. In the same line,
Daniel Thym (n 8) 900-01.
83  Jakob C. Øhrgaard, ‘Less than Supranational, More than Intergovernmental': European Political
Cooperation and the Dynamics of Intergovernmental  Integration’ (1997) 26 Millennium J.Int'l
Stud. 1, 2.
84  Save for two exceptions. Jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 40 TEU and jurisdiction
to review the legality of decisions referred to in Article 275 (2) TFEU providing for restrictive
measures against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council.
85  Panos Koutrakos, ‘EU law: External relations’ (2010) 59 ICLQ 481, 487; Steven Blockmans and
Ramses A. Wessel, ‘The European Union and crisis management: will the Lisbon Treaty make the
EU more effective?’ (2009) 14 J.C.& S.L. 265, 295.
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that is, individual enforcement in an area with limited integrationist potential.
A third argument – although the area of the CFSP is an object of European co-operation
within the framework of the Union, the Member States have deliberately not incorporated
them into the supra-national jurisdiction system.86 If effect were to derive from EU law
(e.g. by explicit Treaty provision) national constitutional courts would have no choice. But
to accept.
Arguments in the previous section; that is, rationales, in favour of individual enforcement,
seem less thorough / less elaborated on.
2. The area of FSJ and direct effect
a)  Pre-Lisbon arguments for and against direct effect
As a presumption a careful extension of the Court's case law (legal principles developed
in the context of the EC Treaty) to the former third pillar of PJCC might bridge many
lacunae in the Treaty. It has been suggested in the legal literature that legal principles
developed in the context of the former EC Treaty could be extended to the EU Treaty as
long as they were not expressly excluded. The principle of direct effect, for example, was
excluded, but the principle of supremacy of European Law was not. Parts of the case law
on supremacy also related to treaty provisions which were not directly applicable. The
critical case was where a legal act under ex-Title VI to the TEU (provisions concerning
police and judicial  cooperation in  criminal  matters)  which required the adoption of a
national law was in conflict with a Member State's constitution. Here, the national law
could be adopted if the European act was considered supreme. A careful extension of the
86  Brunner [1994] 1 CMLR 57 (Maastricht), para 18 and 2 BvE 2/08 Gauweiler v Treaty of Lisbon
(Judgment of 30 June 2009), para 50.
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case law of the ECJ might bridge many lacunae in the EU Treaty.87 
In this sense, as indicated by Spaventa, the Court in the Pupino case88 simply anticipated
this extension.
By transposing a former Community law doctrine to the area of co-operation in criminal
matters,  it  acted  as  a  bridge  between  the  pillars.  The  ruling  in  Pupino was  not
unanimously well received: concerns about loss of sovereignty in the criminal sphere and
judicial law-making contributed to the criticism. That said, it should be regarded that the
ruling might  serve as a much-required judicial  guarantee in  an area where significant
legislative action had taken place without any significant democratic accountability. The
problem, if  there  was one,  did not  stem from the transposition of  a  Community  law
doctrine  to  the  area  of  criminal  co-operation;  rather,  it  stemed from the  institutional
framework in the third pillar that allowed action in the criminal sphere to be taken at the
executive level and far away from the public eye. The Constitutional Treaty would have
solved  that  problem  by  eliminating  the  pillar  structure  and  subjecting  action  in  the
criminal sphere to the same judicial and democratic guarantees that characterised the first
pillar.89
As Spaventa, rhetorically suggested, by transposing a former Community law doctrine to
the field of co-operation in criminal matters, the duty of consistent interpretation acted as
a bridge between the pillars.
87  Armin von Bogdandy, ‘The Legal Case for Unity: The European Union as a Single Organization
with a Single Legal System’ (1999) 36 CMLR 887, 909-10.
88  Case C-105/03 Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino EU:C:2005:386, [2005] ECR I-5285.
89  Eleanor Spaventa (n 62) 24.
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b)  Post-Lisbon arguments for and against direct effect
The starting points for any discussion of judicial protection (which national courts must
secure  as  regards  areas  of  Freedom,  Security  and Justice)  are  national  constitutional
rights, and the process of “communitarisation”.
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the acquis that has been built up under pre-
Lisbon's Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters merged with that of the
“Community”.
Police and Judicial  Cooperation in Criminal  Matters,  transferred to  the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),  as policy aiming at  creating an Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice (FSJ) is submitted to the “Community” method; that is,
some of the Community pillar principles, to unify pre-Lisbon's first and third pillars.
In the Simmenthal90 case the Court has stated that any provision of a Member States' legal
system and any legislative,  administrative or judicial  practice which might impair  the
effectiveness of EC law by withholding from the Member States' court having jurisdiction
to apply such law the power to do everything necessary at the moment of its application to
set aside Member States' legislative provisions which might prevent EC rules from having
full  force and effect were incompatible  with those requirements  which were the very
essence of EC law. That would be the case in the event of a conflict between a provision
of EC law and a subsequent Member States' law if the solution of the conflict were to be
reserved for an authority with a discretion of its own, other than the court called upon to
apply EC law, even if such an impediment to the full effectiveness of EC law were merely
90  Case  6/64  Flaminio  Costa  v  E.N.E.L.  EU:C:1964:66, [1964]  ECR  585;  Case  106/77
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA EU:C:1978:49, [1978] ECR 629.
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temporary.91
As indicated by Hinarejos, following the “communitarisation” of pre-Lisbon's Police and
Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters, the  Simmenthal duty; that is, the duty to dis-
apply  a  conflicting  national  rule,  might  come  coupled  with  a  full  extension  of  the
“Community”  method:  Both  the  recent  case-law  on  the  criminal  competence  of  the
Community and the Commission's proposal to transfer all  third pillar  matters into the
Community pillar  had recently hinted at  a possible  gradual blurring of the distinction
between  first  and  third  pillar  -  not  by  extending  the  principles  of  what  was  then
Community law to the  third  pillar,  but  by transferring areas  of  competence  currently
exercised under the third pillar to the first one. Yet recently, the European Council had
91  Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA EU:C:1978:49, [1978]
ECR 629, paras 22-23. 'Primacy' and 'trigger' models are competing visions for primacy /direct
effect. For critical analysis of the two competing models: Michael Dougan, ‘When worlds collide:
competing visions of the relationship between direct effect and supremacy’ (2007) 44 CMLR 931.
The author previously used the terms 'common law' and 'civil law' models. See Michael Dougan,
‘Legal  Developments’ (2005)  43  JCMS  89. Advocates  of  the  'primacy'  model;  that  is,  the
assumption of a free-standing principle of primacy, are: Miriam Lenz, ‘Horizontal What? Back to
Basics’ (2000) 25 ELRev. 509; Takis Tridimas, ‘Black, White, and Shades of Grey: Horizontality
of  Directives  Revisited’ (2002)  21YEL 327;  Koen  Lenaerts  and  Tim Corthaut  (n  66);  Gerrit
Betlem,  ‘The  Doctrine  of  Consistent  Interpretation—Managing  Legal  Uncertainty’ (2002)  22
OJLS 397. Note also the doctrinal support in the Court's case law; several Advocates General
articulated that there should be a distinction between the 'substitution effect' and the 'exclusionary
effect'. E.g. Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-244/98 Océano Grupo Editorial EU:C:1999:620, [2000]
ECR I-4941,  Opinion of  AG Saggio,  para  38;  Case C-287/98  Grand Duchy of  Luxemburg v
Linster EU:C:2000:3,  [2000] ECR I-6917, Opinion of AG Léger, para 57; and Case C-457/02
Criminal proceedings against Antonio Niselli EU:C:2004:365,  [2004] ECR I-10853, Opinion of
AG Kokott, paras 52-75 (exclusion of the offending national rules). The 'trigger' model assumes
that the Union legal order and the national legal order are separate legal systems, with the inherent
need for linkages; that is, the need to render Union law cognizable before national courts through
the doctrine of direct effect. See Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer v Deutsches Rotes
Kreuz,  Kreisverband  Waldshut  eV.  EU:C:2004:584, [2004]  ECR  I-8835;  and  Sacha  Prechal,
‘Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01, Bernhard Pfeiffer et al., with annotation’ (2005) 42 CMLR
1445. Joined Cases C-387/02, C-391/02 and C-403/02 Criminal proceedings against Berlusconi
(C-387/02),  Sergio  Adelchi  (C-391/02)  and  Marcello  Dell'Utri  and  Others  (C-403/02)
EU:C:2005:270, [2005] ECR I-3565 are affirmations of the Court's understanding in Joined Cases
C-397/01 to C-403/01.  See Michael  Dougan,  ‘When worlds  collide:  competing visions of  the
relationship  between  direct  effect  and  supremacy’ (2007)  44  CMLR 931,  948  and  963.  The
'trigger'  model,  as  opposed to the 'primacy'  model,  is  more straightforward,  and intellectually
sustainable.
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agreed to issue a mandate to draft a new Reform Treaty, which should in theory do away
with the distinction between those two areas. Albeit the details remained to be seen, it was
expected that the general principles of Community law would be explicitly extended to
the third pillar. If that was the case, the extension of the  Simmenthal  duty would come
coupled with a  full  extension of the Community method, and the problems discussed
above would not arise.92 In the writer's view a full extension of the “Community” method
is very superficial and difficult to draw. Already an open-minded reading, indicates the
inadequacy of this understanding. To sum, the fact that FSJ is now “communitarised” says
nothing as to the effect of international agreements.
3. Contractual exclusions of direct effect 
The Court said, in the context of ruling on whether a German tax on wines was applicable
to imports from Portugal (Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A.),
It  is  true  that  the  effects  within  the  Community  of  provisions  of  an
agreement concluded by the Community with a non-member country may
not be determined without taking account of the international origin of the
provisions  in  question.  In  conformity  with  the  principles  of  public
international law Community institutions which have power to negotiate
and conclude an agreement with a non-member country are free to agree
with that country what effect the provisions of the agreement are to have
in the internal legal order of the contracting parties. Only if that question
has not been settled by the agreement does it fall for decision by the courts
having jurisdiction in the matter, and in particular by the Court of Justice
within  the  framework of  its  jurisdiction under  the  Treaty,  in  the  same
manner as any question of interpretation relating to the application of the
agreement in the Community.93 
92  Alicia  Hinarejos,  ‘On  the  Legal  Effects  of  Framework  Decisions  and  Decisions:  Directly
Applicable, Directly Effective, Self-executing, Supreme?’ (2008) 14 ELJ 620-634, at 633-34.
93  Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. EU:C:1982:362, [1982] ECR
3641, para 17.
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In  Portugal v Council, the Court held in connection with a challenge against a Council
Decision  establishing  a  Memorandum  of  Understanding  between  the  European
Community and India and Pakistan, relating to trade in textiles:
It  should  also  be  remembered  that  according  to  the  general  rules  of
international  law  there  must  be  bona  fide  performance  of  every
agreement. Although each contracting party is responsible for executing
fully the commitments which it has undertaken it is nevertheless free to
determine the legal means appropriate for attaining that end in its legal
system, unless the agreement, interpreted in the light of its subject-matter
and purpose, itself specifies those means (Kupferberg, paragraph 18).94
That is, direct effect will also depend upon the phrasing of EU agreements (CFSP and PJC
(by now FSJ) agreements). The agreement between the European Union and,
… the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the status and activities of the European 
Union police mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUPOL Kinshasa) 
[2005] OJ L256/58 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… Georgia on the status and activities of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in 
Georgia, EUJUST THEMIS [2004] OJ L389/42 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the status and activities of the 
European Union Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(EUPOL Proxima) [2004] OJ L16/66 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Republic of Poland on the participation of Polish armed forces in the European
Union force (EUF) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [2003] OJ L285/44
(Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the status of the European Union-
led forces in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [2003] OJ L82/46 (Treaty 
EU, Article 24).
are EU agreements (CFSP agreements) where the contracting parties have agreed that:
the  purpose  of  the  privileges  and  immunities  as  provided  for  in  this
94  Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 35.
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Agreement  are  not  to  benefit  individuals  but  to  ensure  the  efficient
performance of the EU Mission/ operation, (...).95
The agreement between the European Union and,
… the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging 
Data from the European Union to the United States for purposes of the Terrorist Finance 
Tracking Program [2010] OJ L8/11 (Treaty EU, Articles 24, 38).
… Australia on the processing and transfer of European Union-sourced passenger name
record (PNR) data by air carriers to the Australian customs service [2008] OJ L213/49 
(Treaty EU, Articles 24, 38).
… the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Passenger Name 
Record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) (PNR II Agreement) [2007] OJ L204/18 (Treaty EU, Articles 24, 38); 
replaces the interim agreement.
… the United States of America on the processing and transfer of passenger name 
record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland 
Security [Interim]Agreement [2006] OJ L298/29 (Treaty EU, Articles 24, 38).
are EU agreements (PJC (by now FSJ) agreements), where the contracting parties have
agreed that the agreement:
does  not/  shall  not  create  or  confer  any right  or  benefit  on  any other
person or entity, private or public.96
The  aforementioned agreements  are  examples  for  the  contractual  exclusion  of  direct
effect.
95  Preamble [2005]  OJ  L256/58;  Preamble [2004]  OJ  L389/42;  Preamble [2004]  OJ  L16/66;
Preamble [2003] OJ L285/44; Preamble [2003] OJ L82/46.
96  E.g. Article 13 [2010] OJ L8/11; Article 14 [2008] OJ L213/49.
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E. Indirect effect
1. Indirect effects: The significance of the doctrine of consistent interpretation
In  Pupino,97 a reference for a preliminary ruling was made in the context of criminal
proceedings against Maria Pupino, a nursery school teacher accused of having committed
offences of misuse of disciplinary measures. During the course of preliminary criminal
proceedings the public prosecutor asked the court  to allow,  because of the witnesses'
extreme youth, evidence to be taken before a judge ahead of trial.
The  Italian  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  (‘the  CPP’),  relating  to  witness  statements
recorded beforehand, and to special forms of procedures for taking or recording evidence
where the case involves sexual offences and the witness is under 16, derogates from the
ordinary procedure to be followed in taking evidence,  and sets out the circumstances
under which this could be done, but is limited to abuses of a sexual nature. The judge in
charge  of  preliminary  enquires  applied the  relevant  national  provisions.  Not  satisfied
with the limited scope for the application of special protective procedures, referred the
case to the Italian Constitutional Court to extend the special procedure to offences not
identified  by  the  legislature.  The  Italian  Constitutional  Court  found  that  the  limited
availability of special protective procedures, restricted to sexual offences, is compatible
with  the  right  to  equality  and  the  principle  of  dignity  enshrined  in  the  national
Constitution. The national court, bearing in mind its duty to construe national law in the
light of Union law, decided, due to serious doubts as to the compatibility of Articles 392
97  Case C-105/03 Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino EU:C:2005:386, [2005] ECR I-5285.
See generally,  Maria Fletcher, ‘Extending "indirect effect" to the third pillar: the significance of
Pupino?’ (2005) 30 ELRev. 862; J. R. Spencer, ‘Child Witnesses and the European Union’ (2005)
64 CLJ 569; George Gebbie, ‘"Berlusconi" -v- "Pupino": Conflict or Compatibility?’ (2007) 1
JECL 31; Eleanor Spaventa (n 62); Teresa Magno, ‘The Pupino Case: Background in Italian Law
and consequences for the national judge’ (2007) 8 ERA 215; Steve Peers (n 68).
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(1a)98 and 398 (5a) of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure (‘the CPP’) with Articles
2,99 3100 and  8101 of  the  Framework  Decision  on  the  standing  of  victims  in  criminal
proceedings, to stay the proceedings, and asked the Court to rule on the scope of Articles
2, 3 and 8 of the Framework Decision on the standing of victims of crime.102
The Framework Decision related to respect for, and recognition of, victims and to victims
as witnesses, and to the Member States' duty to develop special procedures for giving
evidence, to ensure that vulnerable victims receive specific treatment.
The central question in this case was whether the Framework Decision could have some
effects in the national legal order, and whether national courts would be required to take
account of  Framework Decisions when interpreting their national laws. Faced with the
preliminary  objections  raised  by  the  intervening  governments,  in  particular  with  the
objection  that  the  duty  of  consistent  interpretation  cannot  extend  to  a  Union  law
instrument (which is not in itself directly effective)103 the Court decided to extend, in line
with its Advocate General,104 the duty of consistent interpretation to the  area of Police
and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters, as:
It would be difficult for the Union to carry out its task effectively if the
principle of loyal cooperation, requiring in particular that Member States
take  all  appropriate  measures,  whether  general  or  particular,  to  ensure
fulfilment of their obligations under European Union law, were not also
binding in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters,
98  Article 392 of the CPP (Preliminary enquiries and preliminary hearing). 
99  Article 2 (Respect and recognition). 
100  Article 3 (Hearings, and provision of evidence).
101  Article 8 (Right to protection).
102  Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA of 15 March 2001 on the standing of victims in criminal
proceedings [2001] OJ L82/1.
103  Article 34 (2)  TEU excluded the possibility that  Decisions and Framework Decisions confer
enforceable rights on individuals.
104  Case C-105/03 Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino EU:C:2004:712, [2005] ECR I-5285,
Opinion of AG Kokott, para 26.
127
Chapter II
which is  moreover  entirely based on cooperation between the Member
States and the institutions (...).105
The Court stated that national  courts have a duty of sincere cooperation and have to
interpret national law, insofar as possible,106 in conformity with Framework Decisions,
as:
(...)  the principle  of  conforming interpretation is  binding in  relation to
framework decisions adopted in the context of Title VI of the Treaty on
European Union. When applying national law, the national court that is
called upon to interpret it must do so as far as possible in the light of the
wording and purpose of  the  framework decision  in  order  to  attain the
result which it pursues and thus comply with Article 34(2)(b) EU.107
With the  extension  of  a  former first  pillar  (EC) tool  to  an  area with a  strong inter-
governmental component108 – but also with a strong supra-national component109 – the
principle of loyal cooperation, in the absence of alternative enforcement mechanisms in
pre-Lisbon's third pillar,  takes on added significance. According to Fletcher,  it  was at
least imaginable that there was not the same broad consensus in regard of the goals of
105  Case C-105/03 Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino EU:C:2005:386, [2005] ECR I-5285,
para 42.
106  Case C-105/03 Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino EU:C:2005:386, [2005] ECR I-5285,
para 61.
107  Case C-105/03 Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino EU:C:2005:386, [2005] ECR I-5285,
para 43. The fact that there was no complete system of actions and procedures designed to ensure
the  legality  of  the  acts  of  the  institutions  in  the  context  of  (former)  Title  VI  did  nothing  to
invalidate the conclusion that the duty of consistent interpretation applies to pre-Lisbon's Police
and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (para 35).
108  Intergovernmental  components:  a  (strong)  intergovernmental  component  arises  from  the
Council's monopoly to authorise the opening of negotiations, as displayed in Article 218 (2), (3)
TFEU /and the Council's  monopoly to approve (Article  218 (2), (5) TFEU) /and to conclude
(Article 218 (2), (6) TFEU) EU agreements (CFSP and PJC (by now FSJ) agreements).
109  Supra-national components: a supra-national component arises from the Parliament's right to be
immediately and fully informed of the progress of the negotiations at all stages of the procedure,
as displayed in Article 218 (10) TFEU /and the control a priori of legality, as displayed in Article
218 (11) TFEU.
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integration concerning criminal law co-operation as there was in respect of the first pillar.
A system of  enforcement  based  upon a  limited  interpretative  obligation  on  Member
States'  courts  itself  had  to  be  limited.  But  in  the  absence  of  alternative  enforcement
mechanisms  in  the  third  pillar,  the  Pupino  principle  took  on  added  significance.
Consequently, it seemed particularly important that the scope of the interpretative duty
on Member States' courts was sufficiently clear and precise.110
As indicated by Spencer, the broader implication is that the European Union must respect
fundamental rights as guaranteed by the ECHR. As such, criminal courts, when construing
the rules of English law in relation to criminal justice, in future will have to operate not
merely  looking over  their  left  shoulders  at  the  Strasbourg  Court  and  the  ECHR, but
simultaneously looking over their right ones at the Luxembourg Court and EU Framework
Decisions.111
In  the  light  of  the  above  considerations,  loyal  cooperation,  inherently  limited  by  the
general principles of Union law (in particular, by the principles of legal certainty, non-
retroactivity, and by fundamental rights) may contribute to the protection of individual
rights – but can also be used to the detriment of an individual.112 The applications of the
duty of consistent interpretation may result in detrimental effects on persons charged of a
criminal offence (not to the detriment of the defendant). That is, loyal cooperation may
be  used  to  affect  procedural  rules,  e.g.  rules  on  how evidence  is  gathered,  or  rules
determining the time limit  for an action,  which in themselves are  not  constitutive of
criminal liability. The Court held that:
110  Cf. Maria Fletcher (n 97) 873.
111  J. R. Spencer (n 97) 571.
112  Case C-321/05 Kofoed v Skatteministeriet  EU:C:2007:408, [2007] ECR I-5795; Case C-350/03
Schulte  v  Deutsche Bausparkasse  Badenia  AG EU:C:2005:637,  [2005]  ECR I-9215;  Case  C-
142/04  Maria Aslanidou v Ypourgos Ygeias  & Pronoias EU:C:2005:473,  [2005] ECR I-7181;
Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Waldshut eV.
EU:C:2004:584, [2004] ECR I-8835; Case C-343/98  Renato Collino and Luisella Chiappero v
Telecom Italia SpA EU:C:2000:441, [2000] ECR I-6659; Case C-2/97 Società italiana petroli SpA
(IP) v Borsana Srl EU:C:1998:613, [1998] ECR I-8597.
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the  provisions  which  form  the  subject-matter  of  this  reference  for  a
preliminary ruling do not concern the extent of the criminal liability of the
person concerned but the conduct of the proceedings and the means of
taking evidence.113
For  example,  Spaventa  questioned  whether  the  application  of  the  duty  of  consistent
interpretation to rules of criminal procedure, which might result in a detrimental effect on
the person charged of a criminal offence, would ever be compatible with the guarantees
afforded by the ECHR, and with the principles of legal certainty and forseeability. In her
reasoning, in that respect, it would have been preferable for the Court of Justice to clearly
state that the principle of consistent interpretation could not be used to the detriment of the
defendant, regardless of the nature of the rules in question (in which case the ruling in
Pupino would have been of little use to the prosecution).114
According to Fletcher, the potential of the principle of loyal cooperation is necessarily
limited. It depends upon the willingness and the possibility of national courts to engage
their duty. Individuals undoubtedly have lain at the heart of the wider FSJ agenda and the
protection of citizen's rights in the criminal process was clearly of particular importance.
Where  the  European  Union  had  recognised  the  existence  of  rights  for  suspected
perpetrators or  victims  of criminal  activity  it  was thus  crucial  that those rights  were
enforceable. That was important not merely in terms of ensuring the effective protection
of rights but also so as to ensure the success and even legitimacy of European integration.
113  Case C-105/03 Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino EU:C:2005:386, [2005] ECR I-5285,
para 46.
114  Eleanor Spaventa (n 62) 13. As indicated by Spaventa consistent interpretation can never be used
to  establish  or  aggravate  the  criminal  liability,  Case  80/86  Criminal  proceedings  against
Kolpinghuis Nijmegen BV EU:C:1987:431, [1987] ECR 3969. See also Case C-168/95 Criminal
proceedings against Luciano Arcaro EU:C:1996:363, [1996] ECR I-4705; Joined Cases C-387/02,
C-391/02 and C-403/02 Criminal proceedings against Berlusconi (C-387/02), Sergio Adelchi (C-
391/02) and Marcello Dell'Utri and Others (C-403/02) EU:C:2005:270, [2005] ECR I-3565. The
Court also specified that the duty of consistent interpretation does not stretch/ nor can serve the
purpose of interpretations contra legem Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer v Deutsches
Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Waldshut eV. EU:C:2004:584, [2004] ECR I-8835.
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To the extent that the duty of harmonious interpretation provided one mechanism for the
judicial enforceability of EU rights and obligations contained in framework decisions, it
was a welcome development. Yet, the potential for that principle to enforce rights for the
benefit of the individual was necessarily limited. As seen, it will to a large extent depend
upon the specific circumstances of the case and the willingness and the possibility of a
Member States' court to engage its duty.115
It is crucial that rights are enforceable. This is important in order to ensure the success
and legitimacy of European integration.
2. Indirect effects of EU agreements (CFSP and PJC (by now FSJ) agreements)
The Court confirmed the doctrine of consistent interpretation (also referred to as indirect
effect), with regard to international agreements. In  Anklagemyndigheden v Poulsen and
Diva Navigation Corp, for example, the Court held:
As  a  preliminary  point,  it  must  be  observed,  first,  that  the  European
Community must respect international law in the exercise of its powers
and that, consequently, Article 6 abovementioned must be interpreted, and
its scope limited, in the light of the relevant rules of the international law
of the sea.116
A similar conclusion was reached in Commission v Germany. The Court held that:
When the wording of secondary Community legislation is open to more
than one interpretation, preference should be given as far as possible to
the interpretation which renders the provision consistent with the Treaty.
Likewise,  an  implementing  regulation  must,  if  possible,  be  given  an
interpretation consistent with the basic regulation (see Case C-90/92  Dr
115  Maria Fletcher (n 97) 875.
116  Case  C-286/90  Anklagemyndigheden  v  Poulsen  and  Diva  Navigation  Corp EU:C:1992:453,
[1992] ECR I-6019, para 9.
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Tretter v Hauptzollamt Stuttgart-Ost [1993] ECR I-3569, paragraph 11).
Similarly,  the  primacy  of  international  agreements  concluded  by  the
Community over provisions of secondary Community legislation means
that such provisions must, so far as is possible, be interpreted in a manner
that is consistent with those agreements.117
In Hermès International (a partnership limited by shares) v FHT Marketing Choice BV,
the Court held, citing, by analogy, Poulsen and Diva Navigation,
It  is  true  that  the  measures  envisaged  by  Article  99  and  the  relevant
procedural  rules  are  those  provided  for  by  the  domestic  law  of  the
Member  State  concerned  for  the  purposes  of  the  national  trade  mark.
However, since the Community is a party to the TRIPs Agreement and
since  that  agreement  applies  to  the  Community  trade  mark,  the  courts
referred to in Article 99 of Regulation No 40/94, when called upon to
apply national rules with a view to ordering provisional measures for the
protection of rights arising under a Community trade mark, are required to
do so, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and purpose of Article
50 of the TRIPs Agreement (see, by analogy, Case C-286/90 Poulsen and
Diva  Navigation [1992]  ECR I-6019,  paragraph  9,  and  Case  C-61/94
Commission v Germany [1996] ECR I-3989, paragraph 52).118
It is strongly arguable that indirect effects apply over Union law in its entirety. De Baere
phrases this as follows: As noted with regard to the implications of the Pupino reasoning
for the application of a general duty of loyal cooperation throughout the entire EU legal
order, Article 11 (2) EU (now Article 24 TEU) introduced a similar obligation with regard
to the CFSP. It urged the Member States to support the Union's external and security
policy 'actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity'. The Member
States also had to work together 'to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity',
and were told to 'refrain from any action which was contrary to the interests of the Union
or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations'. Owing to
117  Case C-61/94 Commission v Germany EU:C:1996:313, [1996] ECR I-3989, para 52.
118  Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1998:292, [1998] ECR I-
3603, para 28. 
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the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Justice over Title V of the EU Treaty, no judicial
review was possible within the EU legal order of Member States' compliance with the
principle of loyal cooperation in Article 11 (2) EU. Yet, in light of the Pupino reasoning it
was strongly arguable that the principle of loyal cooperation applied over EU law in its
entirety and could give rise to the application of the duty of consistent interpretation in the
CFSP. Individuals might invoke the duty of consistent interpretation before their domestic
courts,  so  as  to  have  Member  States'  measures  reviewed  for  compliance  with  CFSP
measures.119 
Indirect effect, is an alternative/ additional means for EU agreements (CFSP and PJC (by
now FSJ) agreements) to produce independent effects within the national systems.
F. Conclusion
Chapter 2 focused on the general issues and practice on EU agreements (CFSP and PJC
(by now FSJ) agreements), and integrated sections on direct and indirect effect.
Section 1 dealt with the international legal personality of the Union. The TEU in its Nice
version did not include a provision explicitly conferring legal personality to the Union.
The Nice provisions did not explicitly provide on whose behalf the agreements were
concluded or who was bound by agreements on matters of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy or Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters – questions with
no certain answers available presently.
According  to  one  school  of  thought,  the  European  Union  was  not  a  subject  of
international law; that is, powers rested with the Member States and the Council acted on
behalf of the Member States which were the contracting parties. By contrast, according
to another school of thought, the European Union possesses an implicit legal personality;
119  Geert de Baere (n 65) 259-60.
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that  is,  the Council  acted on behalf  of the European Union and not on behalf  of the
Member  States.  Article  47  TEU makes  the  legal  personality  of  the  European Union
explicit  and  designates  the  Union  as  a  contracting  party;  as  such  the  debate  on  the
question  of  whether  ex-Article  24  TEU conferred  implicitly  legal  personality  to  the
European Union becomes obsolete. In the view of the writer, the debate/reasoning is still
relevant, even though the question is settled.
Section  2  dealt  with  the  practice  on  EU  agreements.  Sections  3  and  4  considered
respectively with direct effects and indirect effects and addressed a vertical dimension
(vis-à-vis national legislation). Arguments in favour of direct effect seem less thorough
and less elaborated on.
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  CHAPTER III: JURISDICTION OF THE COURT ON EU INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS
A. Introduction
As mentioned earlier, prior to the Lisbon Treaty treaty-making had different legal bases
(CFSP and non-CFSP legal bases) for EC (by now EU) agreements, on the one hand, and
CFSP and PJC (by now FSJ) agreements, on the other hand. As indicated by Francis G.
Jacobs, the Court has taken a broad view of its jurisdiction in relation to EC (by now EU)
agreements.1 According to ex-Articles 24 (modified 1997 and 2000) and 38 of the former
TEU the European Union had the capacity  to conclude  CFSP and PJC (by now FSJ)
agreements. Post-Lisbon, Article 218 TFEU has become the sole legal basis (with respect
to monetary policy, see Article 219 TFEU and Common Commercial Policy (CCP) Article
207 TFEU). The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of the jurisdiction of the
Court on EU international agreements. Accordingly the discussion that follows is in three
parts: Section 1 looks at the jurisdiction of the Court on EC (by now EU) agreements
before and after the Lisbon Treaty reforms, Section 2 looks at the jurisdiction of the Court
on CFSP and PJC (by now FSJ) agreements before and after the Lisbon Treaty reforms
and Section 3 considers the standard of review in general, and Yusuf/Kadi in particular.2
1  Francis G Jacobs, ‘Direct effect and interpretation of international agreements in the recent case
law of the European Court of Justice’ in Alan Dashwood and Marc Maresceau (eds),  Law and
practice of  EU external  relations:  salient  features  of  a changing landscape (CUP, Cambridge
2008) 14.
2  Kadi I concerned the legality of Community acts listed by the UN Sanction Committee. Kadi II,
concerned the re-listing after the judgment in Kadi I of 2008. The Court of Justice of the European
Union  confirmed that the standard required by the EU legal  order requires more than limited
procedural review. 
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B. Jurisdiction of the Court on EC (by now EU) agreements before and after the 
Lisbon Treaty reforms
1. Control ex ante of legality of EC (by now EU) agreements
The European Parliament, the Council, the Commission or a Member State were entitled
to challenge the constitutionality  of a  draft  agreement. This judicial  safeguard can be
found in ex-Article 300 (6) TEC (equivalent to Article 218 (11) TFEU), which created the
jurisdiction of the Court for an ex ante review of a draft agreement.
Ex-Article 300 (6) TEC read as follows:
The  European  Parliament,  the  Council,  the  Commission  or  a  Member
State  may obtain the opinion of the Court  of Justice as to  whether  an
agreement  envisaged  is  compatible  with  the  provisions  of  this  Treaty.
Where the opinion of the Court of Justice is adverse, the agreement may
enter  into  force  only  in  accordance  with  Article  48  of  the  Treaty  on
European Union.3
According to de Baere, the  ratio legis of the ex-Article 300 (6) TEC procedure  was to
enable the  institutions and the Member States  to obtain  an authoritative statement  on
whether an envisaged agreement fell within the EC's competence and whether the proper
legal basis had been chosen, the Commission had in the past used the procedure to attempt
to establish exclusive EC competence and disprove Member State  competence. Those
attempts have had varying degrees of success.  Both in its  case law and in its  Article
300 (6) EC Opinions, the Court had developed approaches that were unique to the field of
external relations, such as the extensive doctrine of implied external competences, as a
3  Further on ex-Article 300 (6) TEC. See Panos Koutrakos, EU international relations law (Hart,
Oxford/Portland  2006) 186-192.  The broad construction of  pre-emptive jurisdiction under ex-
Article 300 (6) TEC.
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logical correlate of the primacy principle.4
The Court has delivered fourteen Opinions on international agreements before the entry
into force of the Lisbon Treaty.5 In Opinion 1/75 (Local Cost Standard),6 the first such
opinion, concerning a (draft) Understanding on a Local Cost Standard (general purpose of
the  procedure)  drawn  up  within  the  Organization  for  Economic  Co-operation  and
development (OECD), the Court was asked to rule on the consistency of the agreement
about credits for the financing of local costs linked to export operations with the EC legal
order. In Opinion 1/75, the Court explained the purpose of the Opinion procedure:
It  is  the  purpose  of  [the  procedure  laid  down in  Article  300 (6)  TEC
(Article 218 (11) TFEU)] to forestall complications which would result
from  legal  disputes  concerning  the  compatibility  with  the  Treaty  of
international agreements binding upon the Community. In fact, a possible
decision of the Court to the effect that such an agreement is, either by
reason  of  its  content  or  of  the  procedure  adopted  for  its  conclusion,
4  See Geert de Baere, Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations (OUP, Oxford 2008) 95.
5  Opinion 1/75 (Local Cost Standard) EU:C:1975:145, [1975] ECR 1355; Opinion 1/76 (European
laying-up  fund) EU:C:1977:63,  [1977]  ECR 741;  Opinion  1/78 (Natural  Rubber  Agreement)
EU:C:1979:224, [1979] ECR 2871; Opinion 1/91 (EEA Draft Agreement) EU:C:1991:490, [1991]
ECR I-6079; Opinion 2/91 (ILO Convention 170) EU:C:1993:106, [1993] ECR I-1061; Opinion
1/92 (EFTA Agreement  II) EU:C:1992:189,  [1992] ECR I-2821;  Opinion 2/92 (Third Revised
OECD  Decision) EU:C:1995:83,  [1995]  ECR  I-521;  Opinion  1/94  (WTO  Agreement)
EU:C:1994:384, [1994] ECR I-5267;  Opinion 2/94 (Accession of the Community to the ECHR)
EU:C:1996:140, [1996] ECR I-1759 (the predecessor to  Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the
ECHR EU:C:2014:2454); Opinion 3/94 (Banana Framework Agreement) EU:C:1995:436, [1995]
ECR I-4577;  Opinion 1/00 (European Common Aviation Area) EU:C:2002:231, [2002] ECR I-
3493;  Opinion 2/00 (Cartagena Protocol)  EU:C:2001:664,  [2001] ECR I-9713;  Opinion 1/03
(Lugano Convention) EU:C:2006:81, [2006] ECR I-1145;  Opinion 1/08 (General Agreement on
Trade in Services) EU:C:2009:739, [2009] ECR I-11129 – Opinion pursuant to ex-Article 300 (6)
TEC. See the discussion in Robert Schütze, European constitutional law (CUP, Cambridge 2012)
209. Further – The EC-US Agreement on the processing and transfer of passenger name record
data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs
and Border Protection – the European Parliament requested an Opinion under ex-Article 300 (6)
TEC (Case C-317/04 Parliament v Council, notice in [2004] OJ C228/31). As indicated by Panos
Koutrakos,  EU  international  relations  law (Hart,  Oxford/Portland  2006)  190  –  Parliament's
request for an accelerated procedure was rejected by order of the President. Parliament instead
brought an action for annulment. See Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04 Parliament v Council
(C-317/04) and Commission (C-318/04) EU:C:2006:346, [2006] ECR I-4721, paras 39-45.
6  Opinion 1/75 (Local Cost Standard) EU:C:1975:145, [1975] ECR 1355.
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incompatible with the provisions of the Treaty could not fail to provoke,
not only in a Community context but also in that of international relations,
serious difficulties and might give rise to adverse consequences for all
interested parties, including third countries.7
The general purpose of the procedure was to forestall complications which would result
from  legal  disputes  concerning  the  compatibility  with  the  Treaty  of  international
agreements binding upon the Community.
2. Control ex post of legality of EC (by now EU) agreements
The  main  provisions  of  the  Court's  jurisdiction  are  Article  258  TFEU  (ex-Article
226 TEC), Article 263 TFEU (ex-Article 230 TEC) and Article 267 TFEU (ex-Article 234
TEC).8 The provision governing direct review has been amended by the Lisbon Treaty.
a)  The Court's jurisdiction in infringement proceedings
Article 258 TFEU replaces Article 226 TEC. Under Article 258 TFEU (ex-Article 226
TEC) the Commission may, after having issued a reasoned opinion, bring proceedings
before the Court where it considered that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation
under the Treaties. In  Commission v Germany9 on the International Dairy Arrangement,
the Commission challenged the authorisation granted by German authorities; that is, the
importation under inward processing relief arrangements of dairy products whose customs
7  See Opinion 1/75 (Local Cost Standard) EU:C:1975:145, [1975] ECR 1355.
8  See also Mario Mendez,  The Legal Effects of EU Agreements. Maximalist Treaty Enforcement
and Judicial Avoidance Techniques. (Oxford Studies in European Law, OUP, Oxford 2013), at 78,
79,  81-93  and  289-290  (annulment  actions),  290  (ex  ante review  procedure)  and  79,  288
(preliminary rulings).
9  Case C-61/94 Commission v Germany (International Dairy Arrangement) EU:C:1996:313,[1996]
ECR I-3989.
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value was lower than the minimum prices set under the International Dairy Arrangement
(IDA).10 The German government observed in its defence that the Commission should
have awaited the opinion of the (then) Article  133 Committee (with the TFEU it  has
become the Article 207 Committee). In the German government's view, the (then) Article
133 Committee's task is to discuss the interpretation and implementation of international
agreements and to establish a common Community position in that regard. So long as the
Committee has not reached a consensus, the Commission may not bring an enforcement
action under Article 258 TFEU (ex-Article 226 TEC).
The Court confirmed the Commission's autonomous power to bring enforcement action
under ex-Article 226 TEC. It stated that under ex-Article 211 TEC, the Commission was
responsible  for  ensuring  application  of  the  Treaty  and,  accordingly,  compliance  with
international  agreements  concluded  by  the  EC  which,  pursuant  to  ex-Article
300 (6) TEC, were binding both on the EC institutions and the Member States. For the
Commission to succeed in that task, it must not be hindered in the exercise of its power
under ex-Article 226 TEC to bring proceedings before the Court where a Member State
had failed to fulfil its obligations under such an agreement. The initiation of proceedings
before  the  Court  by the  Commission  could not  therefore  depend on the  outcome of
consultations within the Article 133 Committee; a fortiori, it could not hinge on whether
a  consensus  between  the  Member  States  had  first  been  found  to  exist  within  the
Committee  with  regard  to  the  interpretation  of  the  EC'  s  commitments  under  an
international agreement.11
10  See Panos Koutrakos (n 3) 263-4. The German government did not seek to reverse the thrust of
the Court's approach to the GATT as articulated in  Germany v Council (two years earlier).  See
also Mario Mendez (n 8) 200-202. 
11  Case  C-61/94  Commission  v  Germany (International  Dairy  Arrangement)  EU:C:1996:313,
[1996] ECR I-3989, para 15.
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In Commission v Ireland (Berne Convention)12 the Commission brought an action under
Article 258 TFEU (ex-Article 226 TEC) for a declaration that, by having failed to adhere
to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris  Act
1971) by 1 January 1995, Ireland had not fulfilled its obligations under Article 216 (2)
TFEU (ex-Article 300 (7) TEC) in conjunction with Article 5 of Protocol 28 to the EEA
Agreement. 
The Court held that mixed agreements concluded by the Union, its Member States, and
non-member countries, have the same status in the Union legal order as purely Union
(then Community) agreements. The respective provisions in the 1971 Berne Convention
came within the scope of Union competence.13
The  Court  concluded  that,  in  ensuring  respect  for  commitments  arising  from  an
agreement concluded by the Union institutions, the Member States fulfil an obligation in
relation to the Union within the Union system, which has assumed responsibility for the
due performance of the agreement.14 The Court added that it follows that the requirement
of  adherence  to  the  Berne  Convention  which  Article  5  of  Protocol  28  to  the  EEA
Agreement imposed on the Contracting Parties came within the Union framework. This
is so given that it featured in a mixed agreement concluded by the Union and its Member
States and related to an area covered in large measure by the Treaty. The Commission
was  therefore  competent  to  assess  compliance  with  that  requirement,  subject  to  the
Court's review.15
12  Case C-13/00  Commission v Ireland (Berne Convention) EU:C:2002:184, [2002] ECR I-2943.
For comments see Pieter-Jan Kuijper, ‘Case C-239/03, Commission v. French Republic’ (2005) 42
CMLR 1491-1500.
13  Case C-13/00  Commission v Ireland (Berne Convention) EU:C:2002:184, [2002] ECR I-2943,
para 14. 
14  Case C-13/00  Commission v Ireland (Berne Convention) EU:C:2002:184, [2002] ECR I-2943,
para 15.
15  Case C-13/00  Commission v Ireland (Berne Convention)  EU:C:2002:184,  [2002] ECR I-2943,
para 20.
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In  Commission v France (Étang de Berre)16 the Commission brought an action under
Article  258  TFEU (ex-Article  226  TEC)  for  a  declaration  that  France  has  failed  to
comply with its obligation under Articles 4 (1) and 8 of the Barcelona Convention, for
the protection of the Mediterranean Sea against pollution, under Article 6 (1) and (3) of
the Protocol and under Article 216 (2) TFEU (ex-Article 300 (7) TEC).
The Court cited previous case law and held that  mixed agreements concluded by the
Union, its Member States, and non- member countries, have the same status in the Union
legal order as purely Union agreements 'in so far' as the provisions fall within the scope
of Union competence.17
Since the Convention and the Protocol created rights and obligations in a field covered in
large measure by Union legislation, there was a Union interest in compliance by both the
Union  and  its  Member  States  with  the  commitments  entered  into  under  those
instruments.18
France did not fulfil its obligations under inter alia Article 6 (1) and (3) of the Protocol,
having  not  taken  all  appropriate  measures  to  prevent,  abate  and  combat  heavy  and
prolonged pollution of the Mediterranean Sea (Étang de Berre). Furthermore, it failed to
take  due  account  of  the  requirements  of  Annex  III  to  the  Protocol  concerning  the
protection of the Mediterranean Sea against pollution from land-based sources.19
16  Case C-239/03 Commission v France (Étang de Berre) EU:C:2004:598, [2004] ECR I-9325.
17  Case C-239/03 Commission v France (Étang de Berre) EU:C:2004:598, [2004] ECR I-9325, para
25. In Case C-431/05  Merck Genéricos - Produtos Farmacêuticos Ldª v Merck & Co. Inc. and
Merck Sharp & Dohme Ldª EU:C:2007:496, [2007] ECR I-7001, para 31 the Court removed this
qualification. For an overview and critical  analysis of this case see Rass Holdgaard, 'Case C–
431/05,  Merck Genéricos — Produtos Farmacêuticos Lda v. Merck & Co. Inc. (M & Co.) and
Merck Sharp & Dohme Lda (MSL),  Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 11
September 2007, [2007] ECR I–7001' (2008) 45 CMLR 1233-1250. See further Case C-240/09
Lesoochranárske  zoskupenie  VLK  v  Ministerstvo  životného  prostredia  Slovenskej  republiky
EU:C:2011:125, [2011] ECR I-1255, paras 29-35.
18  Case C-239/03 Commission v France (Étang de Berre) EU:C:2004:598, [2004] ECR I-9325, para
29.
19  Case C-239/03  Commission v France (Étang de Berre) EU:C:2004:598,  [2004] ECR I-9325,
paras 46-70 and 78-85.
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b)  The Court's jurisdiction in annulment proceedings
The following set of issues must be addressed: (i) Reviewable acts, (ii) capacity to bring
proceedings, (iii) grounds for review, (iv) time limits and (v) the effects of annulment.
Article 263 TFEU replaces  Article  230 TEC. Article 263 TFEU (ex-Article 230 TEC)
establishes  a procedure known as the action for annulment  under which the Court of
Justice may review the legality of any acts adopted by the institutions and which have
legal  effects.  Article 263 (1)  TFEU  extends  the  Court's  review  of  legality  to  acts  of
'bodies, offices or agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third
parties'.
The  Court  of  Justice  has  jurisdiction in  actions  brought  by privileged applicants (the
Member  States,  the  European  Parliament,  the  Commission  and  Council),  or  semi-
privileged applicants (the Court of Auditors, European Central Bank and the Committee
of the Regions) in order to protect their prerogatives. Article 263 (4) TFEU has amended
ex-Article 230 (4) TEC. The Court of Justice of the European Union has jurisdiction over
direct  actions  brought  by  other  parties;  that  is,  applicants  who  do  not  fall  into  the
privileged  and  semi-privileged  categories  against  a  regulatory  act  which  is  of  direct
concern to them and against other measures which are of direct or individual concern to
them.
The  grounds  of  judicial  review  remain  unchanged.  Article  263  (2)  TFEU  (ex-
Article 230 (2)  TEC)  stipulates  that  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union  has
jurisdiction in actions brought on grounds of lack of competences,  misuse of powers,
breach of essential procedural requirements, or infringement of the Treaty or of any rule
of law relating to its application, including general principles of EU law, namely, legal
certainty,  legitimate  expectations,  non-retroactivity,  proportionality  and  equality.  The
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observance of the time limit is prescribed by the final paragraph of Article 263 TFEU (ex-
Article 230 TEC).
Where an action for annulment  is  well  founded the Court of Justice of the European
Union will declare the act concerned to be void pursuant to Article 264 TFEU (ex-Article
231 TEC).
Article 266 TFEU (ex-Article 233 TEC) provides that:
The institution whose act has been declared void or whose failure to act
has been declared contrary to the Treaties shall be required to take the
necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court of Justice of
the European Union
Article 268 TFEU (ex-Article 235 TEC) and Article 340 TFEU (ex-Article 288 TEC)
provide that the Union may even be subject to damages caused.
The Court of Justice of the European Union has had the opportunity of direct review on a
number of occasions.
  aa) Lack of competences
The provision governing direct review includes as ground of review lack of competences.
France v Commission (Case C-327/91)20 can be subsumed within the ground of lack of
competence.
In that case the French Government brought an action against the Commission seeking the
annulment of the Agreement signed on 23 September 1991 with the US regarding the
application of their competition laws. The Agreement aimed at promoting cooperation and
coordination between the Commission and the US competition authorities and lessened
20  Case C-327/91 France v Commission EU:C:1994:305, [1994] ECR I-3641.
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the possibility or impact of differences between the parties in the application of EU and
US competition law by their respective authorities. That is, notification of measures taken
in the enforcement of competition law which may affect important interests of the other
party, the exchange of information covering matters of mutual interest pertaining to the
application  of  competition  laws,  coordination  of  enforcement  activities,  reciprocal
consultation procedures, in addition, cooperation regarding anti-competitive activities in
the  territory  of  one  party  that  adversely  affect  important  interests  of  the  other  party
(positive comity). Under Article XI(1) the Agreement (that is, application of competition
rules) had entered into force in September 1991. The action must be understood as being
directed against the act whereby the Commission sought to conclude the international
agreement.
The Commission contended that the Agreement constituted an administrative agreement
which it was competent to conclude.
The judgment in  France v Commission rejected the Commission's claim and adopted a
restrictive  approach  to  the  interpretation  of  Commission's  powers  under  ex-
Article 300 (2) TEC (Article 218 TFEU).21 The Court found that the Commission lacked
competence under Article 300 TEC (Article 218 TFEU) to conclude the EU-US antitrust
agreement on the application of competition laws.
As Koutrakos has argued, in rejecting the broad interpretation of the Commission powers
under ex-Article 300 (2) EC, the Court defined the procedural rules laid down in the EC
Treaty as a system whose functioning relied upon the specific allocation of powers to the
EC institutions. As it linked that allocation to the balance between the institutions, the
Court  transposed into  the EC external  relations  system the  main logic  of the internal
21  Case C-327/91  France v Commission  EU:C:1994:305, [1994] ECR I-3641, para 41. Advocate
General  Tesauro's  Opinion  supported  this  reading:  See  Case  C-327/91  France  v  Commission
EU:C:1993:941, [1994] ECR I-3641, Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 26.
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decision-making process, as underpinned by compliance with the institutional balance.22
  bb) Breach of essential procedural requirements
“Legal  base”  cases  brought  by  Community  institutions  and  Member  States  can  be
subsumed within the ground of breach of an essential procedural requirement.
In Parliament  v Council  (Case C-360/93)23 the Parliament  sought the annulment  of a
Council  act  concerning  the  conclusion  of  the  US-EC  procurement  agreement.24 The
European Parliament  based  its  action  on  infringement  of  the  Treaty and its  essential
procedural  requirements in so far as Decisions 93/323 and 93/324 were based on ex-
Article  133  TEC (Article  207  TFEU)  alone  notwithstanding the  existence  of  articles
specific  to  the  fields  envisaged;  that  is,  the  Parliament's  right  to  be  involved in  the
decision-making process had been denied by the choice of ex-Article 133 TEC (Article
207 TFEU). Ex-Articles 47, 55 and 95 TEC (Article 53, 62 and 114 TFEU), as well as ex-
Article 133 TEC (Article 207 TFEU), put forward as correct by the European Parliament
would have involved the Parliament (cooperation procedure).25 
As Cremona has  noted,  the  Council  argument  in  defence  of  its  position  (that  is,  the
Council defended the use of ex-Article 133 TEC (Article 207 TFEU) as the legal base)
was revealing: It had contended that the focus of the US-Community Agreement, and
therefore of both contested Decisions, was the extension of the benefits of the utilities
Directive to US bidders. The parts of the Agreement dealing with public works, supply
and  service  contracts  more  generally,  were  only  “ancillary”  and  “specify  the  policy
framework  within  which  the  Agreement  is  located”  (to  use  the  phraseology  of  the
22  Panos Koutrakos (n 3) 143.
23  Case C-360/93 Parliament v Council EU:C:1996:84, [1996] ECR I-1195.
24  [1993] OJ L125/1.
25  Case  C-360/93  Parliament  v  Council  EU:C:1996:84, [1996]  ECR  I-1195,  para  10.  The
Commission intervened in support of the Council.
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Advocate General). The central commitment of the Agreement, in relation to utilities, had
fallen within the scope of ex-Article 133 TEC (Article 207 TFEU) as regulating the EC's
external trade. The Council therefore had chosen to argue, not that ex-Article 133 TEC
(Article  207  TFEU)  was  an  appropriate  legal  base  for  an  international  agreement
regulating trade in services, but that the Agreement in question was more limited than the
Parliament maintained, and merely dealt with services in an ancillary manner. Whether the
Decisions should be treated as an amendment of Article 29 of the utilities Directive under
Article 29 (6), or as an extension of the benefit of the Directive to a third country under
Article 29 (5), the effect was to set aside the Article 29 (3) EC preference rule.26
According to Cremona, Case C-360/93 was the second time that the Court had used its
power under ex-Article 230 TEC (Article 263 TFEU) to annul a Decision of a Community
institution concluding an international  agreement.  In so doing, the legal effects of the
Agreement  between  the  US  and  the  European  Community  in  the  field  of  public
procurement  itself  were  not  impugned  (Case  C-360/93  was  concerned  only  with  the
question of the validity of the concluding Decision).27
In Portugal v Council (Case C-268/94)28 Portugal challenged the validity of the legal basis
of  EC competence  and the  corresponding procedure  by which  the  EC concluded the
Agreement. 
26  See Marise Cremona, ‘Case C-360/93, European Parliament v. Council of the European Union,
Judgment of 7 March 1996, [1996] ECR I-1195’ (1997) 34 CMLR 389, 394. The Court rejected
the view put forward by the Council.
27  Ibid, at 397-398. As indicated by Cremona, both Case C-360/93 and Case C-327/91 illustrated the
use  of  ex-Article  173 of  the  Treaty  in  order  to  challenge  the  conclusion  of  an  international
agreement ex post facto (at 398).
28  Case C-268/94 Portugal v Council EU:C:1996:461, [1996] ECR I-6177.
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Portugal  sought  the  annulment  of  the  concluding  act  of  the  Cooperation  Agreement
between  the  European  Community  and  the  Republic  of  India  on  Partnership  and
Development (“EC-India Cooperation Agreement”).29
The  contested  decision,  adopted  in  the  Council  by  a  qualified  majority  vote  after
consulting the Parliament, was based on ex-Articles 133 and 181 TEC (Articles 207 and
211 TFEU), provisions governing co-operation for development are laid down in Articles
208-211 TFEU, in conjunction with the first sentence of ex-Article 300 (2) and the first
subparagraph of (3) TEC (Article 218 TFEU).
The Portuguese Government challenged the validity of the legal basis of EC competence
and the corresponding procedure by which the EC concluded the EC-India Cooperation
Agreement. It argued that the cited articles did not provide a legal basis for the EC-India
Cooperation Agreement.  The correct legal basis  would have been ex-Article  308 TEC
(Article 352 TFEU). Portugal's argument was that the clause specifying that respect for
fundamental rights constituted an essential element of the Agreement; that is, Article 1 (1)
required recourse to ex-Article 308 TEC (Article 352 TFEU) as the legal basis of the
contested decision.30
According to the Portuguese Government, the inclusion of energy, tourism and culture,
required  the  additional  use  of  ex-Article  308  TEC  (Article  352  TFEU)  (with  its
unanimous vote).31 The Portuguese Government's position was amended at the hearing; at
the hearing it argued that cooperation in the spheres of tourism and culture also required
participation of the Member States in the conclusion of the Agreement. The Portuguese
Government contended that the inclusion of intellectual property and drug abuse control
29  [1994] OJ L223/23.
30  Case C-268/94 Portugal v Council EU:C:1996:461, [1996] ECR I-6177, paras 14 et seq.
31  As indicated by Peers, as these matters fell within the competence of the Member States, or (in
the case of energy) formed an EC objective but were not subject of a separate Title of the Treaty.
See Steve Peers, ‘Case C-268/94, Portugal v. Council, (development policy), [1996] ECR I-6177
(Full Court)’ (1998) 35 CMLR 539, 545.
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also required participation of the Member States in the conclusion of the Agreement; that
is, adoption of a mixed agreement.32
The Portuguese Government's arguments; that is, that the legal basis of the contested act
did not confer on the EC the necessary powers to conclude the international agreement as
regards the provision therein relating to fundamental rights, and the provisions therein
relating to various specific fields of cooperation,33 raised the question of the extent to
which an international agreement adopted on the basis of ex-Article 181 TEC (Article 211
TFEU) can lay down provisions on specific matters without there being any need to have
recourse to other legal bases, or indeed to Member States' participation in the conclusion
of the international agreement.34 As noted by Peers, Case C-268/94 was the Court's first
opportunity to delineate what development policy was or could consist of.35
According to Kokott and Hoffmeister, Case C-268/94 dealt with the scope of the new EC
competences in the area of development policy, which were introduced into EC law by the
Maastricht Treaty in 1992; interesting for two reasons: firstly, the Court's reasoning in
respect of the EC's external competences in the field of development cooperation backed
the EC's strategy of concluding third generation framework agreements, and, secondly, the
Court stressed the importance of including fundamental rights and democracy clauses in
these international agreements.36
According  to  them,  “first  generation”  agreements  with  developing  countries  in  Asia
concluded in the 1970s had consisted mainly of the most-favoured-nation-clause. They
32  Case C-268/94 Portugal v Council EU:C:1996:461, [1996] ECR I-6177, para 31.
33  Case C-268/94 Portugal v Council EU:C:1996:461, [1996] ECR I-6177, paras 13, 14 et seq.
34  Case C-268/94 Portugal v Council EU:C:1996:461, [1996] ECR I-6177, para 35.
35  Steve Peers (n 31) 541 and 547.
36  See  Juliane Kokott  and Frank Hoffmeister,  ‘Portuguese Republic  v.  Council.  Case C-268/94.
1996 ECR I-6177. Court of Justice of the European Communities, December 3, 1996.’ (1998) 92
AJIL 292-296, in particular at 293-294.
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were authorised by ex-Article 133 TEC (Article 207 TFEU) (commercial policy). In the
early 1980s, they were replaced by “second generation” agreements, which also included
provisions relating to economic and development cooperation. The EC had based those
agreements on ex-Article 133 TEC (Article 207 TFEU), as well as ex-Article 308 TEC
(Article 352 TFEU), the “necessary and proper” clause of the Treaty. The same was true
for the so-called third-generation agreements with Latin American states signed before
1994, despite the fact that those agreements had contained additional clauses about, inter
alia,  cooperation  in  the  field  of  intellectual  property,  mining,  energy,  traffic,  data
technology, tourism, environment, health, drug abuse and public administration. Although
the  provisions  of  the  Agreement  with  India  had  not  differed  greatly  from the  latter
agreements with the Latin American states, it was the first to be concluded on the basis of
the then new ex-Article 181 TEC (Article 211 TFEU) without unanimity in the Council.
Thus, the judgment of the Court was crucial not merely for the legality of the Agreement
with India, but also for third-generation agreements in general.37
In Parliament v Council (Case C-189/97)38 the European Parliament brought an action for
the  annulment  of  the  Council  Regulation  on  the  conclusion  of  the  Agreement  on
cooperation in the sea fisheries sector between the Community and Mauritania and laying
down provisions for its implementation. The agreement, concluded for a period of five
years from 1 August 1996, enabled European Community fishermen to fish in waters
under the sovereignty or jurisdiction of Mauritania. It was argued that the Agreement with
Mauritania  had  important  budgetary  implications  and  that  its  conclusion  therefore
required the Parliament's assent under ex-Article 300 (3) (2) TEC (Article 218 TFEU).
The Court elaborated on the general role of Parliament. As the Court put it:
the scope of that provision, as set out in the Treaty, cannot, despite what
the Parliament suggests, be affected by the extent of the powers available
to  national  parliaments  when  approving  international  agreements  with
37  See Juliane Kokott and Frank Hoffmeister, above (n 36).
38  Case C-189/97 Parliament v Council EU:C:1999:366, [1999] ECR I-4741.
149
Chapter III
financial implications.39
The assent of an institution required (here: the European Parliament's assent under ex-
Article 300 (3) (2) TEC (Article 218 TFEU)) for the adoption of an act (here: involvement
of the Parliament in the conclusion of an international agreement) constituted an essential
procedural requirement. This can clearly be subsumed within the ground of breach of an
essential procedural requirement.
In  Spain  v  Council  (Case  C-36/98)40 Spain  brought  an  action  for  annulment  of  the
concluding act of the Convention on cooperation for the protection and sustainable use of
the river Danube.41 The contested decision was based on ex-Article 175 (1) TEC (Article
192 (1) TFEU), which provided that the Council is to act on the basis of the procedure
referred to in ex-Article 252 TEC (repealed by the Lisbon Treaty), that is by a qualified
majority, in conjunction with ex-Article 300 (2) and the first subparagraph of (3) TEC
(Article 218 TFEU).
Spain argued that the legal basis adopted was inappropriate. The legal bases put forward
as correct by Spain – ex-Article 175 (2) TEC (Article 192 (2) TFEU), which provided that
the Council is to act unanimously, in conjunction with the second sentence of ex-Article
300 (2) and the first subparagraph of (3) TEC (Article 218 TFEU).42
The problem of concurrent legal bases did not arise; the only difficulty to be resolved was
that of the choice between general rules and specific rules within the same title of the
Treaty.43 The Court reaffirmed the principle that the choice of a legal basis must rest on
39  Case C-189/97 Parliament v Council EU:C:1999:366, [1999] ECR I-4741, para 34.
40  Case C-36/98 Spain v Council EU:C:2001:64, [2001] ECR I-779.
41  [1997] OJ L342/18.
42  Case C-36/98 Spain v Council EU:C:2001:64, [2001] ECR I-779, para 8.
43  Case C-36/98 Spain v Council EU:C:2001:64, [2001] ECR I-779, para 16.
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objective  factors  which  are  amenable  to  judicial  review.  Those  factors
include  in  particular  the  aim and  the  content  of  the  measure  (see,  in
particular,  Case  C-269/97  Commission  v  Council  [2000]  ECR  I-2257,
paragraph 43).44
According to its aim and its content, the Convention's primary purpose was the protection
and improvement of the quality of the waters of the catchment area of the river Danube,
although it also refers, albeit incidentally, to the use of those waters and their management
in  its  quantitative  aspects.45 Internal  EC  rules  corresponding  to  the  Convention's
provisions were adopted on the basis of ex-Article 175 (1) TEC (Article 192 (1) TFEU).
The Court then concluded that the Council was thus correct to take the first sentence of
ex-Article 300 (2) and the first subparagraph of (3) TEC (Article 218 TFEU) as the basis
for approval.46
Commission v Council (Case C-281/01)47 involved a challenge by the Commission to the
legal base of the Council Decision concluding an Agreement between the Government of
the United States of America and the European Community on the coordination of energy-
efficient labelling programs for office equipment.48 On 14 December 2000, the Council
unanimously adopted the decision authorising signature of the Energy Star Agreement.
The Decision cited ex-Article 175 (1) TEC (Article 192 (1) TFEU), in conjunction with
ex-Article 300 (2) TEC as its legal base. In Decision 2001/469 the Council approved the
Energy Star Agreement on behalf of the Community on the basis of ex-Article 175 (1)
TEC  (Article  192  (1)  TFEU),  in  conjunction  with  the  first  sentence  of  the  first
subparagraph of ex-Article 300 (2), the first subparagraph of (3) and (4) TEC (Article 218
44  Case  C-36/98  Spain  v  Council  EU:C:2001:64, [2001]  ECR I-779  para  58.  See  D.  Gadbin,
‘Environnement et aménagement du territoire: face à face entre la jurisprudence et le traité de
Nice (CJCE 30 janv. 2001, Royaume d'Espagne c/ Conseil de l'Union européenne, aff. C-36/98)’
(2001) 37 RTD eur.  687-696.
45  Case C-36/98 Spain v Council EU:C:2001:64, [2001] ECR I-779, para 74.
46  Case C-36/98 Spain v Council EU:C:2001:64, [2001] ECR I-779, paras 74 and 75.
47  Case C-281/01 Commission v Council EU:C:2002:761, [2002] ECR I-12049.
48  [2001] OJ L172/1.
151
Chapter III
TFEU). Under the Energy Star Agreement, European and American labelling programmes
would be coordinated, resulting in the elimination of any obstacles to trade which would
have arisen from the exercise of concurrent programmes. It enabled manufacturers to sell
their equipment on both the European and US market using one single label and a single
registration procedure.
The Commission submitted that  Decision 2001/469 (CCP measure)  should have been
adopted on the basis  of ex Article  133 TEC (Article  207 TFEU) relating to common
commercial policy, on the ground that the Agreement seeks to facilitate trade.49
The Council submitted in the alternative that the correct legal basis was not ex- Article
175 (1) TEC (Article 192 (1) TFEU) but ex-Article 174 (4) TEC. It referred to the Court's
case law to the effect that ex-Article 174 (4) TEC was confined to defining the general
objectives of environmental policy whereas ex-Article 175 TEC (Article 192 (1) TFEU)
constituted the legal basis for EC measures designed to put that policy into effect.50
The Court held that the Energy Star Agreement simultaneously pursued a commercial-
policy  objective  and  an  environmental-protection  objective.51 Therefore,  in  order  to
determine  the  appropriate  legal  basis  for  the  measure  concluding  the  Energy  Star
Agreement,  the  Court  established  whether  either  objective  was  the  Energy  Star
Agreement's main aim or predominant aim, in which case the measure would be founded
on a single legal basis, or whether the objectives pursued were inseparable without one
being secondary and indirect in relation to the other, in which case the measure would be
founded on a dual legal basis.52
49  Case C-281/01 Commission v Council EU:C:2002:761, [2002] ECR I-12049, para 20.
50  Case C-281/01 Commission v Council EU:C:2002:761, [2002] ECR I-12049, para 32.
51  Case C-281/01 Commission v Council EU:C:2002:761, [2002] ECR I-12049, paras 37 and 38.
52  Case C-281/01 Commission v Council EU:C:2002:761, [2002] ECR I-12049, para 39.
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The Court  accepted  that  in  the  long term the  Energy Star  programme should have  a
positive environmental effect:
It  is  true  that  in  the  long term,  depending  on how manufacturers  and
consumers  in  fact  behave,  the  programme  should  have  a  positive
environmental effect as a result of the reduction in energy consumption
which it should achieve. However, that is merely an indirect and distant
effect, in contrast to the effect on trade in office equipment which is direct
and immediate.53
The Court then concluded that the commercial-policy objective pursued by the Energy
Star  Agreement  was  predominant,  so  that  the  decision  approving  the  Energy  Star
Agreement  should  have  been  based  on  ex-Article  133  TEC  (Article  207  TFEU),  in
conjunction with ex-Article 300 (3) TEC (Article 218 TFEU).54 The fact that participation
in the energy Star labelling program was not mandatory did not affect that conclusion.55
Commission v Council  (Case C-211/01)56 is a legal base case brought by Community
institutions. The case involved  a challenge by the Commission to the legal base of the
Council Decision concluding an agreement with Bulgaria establishing certain conditions
for  the  carriage of  goods by road and the  promotion of  combined transport57 and  an
agreement with Hungary establishing certain conditions for the carriage of goods by road
and the promotion of combined transport.58
On 19  March  2001,  the  Council  unanimously  adopted  the  contested  decisions.  Both
Decisions cite ex-Articles 71 and 93 TEC (Articles 91 and 113 TFEU) in conjunction with
53  Case C-281/01 Commission v Council EU:C:2002:761, [2002] ECR I-12049, para 41. See Panos
Koutrakos (n 3) 56-58.
54  Case C-281/01 Commission v Council EU:C:2002:761, [2002] ECR I-12049, para 43.
55  Case C-281/01 Commission v Council EU:C:2002:761, [2002] ECR I-12049, para 44.
56  Case C-211/01 Commission v Council EU:C:2003:452, [2003] ECR I-8913.
57  [2001] OJ L108/4.
58  [2001] OJ L108/27.
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the second subparagraph of ex-Article 300 (3) TEC (Article 218 TFEU) as their legal
base. The Commission was of the opinion that the Council was wrong to take ex-Article
93 TEC (Article 113 TFEU) as the legal basis, which required unanimity in the Council
and mere consultation of the European Parliament.
The Commission submitted that the correct legal basis was ex-Article 71 TEC (Article 91
TFEU). It pointed to the wide scope acknowledged to apply to the common transport
policy in the light of ex-Articles 3 (f), 70 and 71 TEC (Articles 90 and 91 TFEU) and the
Court's case law. The Commission claimed that  the Court should annul the contested
decisions, in so far as they were based on ex-Article 93 TEC (Article 113 TFEU) and
without altering their effects until the Council has adopted new concluding acts.
The Court, formulated its judgment as a confirmation of the Commission's arguments.
The Council should have used ex-Article 71 TEC (Article 91 TFEU), in conjunction with
ex-Article 300 (3) TEC (Article 218 TFEU), as the legal basis for the contested decisions.
In those circumstances, there was no need to examine the Commission's other arguments,
for  instance,  the  scope of  ex-Articles  70 and 71 TEC (Articles 90 and 91 TFEU) in
relation to other objectives of the Treaty. The Court acceded to the Commission's request
to limit the effects of the necessary annulment of the Decisions by maintaining all their
legal effects until the adoption of new concluding measures.
In the judgment on the Rotterdam Convention (Case C-94/03)59 the Commission brought
a  successful  action  seeking  the  annulment  of  the  concluding  act  of  the  Rotterdam
Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for certain hazardous chemicals and
pesticides in international trade,60 in so far as it was based on ex-Article 175 (1) TEC
59  Case C-94/03 Commission v Council EU:C:2006:2, [2006] ECR I-1.
60  [2003] OJ L63/27.
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(Article 192 (1) TFEU).61 The Commission alleged infringement of the EC Treaty in that
the wrong legal basis was chosen. The contested decision should have been based on ex-
Article  133  TEC  (Article  207  TFEU),  in  conjunction  with  ex-Article  300  TEC
(Article 218 TFEU). The Commission relied on the  Convention's object and purposes
(that is, to establish close cooperation in the field of international trade in pesticides and
other hazardous chemicals) and on the Convention's text, the provisions of which reflected
its predominantly commercial purpose. The Court held that,
the  Convention  includes,  both  as  regards  the  aims  pursued  and  its
contents, two indissociably linked components, neither of which can be
regarded as secondary or indirect as compared with the other, one falling
within the scope of the common commercial policy and the other within
that of protection of human health and the environment.62
The Court therefore found that the act of approval should have been based on the two
corresponding legal bases, namely, in that case, ex-Articles 133 and 175 (1) TEC (Articles
207 and 192 (1) TFEU), in conjunction with the relevant provisions of ex-Article 300
TEC (Article 218 TFEU).
The Passenger Name Records (PNR) ruling (Cases C-317/04 & C-318/04)63 concerned the
EC-US Agreement  on the processing  and transfer  of  PNR data  by air  carriers to the
United  States  Department  of  Homeland  Security,  Bureau  of  Customs  and  Border
Protection.64 The (2004) PNR Agreement was signed on 28 May 2004. On 27 July 2004,
Parliament filed an action of annulment. In Case C-318/04 (on the Adequacy Decision)
61  Case C-94/03 Commission v Council EU:C:2006:2, [2006] ECR I-1. It is the legal basis for the
conclusion of this Convention on behalf of the EC and its incorporation into the EC legal order
which is the subject matter of the two judgments analysed in: Panos Koutrakos, ‘Case C-94/03,
Commission v Council, judgment of the Second Chamber of 10 January 2006, [2006] ECR I-1;
Case C-178/03, Commission v Parliament and Council, judgment of the Second Chamber of 10
January 2006, [2006] ECR I-107’ (2007) 44 CMLR 171-194.
62  Case C-94/03 Commission v Council EU:C:2006:2, [2006] ECR I-1, para 51. 
63  See  Joined  Cases  C-317/04  and  C-318/04  Parliament  v  Council  and  Commission  (PNR)
EU:C:2006:346, [2006] ECR I-4721.
64  See the discussion in Mario Mendez, ‘Passenger Name Record Agreement – European Court of
Justice’ (2007) 3 EuConst 127-147.
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Parliament advanced four pleas; alleging, respectively, (i)  ultra vires action (that is, the
Commission had exceeded its powers), (ii) breach of the fundamental principles of the
Data  Protection  Directive;  (iii)  breach  of  fundamental  rights  and  (iv)  breach  of  the
principle of proportionality.65
In  Case  C-317/04  (on  the  Agreement)  Parliament  advanced  six  pleas;  alleging,
respectively, (i) the incorrect choice of ex-Article 95 TEC (Article 114 TFEU) as legal
basis for Decision 2004/496 and (ii) breach of, respectively, the second subparagraph of
ex-Article 300 (3) TEC (Article 218 (6) TFEU) (that is, the assent of Parliament had not
been  attained),  (iii)  Article  8  of  the  ECHR  (right  to  privacy),  (iv)  the  principle  of
proportionality, (v) the requirement to state reasons and (vi) the principle of cooperation
in  good  faith.66 The  Court  found  that  the  Council  Decision  (which  authorised  the
President  of  the  Council  to  sign  the  PNR  agreement  on  behalf  of  the  European
Community),67 and Commission Decision 2004/535/EC (which facilitated arrangements
for the transfer of PNR),68 should both be annulled, because the data processing at issue
(that is, PNR data transfers from air carriers to US authorities, within the security field,
65  Joined  Cases  C-317/04  and  C-318/04  Parliament  v  Council  and  Commission  (PNR)
EU:C:2006:346, [2006] ECR I-4721, para 50.
66  Joined  Cases  C-317/04  and  C-318/04  Parliament  v  Council  and  Commission  (PNR)
EU:C:2006:346, [2006] ECR I-4721, para 60.  See Gráinne Gilmore and Jorrit Rijpma, ‘Joined
Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, European Parliament v Council and Commission, Judgment of the
Grand  Chamber  of  30  May  2006,  [2006]  ECR  I-4721’ (2007)  44  CMLR  1081-1099.  This
annotation  positions  Parliament  v  Council  and  Commission  (PNR)  within  the  context  of  the
Court's case law on legal basis in general.
67  Council Decision 2004/496/EC of 17 May 2004 on the conclusion of an Agreement between the
European Community and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of PNR
data by Air Carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs
and Border Protection [2004] OJ L183/83.
68  Commission Decision 2004/535/EC of 14 May 2004 on the adequate protection of personal data
contained  in  the  Passenger  Name  Record  of  air  passengers  transferred  to  the  United  States’
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (Adequacy Decision) [2004] OJ L235/11.
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regarded as necessary for law enforcement purposes and for safeguarding public security)
was outside the material scope of the Data Protection Directive.69
As Mendez  has  argued,  Parliament  v  Council (Case  C-360/93),  Portugal  v  Council
(Case C-268/94), Parliament v Council (Case C-189/97), Spain v Council (Case C-36/98),
Commission  v  Council  (Case C-281/01),  Commission  v  Council (Case  C-211/01),  the
judgment on the Rotterdam Convention (Case C-94/03) and the Passenger Name Records
(PNR) ruling (Joined Cases C-317/04 & C-318/04), concerned challenges to the chosen
legal basis for the concluded international agreement.70 According to Mendez, those cases
repeated the conventional point that the choice of the legal basis for a measure must be
based on objective factors, including as to aim and content, amenable to judicial review.71
Of those 8 cases, four cases have generated successful challenges.
  cc) Infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application
The most general ground of review is infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law
relating  to  their  application.  Germany  v  Council (Case  C-280/93)72 exemplified  that
infringement of the Treaty or of any rule relating to its application overlaps with the other
grounds of review.
That case was an action of annulment against a Council Regulation supported by Belgium
and the Netherlands. The pleas in law which Germany advanced alleged first, breach of
essential procedural requirements; secondly, of substantive rules; thirdly, of fundamental
principles of Community law; and fourthly, of the Lomé Convention, of the GATT and of
the Banana Protocol.
69  See  Joined  Cases  C-317/04  and  C-318/04  Parliament  v  Council  and  Commission  (PNR)
EU:C:2006:346, [2006] ECR I-4721, paras 55-61 and 67-69.
70  Mario Mendez (n 8) 78.
71  For instance Case C-360/93 Parliament v Council EU:C:1996:84, [1996] ECR I-1195, para 23.
72  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973.
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Under the pleas concerning substantive rules of EC law came: infringement of ex-Article
33 TEC (Article  39  TFEU);  exceeding the  limits  of  ex-Articles  33,  36  and  37 TEC
(Articles 39, 42 and 43 TFEU) and breach of the principle of undistorted competition;
under the pleas concerning fundamental principles of EC law came: complaint of breach
of the principle of non-discrimination; infringement of the right to property and alleged
infringement of the freedom to pursue a trade or business.73
Breach of essential procedural requirements:  Germany argued firstly that the procedure
for adopting the Regulation was irregular. The text of the Regulation diverged from the
initial proposal of the Commission, without there having been a new proposal adopted by
the college of Commissioners. It argued secondly that the Regulation was vitiated by a
defective  statement  of  reasons,  in  that  the  Regulation  referred  only  to  the  first
Commission's proposal. Germany argued thirdly that in view of the substantial nature of
the changes made in the Commission's second proposal, the Parliament should have been
consulted anew.74
The Council, supported by the Commission, maintained that the procedure for adopting
the Regulation was regular.75 It argued that the Regulation does not have to refer both to
the  original  proposal  and  the  subsequent  amendments,  and  that  the  Commission's
amendments to its proposal did not make it necessary for the Parliament to be consulted
anew.
The Council  had  before  it  a  Commission's  proposal  amended in accordance  with the
political agreement accepted by the competent Member on behalf of the Commission at
73  Those principles (the right to property and the freedom to pursue a trade or business) form part of
the general principles of Community law but had to be seen in relation to their social function. See
Case C-280/93 Germany v Council  EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, para 78. Consequently,
the exercise of the right to property and the freedom to pursue a trade or profession could be
restricted, particularly in the context of a common organization of a market.
74  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, paras 28-30.
75  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, para 31.
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the Council session in 1992 and approved by the college of Commissioners.76 The Court
rejected Germany's argument, finding that the Commission's amendments to its proposal
did not affect the very essence of the Regulation taken as a whole, and therefore did not
render it necessary for the Parliament to be consulted again.77
Breach of substantive rules of  EC law:  Germany submitted that  the objectives  of the
Regulation; that is, safeguarding Community production and maintaining the income of
Community producers, did not come under ex-Article 33 TEC (Article 39 TFEU). It also
argued  that  a  development  policy  in  favour  of  the  ACP States  (as  pursued  by  the
Regulation) cannot be based on the provisions on the common agricultural policy but at
most  on  ex-Articles  308,  or  310  TEC  (Articles  352,  or  Article  217  TFEU).  The
submission that there was an infringement of ex-Article 33 TEC (Article 39 TFEU) and
the argument that the limits of ex-Articles 33, 36 and 37 TEC (Articles 39, 42 and 43
TFEU) were exceeded (with respect to the regime for imports from the ACP States) were
unfounded.78 Furthermore, Germany argued that the way the tariff-quota was allocated
conflicted with the objective of undistorted competition (objective mentioned in Article 3
(g)  TEC,  replaced,  in  substance,  by  Article  3  (1)  (b)  TFEU),  in  that  it  effected  a
redistribution of market shares and income to the detriment of traditional importers of
third-country bananas.79
The Court did not uphold the complaint.80 The arguments in support of this complaint
relating to the damage caused to importers of third-country bananas were examined in the
context  of  the  analysis  of  the plea  in  law alleging breach of  fundamental  rights  and
general principles of law.81
76  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, para 35.
77  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, paras 42-43.
78  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, paras 52 and 57.
79  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, para 58.
80  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, paras 59-62.
81  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, paras 64 et seq.
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Fundamental principles of EC law:
The complaint  of  breach  of  the  principle  of  non-discrimination:  With  respect  to  the
complaint  of  breach of  the  principle  of  non-discrimination,  Germany  argued that  the
subdivision of the tariff quota under Regulation 404/93 for imports from countries other
than traditional  ACP countries  constituted  unjustified discrimination against  traders  in
third-countries bananas. It argued that the subdivision of the tariff quota in favour of EC
importers and/or traditional ACP bananas was tantamount to a transfer to them of a 30%
market share by an act of the public authorities.82 However, the Court rejected Germany's
argument that the subdivision to the detriment of the class of operators trading in third-
country  bananas,  without  any  justification,  constituted  discrimination  contrary  to  the
Treaty.83 This rejection holds that differences in treatment (that is, categories of economic
operators have been affected differently by the measures adopted: operators traditionally
essentially supplied by third-country bananas found their import possibilities restricted,
whereas operators formerly obliged to market essentially EC and ACP bananas could now
import  specified  quantities  of  third  country  bananas)  is  inherent  in  the  objective  of
integrating previously compartmentalised markets.84
Infringement of the right to property, disregard of acquired rights:  With respect to the
complaint of infringement of the right to property, Germany submitted that by depriving
operators who traditionally marketed third-country bananas of market shares for a long
period of time, Regulation 404/93 infringed those operators' right to property and their
freedom to pursue their trade or business.
The Court rejected Germany's claims. It held that economic operators cannot claim a right
to  property  in  a  market  share  which he  held at  a  time before  the establishment  of  a
82  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, para 65.
83  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, para 75.
84  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, paras 73-74.
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common organization  of  a  market,  since  market  shares  constitute  only  a  momentary
economic position exposed to the risks of changing circumstances, and cannot claim that
an acquired right (or legitimate expectation) that an existing situation which is capable of
being  altered  by  decisions  taken  by  the  EC  institutions  within  the  limits  of  their
discretionary power will be maintained.85 
Freedom to pursue a trade or business: With reference to infringement of the freedom to
pursue  a  trade  or  business,  Germany  submitted  that  Regulation  404/93  altered  the
competitive  position  of  German  traders.  The  Court  recognised  that  both  the  right  to
property and the freedom to pursue a trade or business form part of the general principles
of EC law. However, the right to property and the freedom to pursue a trade or business
are not absolute, but must be viewed in relation to their social function. Consequently, the
exercise of those principles may be restricted, particularly in the context of a common
organization of a market, provided that those restrictions in fact correspond to objectives
of general interest pursued by the EC and do not constitute a disproportionate/ intolerable
interference,  impairing  the  very  substance  of  the  rights  guaranteed.86 As  regards,  the
freedom to pursue a trade or business, the Court held that the introduction of the tariff
quota under Regulation 404/93 and the machinery for subdividing did indeed alter the
competitive position of economic operators on the German market.87 It was then held that
the restrictions imposed by Regulation 404/93 correspond to objectives of general EC
interest and did not impair the very substance of that right.88
Breach of the principle of proportionality: Germany, then, argued that the introduction of
the tariff quota under Regulation 404/93 violated the principle of proportionality, both as
regards the formula for allocating the quota and the prohibitive rate for imports over and
85  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, paras 79 and 80.
86  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, para 78.
87  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, para 81.
88  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, para 87.
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above the quota.89 It  was  alleged that  the arrangements  for trade with third countries
violated  the  principle  of  proportionality,  in  that  the  objectives  of  supporting  ACP
producers and guaranteeing the income of EC producers could have been achieved by
measures having less effect on competition and on the interests of certain categories of
economic operators. This position was rejected by the Court,90 finding that Germany has
not shown that the Council adopted measures which were manifestly inappropriate having
regard to the objective which the competent institution was seeking to pursue or that it
carried out a manifestly erroneous assessment of the information available to it at the time
Regulation 404/93 was adopted.91
For all those reasons the plea in law alleging breach of substantive rules of EC law was
rejected.92
Infringement of Article 168 of the Lomé Convention, of the GATT, and of the Banana
Protocol:
Germany argued that  Article 168 of the Lomé Convention exempted imports  of ACP
products from all customs duties. It also argued that the Council could not rely on Article
168 (2) (a) to apply different treatment to traditional and non-traditional imports of ACP
bananas. The Court found no breach of the Lomé Convention.93
It was alleged that Regulation 404/93 infringed certain basic provisions of GATT.94 The
Council, supported by the Commission, argued that in view of the nature of GATT 1947,
89  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, para 88.
90  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, paras 94-97.
91  While alternative measures for achieving the objective of the integration of markets, which is the
basis  of  any  common organization  of  a  market,  were  indeed  conceivable,  the  Court  cannot
substitute its assessment for that of the Council (at para 94).
92  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, paras 98-99.
93  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, para 100.
94  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, para 103.
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provisions of GATT cannot be relied on to challenge the lawfulness of an EC act, except
in  the  special  case  where  the  EC  provisions  were  adopted  to  implement  GATT
obligations.95
The  reasons  that  prevented  GATT  provisions  from  being  directly  effective  also
'preclude[d] the Court from taking provisions of GATT into consideration to assess the
lawfulness of a regulation in an action brought by a Member State [under ex-Article 230
TEC (Article 263 TFEU)]'.96
Germany argued that the Regulation was adopted in breach of the Protocol on bananas
(hereinafter  “the  Banana Protocol”),  annexed to  the Implementing  Convention  on the
Association of  the Overseas  Countries and Territories  with the  Community.  Germany
argued that the Banana Protocol was an integral part of the Treaty and that amendments of
that protocol should have been done in accordance with the conditions under ex-Article
309 TEC (Article 354 TFEU).97 In the Court's view to accept Germany's point of view
would effectively make it impossible to set up a common organization of the market in
bananas  under  the  conditions  set  out  in  ex-Article  37  TEC (Article  43  TFEU).  The
Protocol  cannot  have  the  effect  of  derogating  from  basic  provisions  of  the  Treaty.
Consequently, the plea in law alleging an infringement of the Protocol was rejected.98
95  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, para 104.
96  Case C-280/93  Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, para 109.  Advocate
General  Gulmann's  Opinion  supported  this  reading.  See  Case  C-280/93 Germany  v  Council
EU:C:1994:235, [1994] ECR I-4973, Opinion of AG Gulmann, para 137; see also Jan Klabbers,
‘International Law in Community Law: The Law and Politics of Direct Effect’ (2002) 21 YEL
263-298, in particular at 267. As indicated by Eeckhout, the ruling in Germany v Council clarified
that there is no dichotomy between preliminary rulings-cases on validity and direct actions for
annulment,  nor  between  the  position  of  private  parties  and  that  of  EU Member  States  (Piet
Eeckhout,  External  Relations  of  the  European  Union:  Legal  and  Constitutional  Foundations
(OUP, Oxford 2005) 249. See also the discussion at 382-386). As indicated by Koutrakos, despite
the express reference to the legal position of private parties, it is not accurate to say that the ruling
in  the  Bananas case  made  the  direct  effect  of  GATT 1947,  or  rather  the  absence  thereof,  a
condition for reliance upon it by a Member State in annulment proceedings (Panos Koutrakos
(n 3) 255).
97  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, para 113.
98  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973, paras 117-118.
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c)  The Court's jurisdiction in preliminary rulings proceedings
Article 267 TFEU replaces Article 234 TEC. Article 267 TFEU (ex-Article 234 TEC)
establishes  a  preliminary  reference  procedure.  International  agreements  formed  the
subject-matter of references for preliminary rulings.
  aa)  The  interpretative  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  of  Justice  over  provisions  of
international agreements concluded without the participation of Member States
In  International Fruit Company99 the Court dealt with a reference from a Dutch court
(College van Beroep voor  het  Bedrijfsleven).  The judgment itself  concerned a purely
Community agreement. The Court established the legal effects of GATT 1947 in the legal
order of the Community. In issue was the compatibility of Commission Regulations100
which restricted the import of apples into the Netherlands with Article XI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
The first question invited the Court to rule whether the validity of measures adopted by
the institutions of the (then) Community also referred, within the meaning of Article 234
TEC, to their validity under international law.
In its judgment in International Fruit Company case, the Court held as follows:
According  to  the  first  paragraph  of  [Article  234  TEC]  'The  Court  of
Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning …
the validity … of acts of the institutions of the Community'.
99  Joined Cases 21 to 24/72 International Fruit  Company NV and others  v  Produktschap voor
Groenten en Fruit EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219.
100  Regarding Commission Regulations Nos 459/70 [1970] OJ L57/20, 565/70 [1970] OJ L69/33 and
686/70 [1970] OJ L84/21, respectively.
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Under that formulation, the jurisdiction of the Court cannot be limited by
the grounds on which the validity of those measures may be contested.101
In its judgment the Court started by stating that it was taking a broad approach to the
interpretation of the wording of ex-Article 234 (1) TEC. The conditions of review were
further  elaborated.  The  Court  held  that,  before  the  incompatibility  of  a  Community
measure with a provision of international law could affect the validity of that measure, the
Community had first of all to be bound by that provision. The Court further held that,
before  invalidity  could  be  relied  upon  before  a  national  court,  that  provision  of
international law had also to be capable of conferring rights on citizens of the Community
which they could invoke before the courts.102
  bb)  The  interpretative  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  of  Justice  over  provisions  of
international agreements concluded with the participation of Member States
However,  the  Court's  case  law  on  whether  the  Court's  competence  to  rule  on  the
interpretation of provisions in international agreements extends to mixed agreements is
more complex.
Mixed  international  agreements  are  international  agreements  where  there  are  shared
competences and where the Community and Member States are parties.
Craig and de Búrca have essentially  argued that,  notwithstanding the relatively broad
reading given to exclusive external competence, the reality was that many external powers
continued to be shared between the Member States and the EC.103 Opinion 2/91 (ILO
101  Joined Cases 21 to 24/72 International Fruit  Company NV and others  v  Produktschap voor
Groenten en Fruit EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219, paras 4 and 5.
102  Joined Cases 21 to 24/72 International Fruit  Company NV and others  v  Produktschap voor
Groenten en Fruit EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219, paras 7 and 8.
103  Paul P. Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, EU law, Text, Cases, and Materials (5th edn OUP, Oxford
2011) 82.
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Convention  170),104 Opinion  2/00  (Cartagena  Protocol)105 and  Opinion  1/94  (WTO
Agreement)106 can be taken by way of example.
In  Haegeman,107 the  Court  dealt  with  a  reference  from a  Belgian  court  (Tribunal  de
première instance de Bruxelles). The judgment concerned a mixed agreement. At issue in
Haegeman  was  the  Association  Agreement  with  Greece  “Athens  Agreement”.  The
subject-matter of this reference from Belgium was the existence of the jurisdiction of the
Court over mixed international agreements. As the Court put it:
This Agreement is therefore, in so far as concerns the Community, an act
of  one  of  the  institutions  of  the  Community  within  the  meaning  of
paragraph (b) of the first paragraph of Article 177.
The  provisions  of  the  Agreement,  from the  coming into force  thereof,
form an integral part of Community law.
Within  the  framework  of  this  law,  the  Court  accordingly  has  jurisdiction  to  give
preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of this Agreement.108
104  Opinion 2/91 (ILO Convention 170) EU:C:1993:106, [1993] ECR I-1061, paras 16-21.
105  Opinion 2/00 (Cartagena Protocol) EU:C:2001:664, [2001] ECR I-9713, paras 45-46.
106  Opinion 1/94 (WTO Agreement) EU:C:1994:384,  [1994] ECR I-5267, paras  99-105.  See the
discussion in Panos Koutrakos, ‘Interpretation of mixed agreements’ in C. Hillion and P. Koutrakos
(eds),  Mixed Agreements Revisited – The EU and its Member States in the World  (Hart, Oxford
2010) 116-137 (Interpretation of mixed international agreements).  The broad construction of the
duty  of  cooperation  (Case  C-53/96  Hermès  International  v  FHT  Marketing  Choice  BV
EU:C:1998:292, [1998] ECR I-3603, para 32)  and its application has  as a corollary the broad
construction of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union to interpret mixed
international  agreements.  The position  of  the  Court  is  dispelled  by  paragraphs  108 and  109.
Paragraphs 108-109 should be regarded as particularly significant to understanding of the position
of the Community and its Member States under mixed international agreements in general and the
WTO  agreement  in  particular.  See  Joni  Heliskoski,  Mixed  agreements  as  a  technique  for
organizing the international relations of the European Community and its Member States (Kluwer
Law International, The Hague 2001) 228. See further Robert Schütze, From dual to cooperative
federalism: the changing structure of European Law (OUP, Oxford 2009) 308-11.
107  Case 181/73 Haegeman v Belgian State EU:C:1974:41, [1974] ECR 449.
108  Case 181/73 Haegeman v Belgian State EU:C:1974:41, [1974] ECR 449, paras 4-6.
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In Demirel,109 the Court dealt with a reference from a German court (Verwaltungsgericht
Stuttgart).  At  issue  in  Demirel  was the  Association  Agreement  between the EEC and
Turkey “Ankara Agreement on free movement of workers and its Additional Protocol”.110
Advocate General Darmon delivered his Opinion on 19 May 1987.111 He provided a broad
reading of the Court's position:
Thus, in the absence of any reservation of powers in the Agreement, and
subject  to  the  various  prerogatives  as  to  its  implementation,  both  the
nature and the scope of its provisions suggest that, having regard to the
principles defined in the case-law, the interpretation of those provisions is
within the jurisdiction of this Court, particularly with a view to ensuring
their uniform application. It does not seem to me that doubt is cast on that
view of the matter by Article 25 of the Agreement, which confers powers
on the Council of Association only in cases of conflict between States, in
accordance  with a procedure expressly laid down for  the resolution of
disputes which could not be brought before this Court by the non-member
country concerned. 112
The Court did not offer answers regarding the scope of its jurisdiction over the provisions
of mixed international agreements.
In Racke113 the Court dealt with a reference from a German court (Bundesfinanzhof). At
issue was the EEC/Yugoslavia Cooperation Agreement. Subject-matter were the effects of
the suspension of the Cooperation Agreement (suspension of trade concessions following
the  beginning  of  the  war  between  Serbia  and  the  other  Republics  of  the  former
Yugoslavia).
109  Case 12/86 Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd EU:C:1987:400, [1987] ECR 3719.
110  The jurisdiction of the Court was directly challenged (objections to its jurisdiction raised by the
German and British governments). The Court addressed the specific objections.
111  Case 12/86 Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd EU:C:1987:232, [1987] ECR 3719, Opinion of
AG Darmon.
112  Case 12/86 Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd EU:C:1987:232, [1987] ECR 3719, Opinion of
AG Darmon, para 15.
113  Case C-162/96 Racke GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Mainz EU:C:1998:293, [1998] ECR I-3655.
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The Court here held as follows:
As  the  Court  has  already  held  in  Joined  Cases  21/72  to  24/72
International  Fruit  Company  v  Produktschap  voor  Groenten  en  Fruit
[1972]  ECR  1219,  paragraph  5,  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  to  give
preliminary rulings under Article 177 of the Treaty concerning the validity
of acts of the Community institutions cannot be limited by the grounds on
which the validity of those measures may be contested. 
Since  such  jurisdiction  extends  to  all  grounds  capable  of  invalidating
those measures,  the Court  is  obliged to  examine whether  their  validity
may be affected by reason of the fact that they are contrary to a rule of
international law (International Fruit Company, paragraph 6).114
In the above statement, the Court again interpreted the wording of ex-Article 234 (1) TEC
broadly.
In  Hermès115 the  Court  dealt  with  a  reference  from a  Dutch  court (District  Court  of
Amsterdam). The agreement at  issue was the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPs Agreement).
114  Case C-162/96 Racke GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Mainz EU:C:1998:293, [1998] ECR I-3655,
paras  26  and  27.  The  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  was  directly  challenged.  In  this  case,  the
Commission  raised  the  objection  that  the  Court  does  not  have  jurisdiction  in  cases  where
individuals are relying on rules of customary international law to challenge the validity of acts of
the EC institutions. Ibid, para 25.
115  Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1998:292, [1998] ECR I-
3603.
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Hermès  International invoked Article 50 of the TRIPs Agreement which concerned the
infringement  of  its  Benelux  trademark  rights  on  its  Hermès  trademark.116 Advocate
General  Tesauro  delivered  his  Opinion  on 13  November  1997.  He provided  a  broad
reading of the Court's position. The Court's reply was based on two separate arguments. In
the first place, noting the particular nature and type of the agreement at issue in that case,
it  had  argued  that  the  competence  to  conclude  association  agreements  pursuant  to
formerly Article  238 concerned all  the fields covered by the Treaty,  clearly including
freedom of movement for workers, and that therefore the question whether the Court had
jurisdiction to rule on the interpretation of a provision in a mixed agreement within the
exclusive competence of the Member States did not arise. In the second place, the Court
also had observed that in ensuring respect for commitments arising from an agreement
concluded by the EC institutions, the Member States fulfilled, within the EC system, an
obligation  in  relation  to  the  EC,  which  had  assumed  responsibility  for  the  due
performance of the agreement, therefore emphasising the EC scope of the Member States'
obligation to comply with a mixed agreement in its entirety.
It appeared to follow from those statements, which were, of course, not decisive for the
purpose of solving the problem that was in issue in the present case, first, that the Court
itself  considered  that  the  only  matters  on  which  it  had  no  interpretative  jurisdiction
pursuant to formerly Article 177 were matters within the exclusive competence of the
116  See Case C-53/96  Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV  EU:C:1998:292, [1998]
ECR I-3603. Again, the Court's jurisdiction was directly challenged (objections to its jurisdiction
raised  by  the  British,  French  and  Dutch  governments).  The  British,  French  and  Dutch
governments raised the objection that the Court does not have jurisdiction over the rules of the
Trade  Related  Aspects  of  Intellectual  Property  (“TRIPs)”  concerning  the  enforcement  of
intellectual  property  rights.  These  rules  fall  within  the  exclusive  competence  of  the  Member
States. They refer in that regard to para 104 of Opinion 1/94 EU:C:1994:384, [1994] ECR I-5267.
Ibid, para 23. See further the discussion in Andrea Filippo Gagliardi, ‘The right of individuals to
invoke the  provisions  of  mixed  agreements  before  the  national  courts:  a  new message  from
Luxembourg?’ (1999)  24  ELRev.  276-292.  This  note  provides  an  analysis  of  Case  C-162/96
Racke GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Mainz  EU:C:1998:293, [1998] ECR I-3655 and Case C-
53/96  Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV  EU:C:1998:292, [1998] ECR I-3603.
The  two  mixed  international  agreements  before  the  Court  were  the  Cooperation  Agreement
concluded between Yugoslavia,  the Community and the Member States and the Agreement on
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (“TRIPs”).
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Member States and, second, that in the case of an agreement (even a mixed agreement)
concluded by the EC institutions the EC was competent with respect to the agreement in
its entirety. The Advocate General added that he did not think those considerations could
be confined merely to association agreements, where the EC's exclusive competence to
conclude the agreement was based on the Treaty itself, in that case formerly Article 238.
While it had to be recognised that mixed agreements varied considerably in nature and
type,  depending  on  the  degree  of  participation  by  States,  the  fact  remained  that  the
problem,  in  the  present  case,  inevitably  arose  in  the  same  terms  in  the  case  of  an
association agreement, when it was concluded in the form of a mixed agreement, and in
the case of agreements (also mixed) which had no ad hoc legal basis in the Treaty.117
The Court elaborated on its jurisdiction over provisions of international agreements made
between the Community, the Member States and third countries. The position of the Court
is dispelled by paragraph 29: 'It follows that the Court has, in any event, jurisdiction to
interpret  Article  50  of  the  TRIPs  Agreement.'118 The  Court  did  not  offer  an  answer
regarding  the  scope  of  its  jurisdiction  over  the  provisions  of  mixed  international
agreements.
In Dior119 the Court dealt with a reference from a Dutch court (Arrondissementsrechtbank
's-Gravenhage  and  Hoge  Raad  der  Nederlanden). The  agreement  at  issue  was  the
Agreement  on  Trade  Related  Aspects  of  Intellectual  Property  (TRIPs  Agreement).
Advocate General Cosmas delivered his Opinion on 11 July 2000. He provided a strict
117  Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-
3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 18.
118  Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1998:292, [1998] ECR I-
3603.
119  Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98  Parfums Christian Dior SA v TUK Consultancy BV and
Assco Gerüste GmbH and Rob van Dijk v Wilhelm Layher GmbH & Co. KG and Layher BV
EU:C:2000:688, [2000] ECR I-11307.
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reading of Hermès;120 that is, wide scope of the jurisdiction of the Court to interpret mixed
agreements:
In light of the above, it becomes apparent that, in the context of Article
177 of the Treaty, to extend the Court's interpretative jurisdiction to TRIPs
provisions  relating  to  areas  in  which  the  (potential)  Community
competence  has  not  yet  been  exercised  would  constitute  pursuit  of  a
policy of judge-made law in conflict with the constitutional logic of the
Treaty and would be difficult to justify on grounds of expediency.121
In  its  judgment  in  the  Dior  case  the  Court  did  offer  an  answer  to  the  scope  of  its
jurisdiction. The relevant extract is worth mentioning in full: TRIPs, which was set out in
Annex  1  C to  the  WTO Agreement,  had  been concluded by the  Community and its
Member States under joint competence (see Opinion 1/94 [1994] ECR I-5267, paragraph
105). It followed that where a case was brought before the Court in accordance with the
provisions of the Treaty, in particular ex-Article 177 thereof, the Court had jurisdiction to
define  the  obligations  which  the  EC  had  thereby  assumed  and,  for  that  purpose,  to
interpret TRIPs.
In particular, the Court had jurisdiction to interpret Article 50 of TRIPs in order to meet
the needs of the Member States' courts when they were called upon to apply national rules
with a view to ordering provisional measures for the protection of rights arising under EC
legislation falling within the scope of TRIPs (see Hermès, paragraphs 28 and 29).
Likewise, where a provision such as Article 50 of TRIPs could apply both to situations
falling within the scope of national law and to situations falling within that of EC law, as
was the case in the field of trade marks, the Court had jurisdiction to interpret it in order to
forestall future differences of interpretation (see Hermès, paragraphs 32 and 33). In that
120  Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1998:292, [1998] ECR I-
3603.
121  Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98  Parfums Christian Dior SA v TUK Consultancy BV and
Assco Gerüste GmbH and Rob van Dijk v Wilhelm Layher GmbH & Co. KG and Layher BV
EU:C:2000:378, [2000] ECR I-11307, Opinion of AG Cosmas, para 51.
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regard, the Member States and the EC institutions had an obligation of close cooperation
in fulfilling the commitments undertaken by them under joint competence when they had
concluded the WTO Agreement, including TRIPs (see, to that effect, Opinion 1/94, cited
above,  paragraph  108).  Since  Article  50  of  TRIPs  constituted  a  procedural  provision
which should have been applied in the same way in every situation falling within its scope
and is capable of applying both to situations covered by national law and to situations
covered by EC law, that obligation required the judicial bodies of the Member States and
the EC, for practical and legal reasons, to give it a uniform interpretation. Only the Court
of  Justice  acting  in  cooperation  with  the  courts  and  tribunals  of  the  Member  States
pursuant  to  ex-Article  177  of  the  Treaty  was  in  a  position  to  ensure  such  uniform
interpretation. The jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to interpret Article 50 of TRIPs was
therefore  not  restricted  merely  to  situations  covered  by trade-mark  law.122 The  above
extract, is construed in broad terms.
122  Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98  Parfums Christian Dior SA v TUK Consultancy BV and
Assco Gerüste GmbH and Rob van Dijk v Wilhelm Layher GmbH & Co. KG and Layher BV
EU:C:2000:688, [2000] ECR I-11307, paras 33-39.
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The extract clarifies the status of mixed international agreements in the EC legal order.
The above analysis indicated that the Judgment of the Court of 12 December 1972,123 16
June 1998,124 30 April 1974,125 and 14 December 2000126 constitute an advancement in the
construction of the role of the Court.127
C. Jurisdiction of the Court on CFSP and PJC (by now FSJ) agreements
1. Institutional scheme of the Treaties and limitations on review before the Lisbon 
Treaty reforms
As Denza has argued, ex-Article 35 TEU (as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam) gave
the Court a somewhat circumscribed jurisdiction over the binding instruments which are
adopted under pre-Lisbon's “third”-pillar. That is, jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
to national courts on validity and interpretation of framework decisions and decisions, and
on  interpretation  of  conventions  established  under  pre-Lisbon's  Title  VI,  and  on  the
123  Joined Cases 21 to 24/72 International Fruit  Company NV and others  v  Produktschap voor
Groenten en Fruit EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219.
124  Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1998:292, [1998] ECR I-
3603.
125  Case 181/73 Haegeman v Belgian State EU:C:1974:41, [1974] ECR 449.
126  Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98  Parfums Christian Dior SA v TUK Consultancy BV and
Assco Gerüste GmbH and Rob van Dijk v Wilhelm Layher GmbH & Co. KG and Layher BV
EU:C:2000:688, [2000] ECR I-11307.
127  See the discussion in Panos Koutrakos (n 3) 193-202. In Case 12/86 Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch
Gmünd  EU:C:1987:400, [1987]  ECR  3719  and  Case  C-53/96  Hermès  International  v  FHT
Marketing  Choice  BV  EU:C:1998:292,  [1998]  ECR  I-3603 the  Court  did  not  offer  answers
regarding the scope of its jurisdiction over the provisions of mixed international agreements. The
absence  of  a clearer  line of  reasoning is  regrettable.  However,  and, as  mentioned earlier,  the
Advocates-General provided a broad reading of the Court's position (Case 12/86 Demirel v Stadt
Schwäbisch Gmünd  EU:C:1987:232, [1987] ECR 3719, Opinion of AG Darmon,  para 15 and
Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1997:539, [1998] ECR I-
3603, Opinion of AG Tesauro, para 18).
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validity and interpretation of the measures implementing them.128 However, only if the
Member State has accepted jurisdiction,129 jurisdiction to review legality of framework
decisions and decisions (at the suit of a Member State or the Commission; that is, only
privileged applicants)  on grounds which are the same as those on which pre-Lisbon's
Community acts  were challenged under  ex-Article  230 TEC (new 263 TFEU),130 and
jurisdiction to rule on disputes between Member States regarding the interpretation or the
application of any pre-Lisbon's “third”-pillar instrument.131
128  Ex-Article 35 (1) TEU read as follows: 'The Court of Justice of the European Communities shall
have jurisdiction, subject to the conditions laid down in this article, to give preliminary rulings on
the validity  and  interpretation  of  framework  decisions  and  decisions,  on  the  interpretation  of
conventions established under this Title [Title VI] and on the validity and interpretation of the
measures implementing them.'
129  Ex-Article  35 (3)  TEU read  as  follows:  'A Member  State  making  a declaration  pursuant  to
paragraph 2 shall specify that either: (a) any court or tribunal of that State against whose decisions
there  is  no  judicial  remedy  under  national  law  may  request  the  Court  of  Justice  to  give  a
preliminary ruling on a question raised in a case pending before it and concerning the validity or
interpretation of an act referred to in paragraph 1 if that court or tribunal considers that a decision
on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment; or (b) any court or tribunal of that State
may request  the Court  of Justice to give a preliminary ruling on a question raised in  a  case
pending before it and concerning the validity or interpretation of an act referred to in paragraph 1
if that court or tribunal considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give
judgment.' As indicated by Hatzopoulos, as of December 2006 only 16 Member States had made a
declaration under ex-Article 35 (3) TEU. These include Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, and Portugal. Of these 16, only Spain and Hungary have restricted the right to refer to
the Court to national jurisdictions judging without appeal. Vassilis Hatzopoulos, ‘With or without
you ... judging politically in the field of Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (2008) 33 ELRev.
44-65, 47.
130  Ex-Article 35 (6) TEU read as follows: 'The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to review the
legality  of  framework  decisions  and  decisions  in  actions  brought  by  a  Member  State  or  the
Commission  on  grounds  of  lack  of  competence,  infringement  of  an  essential  procedural
requirement, infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse
of powers. The proceedings provided for in this paragraph shall be instituted within two months of
the publication of the measure.'
131  Ex-Article 35 (7) TEU read as follows: 'The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to rule on any
dispute between Member States regarding the interpretation or the application of acts adopted
under Article 34(2) whenever such dispute cannot be settled by the Council within six months of
its being referred to the Council by one of its members. The Court shall also have jurisdiction to
rule on any dispute between Member States and the Commission regarding the interpretation or
the application of conventions established under Article 34(2)(d).'
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Ex-Article 35 TEU marked progress (the Court now had jurisdiction to rule on matters
covered by pre-Lisbon's “third”-pillar) in comparison with the Maastricht Treaty which
gave the Court no jurisdiction over Council instruments.132
As Albors-Llorens has argued, the Amsterdam changes also presented the fundamental
weakness of failing to guarantee the adequate protection of private parties in some of the
new areas where the Court had been given jurisdiction. Natural and legal persons had no
access to a direct system of judicial review of Council measures in the context of the
“Third  Pillar”  and  their  access  to  the  system  of  indirect  judicial  review  through
preliminary rulings was plagued with uncertainties. Ex-Article 68 EC (which imposed
limitations on the role of the Court in areas communitarised under “old” Title IV) also
undermined  the  judicial  protection  available  to  individuals  within  Title  IV (this  Title
covered asylum, immigration, external border controls and judicial co-operation in civil
matters) by modifying the application of ex-Article 234 EC to that Title. The European
Parliament was the other great absentee in the system devised by ex-Article 35 TEU and
in the new procedural route to the Court laid down by ex-Article 68 (3) EC.133
Ex-Article 46 TEU read as follows: 
The provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community, the
Treaty  establishing  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community  and  the
Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community concerning
the powers of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the
exercise of those powers shall apply only to the following provisions of
this Treaty:
(...)
132  Eileen Denza,  The Intergovernmental Pillars of the European Union (OUP, Oxford 2002) 266.
See also Jörg Monar, ‘Justice and home affairs in the Treaty of Amsterdam: reform at the price of
fragmentation’ (1998) 23 ELRev. 320, at 330-332.
133  Albertina Albors-Llorens, ‘Changes in the Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice under the
Treaty of Amsterdam’ (1998) 35 CMLR 1273, 1292.
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(b) provisions of Title VI, under the conditions provided for by Article 35;
(...)
(d) Article  6(2) with regard to action  of the institutions,  insofar as the
Court  has  jurisdiction  under  the  Treaties  establishing  the  European
Communities and under this Treaty; (...).
Ex-Article 46 TEU listed the powers of the Court exhaustively. In terms of Title V of the
(pre-Lisbon) EU Treaty the provision did not confer any competence on the Court; that is,
ex-Article  46 TEU imposed limitations on the jurisdiction of the Court  in  relation to
CFSP.
In Segi and Gestoras Pro Amnistía v Counci134 the Court addressed its limited jurisdiction
by virtue of ex-Articles 46 and 35 TEU under Title VI of the (pre-Lisbon) Treaty on
European Union,135 and the bite of fundamental rights within areas of limited jurisdiction
(3rd “Pillar”).
In the light of its limited jurisdiction136 the General Court (then Court of First Instance)
has held in an obiter:
(...) it must be noted that indeed probably no effective judicial remedy is
134  Case C-355/04 P Segi and Others v Council EU:C:2007:116, [2007] ECR I-1657; and Case C-
354/04 P  Gestoras Pro Amnistía et al. v Council  EU:C:2007:115, [2007] ECR I-1579. For an
analysis of the case see Steve Peers, ‘Salvation outside the Church: Judicial protection in the third
Pillar after the Pupino and Segi judgments’ (2007) 44 CMLR 883, 892-902.
135  In this case  a common position (adopted jointly  within the Union's former second and third
pillars) an instrument not reviewable in the Community courts, with an annexed list of terrorist
organisations had been at issue. The claimants – both organisations, with the aim of supporting the
claim  of  Basque  independence,  identity,  culture  and  language,  part  of  the  Basque  separatist
organisation Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (E.T.A. – an alleged “internal” EU terrorist group) – sought
damages for the disadvantages they had faced as a consequence of being listed.
136  Jurisdiction applied, pursuant to ex-Article 46 TEU, under the conditions listed in ex-Article 35
TEU.
176
Chapter III
available (...) whether before the Community Courts or national courts,
with regard to the inclusion (...) on the list of persons, groups or entities
involved in terrorist acts. (...) Moreover, it is not possible to challenge the
legality  of  the  inclusion  (...)  in  that  annex,  in  particular  through  a
reference for a preliminary ruling on validity, because of the choice of a
common position and not, for example, a decision pursuant to Article 34
EU.137
The General Courts'  obiter did not correspond well with the constitutive elements of a
Community based on the rule of law. Advocate General Mengozzi highlighted the internal
and external dimension of fundamental freedoms (and rights) and pointed to the fact that
the observance of fundamental rights forms the foundation of a Union based on the rule of
law:
As regards the principle of the rule of law, (...) [Union] institutions and the
Member  States  (...)  cannot  be  exempted  from  judicial  review  of  the
compatibility of their acts with the Treaty, in particular Article 6(2) EU,
even where they act on the basis of Titles V and VI of the EU Treaty. (...)
(...) Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the principle
of the rule of law are (...) an ‘internal’ dimension, being a foundation of
the Union and a criterion for assessing the legality of the action of its
institutions and of the Member States in the matters for which the Union
has jurisdiction, and an ‘external’ dimension, as a value to be ‘exported’
beyond the borders of the Union by means of persuasion, incentives and
negotiation.138
The Advocate General did not reach the conclusion that Union Courts (CJ and GC) should
provide for judicial protection and departed from Foto-Frost,139 suggesting that national 
137  Case T-338/02 Segi and Others v Council EU:T:2004:171, [2004] ECR II-1647, para 38.
138  Case C-354/04 P Gestoras Pro Amnistía et al. v Council  EU:C:2006:667,  [2007] ECR I-1579,
Opinion of AG Mengozzi, paras 77 and 79.
139  Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost EU:C:1987:452, [1987] ECR 4199, para 17;
that is, national courts are not authorised to declare Community acts void.
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courts should fill this gap based on the principle of loyal cooperation.140
In  the Advocate  General's opinion  national  authorities  were  competent  to  review
instruments  and to  declare them void (e.g.  annulment of Common Positions) in areas
where there is no system eligible (that is, absence of a preliminary ruling mechanism) to
ensure the uniform application of Union law.141 As Advocate General Mengozzi puts it:
I consider instead that a correct interpretation of the EU Treaty testifies to
the fact that such protection exists, but is entrusted, in the present state of
Union law, not to the Community court but to the national courts.142
However, the Court did not follow its Advocate General. Choosing instead to push the
limits143 of its competence (ex-Articles 46 and 35 under Title VI of the (pre-Lisbon) Treaty
140  Case C-354/04 P Gestoras Pro Amnistía et al. v Council  EU:C:2006:667,  [2007] ECR I-1579,
Opinion of AG Mengozzi,  paras 105-6 and 138. The arguments put forward by the  Advocate
General  –  the  fact  that  the  European  courts'  jurisdiction  is  excluded  has  no  bearing  on  the
jurisdiction of national courts –  are compelling. See Eleanor Spaventa, ‘Opening Pandora’s Box:
Some Reflections on the Constitutional Effects of the Decision in Pupino’ (2007) 3 EuConst 5, 23-
24. If the Union system were to be perceived as fragmented, then judicial protection would be
dependent on purely executive choices.
141  Case C-354/04 P Gestoras Pro Amnistía et al. v Council  EU:C:2006:667, [2007] ECR I-1579,
Opinion of AG Mengozzi, para 121. The same rationale is also reflected in literature – in the
absence  of  a  preliminary  ruling  mechanism  Foto-Frost is  particularly  inapplicable.  See,  for
instance, Wyatt and Dashwood's European Union Law (6nd edn Hart, Oxford 2011) 227; Trevor C
Hartley, Constitutional problems of the European Union (Hart, Oxford 1999) 34-5; and A Arnull,
The European Union and its Court of Justice (2nd edn OUP, Oxford 2006) 134-5.
142  Case C-354/04 P Gestoras Pro Amnistía et al. v Council  EU:C:2006:667, [2007] ECR I-1579,
Opinion of AG Mengozzi, para 99.
143  For critical perspectives Ulrich Haltern,  ‘Rechtsschutz in der dritten Säule der EU’ (2007) JZ
772–778; or Alicia Hinarejos, ‘Recent human rights development in the EU courts: the Charter of
Fundamental Rights, the European Arrest warrant and terror lists’ (2007) 7 EHRLR 793, 809-811.
Although Hinarejos does recognise that the Court was at pains to extend its jurisdiction – so as to
allow for more much-needed judicial control in the intergovernmental pillars – she contends that
the balance in  Gestoras Pro Amnistía  and Segi et al.  is a positive one; '[a]  multitude of anti-
terrorism measures that are bound to affect the rights of individuals are being adopted in these
areas, where the pattern of judicial control foreseen by the Treaty is insufficient. The evolution in
the type of action that the Union has undertaken in these pillars must be coupled with an evolution
in the pattern of judicial control. The [CJ] has shown that it is aware of this, and that it is willing
to push the boundaries to some extent until the Treaty undergoes these needed reforms' (810-11).
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on European Union; that is, review is not foreseen in the Treaty on European Union), and
to extend its jurisdiction as to review the legality of the Common Position. The Court
declared that:
It is true that, as regards the Union, the treaties have established a system
of legal remedies in which, by virtue of Article 35 EU, the jurisdiction of
the Court is less extensive under Title VI of the Treaty on European Union
than it is under the EC Treaty (see, to this effect, Case C-105/03 Pupino
[2005] ECR I-5285, paragraph 35). It is even less extensive under Title V.
(...) Article 35(1) EU, in that it does not enable national courts to refer a
question to the Court for a preliminary ruling on a common position but
only a question concerning the acts listed in that provision, treats as acts
capable of being the subject of such a reference for a preliminary ruling
all measures adopted by the Council and intended to produce legal effects
in relation to third parties. Given that the procedure enabling the Court to
give preliminary rulings is designed to guarantee observance of the law in
the interpretation and application of the Treaty, it would run counter to
that objective to interpret Article 35(1) EU narrowly. The right to make a
reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling must therefore
exist  in respect  of all  measures adopted by the Council, whatever their
nature or form, which are intended to have legal effects in relation to third
parties (...).144
The Court's substantiation strongly relied on the system of legal remedies of former Title
VI, which, according to the Court itself, is more extensive than under former Title V TEU.
In  general,  the  Court's  judgment  and the  Advocate  General's  opinion  reached similar
conclusions, except that the Court had placed much greater stress on the mechanism of
preliminary rulings to ensure the legality of “third” -pillar measures, while the Opinion
had laid greater stress on national courts,  and furthermore had addressed in detail the
issues that national courts would consequently face.145
Hillion  and  Wessel  were  interested  in  whether  pre-Lisbon's  third  pillar-related
144  Case C-355/04 P Segi and Others v Council EU:C:2007:116, [2007] ECR I-1657, paras 50 and 53
[emphasis added].
145  Steve Peers (n 134) 897.
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instruments, other than common positions146 (notably EU agreements) could equally be
subject of a preliminary reference.
Following the approach of the Court, it could not be excluded that the provisions of EU
agreements  concluded on the bases  of  ex-Articles  24 and 38 TEU could  also  be the
subject of a preliminary reference, at least in so far as the provisions related to the “third”
-pillar, and they produced legal effects in relation to third parties. If that held true, national
courts would have been in a position to obtain an interpretation, or indeed question the
validity of such EU agreements. In the light of the pronouncement of the Court in the
Pupino case, and particularly in view of the principle of loyal cooperation, the Member
States' courts then would have been compelled to refer to the content of the EU agreement
when interpreting the relevant rules of national law, or indeed international agreements. In
other words, the Segi jurisprudence combined with the Pupino decision, could well entail
that the Member States' freedom to conclude external agreements might be affected by EU
agreements  based  on  ex-Articles  24  and  38  TEU.  Of  course,  the  effect  of  an  EU
agreement, as envisaged above, would merely have concerned the “third” -pillar related
provisions of that agreement but not its CFSP aspects, nor  a fortiori  the provisions of
'pure' CFSP agreements. If that reasoning held true, it  would have become decisive to
distinguish  what  belongs  to  CFSP  and  what  belongs  to  PJCC  in  cross-pillar  EU
agreements, a task which arguably could be performed by the Court under ex-Article 35
TEU.147
146  The Court referred to 'all measures adopted by the Council, whatever their nature or form': '(...)
The right to make a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling must therefore exist
in  respect  of  all  measures  adopted  by the  Council,  whatever  their  nature  or  form,  which are
intended to have legal effects in relation to third parties (see, by analogy, Case 22/70 Commission
v Council (ERTA) [1971] ECR 263, paragraphs 38 to 42, and Case C-57/95 France v Commission
[1997]  ECR I-1627,  paragraph 7  et  seq.).'  See  Case  C-355/04 P  Segi  and Others  v  Council
EU:C:2007:116, [2007] ECR I-1657, para 53.
147  By analogy. Case C-355/04 P Segi and Others v Council EU:C:2007:116,  [2007] ECR I-1657,
para 53, see, Christophe Hillion and Ramses Wessel, ‘Restraining External Competences of EU
Member States under CFSP’ in Marise Cremona and Bruno de Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations
Law: Constitutional Fundamentals (Essays in European law, Hart, Oxford 2008) 113. 
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This  was brief  and,  at  times,  thinly argued.  The latter  view ignored the fact  that  the
Common Position in question was in substance a Decision.148 It lacked a more convincing
analysis (that is, what are the literal, textual, purpose arguments – that could have been
marshalled in favour or against using the procedure (preliminary reference procedure) by
analogy for international agreements) – and accord to its classification – and was, for that
reason, disappointing.
At stake  was the extension of judicial  control  in pre-Lisbon's  “third”-pillar.  The only
reason  why  the  Court  concluded  on  a  legal  remedy  is  the  presence  of  a  judicial
competence in pre-Lisbon's “third” -pillar, it was thus doubtful that the solution adopted
by the Court would also be applicable to pre-Lisbon's “second” -pillar, enshrined in Title
V of the (pre-Lisbon) Treaty on European Union.149
148  In this respect  cf.  Case C-355/04 P Segi and Others v Council EU:C:2007:116, [2007] ECR I-
1657; and Case C-354/04 P Gestoras Pro Amnistía et al. v Council EU:C:2007:115, [2007] ECR
I-1579; also reflected in literature.  See Eleanor Spaventa,  ‘Counter-terrorism and Fundamental
Rights:  judicial  challenges  and  legislative changes  after  the  rulings in Kadi and  PMOI’ in  A
Antoniadis, R Schütze & E Spaventa (eds), The European Union and Global Emergencies: A Law
and Policy Analysis (Hart, Oxford/Portland 2011) 115.
149  See Christophe Hillion and Ramses Wessel, ‘Restraining External Competences of EU Member
States under CFSP’ in Marise Cremona and Bruno de Witte (eds),  EU Foreign Relations Law:
Constitutional Fundamentals (Essays in  European law,  Hart,  Oxford 2008) 90-91.  See further
Alicia  Hinarejos,  Judicial  Control  in  the  European  Union:  Reforming  Jurisdiction  in  the
Intergovernmental  Pillars (OUP, Oxford 2009) 149.  In the  same vein,  Vincent  Kronenberger,
‘Coherence and consistency of the EU's action in international crisis management: the role of the
European  Court  of  Justice’  in  Steven  Blockmans  (ed),  The  European  Union  and  crisis
management: policy and legal aspects (TMC Asser Press, 2008 The Hague) 201.
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2. Institutional scheme of the Treaties and limitations on review after the Lisbon 
Treaty reforms
a)  Control ex ante of legality of CFSP and FSJ agreements
Article 218 (11) TFEU (ex-Article 300 (6) TEC) allows the Court to provide an opinion.
As  to  the  former,  the  Member  States,  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council  or  the
Commission may obtain the opinion of the Court as to whether a proposed EU agreement
(CFSP and FSJ agreement) is compatible with the Treaties, TEU or TFEU. Where the
opinion of the Court is adverse, the agreement envisaged shall not enter into force unless
it is amended or the Treaties are revised.150 This provision brings CFSP agreements within
the  scope of  the  Court's  jurisdiction (ex  ante procedure).  Article  218 (11) TFEU (ex
Article 300 (6) TEC) provides no derogation for the CFSP; that is, Article 275 TFEU does
not exclude Article 218 TFEU itself from the Court's jurisdiction.151
150  As indicated by Cremona, Article 218 (11) TFEU (ex-Article 300 (6) TEC) implies that, in the
absence  of  such  amendments,  institutional  decisions  concluding  incompatible  agreements  are
invalid.  See  Marise  Cremona,  ‘Coherence  in  European  Union  foreign  relations  law’  in  P
Koutrakos  (ed),  European  Foreign  Policy:  Legal  and  Political  Perspectives  (Edward  Elgar,
Cheltenham 2011) 79, citing Case C-122/95  Germany v Council  EU:C:1998:94, [1998] ECR I-
973. In  Germany v Council  the Court declared the Council decision concluding the Framework
Agreement on Bananas invalid in so far as certain aspects of the Agreement were contrary to the
principle of non-discrimination.
151  Alicia Hinarejos (n 149) 164; Geert de Baere (n 4) 190. Apparently dissenting on this point, Jan
Wouters, Dominic Coppens and Bart De Meester, ‘The European Union's External Relations after
the  Lisbon  Treaty’  in  Stefan  Griller  and  Jacques  Ziller  (eds),  The  Lisbon  Treaty:  EU
Constitutionalism  without  a  Constitutional  Treaty?  (Springer,  Vienna  2008)  165:  'Under  the
formulation of the Constitution (Article III-376), the grounds for exclusion of jurisdiction were
explicitly  spelled  out.  Because  this  list  did  not  refer,  for  example,  to  Article  III-325(11)
(concerning [CJ] opinions on envisaged international agreements), it was open for interpretation
whether  the  [CJ]  could provide  opinions on  international  agreements  in  the  CFSP field.  The
Lisbon  Treaty,  however,  answers  this  question  in  the  negative  because  the  exclusion  of
jurisdiction in the field of CFSP is formulated more broadly: in general, the [CJ] shall have no
jurisdiction with respect to the provisions relating to CFSP nor with respect to acts adopted on the
basis of those provisions” (…).'
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Article 218 (11) TFEU, which creates the jurisdiction of the Court for an Opinion, is a
potentially revolutionary inroad into the CFSP exemption (Article 24 (1) TEU reaffirmed
by Article 275 TFEU).  In  Opinion 1/09 (European Patent Court),152 Opinion delivered
pursuant to Article 218 (11) TFEU, the Court was asked to rule on the compatibility with
Union law of the draft agreement on the European and Community Patents Court. The
draft  agreement  established,  in  essence,  a  new  court  structure,  by  conferring  on  an
international court which is outside the institutional and judicial framework of the EU an
exclusive jurisdiction to hear actions brought by individuals in the field of the Community
patent and to  interpret  and apply  EU law in that  field.  Plans  for  participation in  the
negotiation of an international agreement relating to patent litigation were thwarted: the
envisaged international agreement would deprive Member States' courts of their powers
in relation to the interpretation and application of EU law and the Court of its powers to
reply, by preliminary ruling, to questions referred.153
b)  Control ex post of legality of CFSP and FSJ agreements
Firstly, “control  ex post” of legality of EU agreements (FSJ agreements) is considered.
The  Court  acquires,  due  to  the  assimilation  of  Police  and  Judicial  Co-operation  in
Criminal Matters (PJCC) to the “Community model” of the former first pillar (EC), full
jurisdiction on Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (now FSJ).154
Suffice it to note that the internal act of approval of an agreement is an act of an institution
152  Opinion 1/09 EU:C:2011:123, [2011] ECR I-1137.
153  Opinion 1/09 EU:C:2011:123, [2011] ECR I-1137, paras 60-89. Steve Peers, ‘The constitutional
implications  of  the  EU patent’ (2011)  7  EuConst 229-266  examines  the  options,  in  light  of
Opinion 1/09, for establishing a patent litigation system which is both workable in practice from
the point of view of users of the patent system, and realistic in light of the political constraints on
possible developments. See the section on the 'Proposed Litigation Agreement' (at 245-247) and
the section on the 'Future of the EU Patent' (at 256).
154  Alicia Hinarejos, ‘The Lisbon Treaty versus standing still: a view from the third pillar’ (2009) 5
EuConst  99;  Bruno  Nascimbene,  ‘European  judicial  cooperation  in  criminal  matters:  what
protection for individuals under the Lisbon Treaty?’ (2009) 10 ERA 397. 
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intended to produce legal effects  vis-à-vis third parties (Article 263 TFEU).155 That is,
decisions to conclude EU agreements (FSJ agreements) are subject to a review of legality.
For a transitional period of five years the powers of the Court, in relation to acts adopted
in  the  area  of  Police  and  Judicial  Co-operation  in  Criminal  Matters,  adopted  before
Lisbon, remain those provided under Title VI of the TEU:
As a transitional measure,  and with respect to acts of the Union in the
field of police cooperation and judicial  cooperation in criminal  matters
which  have  been adopted  before  the  entry  into force  of  the  Treaty  of
Lisbon, the powers of the institutions shall be the following at the date of
entry  into  force  of  that  Treaty:  the  powers  of  the  Commission  under
Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union shall
not be applicable and the powers of the Court of Justice of the European
Union under Title VI of the Treaty on European Union, in the version in
force before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, shall remain the
same, including where they have been accepted under Article 35(2) of the
said Treaty on European Union.156
Secondly,  “control  ex  post”  of  legality  of  EU  agreements  (CFSP  agreements)  is
considered. The Court has, save for two exceptions, no jurisdiction with respect to the
provisions relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy;157 that is, Article 40 TEU,
compliance with the Union Treaties'  allocation of powers between the Union and the
Member States  (“mutual non-affectation clause”),  and Article 275 (2) TFEU,  review of
the  legality  of  decisions  providing  for  'restrictive  measures  against  natural  or  legal
persons' adopted by the Council under the CFSP.
155  Case 22/70  Commission v Council  EU:C:1971:32, [1971] ECR 263, para 39; Case C-327/91
French Republic v Commission  EU:C:1994:305, [1994] ECR I-3641, para 14; Joined Cases C-
317/04 and C-318/04 Parliament v Council and Commission (PNR) EU:C:2006:346, [2006] ECR
I-4721 (pleas for annulment of a Council Decision on the conclusion of an agreement (PNR)).
156  See Article 10 (1) of Protocol (No 36) on Transitional Provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon [2008]
OJ C115/322.
157  See  generally,  Maria-Gisella  Garbagnati  Ketvel,  ‘The  jurisdiction  of  the  European  Court  of
Justice in respect of the common foreign and security policy’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 77, 106.
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Yet, there are still unsatisfactory features under the current rules.  It has been criticised
that most national governments have agreed to maintain a provision (now Article 275
TFEU) that expressly excludes CFSP provisions as well as acts adopted on the basis of
those provisions from the jurisdiction of the Court:158
This might appear to the reasonable observer ‘as wholly unjustified in the  light of the
developing content of the Union's foreign policy’, and further constituted ‘a substantial
breach in the rule of law’ as the CFSP area continued to remain a ‘judicial review-free
islet’ notwithstanding two modest reforms laid down in Article 275 (2) TFEU:
The Court of Justice of the European Union could now monitor compliance with the
Union Treaties'  allocation of powers between the Union and the Member States and,
more importantly, rule on proceedings reviewing the legality of decisions providing for
restrictive measures against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council under the
CFSP. This first change only codified the case law of the Court but the last  one was
significant as it largely remedied the gap in fundamental rights protection highlighted by
the  Kadi  line of cases. Also welcome was the inclusion of a provision providing that
CFSP Council  restrictive  measures  adopted  against  natural  or  legal  persons  had  to
include ‘necessary provisions on legal safeguards’.159
These  changes  nevertheless  remain  patently insufficient.  The  CFSP area  continues  to
remain a ‘judicial review-free islet’ notwithstanding reforms.
As  mentioned  earlier,  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union  is
158  There  is  the  possibility  of  subjecting  Common Foreign  and  Security  Policy  measures  to  an
indirect  judicial  review,  in  cases  where CFSP measures  are  implemented.  See Case  T-228/02
Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d'Iran v Council EU:T:2006:384, [2006] ECR II-4665.
In cases where there is  no effective judicial  review, neither  at  national or at  Union level,  the
European Court on Human Rights provides the only remedy to review the compatibility of CFSP
acts with ECHR standards.
159  See Laurent Pech, ‘ ''A Union Founded on the Rule of Law'': Meaning and Reality of the Rule of
Law as a Constitutional Principle of EU Law’ (2010) 6 EuConst 359, 393-94.
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severely limited within the CFSP. The TEU acknowledges two express exceptions. First
express exception is Article 40 TEU (“mutual non-affectation clause”). The Court shall
have jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 40 TEU, which reads as follows:
The implementation of the common foreign and security policy shall not
affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the
institutions  laid  down  by  the  Treaties  for  the  exercise  of  the  Union
competences referred to in Articles 3 to 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union.
Similarly, the implementation of the policies listed in those Articles shall
not affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of
the institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union
competences under this Chapter.160
This  ensures  that  the  implementation of  CFSP does  not  affect  the  application  of  the
procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid down by the Treaties for
the  exercise of  the  competences  referred to  in  Articles 3  to  6 TFEU (that  is,  articles
containing  the  division  of  competences),  to  avoid  encroachment  upon  the  powers
conferred by the Treaties,161 and vice-versa.
160  See on the scope of Article 40 TEU, Peter van Elsuwege, ‘EU External Action after the Collapse
of the Pillar Structure: In search of a New Balance between Delimitation and Consistency’ (2010)
47 CMLR 987, 1002 et seq. Pre-Lisbon Article 47 TEU read as follows: 'Subject to the provisions
amending the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community with a view to establishing
the European Community, the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community and
the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, and to these final provisions,
nothing in  this Treaty shall  affect  the Treaties  establishing the  European Communities  or the
subsequent Treaties and Acts modifying or supplementing them.' The Court held in relation to pre-
Lisbon Article 47 TEU: 'It is the task of the Court to ensure that acts which, according to the
Council, fall within the scope of Title VI of the Treaty on European Union do not encroach upon
the  powers  conferred  by  the  EC Treaty  on  the  Community.'  See  for  example,  Case  C-91/05
Commission v Council  (ECOWAS)  EU:C:2008:288, [2008] ECR I-3651,  in  particular  para 56;
Case C-176/03 Commission v Council EU:C:2005:542, [2005] ECR I-7879, para 39 and Case C-
170/96 Commission v Council EU:C:1998:219, [1998] ECR I-2763, para 16.
161  Case C-170/96  Commission v Council  EU:C:1998:219, [1998] ECR I-2763, para 16; Case C-
176/03 Commission v Council EU:C:2005:542, [2005] ECR I-7879, para 39.
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According  to  Hinarejos,  there  are  some  differences  between  Article  40  TEU and  its
predecessor provision (ex-Article 47 TEU162):
The first difference was that, contrary to its counterpart in the Lisbon Treaty, ex-Article 47
TEU could be understood to give power to the Court to check the compliance of (properly
adopted) CFSP measures with the TEC. This was because ex-Article 47 TEU only stated
that  'nothing  in  this  Treaty  shall  affect  the  Treaties  establishing  the  European
Communities', whereas Article 40 TEU (after TL) referred specifically to 'the application
of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions' laid down in the TEU
and TFEU. It had been argued that, within the CFSP, ex-Article 47 TEU should not be
read as single-handedly granting the Court  competence  to  review CFSP measures for
compliance with Community rules in the absence of any review mechanism in the area; in
any case, that possibility then would have been precluded in the Lisbon Treaty.
The second difference was that, within the framework of the Lisbon Treaty, the borders
would  be set  between the CFSP and all  other  Union policies,  where the  EC method
162  Case C-170/96 Commission v Council EU:C:1998:219, [1998] ECR I-2763 (Joint Action, airport
transit  visas);  Case  C-176/03  Commission  v  Council  EU:C:2005:542, [2005]  ECR  I-7879
(Framework Decision, protection of the environment through criminal law); and Case C-440/05
Commission v Council EU:C:2007:625, [2007] ECR I-9097 (Framework Decision, enforcement
of the law against ship-source pollution), related to acts adopted pursuant to ex-Title VI TEU.
Case C-91/05 Commission v Council EU:C:2008:288, [2008] ECR I-3651 was the first occasion
when the Court was requested to draw the line between the EC Treaty and Title V of the TEU on
the CFSP on the basis of ex-Article 47 TEU. The Commission brought an action seeking to have
the Decision annulled and the Joint Action to be declared inapplicable. Taking the view that the
Council Decision had not been adopted on the correct legal basis and that by virtue of that fact ex-
Article 47 TEU had been infringed (the adoption of such a measure fell within the competence
conferred upon the EC in the area of development cooperation). The Small Arms case concerned
first, the meaning of ex-Article 47; secondly, nature of the EC competence in the assessment as to
whether or not ex-Article 47 has been infringed by a measure that has been adopted pursuant to
the TEU; and, thirdly, the application of ex-Article 47 TEU to situations where a measure has
multiple objectives; that is, some of which fall within Community competence and others within
the competence of the Union. The Court drew a demarcation between the areas of Community
development co-operation and CFSP respectively (at paras 76-77). Joni Heliskoski, ‘Small arms
and light weapons within the Union's pillar structure: an analysis of Article 47 of the EU Treaty’
(2008) 33 ELRev. 898-912 provides a general analysis of purpose and meaning of ex-Article 47
on the basis of the Small Arms case considered in the light of the Court's earlier case law on the
subject.
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applied fully, rather than between the intergovernmental pillars and the Community pillar.
In both cases, the application of the EC method seemed to be the underlying distinction.
The third difference was that whereas ex-Article 47 TEU established the primacy of EC
competences over  EU ones,  Article  40 TEU (after  TL) seemed to accord them equal
weight.  The aim of Article 40 TEU (after  TL) would not have been to safeguard the
acquis communautaire as much as to prevent mutual interference between the CFSP and
any other policy. It should nevertheless be borne in mind that the Court already ensured
under ex-Article 230 EC that no measure was inappropriately adopted under pre-Lisbon's
EC “Pillar”  when it  should  have had an intergovernmental  legal  basis.  The 'two-way
street' of Article 40 TEU (after TL) could therefore be seen as the fusion of two functions
the  Court  had  already  been  exercising  under  two  different  Treaty  headings:  it  had
protected EC competences from EU encroachment under ex-Article 47 TEU, but it had
also performed the converse task by enforcing the principle of conferral of powers and
without the need to invoke ex-Article 47 TEU. In practice, the difference would have been
that, in a situation such as the one at stake in ECOWAS, where the Court recognised that
the measure had two equally central aims or components, one falling within the scope of
the CFSP and another one falling within another area of EU competence, a literal reading
of Article 40 TEU would not have necessarily provided for the necessary conflict rule to
choose one legal basis over the other.163 
According to van Elsuwege, this “mutual non-affectation clause” stood in stark contrast to
the  hierarchic  relationship  between  the  “Pillars”  under  the  old  treaty  regime,  where,
inspired by a fear of intergovernmental contamination of supranational decision-making,
several provisions had underlined the primacy of Community competences (see ex-Article
47 TEU in conjunction with ex-Articles 1 (3) and 2 TEU).164
163  Alicia Hinarejos (n 149) 152 and 153.
164  Peter van Elsuwege (n 160) 987, 1002.
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De Baere points to the use of annulment procedures brought against the legal instrument
concluding an agreement alleging a violation of Article 40 TEU.
According to him Article 275 TFEU did not exclude Article 218 TFEU itself from the
jurisdiction of the Court. That implied that the Court should have been able to review
compliance with the unified treaty-making procedure provided for in Article 218 TFEU,
regardless of whether the agreement concerned would have covered EC external relations,
or matters belonging to the CFSP. Because the unified treaty-making procedure would
have  left  in  place  some  procedural  differences  between  provisions  of  the  agreement
pertaining to those two aspects of foreign policy, the jurisdiction of the Court would have
included 'policing the borders' between the two. That would have seemed to include the
possibility  for  the  Court  to  review  ex  post  the  compliance  with  those  procedural
differences corresponding to the horizontal division of competences. One could think of
an annulment procedure brought against the legal instrument concluding an agreement
alleging a violation of Article 40 EU, which would have fallen under the jurisdiction of
the Court according to Article 275 TFEU.165
Second express exception is Article 275 (2) TFEU, which reads as follows:
the Court shall have jurisdiction to monitor compliance with Article 40 of
the  Treaty  on European Union and to  rule  on proceedings,  brought  in
accordance  with  the  conditions  laid  down  in  the  fourth  paragraph  of
Article 263 of this Treaty, reviewing the legality of decisions providing for
restrictive  measures  against  natural  or  legal  persons  adopted  by  the
Council on the basis of Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on European
Union.
Article 275 (2) TFEU is again one of the potentially revolutionary inroads into the CFSP
for the Court. The inclusion of the provision indicates that the constitution-makers wanted
to reinforce judicial review  – a break with the pre-Lisbon Treaty status quo.
165  Geert de Baere (n 4) 190-91.
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The Court shall also be able to review the legality of decisions referred to in Article 275
(2) TFEU providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons adopted by
the Council on the basis of Chapter 2 (containing specific provisions on the  Common
Foreign  and  Security  Policy)  of  Title  V of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union  (that  is,
measures referred to in Article 215 TFEU).166
Cremona goes as far as to argue that  there was no reason in principle why a Council
decision concluding a treaty should not have been subject to review under that provision,
although it was probably more likely that a measure implementing the agreement would
have satisfied those conditions.167 That  is,  review of the legality of Council  decisions
providing for restrictive measures adopted on the basis of the CFSP and CSDP provisions.
166  Article 215 TFEU reads as follows: '1. Where a decision, adopted in accordance with Chapter 2
of Title V of the Treaty on European Union, provides for the interruption or reduction, in part or
completely, of economic and financial relations with one or more third countries, the Council,
acting by a qualified majority on a joint proposal from the High Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission, shall adopt the necessary measures. It
shall inform the European Parliament thereof.  2. Where a decision adopted in accordance with
Chapter  2  of  Title  V of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union  so  provides,  the  Council  may adopt
restrictive measures under the procedure referred to in paragraph 1 against natural or legal persons
and groups or non-State entities.  3. The acts referred to in this Article shall include necessary
provisions on legal  safeguards.'  The practical  significance of  Article  275 TFEU is limited,  as
restrictive measures are likely to be normally adopted through Article 75 TFEU (Area of Freedom
Security and Justice as regards preventing and combating terrorism and related activities). See
Tarcisio Gazzini  and Ester  Herlin-Karnell,  ‘Restrictive measures  adopted by the EU from the
standpoint of international and EU law’ (2011) 36 ELRev. 798, 815.
167  See Marise Cremona, ‘Who can make treaties? The European Union’ in Duncan B. Hollis (ed),
The Oxford Guide to Treaties (OUP, 2012 Oxford) 111.
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D. The standard of assessment
1.  National judicatures
In cases where legal spheres conflict in their substance, Advocate General Mengozzi has
suggested that the standard of assessment of validity are, in accordance with the principle
of loyal cooperation, the general principles of Union law:
According to him the principle of loyal cooperation dictated that when Member States'
courts assessed the legality of acts adopted by the Council under Article 34 TEU (Title VI
of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union),  including  an  assessment  made  in  an  action  for
damages, they should have done so in the light of the relevant provisions and general
principles of  Union law,  particularly the fundamental  rights  under Article 6 (2) TEU,
namely  those  guaranteed  by  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  and  those
stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. Reference by
the  Member States'  courts  to  the  constitutional  provisions  of  their  own legal  systems
might  not  be  sufficient  to  guarantee the  standard  of  protection of  fundamental  rights
deriving from Article  6 (2) TEU, to the extent that,  as was repeatedly observed, that
standard was not the 'lowest common denominator' of protection afforded to fundamental
rights by the constitutional laws of the Member States but rather a high level of protection
appropriate to the needs of Union law.168
As indicated by Advocate General Mengozzi, application of the standard of protection
required could pose difficulties to the national judicature and involves national judicatures
168  Case C-354/04 P Gestoras Pro Amnistía et al. v Council  EU:C:2006:667, [2007] ECR I-1579,
Opinion  of  AG  Mengozzi,  para  138.  This  view  is  also  reflected  in  literature. See  Eleanor
Spaventa,  ‘Fundamental  What?  The  Difficult  Relationship  between  Foreign  Policy  and
Fundamental Rights’ in Marise Cremona and Bruno de Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law:
Constitutional Fundamentals (Essays in European law, Hart, Oxford 2008) 250 and Monica Claes,
The National Court’s Mandate in the European Constitution (Modern Studies in European Law,
Hart, Oxford 2006) 560.
191
Chapter III
in clarifying the fundamental rights recognised by the Union, a task hitherto performed by
the Court of Justice of the European Union.
Application of the standard of protection required by Article 6(2) EU could
undoubtedly pose some difficulties to the national court and involve it in
clarifying the fundamental rights recognised by the Union, a task hitherto
performed mainly by the Community court. Such difficulties should not,
however, be exaggerated. National courts can rely for that purpose on the
provisions of the Charter and on Community case-law, as well as on the
provisions of the ECHR and the case-law of the European Court of Human
Rights.  In order to assess the legality  of the Council  acts  described in
Article  34  EU,  at  least  those  mentioned  in  Article  35(1)  EU,  national
courts may naturally seek the assistance of the Court, to the extent that the
choices  made by the  respective  States  under  Article  35(2)  and (3)  EU
allow, by making a reference for a preliminary ruling on validity. In any
case,  the difficulty  in question cannot justify  preferring the absence of
judicial protection of fundamental rights, which result from Article 6(2)
EU, in the context of Title VI of the EU Treaty.169
Difficulties should not be exaggerated. National judicatures can rely for that purpose on
the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and on Union case law, as well as on
the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights. National judicatures may seek the assistance of the
Court, by making references for a preliminary ruling.
2. Union judicature (intensity of judicial review)
In the Kadi I ruling of 2008170 concerning the legality of Community acts listed by the UN
Sanction Committee the Court has emphatically emphasised that:
169  Case C-354/04 P Gestoras Pro Amnistía et al. v Council  EU:C:2006:667,  [2007] ECR I-1579,
Opinion of AG Mengozzi, para 139.
170  Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P  Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v
Council and Commission EU:C:2008:461, [2008] ECR I-6351.
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obligations imposed by an international agreement cannot have the effect
of  prejudicing  the  constitutional  principles  of  the  EC  Treaty,  which
include the principle that all Community acts must respect fundamental
rights, that respect constituting a condition of their lawfulness which it is
for the Court to review in the framework of the complete system of legal
remedies established by the Treaty.171
The Court held that:
the Community judicature must, in accordance with the powers conferred
on it by the EC Treaty, ensure the review, in principle the full review, of
the lawfulness of all Community acts in the light of the fundamental rights
forming  an  integral  part  of  the  general  principles  of  Community  law,
including  review  of  Community  measures  which,  like  the  contested
regulation, are designed to give effect to the resolutions adopted by the
Security  Council  under  Chapter  VII  of  the  Charter  of  the  United
Nations.172
advancing  its  own  values  (fundamental  rights  protection)  and  reversing  the  General
Court's ruling; that is,  the restrictive notion of the standard of review adopted by the
General Court – a strength of the judgment.173
As indicated  by  Eeckhout  and Poli/Tzanou,  the  Court  is  supported  for  reversing  the
General Court's ruling (application of jus cogens), thus allaying fears of revitalisation of a
'Solange I rebellion' of Member States' constitutional courts that could have led to a lack
of uniformity in protection of fundamental rights within the EU legal order.174
171  Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P  Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v
Council and Commission EU:C:2008:461, [2008] ECR I-6351, para 285.
172  Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P  Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v
Council and Commission EU:C:2008:461, [2008] ECR I-6351, para 326.
173  The  General Court  confined judicial review to  jus cogens (review on the basis of  jus cogens
norms), an international – in contrast to a European – standard. See Case T-315/01 Kadi v Council
and Commission EU:T:2005:332, [2005] ECR II-3649.
174  Piet Eeckhout, ‘Community terrorism listings, fundamental rights and the UN Security council
resolutions. In search of the right fit’ (2007) 3 EuConst 183, 202 and Sara Poli and Maria Tzanou,
‘The Kadi Rulings: A Survey of the Literature’ (2009) 28 YEL 533, 543.
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Aftermath of  Kadi I and Kadi  II-developments:  Kadi II,175 concerned the re-listing after
the judgment in Kadi I of 2008. As the General Court itself puts it:
doubts may have been voiced in legal circles as to whether the judgment
of the Court of Justice in Kadi is wholly consistent with, on the one hand,
international  law  and,  more  particularly,  Articles  25  and  103  of  the
Charter of the United Nations  and, on the other hand, the EC and EU
Treaties, and more particularly Article 177(3) EC, Articles 297 EC and
307 EC, Article  11(1) EU and Article 19(2) EU (see,  also Article 3(5)
TEU and Article 21(1) and (2) TEU, as well as declaration No 13 of the
Conference of Representatives of the Governments of the Member States
concerning the common foreign and security policy annexed to the Treaty
of Lisbon, which stresses that 'the [EU] and its Member States will remain
bound by the  provisions  of  the  Charter  of  the  United Nations  and,  in
particular, by the primary responsibility of the Security council and of its
members for the maintenance of international peace and security'. 176
(...)
The  General  Court  acknowledges  that  those  criticisms  are  not  entirely
without foundation.177
The General Court applied the  Kadi  I approach of 2008 of the Court of Justice of the
European Union  in  full,  including  full  review.  The  position  of  the  General  Court  is
dispelled by paragraph 125:
the  Court  of  Justice  also  stated,  in  Kadi,  that  the  implementation  of
resolutions  adopted  by  the  Security  Council  under  Chapter  VII  of  the
Charter of the United Nations must be undertaken in accordance with the
procedure applicable in that respect in the domestic legal order of each
Member  of  the  United  Nations  (paragraph  298),  that  it  is  not  a
consequence  of  the  principles  governing  the  international  legal  order
175  Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Commission, Council and United Kingdom
v Kadi EU:C:2013:518.
176  Case T-85/09 Kadi v Commission EU:T:2010:418, [2010] ECR II-5177, para 115.
177  Case T-85/09 Kadi v Commission EU:T:2010:418, [2010] ECR II-5177, para 121.
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under  the  United  Nations  that  any  judicial  review  of  the  internal
lawfulness of a Community measure such as the contested regulation in
the light of fundamental freedoms is excluded by virtue of the fact that
that  measure  is  intended to give effect to such a resolution (paragraph
299), that such immunity from jurisdiction for such a measure cannot find
a basis in the EC Treaty (paragraph 300), that the review, by the Court of
Justice,  of  the  validity  of  any  Community  measure  in  the  light  of
fundamental  rights  must  be  considered  to  be  the  expression,  in  a
community  based  on  the  rule  of  law,  of  a  constitutional  guarantee
stemming from the EC Treaty as an autonomous legal system which is not
to be prejudiced by an 'international agreement' (paragraph 316), and that
accordingly  'the  Community  judicature  must,  in  accordance  with  the
powers conferred on it by the EC Treaty, ensure the review, in principle
the full review, of the lawfulness of all Community acts in the light of the
fundamental rights forming an integral part of the general principles of
Community law, including review of Community measures which … are
designed to give effect to the resolutions adopted by the Security Council
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations' (paragraph 326).
As  Cuyvers  has  said,  a  sort  of  “Bosphorus”  approach  (developed  to  determine  the
European Court of Human Rights' relation to the EU) – creating falsifiable presumptions
that the Union provides a sufficient degree of fundamental rights protection.178
In paragraph 151 the General Court considered that:
once there is acceptance of the premiss, laid down by the judgment of the
Court of Justice in Kadi, that freezing measures such as those at issue in
this instance enjoy no immunity from jurisdiction merely because they are
intended to  give  effect  to  resolutions  adopted  by  the  Security  Council
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the principle of a
full and rigorous judicial review of such measures is all the more justified
given that such measures have a marked and long-lasting effect  on the
fundamental rights of the persons concerned.
178  See Armin Cuyvers, ‘The Kadi II judgment of the General Court: the ECJ's predicament and the
consequences for Member States’ (2011) 7 EuConst 481, 491.
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The position of Advocate General Bot is dispelled by paragraphs 67, 85 and 86:179
there  are  several  reasons  against  a  judicial  review as  thorough as  that
undertaken  by  the  General  Court  in  the  judgment  under  appeal,  with
reference to its judgment in  OMPI.  (…) the preventative nature of the
measures in question, the international context of the contested act, the
need  to  balance  the  requirements  of  combating  terrorism  and  the
requirements of protection of fundamental rights, the political nature of
the assessments made by the Sanctions Committee in deciding to list a
person or an entity, and the improvements in the procedure before that
body in recent years and, in particular, since the judgment of the Court of
Justice in Kadi.180
Context-sensitive forms of judicial reviews reflect:
confidence  and  collaboration  between  the  participating  international,
regional  and  national  institutions,  rather  than  mistrust.  The  mutual
confidence which must exist between the European Union and the United
Nations  is  justified  by  the  fact  that  the  values  concerning  respect  for
fundamental rights are shared by those two organisations.181
Advocate General Bot further argued that:
the EU courts should not adopt a standard of review which would require
the EU institutions to examine systematically and intensively the merits of
the decisions taken by the Sanctions Committee, on the basis of evidence
or information available to that body, before giving effect to them. The
improvements to the listing and delisting procedure should strengthen the
confidence that the EU institutions and judicature have in the decisions
179  Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Commission, Council and United Kingdom
v Kadi EU:C:2013:176, Opinion of AG Bot.
180  Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Commission, Council and United Kingdom
v Kadi EU:C:2013:176, Opinion of AG Bot, para 67.
181  Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Commission, Council and United Kingdom
v Kadi EU:C:2013:176, Opinion of AG Bot, para 85. 
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taken by the Sanctions Committee.182
As Advocate General Bot has said, limited reviews (context-sensitive)  reflect confidence/
collaboration between the participating international, regional/ national institutions. The
Court of Justice of the European Union's position is dispelled by paragraphs 119 and 120.
Review entails:
a  verification  of  the  allegations  factored  in  the  summary  of  reasons
underpinning that decision (…), with the consequence that judicial review
cannot  be  restricted  to  an  assessment  of  the  abstract  cogency  in  the
abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons
(…) deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated.
(…)
it is for the Courts of the European Union (…) to request the competent
European  Union  authority,  when  necessary,  to  produce  information  or
evidence, confidential or not, relevant to such examination.183
The Court of Justice of the European Union confirmed that the standard required by the
EU legal order requires more than limited – procedural –  review.184 That is, review must
concern whether those reasons, or, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to
support that decision, is substantiated.
182  Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Commission, Council and United Kingdom
v Kadi EU:C:2013:176, Opinion of AG Bot, para 86.
183  Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Commission, Council and United Kingdom
v Kadi EU:C:2013:518.
184  See especially Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Commission, Council and
United Kingdom v Kadi EU:C:2013:518, para 120. See in this regard also Niamh Nic Shuibhne,
‘Being bound (Editorial Comment)’ (2013) 38 EuConst 435-436.
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E. Conclusion
This  chapter  gave  an  overview of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  on EC (by now EU)
agreements and CFSP and PJC (by now FSJ) agreements.
Section 1 discussed the jurisdiction of the Court on EC (by now EU) agreements before
the Lisbon Treaty reforms. The relevant case law of the Court was examined in the present
contribution.  The  following  conclusions  are  in  order:  In  terms  of  routes  to  ex  ante
challenges, Opinions of the Court of Justice pursuant to Article 218 (11) TFEU (ex-Article
300 (6) TEC) are relevant. Under this provision the European Parliament, the Council, the
Commission or a Member State are entitled to challenge the constitutionality of a draft
agreement. The actors in this provision (the Member States, the European Parliament, the
Council and the Commission) are privileged applicants. Private parties, so called non-
privileged applicants, cannot seek judicial review. Opinion 1/75 (Local Cost Standard)185
was the first such opinion. The Court has delivered fourteen Opinions on international
agreements before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. In terms of routes to ex post
challenges, the main provisions of the Court's jurisdiction can be summarised as follows:
first, judgments of the Court delivered in the course of Article 258 TFEU (ex-Article 226
TEC), second, Article 263 TFEU (ex-Article 230 TEC) and third, Article 267 TFEU (ex-
Article 234 TEC). Article 5 TEU (ex-Articles 5 (1), (2) and (3) TEC) defines limits to
Article 19 TEU (ex-Article 220 TEC). Under Article 258 TFEU (ex-Article 226 TEC) in
cases  where  the  Commission  considers  that  a  Member  State  has  failed  to  fulfil  an
obligation under  this  Treaty,  the  Commission  may,  after  having delivered  a  reasoned
opinion,  bring  proceedings  before  the  Court.  For  instance,  as  the
Commission v Germany186 case on the International Dairy Arrangement has shown. Under
Article 263 TFEU (ex-Article 230 TEC) the Court can review EC acts, demonstrated, for
185  Opinion 1/75 (Local Cost Standard) EU:C:1975:145, [1975] ECR 1355.
186  Case C-61/94 Commission v Germany EU:C:1996:313, [1996] ECR I-3989.
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instance in the Germany v Council187 case.
Under  Article  267  TFEU  (ex-Article  234  TEC)  the  Court  has  jurisdiction  to  give
preliminary  rulings,  in  this  respect  International  Fruit  Company,188 Haegeman,189
Demirel,190 Racke,191 Hermès192 and the Dior193 case are examples.
Section  2  discussed  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  on  CFSP and  PJC  (by  now  FSJ)
agreements.  In terms of a legal point, it must be emphasised that whether decisions to
conclude CFSP agreements can be challenged as if they were a normal internal act under
Article 263 TFEU is open to question. To make this argument one would have to explore
the scope of Article 263 TFEU and see whether there are any jurisdictional limitations in
Title V of the TFEU. In the writer's view, it is not yet certain that this is the case. Article
40 TEU, as one of the heads of jurisdiction that the Court had and now has (on a reformed
basis), could be relevant for giving it ex post jurisdiction on an international agreement, at
least as far as the competence question is concerned.
Section 3 discussed the standard of review in general, and Yusuf/ Kadi194 in particular.
187  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973.
188  Joined Cases 21 to 24/72 International Fruit  Company NV and others  v  Produktschap voor
Groenten en Fruit EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219.
189  Case 181/73 Haegeman v Belgian State EU:C:1974:41, [1974] ECR 449.
190  Case 12/86 Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd EU:C:1987:400, [1987] ECR 3719.
191  Case C-162/96 Racke GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Mainz EU:C:1998:293, [1998] ECR I-3655.
192  Case C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV EU:C:1998:292, [1998] ECR I-
3603.
193  Joined Cases C-300/98 and C-392/98  Parfums Christian Dior SA v TUK Consultancy BV and
Assco Gerüste GmbH and Rob van Dijk v Wilhelm Layher GmbH & Co. KG and Layher BV
EU:C:2000:688, [2000] ECR I-11307.
194  Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P  Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v
Council  and  Commission EU:C:2008:461,  [2008]  ECR I-6351; Joined  Cases  C-584/10  P,  C-
593/10 P and C-595/10 P Commission, Council and United Kingdom v Kadi EU:C:2013:518.
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GENERAL CONCLUSION
This dissertation aimed to provide an analysis of the institutional and legal effects of
international agreements.
The  oldest  agreements  are  those  of  the  European  Community.  The  procedure  for
negotiating  and  concluding  Community  agreements  was  set  out  in  Article  300  TEC.
International agreements concluded by the European Community were binding on the EC
institutions and on Member States, pursuant to Article 300 (7) TEC. The Council  and
Parliament  approved the conclusion of  such agreements,  according to  Article  300 (3)
TEC. The Court had accepted on a broad basis direct effect of provisions of free trade
associations, accession associations, development associations and the EEA. In 1972 it
denied  direct  effect  of  the  GATT.1 In  1999  it  also  denied  direct  effect  of  the  WTO
agreements.2
The  first  chapter  highlighted  the  structural  differences  between  WTO  law  and  other
agreements.  The  demarcation  between  relevant  and  irrelevant  parameters  for  the
recognition of direct effect was thematised. It was argued that the similarity of terms (that
is,  provisions  of  the  agreement/  provisions  of  the  Treaty),  the  imbalance  between
obligations assumed (that  is,  a certain asymmetry of obligations/ non-reciprocity),  the
position to dominate the framing of an agreement (that is,  the ability to preserve and
pursue interests) and the degree of integration (that is, the question of whether there is any
'special  link'  with  the  European  Union),  and  (jointly)  applied  safeguard  clauses,  are
criteria which do not affect the direct enforceability. It was also stressed that unilaterally
applied  safeguard  clauses  indicate  that  the  contracting  parties  did  not  intend  direct
enforceability; that is, obligations assumed are not sufficiently unconditional.
1  The Court had consistently refused to recognise the direct effect of GATT rules. See Joined Cases
21 to 24/72 International Fruit Company NV and others v Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit
EU:C:1972:115, [1972] ECR 1219, para 27; Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367,
[1994] ECR I- 4973, para 110.
2  Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395, para 48.
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Subsequently,  it  was  shown  that,  due  to  the  contractual  nature  of  obligations  of
international  agreements,  the efficient  breach  and  pacta  sunt  servanda  methodology
provided a possible conceptual framework for the denial or recognition of direct effect of
international agreements.
The  Incurse in this  chapter turned to the technical  aspects of the question of indirect
effects. The ruling in  Fediol3 and  Nakajima4 addressed the issue of indirect effects of
GATT rules. In Portugal v Council,5 the Court confirmed its holdings in the Fediol  and
Nakajima cases under GATT and extended them to WTO.
The  second  chapter  discussed  the  general  issues  and  practice  of  EU  international
agreements (CFSP and PJC (by now FSJ) agreements). This chapter first dealt with the
international legal personality of the European Union prior to the Lisbon Treaty. It has
been  argued  in  legal  scholarship  that  the  European  Union  was  not  a  subject  of
international law; that is, powers rested with the Member States and the Council acted on
behalf  of  the  Member  States  which  were  the  contracting  parties.  Others,  however,
contended that the European Union possessed an implicit legal personality; that is, the
Council acted on behalf of the European Union and not on behalf of the Member States.
Prior  to  the  Lisbon  Treaty  the  actual  practice  only  (the  European  Union did  already
conclude international agreements) allowed to argue that the European Union possessed
an implicit legal personality. Article 47 TEU made the legal personality of the European
Union explicit and designated the Union as a contracting party; as such the debate on the
question  whether  ex-Article  24  TEU  conferred  implicitly  legal  personality  to  the
European Union became irrelevant.
This chapter subsequently dealt with the practice on EU agreements and respectively with
direct effects and indirect effects and addressed a vertical dimension (vis-à-vis national
3  Case 70/87 Fediol v Commission EU:C:1989:254, [1989] ECR 1781.
4  Case C-69/89 Nakajima All Precision Co. Ltd v Council EU:C:1991:186, [1991] ECR I-2069.
5  Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council EU:C:1999:574, [1999] ECR I-8395.
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legislation). The purpose was to give an overview of arguments against and in favour of
direct effects before and after the Lisbon Treaty reforms.
First of all, CFSP and individual enforcement was addressed. The ability of a norm to be
self-executing or justiciable is, even after the de-pillarisation following the TL, severely
limited under the CFSP. The Court continues to lack jurisdiction under Article 267 TFEU
with  regard  to  CFSP  measures.  This  resulted  in  a  second  argument  against  direct
enforcement. The distinct nature of CFSP competences (Article 24 TEU), reflected in the
continued exclusion of the Court in these matters, was an additional reason for being
careful  with  the  Union-wide  application  of  Community  concepts.  A further argument
against individual enforcement was that, although the area of the CFSP is an object of
European co-operation within the framework of the Union, the Member States  decided
not to incorporate them into the supra-national jurisdiction system.
Secondly,  FSJ and individual  enforcement  was addressed.  The starting points  for any
discussion of judicial protection (which national courts must secure as regards areas of
Freedom, Security  and Justice)  were national  constitutional  rights,  and the process of
“communitarisation”. It was argued that a full extension of the “Community” method is
superficial and difficult to draw.
It has been shown that CFSP and PJC (by now FSJ) agreements do not have direct effect;
arguments in favour of individual enforcement are less thorough and less elaborated on.
This was followed by an analysis of contractual exclusions of direct effect.
The third chapter discussed the jurisdiction of the Court on EU international agreements
before and after the Lisbon Treaty reforms to conclude that the jurisdiction of the CJEU
has expanded.
The first part of the chapter concentrated on the jurisdiction of the Court on EC (by now
EU) agreements. With regard to ex ante challenges, Article 218 (11) TFEU provides for
the right to obtain an opinion of the Court about the validity of an international agreement
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(compatibility with the Treaties).6 The Court identified the general purpose of the ex-ante
procedure which is to forestall complications resulting from legal disputes concerning the
compatibility with the Treaties of international agreements binding upon the Union, and
with regard to routes to ex post challenges the main provisions of the Court's jurisdiction
are Article 258 TFEU, Article 263 TFEU and Article 267 TFEU.
Under Article 258 TFEU the Commission may, after having issued a reasoned opinion,
bring proceedings before the Court where it considered that a Member State has failed to
fulfil  an  obligation  under  the  Treaties.  The  European  Commission  made  use  of  that
provision.  For  example,  in  Commission  v  Germany7 on  the  International  Dairy
Arrangement,  the  Commission  challenged  the  authorisation  granted  by  German
authorities  for  the  importation  under  inward  processing  relief  arrangements  of  dairy
products  whose  customs  value  was  lower  than  the  minimum  prices  set  under  the
International Dairy Arrangement.
Under  Article  263 TFEU the Court  has  jurisdiction  to  review the legality of  any act
adopted by the institutions and which have legal effects. The provision governing direct
review includes, as grounds of review, lack of competences, misuse of powers, breach of
essential procedural requirements, or infringement of the Treaty or of any rule of law
relating  to  its  application.  The  different  strands  of  case  law  were  discussed.
France v Commission8 could  be  subsumed within the  ground of  lack of  competences.
Parliament v Council,9 Portugal v Council,10 Parliament v Council,11 Spain v Council,12
6  E.g. The Commission made a request to the CJEU for an Opinion according to Article 218 (11)
TFEU on the compatibility of the draft agreement providing for the accession of the European
Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms with the
EU legal order (Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR EU:C:2014:2454).
7  Case C-61/94 Commission v Germany EU:C:1996:313, [1996] ECR I-3989.
8  Case C-327/91 France v Commission EU:C:1994:305, [1994] ECR I-3641.
9  Case C-360/93 Parliament v Council EU:C:1996:84, [1996] ECR I-1195.
10  Case C-268/94 Portugal v Council EU:C:1996:461, [1996] ECR I-6177.
11  Case C-189/97 Parliament v Council EU:C:1999:366, [1999] ECR I-4741.
12  Case C-36/98 Spain v Council EU:C:2001:64, [2001] ECR I-779.
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Commission  v  Council,13 Commission  v  Council,14 the  judgment  on  the  Rotterdam
Convention15 and the PNR ruling16 were cases on legal base issues. “Legal base cases”
brought by Community institutions and Member States could be subsumed within the
ground of infringement of essential procedural requirements. The most general ground of
review is infringement of the Treaty or of any rule relating to its application. The Court
has  used  this  ground  of  review in  Germany  v  Council.17 That  case  exemplified  that
infringement of the Treaty or of any rule relating to its application can overlap with the
other grounds of review.
Under Article 267 TFEU the national courts of the EU Member States may refer to the
Court  questions  concerning  the  interpretation  of  the  Treaties  and  the  validity  and
interpretation  of  acts  of  the  institutions,  bodies,  offices  or  agencies  of  the  Union.
International agreements formed the subject-matter of references for preliminary rulings.
Two strands of the case law concerning the interpretative jurisdiction of the Court over
provisions of international agreements concluded with (mixed agreements) and without
the participation of the Member States (purely Community agreements) were discussed.
The second part of the chapter concentrated on the Court's jurisdiction on EU international
agreements (CFSP and PJC (by now FSJ) agreements). Article 24 (1) TEU, reaffirmed in
Article 275 TFEU, excluded the CJEU from issues concerning the CFSP. There are two
situations where the CJEU might have jurisdiction.
Firstly, Article 218 (11) TFEU brought CFSP provisions within the scope of the Court's
jurisdiction.  It  was  argued  that  this  provision  is  a  potential  inroad  into  the  CFSP
exemption (Article 275 TFEU).
13  Case C-281/01 Commission v Council EU:C:2002:761, [2002] ECR I-12049.
14  Case C-211/01 Commission v Council EU:C:2003:452, [2003] ECR I-8913.
15  Case C-94/03 Commission v Council EU:C:2006:2, [2006] ECR I-1.
16  Joined  Cases  C-317/04  and  C-318/04  Parliament  v  Council  and  Commission  (PNR)
EU:C:2006:346, [2006] ECR I-4721.
17  Case C-280/93 Germany v Council EU:C:1994:367, [1994] ECR I-4973.
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Secondly,  it  is  questionable  whether  decisions  to  conclude  CFSP agreements  can  be
challenged as if they were a normal internal act under Article 263 TFEU. It could be
argued that the scope of Article 263 TFEU has to be explored and find whether there are
any jurisdictional  limitations  in  Title  V of  the  TFEU. There  still  remains uncertainty
whether this will be the case.
Article 40 TEU is conceptualised to prevent mutual encroachment between CFSP and
non-CFSP. The CJEU monitors compliance with Article 40 TEU, successor provision to
Article 47 TEU, and that provision, as one of the heads of jurisdiction, is relevant for
giving  it  ex  post jurisdiction  on  an  international  agreement,  at  least  as  far  as  the
competence question is concerned. An example would be an annulment procedure brought
against the legal instrument concluding an international agreement alleging a violation of
Article 40 TEU.
As pointed out above, there is evidence for wanted reinforced judicial review. Changed
post-  Lisbon  constitutional  environment  has  been  shown  and  discussed,  having
interactions between CFSP and TFEU competences referred to in Articles 3-6 TFEU, and
it remains to be seen how the CJEU will go on, especially with regard to the scope of
application of Article 40 TEU. The effective protection of interests and rights of private
parties  would  be  better  served  by  a  more  extensive  judicial  review  of  international
agreements exercised by the CJEU.
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  APPENDICES EU AGREEMENTS (CFSP AND PJC (BY NOW FSJ) 
AGREEMENTS) PRE-TL
Appendix I: Status and activities of the European Union with host States
I-1. European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)
Agreement between the European Union and ...
… Georgia on the status of the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia [2008] 
OJ L310/31 (Treaty EU, Article 24).1
… the Government of Indonesia on the tasks, status, privileges and immunities of the 
European Union Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia) (Aceh Monitoring Mission —
AMM) and its personnel [2006] OJ L273/9 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Government of Indonesia on the tasks, status, privileges and immunities of the 
European Union Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia) (Aceh Monitoring Mission —
AMM) and its personnel [2006] OJ L176/108 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Government of Indonesia on the tasks, status, privileges and immunities of the 
European Union Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia) (Aceh Monitorino Mission —
AMM) and its personnel [2006] OJ L71/55 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Government of Indonesia on the tasks, status, privileges and immunities of the 
European Union Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia) (Aceh Monitoring Mission —
AMM) and its personnel [2005] OJ L288/60 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Republic of Albania on the activities of the European Union Monitoring Mission 
(EUMM) in the Republic of Albania [2003] OJ L93/50 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the activities of the European Union 
Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [2001] 
OJ L241/2 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the activities of the European Union 
Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [2001] OJ L125/2 
1  Published in the Official Journal of the European Union. This list is not exhaustive. Article 17 (1)
(h)  of  Council  Decision  2004/338/EC  of  22  March  2004  adopting  the  Council's  Rules  of
Procedure 2004/338/EC [2004] OJ L106/22 reads as follows: '1. The following shall be published
in the Official  Journal  of  the European Union (…) (h)  international  agreements  concluded in
accordance  with  Article  24  of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union,  unless  the  Council  decides
otherwise on the grounds of Articles 4 and 9 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament,
Council and Commission documents.'
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(Treaty EU, Article 24).
I-2. European Union Police Mission (EUPM)
Agreement between the European Union and ...
… the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the status and activities of the European 
Union police mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUPOL Kinshasa) 
[2005] OJ L256/58 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the status and activities of the 
European Union Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(EUPOL Proxima) [2004] OJ L16/66 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) on the activities of the European Union Police 
Mission (EUPM) IN BiH [2002] OJ L293/2 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
I-3. European Union-led forces (EUF)
Agreement between the European Union and ...
… the Republic of Seychelles on the status of the European Union-led forces in the 
Republic of Seychelles in the framework of the EU military operation Atalanta [2009] 
OJ L323/14 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
... the Republic of Djibouti on the status of the European Union-led forces in the 
Republic of Djibouti in the framework of the EU military operation Atalanta [2009] OJ 
L33/43 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Central African Republic on the status of the European Union-led forces in the 
Central African Republic [2008] OJ L136/46 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Republic of Chad on the status of the European Union-led forces in the Republic 
of Chad [2008] OJ L83/40 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Republic of Cameroon on the status of the European Union-led Forces in transit 
within the territory of the Republic of Cameroon [2008] OJ L57/31 (Treaty EU, Article 
24).
… the Gabonese Republic on the status of the European Union-led forces in the 
Gabonese Republic [2006] OJ L187/43 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the status of the European Union-
led forces in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [2003] OJ L82/46 (Treaty 
EU, Article 24).
I-4. European Union Rule of Law Mission
Agreement between the European Union and ...
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… Georgia on the status and activities of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in 
Georgia, EUJUST THEMIS [2004] OJ L389/42 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
I-5. European Union Special Representative and his/her support team
Agreement between the European Union and ...
… the Government of Georgia on the status in Georgia of the European Union Special 
Representative for the South Caucasus and his/her support team [2006] OJ L135/15 
(Treaty EU, Article 24).
I-6. European Union Mission in Support of Security Sector Reform
Agreement between the European Union and ...
… the Republic of Guinea-Bissau on the Status of the European Union Mission in 
Support of Security Sector Reform in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau [2008] OJ 
L219/66 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
I-7. Joint naval operations, conducted by the European Union-led naval force 
(EUNAVFOR)
Agreement between the European Union and ...
… the Republic of Seychelles on the Conditions and Modalities for the Transfer of 
Suspected Pirates and Armed Robbers from EUNAVFOR to the Republic of Seychelles 
and for their Treatment after such Transfer [2009] OJ L315/37 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Government of Kenya on the conditions and modalities for the transfer of 
persons suspected of having committed acts of piracy and detained by the European 
Union-led naval force (EUNAVFOR), and seized property in the possession of 
EUNAVFOR, from EUNAVFOR to Kenya and for their treatment after such transfer 
[2009] OJ L79/49 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
Appendix II: Participation in European Union Missions
II-1. Participation in the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL 
AFGHANISTAN)
Agreement between the European Union and … 
 … New Zealand on the participation of New Zealand in the European Union Police 
Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN) [2007] OJ L274/18 (Treaty EU, 
Article 24).
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 … the Republic of Croatia on the participation of the Republic of Croatia in the 
European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN) [2007] OJ 
L270/28 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
II-2. Participation in the European Union Police Mission in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL ‘Proxima’)
Agreement between the European Union and … 
 … the Republic of Turkey on the participation of the Republic of Turkey in the 
European Union Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(EUPOL ‘Proxima’) [2004] OJ L354/90 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Kingdom of Norway on the participation of the Kingdom of Norway in the 
European Union Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(EUPOL ‘Proxima’) [2004] OJ L354/86 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… Ukraine on the participation of Ukraine in the European Union Police Mission in the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL ‘Proxima’) [2004] OJ L354/82 
(Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Swiss Confederation on the participation of the Swiss Confederation in the 
European Union police mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(EUPOL ‘Proxima’) [2004] OJ L354/78 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
II-3.  Participation in  the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (BiH)
Agreement between the European Union and … 
 … the Slovak Republic on the participation of the Slovak Republic in the European 
Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) [2003] OJ L239/44 
(Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … the Republic of Bulgaria on the participation of the Republic of Bulgaria in the 
European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) [2003] OJ 
L239/41 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … Ukraine on the participation of Ukraine in the European Union Police Mission 
(EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) [2003] OJ L239/38 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … the Republic of Turkey on the participation of the Republic of Turkey in the 
European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) [2003] OJ 
L239/35 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … the Kingdom of Norway on the participation of the Kingdom of Norway in the 
European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) [2003] OJ 
L239/32 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … the Republic of Slovenia on the participation of the Republic of Slovenia in the 
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European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) [2003] OJ 
L239/29 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … the Republic of Estonia on the participation of the Republic of Estonia in the 
European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) [2003] OJ 
L239/26 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … Romania on the participation of Romania in the European Union Police Mission 
(EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) [2003] OJ L239/23 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … the Republic of Hungary on the participation of the Republic of Hungary in the 
European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) [2003] OJ 
L239/20 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … the Republic of Latvia on the participation of the Republic of Latvia in the European 
Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) [2003] OJ L239/17 
(Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … the Government of the Swiss Confederation, represented by the Federal Department 
of Foreign Affairs, on the participation of Switzerland in the European Union Police 
Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) [2003] OJ L239/14 (Treaty EU, 
Article 24).
 … the Republic of Lithuania on the participation of the Republic of Lithuania in the 
European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) [2003] OJ 
L239/11 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … the Czech Republic on the participation of the Czech Republic in the European 
Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) [2003] OJ L239/8 
(Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … the Republic of Iceland on the participation of the Republic of Iceland in the 
European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) [2003] OJ 
L239/5 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … the Republic of Cyprus on the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in the 
European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) [2003] OJ 
L239/2 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … the Russian Federation on the participation of the Russian Federation in the 
European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) [2003] OJ 
L197/38 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … the  Republic  of  Poland  on  the  participation  of  the  Republic  of  Poland  in  the
European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) [2003] OJ
L64/38 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
II-4. Participation of the Republic of Cyprus in the European Union Forces (EUF)
in the Democratic Republic of Congo
Agreement between the European Union and … 
 … the Republic  of  Cyprus on  the  participation of  the  Republic of  Cyprus in  the
European Union Forces (EUF) in the Democratic Republic of Congo [2003] OJ L253/23
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(Treaty EU, Article 24).
II-5. Participation in the European Union-led forces (EUF) in the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia
Agreement between the European Union and … 
 … Romania on the participation of Romania in the European Union-led forces (EUF) in
the Former Yugoslav Republic of  Macedonia [2004] OJ L120/62  (Treaty EU, Article
24).
 … the Slovak Republic on the participation of the armed forces of the Slovak Republic
in  the European Union-led  Forces (EUF)  in  the Former Yugoslav  Republic of
Macedonia [2004] OJ L12/54 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Government of  Latvia  on  the participation  of  the  Republic of  Latvia  in the
European  Union-led forces (EUF)  in  the former Yugoslav  Republic of  Macedonia
[2003] OJ L313/79 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … the Republic of Poland on the participation of Polish armed forces in the European
Union force (EUF) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [2003] OJ L285/44
(Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … the Republic  of Turkey on  the participation  of  the  Republic of Turkey in  the
European Union-led forces in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [2003] OJ
L234/23 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … the Republic of Lithuania on the participation of the Republic of Lithuania in the
European Union-led  forces (EUF)  in  the Former Yugoslav  Republic of  Macedonia
[2003] OJ L234/19 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … the Czech Republic on the participation of the Czech Republic in the European
Union-led Forces (EUF) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of  Macedonia [2003] OJ
L229/39 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … the Republic  of  Estonia on  the participation of  the  Republic of  Estonia in  the
European Union-led  forces (EUF)  in  the  Former Yugoslav Republic of  Macedonia
[2003] OJ L216/61 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
II-6. Participation in the European Union Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia) 
(Aceh Monitoring Mission — AMM)
Agreement between the European Union and … 
 … the Philippines on the participation of the Philippines in the European Monitoring 
Mission in Aceh (Indonesia) (Aceh Monitoring Mission — AMM) [2007] OJ L183/76 
(Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … Thailand on the participation of Thailand in the European Monitoring Mission in 
Aceh (Indonesia) (Aceh Monitoring Mission — AMM) [2007] OJ L183/70 (Treaty EU, 
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Article 24).
 … Malaysia on the participation of Malaysia in the European Monitoring Mission in 
Aceh (Indonesia) (Aceh Monitoring Mission — AMM) [2007] OJ L183/64 (Treaty EU, 
Article 24).
 … Singapore on the participation of Singapore in the European Monitoring Mission in 
Aceh (Indonesia) (Aceh Monitoring Mission — AMM) [2007] OJ L183/58 (Treaty EU, 
Article 24).
 … Brunei on the participation of Brunei in the European Monitoring Mission in Aceh 
(Indonesia) (Aceh Monitoring Mission — AMM) [2007] OJ L183/52 (Treaty EU, 
Article 24).
 … the Swiss Confederation on the participation of the Swiss Confederation in the 
European Union Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia) (Aceh Monitoring Mission — 
AMM) [2005] OJ L349/31 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
II-7. Participation in the European Union military crisis management operation in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation ALTHEA)
Agreement between the European Union and … 
 … the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the participation of the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the European Union military crisis management 
operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation ALTHEA) [2006] OJ L188/10 (Treaty 
EU, Article 24).
 … the Republic of Chile on the participation of the Republic of Chile in the European 
Union military crisis management operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation 
ALTHEA) [2005] OJ L202/40 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
 …  the Argentine Republic  on  the participation  of  the  Argentine  Republic in  the
European  Union  military crisis management operation in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina
(Operation ALTHEA) [2005] OJ L156/22 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … New Zealand on the participation of New Zealand in the European Union military 
crisis management operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation ALTHEA) [2005] 
OJ L127/28 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … the Republic of Albania on  the participation of  the Republic of Albania  in the
European Union  military crisis management operation  in Bosnia and  Herzegovina
(Operation ALTHEA) [2005] OJ L65/35 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … the Kingdom of  Morocco on the participation of  the  Kingdom of  Morocco  in the
European  Union  military crisis management operation  in Bosnia and  Herzegovina
(Operation ALTHEA) [2005] OJ L34/47 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … the Swiss Confederation on  the participation of  the  Swiss Confederation  in the
European  Union  military crisis management operation  in Bosnia and  Herzegovina
(Operation ALTHEA) [2005] OJ L20/42 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
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II-8. Participation in the European Union military operation in support of the 
United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(MONUC)
Agreement between the European Union and … 
 … the Government of the Swiss Confederation on the participation of the Swiss 
Confederation in the European Union military operation in support of the United 
Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) 
during the election process (Operation EUFOR RD Congo) [2006] OJ L276/111 (Treaty
EU, Article 24).
II-9. Participation in the European Union military operation in the Republic of 
Chad and in the Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA)
Agreement between the European Union and ...
 … the Russian Federation on the participation of the Russian Federation in the 
European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African 
Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA) [2008] OJ L307/16 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … the Republic of Croatia on the participation of the Republic of Croatia in the 
European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African 
Republic (Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA) [2008] OJ L268/33 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … the Republic of Albania on the participation of the Republic of Albania in the 
European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African 
Republic (Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA) [2008] OJ L217/19 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
II-10. Participation in the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo 
(EULEX KOSOVO)
Agreement between the European Union and … 
 … the Republic of Croatia on the participation of the Republic of Croatia in the 
European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO [2008] OJ 
L317/20 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … the United States of America on the participation of the United States of America in
the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO [2008] OJ 
L282/33 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … the Swiss Confederation on the participation of the Swiss Confederation in the 
European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO [2008] OJ 
L217/24 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
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II-11. Framework for the participation in the European Union crisis management
operations
Agreement between the European Union and … 
… the Republic of Turkey establishing a framework for the participation of the Republic
of Turkey in the European  Union crisis management operations [2006] OJ L189/17
(Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … Canada establishing a framework for the participation of Canada in the European
Union crisis management operations [2005] OJ L315/21 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … Ukraine establishing a framework for the participation of Ukraine in the European 
Union crisis management operations [2005] OJ L182/29 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … Romania establishing a framework for the participation of Romania in the European
Union crisis-management operations [2005] OJ L67/14 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … the Kingdom of  Norway establishing a  framework for  the  participation of  the
Kingdom of  Norway in the  European  Union crisis-management operations [2005] OJ
L67/8 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
 … the Republic of Iceland establishing a framework for the participation of the 
Republic of Iceland in the European Union crisis-management [2005] OJ L67/2 (Treaty 
EU, Article 24).
 … the  Republic  of  Bulgaria  establishing  a  framework  for  the  participation  of  the
Republic of Bulgaria in the EU crisis management operations [2005] OJ L46/50 (Treaty
EU, Article 24).
II-12. Participation in the European Union military operation to contribute to the 
deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the 
Somali coast
Agreement between the European Union and ...
… the Republic of Croatia on the participation of the Republic of Croatia in the 
European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and 
repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast (Operation Atalanta)
[2009] OJ L202/84 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
Appendix III: Exchange of classified information
III-1. Exchange of classified information between the European Union and third 
States
Agreement between the European Union and ...
… the Government of the Russian Federation on the protection of classified information
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[2010] OJ L155/57 (Treaty EU, Articles 24, 38).
… Australia on the security of classified information [2010] OJ L26/31 (Treaty EU, 
Article 24).
… Israel on security procedures for exchanging classified information [2009] OJ 
L192/64 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Swiss Confederation on the security procedures for the exchange of classified 
information [2008] OJ L181/58 (Treaty EU, Articles 24, 38).
… the government of the United States of America on the security of classified 
information [2007] OJ L115/30 (Treaty EU, Articles 24, 38).
… the Republic of Iceland on security procedures for the exchange of classified 
information [2006] OJ L184/35 (Treaty EU, Articles 24, 38).
… the Republic of Croatia on security procedures for the exchange of classified 
information [2006] OJ L116/74 (Treaty EU, Articles 24, 38).
… Ukraine on the security procedures for the exchange of classified information [2005]
OJ L172/84 (Treaty EU, Articles 24, 38).
… the Republic of Bulgaria on the security procedure for the exchange of classified 
information [2005] OJ L118/53 (Treaty EU, Articles 24, 38).
… Romania on security procedures for the exchange of classified information [2005] 
OJ L118/48 (Treaty EU, Articles 24, 38).
… the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the security procedures for the 
exchange of classified information [2005] OJ L94/39 (Treaty EU, Articles 24, 38).
… the Kingdom of Norway on security procedures for the exchange of classified 
information [2004] OJ L362/29 (Treaty EU, Articles 24, 38).
… Bosnia and Herzegovina on security procedures for the exchange of classified 
information [2004] OJ L324/16 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
III-2. Exchange of classified information between the European Union and 
international institutions
Agreement between the European Union and ...
… the European Space Agency on the security and exchange of classified information 
[2008] OJ L219/59 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the International Criminal Court on cooperation and assistance [2006] OJ L115/50 
(Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation on the Security of Information [2003] OJ 
L80/36 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
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Appendix IV: Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP)
Agreement between the European Union and ...
… the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging 
Data from the European Union to the United States for purposes of the Terrorist Finance 
Tracking Program [2010] OJ L8/11 (Treaty EU, Articles 24, 38).2
Appendix  V: Enhanced  cooperation  in  the  field  of  extradition  and mutual  legal
assistance
V-1. The Norway-Iceland participation
Agreement between the European Union and ...
… the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway on the application of certain 
provisions of the Convention of 29 May 2000 on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
between the Member States of the European Union and the 2001 Protocol thereto 
[2004] OJ L26/3 (Treaty EU, Articles 24, 38).
V-2. Mutual legal assistance
Agreement between the European Union and ...
… Japan on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters [2010] OJ L39/20 (Treaty EU, 
Articles 24, 38).
… the United States of America on mutual legal assistance [2003] OJ L181/34 (Treaty 
EU, Articles 24, 38).
V-3. Extradition and surrender procedures
Agreement between the European Union and ...
… the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway on the surrender procedure 
between the Member States of the European Union and Iceland and Norway [2006] OJ 
L292/2 (Treaty EU, Articles 24, 38).
… the United States of America on extradition [2003] OJ L181/27 (Treaty EU, Articles 
24, 38).
2  'As soon as the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force, the Parties shall endeavour to conclude a long-
term agreement to succeed this Agreement', according to Article 15 (4).
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Appendix VI: Processing /and transfer of PNR data
Agreement between the European Union and ...
… Australia on the processing and transfer of European Union-sourced passenger name
record (PNR) data by air carriers to the Australian customs service [2008] OJ L213/49 
(Treaty EU, Articles 24, 38).
… the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Passenger Name 
Record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) (PNR II Agreement) [2007] OJ L204/18 (Treaty EU, Articles 24, 38); 
replaces the interim agreement.
… the United States of America on the processing and transfer of passenger name 
record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland 
Security [Interim]Agreement [2006] OJ L298/29 (Treaty EU, Articles 24, 38).3
Appendix VII: Schengen Association
Agreement between the European Union and ...
… the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's
association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen 
acquis [2008] OJ L53/52 (Treaty EU, Articles 24, 38).
… the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latters' 
association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen 
acquis [1999] OJ L176/36 (Treaty EU, Articles 24, 38).4
3  Agreement  between  the  European  Community  and  the  United  States  of  America  on  the
processing and transfer of PNR data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland
Security,  Bureau  of  Customs  and  Border  Protection  [2004]  (PNR I  Agreement)  OJ  L183/84
(Treaty EC, Articles  95, 300) – annulled (Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04  Parliament v
Council and Commission (PNR) EU:C:2006:346, [2006] ECR I-4721).
4  Information relating to the entry into force of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the
European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway on the establishment of
rights and obligations between Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, on the one hand, and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway, on the other, in
areas of the Schengen acquis which apply to these States, signed at Brussels on 30 June 1999
[2000] OJ L149/36.
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  DESCRIPTIVE REPOSITORY
A. Descriptive repository of provisions in EU agreements (CFSP and PJC (by now 
FSJ) agreements) with persons-related provisions
EU agreements (CFSP and PJC (by now FSJ) agreements) incorporate fundamental rights
guarantees.  For  example,  the  EU-Kenya  Exchange  of  Letters  on  the  conditions  and
modalities for the transfer of persons suspected of having committed acts of piracy and
detained by the European Union-led naval force (EUNAVFOR), and seized property in
the possession of EUNAVFOR, from EUNAVFOR to Kenya and for their treatment after
such transfer, the EU-US Agreement on mutual legal assistance, the EU-Japan Agreement
on mutual legal assistance, the EU-US Extradition Agreement, the Iceland/Norway and
the Switzerland Association Agreement and the Agreement between the European Union
and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging
Data from the European Union to the United States for purposes of the Terrorist Finance
Tracking Program.
 1.  Status and activities of the EU with host States and persons-related provisions
According to Treves, detailed provisions for the protection of the human rights of pirates,
and armed robbers,  captured by EUNAVOR and transferred to  Kenya,  are  set  out  in
Articles 3 and 4 of the Exchange of Letters. The Exchange of Letters does not mention
shipriders – though not ruling out their involvement.1
1  [2009] OJ L79/49. See Tullio Treves, ‘Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments
off the Coast of Somalia’ (2009) 20 E.J.I.L. 399, 412.
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Articles 3 and 4 of the Exchange of Letters read as follows:
3. Treatment, prosecution and trial of transferred persons
(a)  Any  transferred  person  will  be  treated  humanely  and  will  not  be
subjected  to  torture  or  cruel,  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  or
punishment,  will  receive  adequate  accommodation  and  nourishment,
access  to  medical  treatment  and  will  be  able  to  carry  out  religious
observance.
(b) Any transferred person will  be brought promptly before a judge or
other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power, who will decide
without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and will order his release
if the detention is not lawful.
(c) Any transferred person will be entitled to trial within a reasonable time
or to release.
(d)  In  the  determination  of  any  criminal  charge  against  him,  any
transferred  person  will  be  entitled  to  a  fair  and  public  hearing  by  a
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
(e)  Any  transferred  person  charged  with  a  criminal  offence  will  be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
(f)  In  the  determination  of  any  criminal  charge  against  him,  every
transferred person will be entitled to the following minimum guarantees,
in full equality:
(1)  to  be  informed  promptly  and  in  detail  in  a  language  which  he
understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him;
(2) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence
and to communicate with counsel of his own choice;
(3) to be tried without undue delay;
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(4) to be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through
legal assistance of his own choice; to be informed, if he does not have
legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him,
in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment
by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it;
(5) to  examine,  or have  examined, all  evidence  against  him, including
affidavits  of  witnesses  who  conducted  the  arrest,  and  to  obtain  the
attendance  and examination of witnesses  on his behalf  under the same
conditions as witnesses against him;
(6) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand  or
speak the language used in court;
(7) not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.
(g) Any transferred person convicted of a crime will be permitted to have
the  right  to  his  conviction  and sentence  reviewed by or  appealed  to  a
higher tribunal in accordance with the law of Kenya.
(h) Kenya will not transfer any transferred person to any other State for
the purposes of investigation or prosecution without prior written consent
from EUNAVFOR.
4. Death penalty
No transferred person will be liable to suffer the death sentence. Kenya
will, in accordance with the applicable laws, take steps to ensure that any
death sentence is commuted to a sentence of imprisonment.
Article 5 (e) of the Exchange of Letters requires that Kenya notifies EUNAVFOR of the
transferred  person's  place of  detention,  deterioration  of  his  physical  condition  and of
allegations of alleged improper treatment. Representatives of the EU/EUNAVFOR have
access to persons transferred under the Exchange of Letters while  in custody and are
entitled  to  question  them.  Article  5  (f)  of  the  Exchange  of  Letters  requires  that
national/international  humanitarian  agencies  will,  at  their  request,  be  allowed  to  visit
persons transferred under the Exchange of Letters.
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Article 5 (e)-(f) of the Exchange of Letters read as follows:
(e) In addition, Kenya will notify EUNAVFOR of the place of detention
of any person transferred under this Exchange of Letters, any deterioration
of  his  physical  condition  and  of  any  allegations  of  alleged  improper
treatment. Representatives of the EU and EUNAVFOR will have access to
any persons transferred under this Exchange of Letters as long as such
persons are in custody and will be entitled to question them.
(f) National and international humanitarian agencies will, at their request,
be allowed to visit persons transferred under this Exchange of Letters.
Article  9  of  the  Exchange  of  Letters  provides  for  implementing  arrangements  to  be
concluded:
(b) Implementing arrangements may cover, inter alia:
(1) the identification of competent law enforcement authorities of Kenya
to whom EUNAVFOR may transfer persons;
(2) the detention facilities where transferred persons will be held;
(3) the handling of documents, including those related to the gathering of
evidence, which will be handed over to the competent law enforcement
authorities of Kenya upon transfer of a person;
(4) points of contact for notifications;
(5) forms to be used for transfers;
(6) provision of technical support, expertise, training and other assistance
upon request of Kenya in order to achieve the objectives of this Exchange
of Letters.
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According to Guilfoyle, the Exchange of Letters incorporates guarantees drawn from the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), also found in ECHR; that
is, rights protection to transferees.2
Article 3 (b)-(g) of the Exchange of Letters read as follows:
(b) Any transferred person will  be brought promptly before a judge or
other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power, who will decide
without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and will order his release
if the detention is not lawful.3
(c) Any transferred person will be entitled to trial within a reasonable time
or to release.4
(d)  In  the  determination  of  any  criminal  charge  against  him,  any
transferred  person  will  be  entitled  to  a  fair  and  public  hearing  by  a
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.5
(e)  Any  transferred  person  charged  with  a  criminal  offence  will  be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.6
(f)  In  the  determination  of  any  criminal  charge  against  him,  every
transferred person will be entitled to the following minimum guarantees,
2  Douglas Guilfoyle, ‘Counter-piracy law enforcement and human rights’ (2010) 59 ICLQ 141,
165.
3  ICCPR, which all Member States have ratified,  Article 9 (4); and ECHR,  Article 5 (3) which
reads as follows: 'Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1
(c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to
exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.'
4  ICCPR, Article 9 (3); and ECHR, Article 5 (3).
5  ICCPR, Article 14 (1), second sentence; and ECHR, Article 6 (1) first sentence which reads as
follows: 'In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent
and impartial tribunal established by law.'
6  ICCPR, Article 14 (2); and ECHR, Article 6 (2) which reads as follows: 'Everyone charged with a
criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.'
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in full equality:7
(1)  to  be  informed  promptly  and  in  detail  in  a  language  which  he
understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him;
(2) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence
and to communicate with counsel of his own choice;
(3) to be tried without undue delay;
(4) to be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through
legal assistance of his own choice; to be informed, if he does not have
legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him,
in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment
by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it;
(5) to  examine,  or have  examined, all  evidence  against  him, including
affidavits  of  witnesses  who  conducted  the  arrest,  and  to  obtain  the
attendance  and examination of witnesses  on his behalf  under the same
conditions as witnesses against him;
(6) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand  or
speak the language used in court;
(7) not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.
(g) Any transferred person convicted of a crime will be permitted to have
the  right  to  his  conviction  and sentence  reviewed by or  appealed  to  a
higher tribunal in accordance with the law of Kenya.8
7  ICCPR, Article 14 (3) (a)-(g); and ECHR, Article 6 (3) (a)-(e) which read as follows: 'Everyone
charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in
a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him; (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c)  to defend
himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means
to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require;  (d) to
examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of
witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free
assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.'
8  ICCPR, Article 14 (5).
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 2.  Enhanced cooperation in the field of extradition and mutual legal assistance and 
persons-related provisions
a)  EU-US Agreement on mutual legal assistance and persons-related provisions
Article 3 of the EU-US Agreement on mutual legal assistance9 addresses the scope of
application of the Agreement in relation to bilateral mutual legal assistance treaties with
Member States and in the absence thereof. It stipulates in recital 3 (3a) that the Union,
pursuant to the TEU, shall ensure the application of the provisions of the Agreement in the
absence of a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty in force between a Member State and
the United States.
The  EU-US Agreement  on  mutual  legal  assistance  contains  provisions  related  to  the
refusal  of  assistance.  Article  4  of  the  EU-US Agreement  on  mutual  legal  assistance
concerns the exchange of bank information. It applies to provide for the identification of
financial accounts and transactions in addition to any authority already provided under
bilateral treaty provisions, as displayed in Article 3 (1a).
In case of offences or designated serious offences punishable under the laws of both the
requested  and  requesting  States  and  offences  involving  deprivation  of  liberty  or  a
detention order of a maximum period of at least four years in the requesting State – and at
least two years in the requested State – the requested State may, pursuant to Article 15,
limit its obligation to provide assistance, as displayed in Article 4 (4a) (i), (ii) and (iii). In
cases of limited assistance, pursuant to Article 4 (4a) (ii) or (iii), the requested State shall,
at a minimum, enable identification of accounts associated with terrorist activities, and the
laundering  of  proceeds  generated  from  a  comprehensive  range  of  serious  criminal
activities, as displayed in Article 4 (4b). The communication of the information requested
9  [2003] OJ L181/34.
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may not be refused on grounds of bank secrecy, as displayed in Article 4 (5).
The Contracting Parties shall avoid the imposition of extraordinary burdens on requested
States through application of Article 4, and shall take measures required to reduce pending
and future burdens. Where extraordinary burdens on a requested State nonetheless result,
consultations shall take place between the requested and requesting State, with a view to
facilitating the application of this Article, as displayed in Article 4 (7).
Provisions related to the protection of personal data: The EU-US Agreement on mutual
legal assistance contains provisions related to the protection of personal data; that is, the
requested State may refuse assistance on data protection grounds.10
If the request cannot be executed without breaching confidentiality the requested state
may refuse the communication of the information, as displayed in Article 10 of the EU-
US Agreement on mutual legal assistance. Article 10 applies in the absence of bilateral
treaty provisions pertaining to the circumstances under which a requesting State may seek
confidentiality, as displayed in Article 3 (1g).
Article 9 of the EU-US Agreement on mutual legal assistance limits the use of personal
and other data requested and imposes restrictions. Article 9 may be applied in place of or
in  the  absence  of  bilateral  treaty  provisions  governing  limitations  on  use  to  protect
personal and other data, as displayed in Article 3 (1f).
10  Article 10 [Requesting State's request for confidentiality] of the  EU-US Agreement on mutual
legal assistance reads as follows: 'The requested State shall use its best efforts to keep confidential
a request and its contents if such confidentiality is requested by the requesting State. If the request
cannot be executed without breaching the requested confidentiality, the central authority of the
requested  State  shall  so inform the  requesting State,  which shall  then determine  whether  the
request should nevertheless be executed.'
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The  data  requested  may  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  criminal  investigations  and
proceedings, for preventing an immediate and serious threat to its public security, in non-
criminal  judicial  or  administrative  proceedings  directly  related  to  investigations  or
proceedings, and for any other purpose, only with the prior consent of the requested State,
as displayed in Article 9 (1a-e).
Article 9 of the EU-US Agreement  on mutual  legal  assistance does not prejudice the
ability  of  the  requested  State  to  impose  additional  conditions,  where  the  request  for
assistance cannot be complied with in the absence of such conditions,  as displayed in
Article 9 (2a). A requested State may apply the use limitation provision of the applicable
bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty in lieu of Article 9, where doing so will result in
less restriction on the use of information and evidence than provided for in the EU-US
Agreement on mutual legal assistance, as displayed in Article 9 (4).11
The  Explanatory  Note  on  the  EU-US  Agreement  on  mutual  legal  assistance  reflects
understandings  regarding  the  application  of  certain  provisions  of  the  Agreement,  and
points to the fact that a categorical, or systematic, application of data protection principles
by the requested State to refuse cooperation shall be precluded. The Explanatory Note on
Article 9 reads as follows:
Article  9(2)(b)  is  meant  to  ensure  that  refusal  of  assistance  on  data
protection  grounds  may be  invoked  only  in  exceptional  cases.  Such  a
situation could arise if, upon balancing the important interests involved in
the particular case (on the one hand, public interests, including the sound
administration  of  justice  and,  on  the  other  hand,  privacy  interests),
furnishing the specific  data  sought by the requesting State would raise
difficulties so fundamental as to be considered by the requested State to
11  The Agreement also obliges the contracting parties to try to resolve differences by consultation
before they refuse mutual legal assistance, as displayed in Article 11 of the EU-US Agreement on
mutual legal assistance. Article 11 [Consultations] reads as follows: 'The Contracting Parties shall,
as appropriate, consult to enable the most effective use to be made of this Agreement, including to
facilitate  the  resolution  of  any  dispute  regarding  the  interpretation  or  application  of  this
Agreement.'
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fall within the essential interests grounds for refusal. A broad, categorical,
or systematic application of data protection principles by the requested
State  to  refuse  cooperation  is  therefore  precluded.  Thus,  the  fact  the
requesting and requested States have different systems of protecting the
privacy  of  data  (such  as  that  the  requesting  State  does  not  have  the
equivalent  of  a  specialised  data  protection  authority)  or  have  different
means other than the process of deletion to protect the privacy or accuracy
of the personal data received by law enforcement authorities), may as such
not be imposed as additional conditions under Article 9(2a).
According to Georgopoulos, a closer look demonstrates that the rapprochement between
the European level of protection and the EU-US Agreement on mutual legal assistance is
partial. The Explanatory Note on the EU-US Agreement on mutual legal assistance makes
clear  that  –  despite  the different  conceptions existing in  the EU/US legal  systems on
personal  data  protection,  no refusal  to cooperate  can be justified by invoking general
principles. The absence of a body in charge of the protection of data, or the erasure of
personal information to protect confidentiality, in themselves are not sufficient grounds on
which the requested state could refuse legal assistance. In consequence, the freedom left
to Member States by the EU-US Agreement on mutual legal assistance is particularly
circumscribed– as such – and this is important – provisions of the EU-US Agreement on
mutual legal assistance introduce exceptions to what should be inviolable, constitutional
principles.12
12  Theodore Georgopoulos, ‘What kind of treaty making power for the EU? Constitutional problems
related to the conclusion of the EU-US agreements on extradition and mutual legal assistance’
(2005) 30 ELRev. 190, 200.
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b)  EU-Japan Agreement on mutual legal assistance and persons-related provisions
Article 3 of the EU-Japan Agreement on mutual  legal  assistance13 in criminal matters
addresses the scope of assistance.14 Article 10 of the EU-Japan Agreement on mutual legal
assistance concerns the execution of requests. In case the execution of the request in the
manner or procedure described in the request is contrary to the laws of the requested State
or  poses  a  practical  problem  for  the  requested  State,  consultations  shall  take  place
between the requested and requesting States in order to solve the practical problem, as
displayed in Article 10 (2).
In case the execution of a request is deemed to interfere with an ongoing investigation,
prosecution or other proceeding in the requested State, the requested State may postpone
the execution or may make the execution subject to conditions deemed necessary after
consultations with the requesting State, as displayed in Article 10 (2). If a request for
assistance cannot be executed in whole or in part, the requested State shall inform the
requesting State of the reasons therefore, as displayed in Article 10 (6).
The EU-Japan Agreement on mutual legal assistance contains provisions related to the
refusal of assistance; that is, refusal of the communication of the information requested.
Article 11 (1) (a-e), (2) of the EU-Japan Agreement on mutual legal assistance stipulates
that assistance may be refused if a request concerns a political offence. Further, assistance
may be refused if the requested State considers that the execution of a request prejudices
13  [2010] OJ L39/20.
14  Article 3 [Scope of assistance] of the EU-Japan Agreement on mutual legal assistance  reads as
follows: 'Assistance shall include the following: (a) taking testimony or statements; (b) enabling
the hearing by videoconference; (c) obtaining items, including through the execution of search
and seizure; (d) obtaining records, documents or reports of bank accounts; (e) examining persons,
items or places; (f) locating or identifying persons, items or places; (g) providing items in the
possession of the legislative, administrative or judicial authorities of the requested State as well as
the local authorities thereof; (h) serving documents and informing a person of an invitation to
appear in the requesting State; (i) temporary transfer of a person in custody for testimony or other
evidentiary purposes; (j) assisting in proceedings related to freezing or seizure and confiscation of
proceeds  or  instrumentalities;  and  (k)  any  other  assistance  permitted  under  the  laws  of  the
requested State and agreed upon between a Member State and Japan.'
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the sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential interests of the requested State
(e.g. the execution of a request concerning an offence punishable by death under the laws
of the requesting State or an offence punishable by life imprisonment under the laws of
the requesting State,  unless the requested State  and the requesting State agree on the
conditions under which the request can be executed).
It is stipulated that assistance may be refused if the request has been made with a view to
prosecution or punishment for reason of race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, political
opinions  or  sex.  Assistance  may  be  refused  if  the  person,  who  is  the  subject  of  the
investigation, prosecution or other proceeding, for which the assistance is requested, has
already been finally convicted or acquitted for the same facts; or if the conduct that is the
subject  of  the  investigation,  prosecution  or  other  proceeding,  including  judicial
proceeding, in the requesting State does not constitute a criminal offence under the laws
of the requested State /or a request does not conform to the requirements of the EU-Japan
Agreement on mutual legal assistance.
Article 11 (2) stipulates that the requested State may refuse assistance which necessitates
coercive measures. The communication of the information requested can not be refused
on grounds of bank secrecy, as displayed in Article 11 (3) of the EU-Japan Agreement on
mutual legal assistance.
Before refusing assistance – the requesting State has to consult with the requesting State
when it is considered that assistance may be provided subject to certain conditions, as
displayed in Article 11 (4). If assistance is refused, the requested State shall inform the
requesting State of the reasons therefore, as displayed in Article 11 (5) of the EU-Japan
Agreement on mutual legal assistance.
A provision, on use to protect personal data, is contained in Article 10 (4) of the EU-Japan
229
Descriptive Repository
Agreement on mutual legal assistance, which stipulates that the requested state may refuse
the communication of the information requested if a request cannot be executed without
disclosure  of  confidential  information.  Article  10  (4)  of  the  EU-Japan  Agreement  on
mutual legal assistance reads as follows:
The requested State shall make its best efforts to keep confidential the fact
that a request has been made, the contents of the request, the outcome of
the execution of the request and other relevant information concerning the
execution  of  the  request  if  such  confidentiality  is  requested  by  the
requesting State.  If  a request  cannot be executed without  disclosure of
such information, the requested State shall so inform the requesting State,
which shall  then determine whether  the request  should nevertheless  be
executed.
The requesting State shall not use personal data, provided or otherwise obtained under the
EU-Japan  Agreement  on  mutual  legal  assistance,  other  than  described  in  the  request
without  prior  consent  of  the  requested  State.  The  requested  State  may  request  that
personal data, provided or otherwise obtained under the Agreement, be kept confidential,
as displayed in Article 13 (1), (2).15
15  Article 13 (1) and (2) [Limitations on use of testimony, statements, items or information] of the
EU-Japan Agreement on mutual legal assistance read as follows: '1. The requesting State shall not
use  testimony,  statements,  items  or  any  information,  including  personal  data,  provided  or
otherwise  obtained under this  Agreement  other  than in  the  investigation,  prosecution or other
proceeding, including judicial proceeding, described in the request without prior consent of the
requested State. In giving such prior consent, the requested State may impose such conditions as it
deems appropriate. 2. The requested State may request that testimony, statements, items or any
information, including personal data, provided or otherwise obtained under this  Agreement be
kept confidential or be used only subject to other conditions it may specify. If the requesting State
agrees  to  such  confidentiality  or  accepts  such  conditions,  it  shall  comply  with  them.'  The
Agreement also obliges the contracting parties to try to resolve differences by consultation before
they refuse mutual legal assistance,  as displayed in Article  28  of the EU-Japan Agreement on
mutual legal assistance. Article 28 [Consultations] reads as follows: '1. The Central Authorities of
the Member States and Japan shall, if necessary, hold consultations for the purpose of resolving
any difficulties with regard to the execution of a request, and facilitating speedy and effective
assistance under this Agreement, and may decide on such measures as may be necessary for this
purpose. 2. The Contracting Parties shall, as appropriate, hold consultations on any matter that
may arise in the interpretation or application of this Agreement.'
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c)  EU-US Extradition Agreement and persons-related provisions
Article 3 of the EU-US Extradition Agreement16 addresses the scope of application of the
Agreement in relation to bilateral extradition treaties with Member States. If a requested
Member State receives simultaneous extradition requests from the US, and a request for
surrender  pursuant  to  the  European  arrest  warrant,  the  competent  authority  of  the
requested  Member  State  shall  determine  to  which  State,  if  any,  it  will  surrender  the
accused person, as displayed in Article 10 (2). Article 17 (2) of the EU-US Extradition
Agreement stipulates that in case where the constitutional principles of the requested State
may impede the fulfilment of its obligation to extradite, and resolution of the matter is not
provided for in the Agreement or the applicable bilateral treaty, consultations shall be held
between the requesting and requested States.
General  references  –  The  Preamble  to  the  EU-US  Extradition  Agreement  refers  to
contracting  parties  having  'due  regard  for  rights  of  individuals  (…)  mindful  of  the
guarantees under their respective legal systems which provide for the right to a fair trial to
an  extradited  person,  including  the  right  to  adjudication  by  an  impartial  tribunal
established pursuant to law, (…)'.17
The EU-US Extradition Agreement contains provisions related to the refusal of assistance.
Article 13 of the EU-US Extradition Agreement, a substantive provision, guarantees,18 in
16  [2003] OJ L181/27.
17  See the Preamble to the EU-US Extradition Agreement [2003] OJ L181/27.
18  Article 13 [Capital punishment] of the EU-US Extradition Agreement reads as follows: 'Where the
offence for which extradition is sought is punishable by death under the laws in the requesting
State and not punish- able by death under the laws in the requested State, the requested State may
grant  extradition  on the  condition that  the  death  penalty shall  not  be  imposed  on the person
sought, or if for procedural reasons such condition cannot be complied with by the requesting
State, on condition that the death penalty if imposed shall not be carried out. If the requesting
State accepts extradition subject to conditions pursuant to this Article, it shall comply with the
conditions. If the requesting State does not accept the conditions, the request for extradition may
be denied.'
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light of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights,19 that capital punishment
will not be carried out. The latter provision foresees that cooperation shall be refused if
the requesting State cannot offer guarantees that capital punishment shall not be imposed.
Article 13 may be applied in place of or in the absence of bilateral  treaty provisions
governing capital punishment, as displayed in Article 3 (1) (j). If a requested State cannot
protect the information in the manner sought by the requesting State, the requested state
may refuse the communication of the information requested, as displayed in Article 14 of
the EU-US Extradition Agreement. Article 14 applies, pursuant to Article 3 (1) (k), in the
absence of bilateral treaty provisions governing the treatment of sensitive information in a
request.
Contracting parties are obliged to try to resolve differences by consultation before they
refuse  an  extradition  request,  as  displayed  in  Article  15  of  the  EU-US  Extradition
Agreement.20
Article 17 (2) of the EU-US Extradition Agreement stipulates that where the constitutional
principles  or  final  judicial  decisions  (to  be read  as  covering  decisions  by  the  CJEU)
binding upon the requested State pose an impediment to fulfilment of the request, and
resolution of the matter is not provided for in the Agreement, or the applicable bilateral
treaty, consultations will take place.
The EU-US Extradition Agreement does not contain specific references to the standards
set  by  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  and  by  the  ECHR  –  or  to  specific  data
19  See Soering v United Kingdom (App no 14038/88)  (1989) 11 EHRR 439, para  91: '(...)  the
decision by a Contracting State to extradite a fugitive may give rise to an issue under Article 3,
and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds
have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of being
subjected  to  torture  or  to  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  or  punishment  in  the  requesting
country.'
20  Article  15  [Consultations]  of  the  EU-US  Extradition  Agreement  reads as  follows:  'The
Contracting Parties shall, as appropriate, consult to enable the most effective use to be made of
this Agreement, including to facilitate the resolution of any dispute regarding the interpretation or
application of this Agreement.'
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protection instruments – such as the 1981 Council of Europe Data Protection Convention
or Data Protection Directives.21
 3.  Schengen Association: The Iceland/Norway and the Switzerland Association 
Agreement and persons-related provisions
Annex  A of  the  Iceland/Norway  and Switzerland  Association  Agreements  excludes  a
certain number of provisions of the Schengen acquis from application; these exceptions
include  provisions  on  responsibility  for  processing  applications  for  asylum,  firearms/
ammunition, transport and movement of goods.22
Rights for any person are set out in Articles 110, 111 (1) and 114 (2) of the Convention
implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA). 
Article 110 CISA stipulates that any person may have factually inaccurate data – relating
to them – corrected, or unlawfully stored data deleted. Article 111 (1) CISA stipulates that
any person in the territory of each Member State may:
bring before the courts or the authority competent under national law an
action to correct, delete or obtain information or to obtain compensation in
21  See  generally,  Christine  van  den  Wyngaert,  ‘Applying  the  European  Convention  on  Human
Rights  to  Extradition:  Opening  Pandora's  Box?’  (1990)  39  ICLQ  757-779  and  Valsamis
Mitsilegas,  ‘The new EU-USA Cooperation  on Extradition,  Mutual  Legal  Assistance  and  the
Exchange of Police Data’ (2003) 8 E.F.A.Rev. 515, 531-2 and 534.
22  The  Schengen  acquis  -  Agreement  between  the  Governments  of  the  States  of  the  Benelux
Economic  Union,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  and the  French Republic  on the  gradual
abolition of checks at their common borders [2000] OJ L239/13 supplemented by the Convention
implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of
the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the
gradual abolition of checks at their common borders [2000] OJ L239/19.
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connection with an alert involving them.23
According to Colvin, this means that the exercise of the individual rights is governed by
the different national laws of each Member State (variable geometry).24
Article 114 (2) CISA reads as follows:
Any person shall have the right to ask the supervisory authorities to check
data entered in the Schengen Information System which concern them and
the use made of such data. That right shall be governed by the national
law of the Contracting Party to which the request is made. If the data have
been entered by another Contracting Party, the check shall be carried out
in close coordination with that Contracting Party's supervisory authority.
That is, any person shall have the right to ask the supervisory authorities to check the
processing/use of data entered in the SIS – which concern them.
 4.  EU-US TFTP Agreement and persons-related provisions
The  Preamble  to  the  EU-US  TFTP Agreement25 refers  to  the  guarantee  of  effective
exercise of rights; that is, any person, irrespective of nationality, can lodge a complaint
before an independent data protection authority, other similar authority, independent and
impartial court /or tribunal, to seek effective remedies.
Article 5 (2) (a-m) of the EU-US TFTP Agreement contain safeguards applicable to the
23  Case  C-150/05  Van  Straaten  EU:C:2006:614, [2006]  ECR  I-9327.  The  Van  Straaten case
concerns the application of these rules – ne bis in idem principle, laid down in Articles 54 et seq.
of the 1990 CISA. Fundamental rights protection, and the logic of border security – a borders
paradox.  See e.g.  Steve  Peers,  ‘Key Legislative  Developments  on Migration  in  the European
Union: SIS II’ (2008) 10 Eur.J.Migration&L 77-104. 
24  Madeleine Colvin, ‘The Schengen Information System: a human rights audit’ (2001) 3 EHRLR
271, 273.
25  [2010] OJ L8/11.
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processing of provided data:
(e)  Access  to  Provided  Data  shall  be  limited  to  analysts  investigating
terrorism or its financing and to persons involved in the technical support,
management, and oversight of the TFTP;
...
(i) During the term of this Agreement, the U.S. Treasury Department shall
undertake a review to identify all non-extracted data that are no longer
necessary  to  combat  terrorism  or  its  financing.  Where  such  data  are
identified, procedures to delete those data shall commence within two (2)
months of the date that they are so identified and shall be completed as
soon as possible thereafter but in any event not later than eight (8) months
after identification, absent extraordinary technological circumstances;
(j) If it transpires that financial payment messaging data were transmitted
which were not requested, the U.S. Treasury Department shall promptly
and permanently delete such data and shall inform the relevant Designated
Provider and central authority of the requested Member State;
(k) Subject to subparagraph (i), all non-extracted data received prior to 20
July 2007 shall be deleted not later than five (5) years after that date;
(l) Subject to subparagraph (i), all non-extracted data received on or after
20 July 2007 shall be deleted not later than five (5) years from receipt; and
(m)  Information  extracted  from  Provided  Data,  including  information
shared under  subparagraph (h),  shall  be subject  to  the retention period
applicable  to  the  particular  government  authority  according  to  its
particular regulations and record retention schedules.
Rights for any person are set out in Article 11 (1) and (3) of the Agreement between the
European Union and the  United  States  of  America on the processing and transfer  of
Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for purposes of
the  Terrorist  Finance  Tracking  Program.  Article  11  (2),  (3)  of  the  EU-US  TFTP
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Agreement read as follows:
1.  Any  person  has  the  right  to  obtain,  following  requests  made  at
reasonable intervals,  without  constraint  and without  excessive delay or
expense, confirmation from his or her data protection authority whether
all necessary verifications have taken place within the European Union to
ensure  that  his  or  her  data  protection  rights  have  been  respected  in
compliance  with  this  Agreement,  and,  in  particular,  whether  any
processing of his or her personal data has taken place in breach of this
Agreement.  Such right  may be  subject  to necessary  and proportionate
measures applicable under national law, including for the protection of
public security or national security or to avoid prejudicing the prevention,
detection,  investigation,  or  prosecution  of  criminal  offences,  with  due
regard for the legitimate interest of the person concerned.
(...)
3.  Any  person  who  considers  his  or  her  personal  data  to  have  been
processed  in  breach  of  this  Agreement  is  entitled  to  seek  effective
administrative  and judicial  redress  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  the
European Union, its Member States, and the United States, respectively.
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B. Descriptive repository of dispute settlement procedures
According  to  Bonafé,  the  nature  of  dispute  settlement  mechanisms  created  by
international agreements26 plays an important role in determining the way in which the
international agreement intends to secure the enforceability of its obligations.27
The specific provisions of the dispute settlement systems are examined in more detail.
These provisions are not uniform. The detail in which EU agreements (CFSP and PJC (by
now FSJ) agreements) deal with the issue varies.
26  See generally David Sloss, ‘Treaty Enforcement in Domestic Courts: A Comparative Analysis’ in
D. Sloss (ed),  The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement. A comparative Study (CUP,
Cambridge 2009) 60 (analysis of judicial practice; that is, practice of national courts, in eleven
states)  and Sean D. Murphy, ‘Does International Law Obligate States to Open Their National
Courts to Persons for the Invocation of Treaty Norms That Protect or Benefit Persons?’ in D. Sloss
(ed), The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement. A comparative Study (CUP, Cambridge
2009) 107 (discussing, LaGrand and Avena).
27  Dispute  settlement  mechanisms serve  the  purpose  of  securing  compliance  with international
primary  obligations.  Beatrice  I.  Bonafé,‘Direct  Effect  of  International  Agreements  in  the  EU
Legal Order: Does it depend on the Existence of an International Dispute Settlement Mechanism?’
in Enzo Cannizzaro, Paolo Palchetti and Ramses A. Wessel (eds), International Law as Law of the
European Union (Martinus Nijhoff,  Leiden 2011) 229-248 for  example addresses the specific
question of whether the existence of dispute settlement mechanisms at the international level can
play a role in the recognition by the CJEU of direct effects to international agreements binding on
the European Union.
From the standpoint of international law – as indicated by Beatrice I. Bonafé – dispute settlement
mechanisms are – in principle – neutral and can either militate in favour/against direct effects. The
existence  of  an  international  dispute  settlement  mechanism,  or  at  least  of  such  mechanisms
possessing certain characteristics, does play a role in determining direct effects not per se – but as
an  element  to  be  taken  into  consideration  when examining  nature/  purpose  of  the  particular
international agreement. In particular, at least as far as the WTO is concerned. The new system for
the settlement of disputes is set out in Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (1986-
1994) – Annex 2 – Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(WTO) [1994] OJ L336/234.
According to Beatrice I. Bonafé – it is the framework of 'clear, precise, and not subject, in their
implementation  or  effects,  to  the  adoption  of  any  subsequent  measure'–requirement  that  the
existence of international dispute settlement mechanisms is usually taken into consideration. The
existence of international dispute settlement mechanisms demonstrates the particular intention of
the contracting parties as to the means for securing the execution of the international agreement;
that is, how the contracting parties intended to secure compliance with treaty provisions, and shed
some light on the 'nature and purpose' test constantly applied by the Court. 
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 1.  Status and activities of the European Union with host States and dispute 
resolution
It is the agreement between the European Union and,
… Georgia on the status of the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia [2008] 
OJ L310/31 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Republic of Seychelles on the status of the European Union-led forces in the 
Republic of Seychelles in the framework of the EU military operation Atalanta [2009] 
OJ L323/14 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
... the Republic of Djibouti on the status of the European Union-led forces in the 
Republic of Djibouti in the framework of the EU military operation Atalanta [2009] OJ 
L33/43 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Central African Republic on the status of the European Union-led forces in the 
Central African Republic [2008] OJ L136/46 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Republic of Chad on the status of the European Union-led forces in the Republic 
of Chad [2008] OJ L83/40 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Republic of Cameroon on the status of the European Union-led Forces in transit 
within the territory of the Republic of Cameroon [2008] OJ L57/31 (Treaty EU, Article 
24).
… the Gabonese Republic on the status of the European Union-led forces in the 
Gabonese Republic [2006] OJ L187/43 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Republic of Guinea-Bissau on the Status of the European Union Mission in 
Support of Security Sector Reform in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau [2008] OJ 
L219/66 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
– EU agreements (CFSP agreements) – which refer to arbitration.
a)  European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)
In relation to any damage to or loss of civilian or government property which are related
to operational necessities or caused by activities in connection with civil disturbances or
protection of the mission, the  Agreement between the European Union and Georgia on
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the status of the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia excludes liability. For
other activities; that is, damage to or loss of civilian or government property, as well as
claims for death of or injury to persons and for damage to or loss of mission's property,
the  arrangement  in  the  Agreement  between the  European Union and Georgia  on  the
status  of  the  European  Union  Monitoring  Mission  in  Georgia  sets  out  a  three-stage
procedure. Article 17 (1) and (2) of the Agreement read as follows:
1. EUMM Georgia and EUMM Georgia personnel shall not be liable for
any  damage  to  or  loss  of  civilian  or  government  property  which  are
related to operational necessities or caused by activities in connection with
civil disturbances or protection of EUMM Georgia.
2. With a view to reaching an amicable settlement, claims for damage to
or loss of civilian or government property not covered by paragraph 1, as
well as claims for death of or injury to persons and for damage to or loss
of EUMM Georgia property, shall be forwarded to EUMM Georgia via
the competent authorities of the Host State, as far as claims brought by
legal  or  natural  persons  from the  Host  State  are  concerned,  or  to  the
competent authorities of the Host State, as far claims brought by EUMM
Georgia are concerned.28
Paragraphs 3-6 of Article 17 refer to reaching an amicable settlement, the deliberation of
a claims commission, and an arbitration tribunal:
3.  Where  no  amicable  settlement  can  be  found,  the  claim  shall  be
submitted  to  a  claims  commission  composed  on  an  equal  basis  of
representatives of EUMM Georgia and representatives of the Host State.
Settlement of claims shall be reached by common agreement.
4. Where no settlement can be reached within the claims commission, the
dispute shall:
(a) for claims up to and including EUR 40000, be settled by diplomatic
means between the Host State and EU representatives;
28  [2008] OJ L310/31.
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(b) for claims above the amount referred to in point (a), be submitted to an
arbitration tribunal, the decisions of which shall be binding.
Where  no  amicable  settlement  can  be  found,  claims  are  submitted  to  a  claims
commission  composed equally  by  representatives  of  the  mission  and the  Host  State.
Settlement  of  claims is  reached by common agreement.  Where  no settlement  can be
reached within the claims commission, disputes are submitted to an arbitration tribunal,
the decisions of which are binding – with no further report back, or action, by the claims
commission. For claims below a specific amount, provision is made for settlement by
diplomatic means between the High Representative and the Host State. Article 17 (5) and
(6); that is, specifications on the appointment process and the composition of the arbitral
tribunal, read as follows:
5.  The  arbitration  tribunal  shall  be  composed of  three  arbitrators,  one
arbitrator  being  appointed  by  the  Host  State,  one  arbitrator  being
appointed by EUMM Georgia and the third one being appointed jointly by
the Host State and EUMM Georgia. Where one of the parties does not
appoint an arbitrator within two months or where no agreement can be
found between the Host State and EUMM Georgia on the appointment of
the third arbitrator,  the arbitrator in question shall  be appointed by the
Court of Justice of the European Communities.
6.  An  administrative  arrangement  shall  be  concluded  between  EUMM
Georgia and the administrative authorities of the Host State in order to
determine  the  terms  of  reference  of  the  claims  commission  and  the
tribunal, the procedure applicable within these bodies and the conditions
under which claims are to be lodged.29
The arbitration tribunal is composed of three arbitrators. In cases where one of the parties
does not appoint an arbitrator, within two months, or where no agreement can be found
on the appointment of the third arbitrator, the arbitrator in question shall be appointed by
the CJEU. Administrative arrangements are concluded in order to determine the terms of
reference  of  the  claims  commission/  tribunal,  the  procedures  applicable  and  the
29  [2008] OJ L310/31.
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conditions under which claims are to be lodged.
As for the interpretation of the  Agreement between the European Union and Georgia on
the status of the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia, they are to be settled
exclusively by diplomatic means between EU representatives and the Host State. Article
18 of the Agreement reads as follows:
1. All issues arising in connection with the application of this Agreement
shall be examined jointly by representatives of EUMM Georgia and the
Host State's competent authorities.
2. Failing any prior settlement, disputes concerning the interpretation or
application of this Agreement shall be settled exclusively by diplomatic
means between the Host State and EU representatives.
Article 16 (a)-(c) of the  Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters between the
European Union and the Government of Indonesia on the tasks, status, privileges and
immunities  of  the  European  Union  Monitoring  Mission  in  Aceh  (Indonesia)  (Aceh
Monitoring Mission — AMM) and its personnel read as follows:
(a) The GOI, Sending States, the AMM and AMM personnel shall not be
liable for any damage to or loss of civilian or government property which
are related to operational necessities or caused by activities in connection
with civil disturbances or protection of the AMM.
(b) with a view to reaching an amicable settlement, claims for damage to
or loss of civilian or government property not covered by paragraph 1, as
well as claims for death or injury to persons and for damage to or loss of
AMM  property,  shall  be  forwarded  to  the  AMM  via  the  competent
authorities  of  the  GOI,  as  far  as  damage sustained by legal  or  natural
persons from the Republic of Indonesia is concerned, or to the competent
authorities of the Republic of Indonesia, as far as damage sustained by the
AMM and its personnel are concerned. Claims may concern both issues
related to contractual or non-contractual liability.
(c)  Where  no  amicable  settlement  can  be  found,  the  claim  shall  be
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submitted  to  a  claims  commission  composed  on  an  equal  basis  of
representatives of the AMM and representatives of the GOI. Settlement of
claims shall be reached by common agreement.30
In cases where no amicable settlement can be found, claims are submitted to a claims
commission. This  commission shall be composed on an equal basis of representatives of
the  AMM  and  representatives  of  the  GOI.  Settlements  are  reached  by  common
agreement.
The Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters between the European Union and
the  Government  of  Indonesia  on  the  tasks,  status,  privileges  and  immunities  of  the
European Union Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia) (Aceh Monitoring Mission —
AMM) and its personnel does not refer to arbitration.
As for the application of the Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters between the
European Union and the Government of Indonesia on the tasks, status, privileges and
immunities  of  the  European  Union  Monitoring  Mission  in  Aceh  (Indonesia)  (Aceh
Monitoring  Mission  — AMM) and its  personnel,  they  shall  be  examined  jointly  by
representative  of  the  AMM  and  the  GoI’s  competent  authorities.  Article  17  of  the
Agreement reads as follows:
(a)  All  issues  arising  in  connection  with  the  application  of  these
Provisions shall be examined jointly by representative of the AMM and
the GoI’s competent authorities.
(b) Failing any prior settlement, disputes concerning the interpretation or
application of these Provisions shall be settled exclusively by diplomatic
means.
b)  European Union Police Mission (EUPM)
Article 14 of the Agreement between the European Union and the Democratic Republic
30  [2005] OJ L288/60.
242
Descriptive Repository
of the Congo on the status and activities of the European Union police mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUPOL Kinshasa) reads as follows:
1. The Member States, other States participating in EUPOL Kinshasa, or
EU Institutions, shall not be obliged to reimburse claims arising out of
activities in connection with civil disturbances, protection of the EUPOL
Kinshasa  or  its  personnel,  or  which  are  incidental  to  operational
necessities.
2. Any other claim of a civil law character, including claims of personnel
locally employed by EUPOL Kinshasa, to which EUPOL Kinshasa or any
member thereof is a party and over which the courts of the Host Party do
not have jurisdiction because of any provision of the present Agreement,
shall be submitted through the authorities of the Host Party to the Head of
Mission/Police  Commissioner  and  shall  be  dealt  with  by  separate
arrangements, as referred to in Article 17, whereby procedures for settling
claims and for addressing claims shall be established. Settlement of claims
will occur after previous consent of the State concerned.
The Agreement between the European Union and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
on the status and activities  of the European Union police mission in the Democratic
Republic  of  the  Congo (EUPOL Kinshasa)  provides for  a  Joint  Coordination  Group.
Article 15 of the Agreement between the European Union and the Democratic Republic
of the Congo on the status and activities of the European Union police mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUPOL Kinshasa) reads as follows:
1. All issues arising in connection with the application of this agreement
shall  be discussed by a Joint Coordination Group. This Group shall  be
composed  of  representatives  of  EUPOL Kinshasa  and  the  competent
authorities of the Host Party.
2. Failing any prior settlement, disputes with regard to the interpretation
or application of this Agreement shall be settled between the Host Party
and EU representatives by diplomatic means.31
31  [2005] OJ L256/58.
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Pursuant to Article 15 of the Agreement issues arising in connection with the application
of this agreement shall be discussed by a Joint Coordination Group. A body composed of
representatives of EUPOL Kinshasa and the competent authorities of the Host Party.
See also the Agreement between the European Union and the Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia on the status and activities of the European Union Police Mission in the
Former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia  (EUPOL  Proxima).  Article  14  of  the
Agreement with FYROM reads as follows:
1. The Member States, other States participating in EUPOL Proxima, or
EU Institutions, shall not be obliged to reimburse claims arising out of
activities  in  connection  with  civil  disturbances,  protection  of  the  EU
Mission or its personnel, or which are incidental to operational necessities.
2. Any other claim of a civil law character, including claims of personnel
locally  employed  by  EUPOL Proxima,  to  which  the  Mission  or  any
member thereof is a party and over which the courts of the Host Party do
not have jurisdiction because of any provision of the present Agreement,
shall be submitted through the authorities of the Host Party to the Head of
Mission and shall be dealt with by separate arrangements, as referred to in
Article  17,  whereby  procedures  for  settling  claims  and  for  addressing
claims shall be established. Settlement of claims will occur after previous
consent of the State concerned.
Article 15 of the Agreement with TFYRM reads as follows:
1. All issues arising in connection with the application of this agreement
shall  be discussed by a Joint Coordination Group. This Group shall  be
composed  of  representatives  of  EUPOL  Proxima  and  the  competent
authorities of the Host Party.
2. Failing any prior settlement, disputes with regard to the interpretation
or application of the present Agreement shall be settled between the Host
Party and EU representatives by diplomatic means.32
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Agreement issues arising in connection with the application
32  [2004] OJ L16/66.
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of  the  agreement  shall  be  discussed  by  a  Joint  Coordination  Group  composed  of
representatives of EUPOL Proxima and the competent authorities of the Host Party.
c)  European Union-led forces (EUF)
See for example the dispute settlement procedure referred to in Article 15 (3) and (4) of
the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Seychelles on the status
of the European Union-led forces in the Republic of Seychelles in the framework of the
EU military operation Atalanta. Article 15 refers to reaching an amicable settlement:
3.  Where  no  amicable  settlement  can  be  found,  the  claim  shall  be
submitted  to  a  claims  commission  composed  on  an  equal  basis  of
representatives  of  EUNAVFOR  and  representatives  of  the  Host  State.
Settlement of claims shall be reached by common agreement.
4. Where no settlement can be reached within the claims commission, the
dispute shall:
(a) for claims up to and including EUR 40000, be settled by diplomatic
means between the Host State and EU representatives;
(b) for claims above the amount referred to in point (a), be submitted to an
arbitration tribunal, the decisions of which shall be binding.33
The  claims  commission  shall  be  composed  on  an  equal  basis  of  representatives  of
EUNAVFOR and representatives of the Host State. For claims below a specific amount,
provision  is  made  for  the  settlement  by  diplomatic  means  between  the  High
Representative and the Host State.
In the same vein, for example, the dispute settlement procedure referred to in Article 15
(3) and (4) of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Djibouti
33  [2009] OJ L323/14.
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on  the  status  of  the  European  Union-led  forces  in  the  Republic  of  Djibouti  in  the
framework of the EU military operation Atalanta,34 the dispute settlement  procedures
referred to in Articles 15 (3) and (4) of the Agreement between the European Union and
the  Central  African  Republic  on  the  status  of  the  European  Union-led  forces  in  the
Central African Republic,35 the dispute settlement procedures referred to in Articles 15
(3) and (4) of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Chad on
the  status  of  the  European  Union-led  forces  in  the  Republic  of  Chad,36 the  dispute
settlement procedures referred to in Articles 15 (3) and (4) of the Agreement between the
European Union and the Gabonese Republic  on the status of the European Union-led
forces in the Gabonese Republic,37 and the dispute settlement procedure referred to in
Article 15 (3) and (4) of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of
Cameroon on the status of the European Union-led Forces in transit within the territory
of  the  Republic  of  Cameroon.38 Article  15  of  the  Agreement  between  the  European
Union and the Republic of Cameroon on the status of the European Union-led Forces in
transit  within  the  territory  of  the  Republic  of  Cameroon  is  less  detailed  –  with  no
reference to specific figures. For example, according to Koutrakos, 'possibly because its
subject-matter was the transit, rather than the establishment, of EUFOR Tchad forces.'39
d)  European Union Rule of Law Mission
Article 13 of the Agreement between the European Union and Georgia on the status and
activities of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Georgia, EUJUST THEMIS
34  [2009] OJ L33/43.
35  [2008] OJ L136/46.
36  [2008] OJ L83/40.
37  [2006] OJ L187/43.
38  [2008] OJ L57/31.
39  See Panos Koutrakos, ‘International Agreements in the Area of the EU's Common Security and
Defence Policy’ in Enzo Cannizzaro, Paolo Palchetti and Ramses A. Wessel (eds),  International
Law as Law of the European Union (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 2011) 179-180.
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reads as follows:
1.  The  EU  Member  States  or  EU  Institutions  shall  not  be  obliged  to
reimburse  claims  arising  out  of  activities  in  connection  with  civil
disturbances,  protection  of  the  EU Mission  or  its  personnel,  or  which
result from the execution of the Mission.
2. Any other claim of a civil law character, including claims of personnel
locally  employed  by EUJUST THEMIS,  to  which  the  Mission  or  any
member thereof is a party and over which the courts of the Host Party do
not have jurisdiction because of any provision of this Agreement, shall be
submitted through the authorities of the Host Party to the Head of Mission
and shall be dealt with by separate arrangements, as referred to in Article
16, whereby procedures for settling claims and for addressing claims shall
be established. Settlement of claims shall occur after previous consent of
the State concerned.
Article 14 of the Agreement between the European Union and Georgia on the status and
activities of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Georgia, EUJUST THEMIS
reads as follows:
1. All issues arising in connection with the application of this Agreement
shall  be discussed by a Joint Coordination Group. This Group shall  be
composed  of  representatives  of  EUJUST THEMIS  and  the  competent
authorities of the Host Party.
2. Failing any prior settlement, disputes with regard to the interpretation
or application of this Agreement shall be settled between the Host Party
and EU representatives by diplomatic means.40
Pursuant to Article 14 of the Agreement issues arising in connection with the application
of  the  agreement  shall  be  discussed  by  a  Joint  Coordination  Group.  The  Joint
Coordination  Group  is  composed  of  representatives  of  EUJUST  THEMIS  and  the
competent authorities of the Host Party.
40  [2004] OJ L389/42.
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e)  European Union Mission in support of Security Sector Reform
See  the  dispute  settlement  procedure  referred  to  in  Article  16  (3)  and  (4)  of  the
Agreement  between  the  European  Union  and  the  Republic  of  Guinea-Bissau  on  the
Status  of  the  European Union Mission  in  Support  of  Security  Sector  Reform in  the
Republic of Guinea-Bissau. Article 16 (3) and (4) read as follows:
3.  Where  no  amicable  settlement  can  be  found,  the  claim  shall  be
submitted  to  a  claims  commission  composed  on  an  equal  basis  of
representatives of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau and representatives of the Host
State. Settlement of claims shall be reached by common agreement.
4. Where no settlement can be reached within the claims commission, the
dispute shall:
(a) for claims up to and including EUR 40000, be settled by diplomatic
means between the Host State and EU representatives;
(b) for claims above the amount referred to in point (a), be submitted to an
arbitration tribunal, the decisions of which shall be binding.41
Pursuant to Article 17 issues arising in connection with the application of the agreement
shall  be  examined  jointly  by  representatives  of  the  mission  and  the  Host  State's
competent authorities:
1. All issues arising in connection with the application of this Agreement
shall  be examined jointly by representatives of EU SSR Guinea-Bissau
and the Host State's competent authorities.
2. Failing any prior settlement, disputes concerning the interpretation or
application of this Agreement shall be settled exclusively by diplomatic
means between the Host State and EU representatives.
41  [2008] OJ L219/66.
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f)  Joint naval operations, conducted by the European Union-led naval force 
(EUNAVFOR)
For example, Article 8 of the Exchange of Letters between the European Union and the
Government  of  Kenya  on  the  conditions  and  modalities  for  the  transfer  of  persons
suspected of having committed acts of piracy and detained by the European Union-led
naval force (EUNAVFOR), and seized property in the possession of EUNAVFOR, from
EUNAVFOR to Kenya and for their treatment after such transfer stipulates that:
(a) All issues arising in connection with the application of these provisions
will be examined jointly by Kenyan and EU competent authorities.
(b) Failing any prior settlement, disputes concerning the interpretation or
application of these provisions will be settled exclusively by diplomatic
means between Kenyan and EU representatives.42
Issues arising in connection with the application of the provisions of the EU- Kenya
Agreement are examined jointly by Kenyan/ EU competent authorities.
42  [2009] OJ L79/49. 
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A number of international agreements provide for their denunciation.43 The denunciation
shall  take  effect  45,  or  6044 days  after  receipt  by  the  other  contracting  party  of  the
notification of denunciation. Denunciation shall not affect any rights or obligations arising
from the execution of the international agreement prior to its denunciation. E.g. 45 days
are provided in the Agreement with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the
status of the European Union-led forces in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.45
43  See Article 18 of the EU-Congo Agreement on the status and activities of the European Union
police mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUPOL Kinshasa) [2005] OJ L256/58;
Article  18 of  the EU-FYROM Agreement on the status and activities  of  the European Union
Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL Proxima) [2004] OJ
L16/66; Article 17 of the EU-FYROM Agreement on the status of the European Union-led forces
in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [2003] OJ L82/46; Article 17 of the EU-Georgia
Agreement on the status and activities of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Georgia,
EUJUST THEMIS [2004] OJ L389/42; Article 8 of the EU-Georgia Agreement on the status in
Georgia of the European Union Special Representative for the South Caucasus and his/her support
team [2006] OJ L135/15;  Article 16 of the EU-Turkey Agreement establishing a framework for
the participation of the Republic of Turkey in the European Union crisis management operations
[2006] OJ L189/17;  Article 16 of the EU-Canada Agreement establishing a framework for the
participation of Canada in the European Union crisis management operations [2005] OJ L315/21;
Article 16 of the EU-Ukraine Agreement establishing a framework for the participation of Ukraine
in the European Union crisis management operations [2005] OJ L182/29; Article 16 of the EU-
Romania Agreement establishing a framework for the participation of Romania in the European
Union crisis- management operations [2005] OJ L67/14; Article 16 of the EU-Norway Agreement
establishing a framework for the participation of the Kingdom of Norway in the European Union
crisis-management  operations  [2005]  OJ  L67/8;  Article  16  of  the  EU-Iceland  Agreement
establishing a framework for the participation of the Republic of Iceland in the European Union
crisis-management  [2005]  OJ L67/2;  Article  16 of  the EU-Bulgaria  Agreement  establishing a
framework  for  the  participation  of  the  Republic  of  Bulgaria  in  the  EU  crisis  management
operations [2005] OJ L46/50.
44  See Article 18 (4), (5) of the EU-Congo Agreement on the status and activities of the European
Union police mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUPOL Kinshasa) [2005] OJ
L256/58; Article  18 (4), (5) of the EU-FYROM Agreement on the status and activities of the
European  Union  Police  Mission  in  the  Former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia  (EUPOL
Proxima) [2004] OJ L16/66; Article 17 (4), (5) of the EU-Georgia Agreement on the status and
activities of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Georgia, EUJUST THEMIS [2004] OJ
L389/42; Article 8 (4), (5) of the EU-Georgia Agreement on the status in Georgia of the European
Union  Special  Representative  for  the  South  Caucasus  and  his/her  support  team  [2006]  OJ
L135/15.
45  See Article 17 (4), (5) of the EU-FYROM Agreement on the status of the European Union-led
forces in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [2003] OJ L82/46.
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 2.  Participation in European Union Missions and dispute resolution
According  to Koutrakos,46 the  more  recent  agreements  provide  for  the  settlement  of
disputes  concerning their  interpretation.  Provided for  the  first  time in the Agreement
about the participation of the Republic of Turkey in the European Union Police Mission
in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL ‘Proxima’).47
The agreement between the European Union and,
… New Zealand on the participation of New Zealand in the European Union Police 
Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN) [2007] OJ L274/18 (Treaty EU, 
Article 24).
… the Republic of Croatia on the participation of the Republic of Croatia in the 
European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN) [2007] OJ 
L270/28 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Republic of Turkey on the participation of the Republic of Turkey in the 
European Union Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(EUPOL ‘Proxima’) [2004] OJ L354/90 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Kingdom of Norway on the participation of the Kingdom of Norway in the 
European Union Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(EUPOL ‘Proxima’) [2004] OJ L354/86 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… Ukraine on the participation of Ukraine in the European Union Police Mission in the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL ‘Proxima’) [2004] OJ L354/82 
(Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Swiss Confederation on the participation of the Swiss Confederation in the 
European Union police mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
(EUPOL ‘Proxima’) [2004] OJ L354/78 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Republic of Cyprus on the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in the 
European Union Forces (EUF) in the Democratic Republic of Congo [2003] OJ 
L253/23 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
46  See Panos Koutrakos (n 39) 174.
47  See Article 8 of the EU-Turkey Agreement on the participation of the Republic of Turkey in the
European  Union  Police  Mission  in  the  former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia  (EUPOL
‘Proxima’) [2004] OJ L354/90.
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… the Philippines on the participation of the Philippines in the European Monitoring 
Mission in Aceh (Indonesia) (Aceh Monitoring Mission — AMM) [2007] OJ L183/76 
(Treaty EU, Article 24).
… Thailand on the participation of Thailand in the European Monitoring Mission in 
Aceh (Indonesia) (Aceh Monitoring Mission — AMM) [2007] OJ L183/70 (Treaty EU, 
Article 24).
… Malaysia on the participation of Malaysia in the European Monitoring Mission in 
Aceh (Indonesia) (Aceh Monitoring Mission — AMM) [2007] OJ L183/64 (Treaty EU, 
Article 24).
… Singapore on the participation of Singapore in the European Monitoring Mission in 
Aceh (Indonesia) (Aceh Monitoring Mission — AMM) [2007] OJ L183/58 (Treaty EU, 
Article 24).
… Brunei on the participation of Brunei in the European Monitoring Mission in Aceh 
(Indonesia)
(Aceh Monitoring Mission — AMM) [2007] OJ L183/52 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Swiss Confederation on the participation of the Swiss Confederation in the 
European Union
Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia) (Aceh Monitoring Mission — AMM) [2005] 
OJ L349/31 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the participation of the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the European Union military crisis management 
operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation ALTHEA) [2006] OJ L188/10 (Treaty 
EU, Article 24).
… the Republic of Chile on the participation of the Republic of Chile in the European 
Union military crisis management operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation 
ALTHEA) [2005] OJ L202/40 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Argentine Republic on the participation of the Argentine Republic in the 
European Union military crisis management operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Operation ALTHEA) [2005] OJ L156/22 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… New Zealand on the participation of New Zealand in the European Union military 
crisis management operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation ALTHEA) [2005] 
OJ L127/28 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Republic of Albania on the participation of the Republic of Albania in the 
European Union military crisis management operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Operation ALTHEA) [2005] OJ L65/35 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Kingdom of Morocco on the participation of the Kingdom of Morocco in the 
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European Union military crisis management operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Operation ALTHEA) [2005] OJ L34/47 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Swiss Confederation on the participation of the Swiss Confederation in the 
European Union military crisis management operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Operation ALTHEA) [2005] OJ L20/42 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Government of the Swiss Confederation on the participation of the Swiss 
Confederation in the European Union military operation in support of the United 
Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) 
during the election process (Operation EUFOR RD Congo) [2006] OJ L276/111 (Treaty 
EU, Article 24).
… the Russian Federation on the participation of the Russian Federation in the 
European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African 
Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA) [2008] OJ L307/16 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Republic of Croatia on the participation of the Republic of Croatia in the 
European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African 
Republic (Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA) [2008] OJ L268/33 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Republic of Albania on the participation of the Republic of Albania in the 
European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African 
Republic (Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA) [2008] OJ L217/19 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Republic of Croatia on the participation of the Republic of Croatia in the 
European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO [2008] OJ 
L317/20 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the United States of America on the participation of the United States of America in 
the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO [2008] OJ 
L282/33 (Treaty EU, Article 24).48
… the Swiss Confederation on the participation of the Swiss Confederation in the 
European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO [2008] OJ 
L217/24 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Republic of Turkey establishing a framework for the participation of the 
Republic of Turkey in the European Union crisis management operations [2006] OJ 
L189/17 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… Canada establishing a framework for the participation of Canada in the European 
48  EULEX KOSOVO was  the  first  CSDP mission  in  which  the  US had  participated.  EULEX
KOSOVO reflects the addition in Article 43 TEU of the fight against terrorism as one of aims of
the Common Security and Defence Policy tasks. See Panos Koutrakos, The EU Common Security
and Defence Policy (OUP, Oxford 2013) 133-182. 
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Union crisis management operations [2005] OJ L315/21 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… Ukraine establishing a framework for the participation of Ukraine in the European 
Union crisis management operations [2005] OJ L182/29 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… Romania establishing a framework for the participation of Romania in the European 
Union crisis- management operations [2005] OJ L67/14 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Kingdom of Norway establishing a framework for the participation of the 
Kingdom of Norway in the European Union crisis-management operations [2005] OJ 
L67/8 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
… the Republic of Iceland establishing a framework for the participation of the 
Republic of Iceland in the European Union crisis-management [2005] OJ L67/2 (Treaty 
EU, Article 24).
… the Republic of Bulgaria establishing a framework for the participation of the 
Republic of Bulgaria in the EU crisis management operations [2005] OJ L46/50 (Treaty 
EU, Article 24).
… the Republic of Croatia on the participation of the Republic of Croatia in the 
European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and 
repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast (Operation Atalanta) 
[2009] OJ L202/84 (Treaty EU, Article 24).
provide  for  a  dispute  settlement  mechanism  concerning  their  interpretation.  The
settlement of disputes is carried out by diplomatic means between the parties. That is, the
contracting  parties  shall  endeavour  to  resolve  by  mutual  accord  problems  or  doubts
arising from the interpretation of the international agreement.
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A number of participation agreements does not provide for dispute resolution.49 Dispute
resolution clauses are not the only vehicle for ensuring treaty performances. Alternatives
include 'non-compliance' clauses.
All  participation  agreements  include  a  non-compliance  clause  which  enables  either
contracting party to terminate the agreement.
According to Koutrakos,50 there are two provisos attached. The first is substantive (that is,
49  See the EU-Slovakia Agreement on the participation of the Slovak Republic in the European
Union  Police  Mission  (EUPM)  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  (BiH)  [2003]  OJ  L239/44;  EU-
Bulgaria Agreement on the participation of the Republic of Bulgaria in the EUPM in BiH [2003]
OJ L239/41; EU-Ukraine Agreement on the participation of Ukraine in the EUPM in BiH [2003]
OJ L239/38; EU-Turkey Agreement on the participation of the Republic of Turkey in the EUPM
in BiH [2003]  OJ  L239/35;  EU-Norway Agreement  on  the  participation  of  the  Kingdom of
Norway in the EUPM in BiH [2003] OJ L239/32; EU-Slovenia Agreement on the participation of
the Republic of Slovenia in the EUPM in BiH [2003] OJ L239/29; EU-Estonia Agreement on the
participation of the Republic of Estonia in the EUPM in BiH [2003] OJ L239/26; EU-Romania
Agreement  on  the  participation  of  Romania  in  the  EUPM in  BiH  [2003]  OJ  L239/23;  EU-
Hungary Agreement on the participation of the Republic of Hungary in the EUPM in BiH [2003]
OJ L239/20; EU-Latvia Agreement on the participation of the Republic of Latvia in the EUPM in
BiH [2003] OJ L239/17; EU-Switzerland Agreement on the participation of Switzerland in the
EUPM in BiH [2003] OJ L239/14; EU-Lithuania Agreement on the participation of the Republic
of Lithuania in the EUPM in BiH [2003] OJ L239/11; EU-Czechia Agreement on the participation
of the Czech Republic in the EUPM in BiH [2003] OJ L239/8; EU-Iceland Agreement on the
participation  of  the  Republic  of Iceland in the EUPM in BiH [2003] OJ L239/5;  EU-Cyprus
Agreement on the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in the EUPM in BiH [2003] OJ L239/2;
EU-Russia Agreement on the participation of the Russian Federation in the EUPM in BiH [2003]
OJ L197/38; EU-Poland Agreement on the participation of the Republic of Poland in the EUPM
in  BiH  [2003]  OJ  L64/38;  EU-Romania  Agreement  on  the  participation  of  Romania  in  the
European Union-led forces  (EUF) in  the Former Yugoslav Republic  of  Macedonia  (FYROM)
[2004]  OJ  L120/62;  EU-Slovakia  Agreement  on  the  participation  of  the  armed forces  of  the
Slovak Republic in the EUF in the FYROM [2004] OJ L12/54; EU-Latvia Agreement on the
participation of the Republic of Latvia in the EUF in the FYROM [2003] OJ L313/79; EU-Poland
Agreement on the participation of Polish armed forces in the EUF in the FYROM [2003] OJ
L285/44; EU-Turkey Agreement on the participation of the Republic of Turkey in the EUF in the
FYROM [2003] OJ L234/23; EU-Lithuania Agreement on the participation of the Republic of
Lithuania  in  the  EUF  in  the  FYROM  [2003]  OJ  L234/19;  EU-Czechia  Agreement  on  the
participation of the Czech Republic in the EUF in the FYROM [2003] OJ L229/39; EU-Estonia
Agreement on the participation of the Republic of Estonia in the EUF in the FYROM [2003] OJ
L216/61.
50  See Panos Koutrakos (n 39) 173.
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'[s]hould one of the Participating Parties fail to comply with its obligations laid down in
the previous Articles, the other Party shall have the right to terminate this agreement'), and
requires  that  one  of  the  Participating  Parties  must  have  failed  to  comply  with  its
obligations  as laid down in the agreement  in  question.  The second is  procedural  and
requires notice. The length varies – that is, a one-month,51 or two months' notice.52 By way
of exception, a number of participation agreements provide for their denunciation.53 The
period following written notification, which is required for denunciations to take effect, is
six months.
In some cases there is binding dispute settlement – through arbitration at the election of
one party. A case in point is the Agreement between the European Union and the Russian
Federation on the participation of the Russian Federation in the European Union military
operation  in  the  Republic  of  Chad  and  in  the  Central  African  Republic  (EUFOR
Tchad/RCA)  which  is  very  detailed  in  certain  aspects.  Article  8  of  the  Agreement
between the  European Union and the  Russian Federation  on  the  participation  of  the
Russian Federation in the European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad
and in the Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA) reads as follows:
1.  Disputes  between  the  Parties  concerning  the  interpretation  or
application of this Agreement and its implementing arrangements shall be
settled by the relevant authorities of the Parties at the appropriate level or
by diplomatic means.
2.  Any  financial  claims  or  disputes,  that  have  not  been  resolved  in
51  See, for instance, Article 7 of the EU-Russia Agreement [2008] OJ L307/16; Article 8 of the EU-
Croatia  Agreement  [2008]  OJ  L268/33;  Article  7  of  the  EU-Albania  Agreement  [2008]  OJ
L217/19;  Article  7  of  the  EU-Croatia  Agreement  [2008]  OJ  L317/20;  Article  7  of  the  EU-
Switzerland Agreement [2008] OJ L217/24; Article 8 of the EU-Croatia Agreement  [2009] OJ
L202/84.
52  See, for instance, Article 7 of the EU-Slovakia Agreement [2003] OJ L239/44; Article 8 (2) of the
EU-US Agreement on the participation of the United States of America in the European Union
Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO [2008] OJ L282/33.
53  See Article 9 (3) of the EU-Turkey  Agreement [2004] OJ L354/90;  Article 9 (4) of the EU-
Norway  Agreement [2004] OJ L354/86; Article 9 (4) of the EU-Ukraine  Agreement [2004] OJ
L354/82; Article 9 (4) of the EU-Switzerland Agreement [2004] OJ L354/78.
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accordance  with  paragraph  1  of  this  Article,  may  be  submitted  to  a
mutually agreed conciliator or mediator.
Any  claims  or  disputes  which  have  failed  to  be  settled  by  such
conciliation  or  mediation  may  be  submitted  by  either  Party  to  an
arbitration tribunal. Each Party appoints one arbitrator to the arbitration
tribunal. The two arbitrators so appointed shall appoint a third arbitrator,
who will be the Chairman. Where one of the Parties fails to appoint an
arbitrator  within  two  months  from  the  receipt  of  the  other  Parties
notification of submitting the dispute to the arbitration tribunal or where
no agreement can be found, within two months from their appointment,
between the  two arbitrators  on  the  appointment  of  the  third arbitrator,
either Party may ask the President of the International Court of Justice to
make an appointment. Where the President of the International Court of
Justice  is  a  national  of  either  Party  or  is  unable  to  discharge  the  said
function for any other reason, the necessary appointments shall be made
by the next most senior Member of the International Court of Justice who
is not a national of either Party. The arbitration tribunal shall decide ex
aequo  et  bono.  The  arbitrators  have  no  authority  to  award  punitive
damages. The arbitrators shall agree on the procedures for arbitration. The
seat  of  the  arbitration  shall  be  in  Brussels  and  the  language  of  the
arbitration shall be English. The arbitral award shall contain a statement of
reasons on which it is based and is accepted by the Parties as the final
adjudication of the dispute. Each Party shall bear its own expenses, and all
common costs shall be shared between the Parties in equal parts.54
That  is,  dispute  settlement  with  reference  to  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  for
appointments. The second paragraph of Article 8 provides that the arbitration tribunal is
empowered to decide  ex aequo et  bono  (the decision of the parties to obtain such a
solution). In all cases the arbitral tribunal decides in accordance with the terms of the
agreement. The award contains a statement of reasons.
54  [2008] OJ L307/16.
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 3.  Exchange of classified information between the European Union and third 
States and international institutions and dispute resolution
Procedures  involving  Parties  themselves  –  through  consultation  or  negotiation. Any
dispute arising between the parties with respect to interpretation or application shall be
settled by consultation or negotiation.55 During the negotiation both Parties shall continue
to fulfil all of their obligations under the Agreement.56 Whilst not all agreements provide
for their denunciation (for instance the recent ones with Australia and Israel do not),57
most of them do.58 The period following written notice, which is required for denunciation
55  See Article 17 of the EU-Australia  Agreement [2010] OJ L26/31; Article 17 of the EU-Israel
Agreement [2009] OJ L192/64; Article 16 of the EU-Switzerland Agreement [2008] OJ L181/58;
Article 16 of the EU-US Agreement [2007] OJ L115/30; Article 16 of the EU-Iceland Agreement
[2006] OJ L 184/35; Article 16 of the EU-Croatia Agreement [2006] OJ L116/74; Article 15 of the
EU-Ukraine Agreement [2005] OJ L172/84; Article 16 of the EU-Bulgaria Agreement [2005] OJ
L118/53; Article 16 of the EU-Romania  Agreement [2005] OJ L 118/48; Article 16 of the EU-
FYROM  Agreement [2005]  OJ  L94/39;  Article  16  of  the  EU-Norway  Agreement [2004]  OJ
L362/29; Article 16 of the EU-BiH Agreement [2004] OJ L324/16; Article 16 of the Agreement
between the European Space Agency and the European Union on the security and exchange of
classified information [2008] OJ L219/59; Article 18 of the Agreement between the International
Criminal Court and the European Union on cooperation and assistance [2006] OJ L115/50.
56  See Article 17 of the Agreement on security procedures for exchanging classified information
between the European Union and Israel [2009] OJ L192/64.
57  [2010] OJ L26/31 and [2009] OJ L192/64.
58  See Article 16 of the EU-Russia Agreement [2010] OJ L155/57; Article 18 of the EU-Switzerland
Agreement [2008] OJ L181/58; Article 20 of the EU-US Agreement [2007] OJ L115/30; Article
18 of the EU-Iceland  Agreement [2006] OJ L184/35; Article 18 of the EU-Croatia  Agreement
[2006] OJ L116/74; Article 17 of the EU-Ukraine  Agreement [2005] OJ L172/84; Article 18 of
the  EU-Bulgaria  Agreement [2005]  OJ  L118/53;  Article  18  of  the  EU-Romania  Agreement
[2005] OJ L118/48; Article 18 of the EU-FYROM Agreement [2005] OJ L94/39; Article 18 of the
EU-Norway  Agreement [2004]  OJ L362/29;  Article  18 of  the EU-BiH Agreement  [2004]  OJ
L324/16;  Article 18 of the Agreement between the European Space Agency and the European
Union on the security and exchange of classified information [2008] OJ L219/59; Article 20 of the
Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the European Union on cooperation and
assistance [2006] OJ L115/50; Article 17 of the Agreement between the European Union and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Agreement on the Security of Information [2003] OJ L80/36;
Articles 16 and 17 of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and
the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latters' association with the implementation, application
and development of the Schengen acquis [1999] OJ L176/36.
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to take effect, varies from ninety days59 to six months.60 The agreements also provide that,
notwithstanding  such  denunciation,  obligations  regarding  the  protection  of  classified
information provided or exchanged pursuant to the international agreement shall continue
to be protected in accordance with the provisions set forth therein.
 4.  TFTP and dispute resolution
Procedures involving Parties themselves – through consultations only. Article 12 of the
EU-US Agreement on the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the
European Union to  the  United  States  for  purposes  of  the  Terrorist  Finance  Tracking
Program reads as follows:
1. The Parties shall, as appropriate, consult to enable the most effective
use to be made of this Agreement, including to facilitate the resolution of
any dispute regarding the interpretation or application of this Agreement.
2. The Parties shall take measures to avoid the imposition of extraordinary
burdens on  one another  through application  of  this  Agreement.  Where
extraordinary  burdens  nonetheless  result,  the  Parties  shall  immediately
consult  with  a  view  to  facilitating  the  application  of  this  Agreement,
including  the  taking  of  such  measures  as  may  be  required  to  reduce
pending and future burdens.
3. The Parties shall immediately consult in the event that any third party,
including an authority  of another  country,  challenges  or asserts  a legal
claim with respect to any aspect of the effect or implementation of this
Agreement.61
59  Article 20 (4) of the EU-US Agreement [2007] OJ L115/30.
60  [2010] OJ L155/57; [2008] OJ L181/58; [2006] OJ L184/35; [2006] OJ L116/74; [2005] OJ
L172/84; [2005] OJ L118/53; [2005] OJ L118/48; [2005] OJ L94/39; [2004] OJ L362/29; [2004]
OJ L324/16; [2008] OJ L219/59; [2006] OJ L115/50; [2003] OJ L80/36.
61  [2010] OJ L8/11.
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There is a general duty upon the Parties to consult each other in order to 'enable the most
effective use to be made of the Agreement, including to facilitate the resolution of any
dispute regarding the interpretation or application'. The European Union and the US have
the  obligation  to  take  measures  to  avoid  extraordinary  burdens  as  the  result  of  the
application  of  the  EU-US  Agreement  on  the  processing  and  transfer  of  Financial
Messaging  Data  from  the  European  Union  to  the  United  States  for  purposes  of  the
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, and in cases in which such burdens nonetheless may
result, they must immediately consult with a view to facilitating the application of the
Agreement. The third paragraph of Article 12 provides that the Parties must immediately
consult  in  the  event  that  any  third  party,  including  authorities  of  another  country,
challenges/ asserts a legal claim with respect to aspects of the effects/ implementation of
the Agreement.
Article 14 of the EU-US Agreement provides for termination:
1. Either party may suspend or terminate this Agreement at any time by
notification through diplomatic channels. Suspension shall take effect 10
days from the date of receipt of such notification.
2. Notwithstanding the suspension or termination of this Agreement, all
data  held by the U.S. Treasury Department pursuant to this Agreement
shall continue to be processed in accordance with this Agreement.
 5.  Enhanced cooperation in the field of extradition and mutual legal assistance and 
dispute resolution
a)  The Norway-Iceland participation and dispute resolution
Article 4 of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and
the Kingdom of Norway on the application of certain provisions of the Convention of 29
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may 2000 on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the
European Union and the 2001 Protocol thereto reads as follows:
Any dispute between either Iceland or Norway and a Member State of the
European  Union  regarding  the  interpretation  or  the  application  of  this
Agreement or of any of the provisions referred to in Article 1 thereof may
be referred by a Party to the dispute to a meeting of representatives of the
governments of the Member States of the European Union and of Iceland
and Norway, with a view to its settlement within six months.62
There is a termination clause in the contract. Article 8 of the Norway-Iceland participation
Agreement reads as follows:
1. This Agreement may be terminated by the Contracting Parties. In the
event of termination by either Iceland or Norway, this  Agreement shall
remain in force between the European Union and the State for which it
has not been terminated.
2. Termination of this Agreement pursuant to paragraph 1 shall take effect
six months after the deposit of the notification of termination. Procedures
for complying with requests for mutual legal assistance still pending at
that  date  shall  be  completed in  accordance with  the provisions  of  this
Agreement.
3. This Agreement shall be terminated in the event of termination of the
Agreement of 18 May 1999 concluded by the Council of the European
Union, the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway on the latters'
association with the application, implementation and development of the
Schengen acquis.
4. Termination of this Agreement pursuant to paragraph 3 shall take effect
for the same Party or Parties and on the same date as the termination of
the Agreement of 18 May 1999 referred to in paragraph 3.63
62  [2004] OJ L26/3.
63  See Article 8 of the Agreement with the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway on the
application of  certain provisions of the Convention of  29 may 2000 on Mutual  Assistance in
Criminal  Matters  between the  Member  States  of  the  European  Union and  the  2001 Protocol
thereto [2004] OJ L26/3.
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b)  Mutual legal assistance and dispute resolution
Procedures involving Parties themselves – through consultations only.  Article 28 of the
EU-Japan Agreement on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters reads as follows:
1.  The  Central  Authorities  of  the  Member  States  and  Japan  shall,  if
necessary, hold consultations for the purpose of resolving any difficulties
with  regard  to  the  execution  of  a  request,  and facilitating  speedy  and
effective  assistance  under  this  Agreement,  and  may  decide  on  such
measures as may be necessary for this purpose.
2. The Contracting Parties shall, as appropriate, hold consultations on any
matter  that  may  arise  in  the  interpretation  or  application  of  this
Agreement.64
There is a termination clause in the contract. Article 31 (3) of the EU-Japan Agreement
reads as follows:
Either  Contracting Party may terminate  this Agreement  at  any time by
giving written notice to the other Contracting Party, and such termination
shall be effective six months after the date of such notice.
Article  11  of  the  EU-US  Agreement  on  mutual  legal  assistance;  that  is, a  general
consultation duty, reads as follows:
The Contracting Parties shall, as appropriate, consult to enable the most
effective  use  to  be made  of  this  Agreement,  including to  facilitate  the
resolution of any dispute regarding the interpretation or application of this
Agreement.65
Articles 4 (7) and 8 (3) of the EU-US Agreement on mutual legal assistance provide for a
specific consultation duty.
Article 4 (7) of the EU-US Agreement on mutual legal assistance reads as follows:
64  [2010] OJ L39/20.
65  [2003] OJ L181/34.
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Identification of bank information
…
7. The Contracting Parties shall take measures to avoid the imposition of
extraordinary  burdens  on  requested  States  through  application  of  this
Article.  Where  extraordinary burdens  on a  requested State  nonetheless
result,  including  on  banks  or  by  operation  of  the  channels  of
communications  foreseen  in  this  Article,  the  Contracting  Parties  shall
immediately  consult  with  a  view  to  facilitating  the  application  of  this
Article,  including  the  taking  of  such  measures  as  may  be  required  to
reduce pending and future burdens.66
Article 8 (3) of the EU-US Agreement on mutual legal assistance stipulates that:
Mutual legal assistance to administrative authorities
…
3. The Contracting Parties shall take measures to avoid the imposition of
extraordinary  burdens  on  requested  States  through  application  of  this
Article.  Where  extraordinary  burdens  on  a  requested  state  nonetheless
result,  the Contracting Parties shall  immediately consult with a view to
facilitating the application of this  Article,  including the taking of  such
measures as may be required to reduce pending and future burdens.67
There is a termination clause in the contract. Article 16 (2) of the EU-US Agreement on
mutual legal assistance stipulates that:
The application of this Agreement to any territory or country in respect of
which extension has been made in accordance with subparagraph (b) of
paragraph  1  may be  terminated  by  either  Contracting  Party  giving  six
months'  written  notice  to  the  other  Contracting  Party  through  the
diplomatic channel, where duly confirmed between the relevant Member
State and the United States of America.
66  [2003] OJ L181/34.
67  [2003] OJ L181/34.
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c)  Extradition and surrender procedures and dispute resolution
Article 36 of the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and
the Kingdom of Norway on the surrender procedure between the Member States of the
European Union and Iceland and Norway stipulates that:
Any dispute between either Iceland or Norway and a Member State of the
European  Union  regarding  the  interpretation  or  the  application  of  this
Agreement  may be  referred by a  party to  the dispute  to  a  meeting  of
representatives of the governments of the Member States of the European
Union and of Iceland and Norway, with a view to its settlement within six
months.68
There is a termination clause in the contract. Article 41 of the Agreement between the
European  Union  and  the  Republic  of  Iceland  and  the  Kingdom  of  Norway  on  the
surrender procedure between the Member States of the European Union and Iceland and
Norway reads as follows:
1. This Agreement may be terminated by the Contracting Parties. In the
event of termination by either Iceland or Norway, this  Agreement shall
remain in force between the European Union and the Contracting Party
for which it has not been terminated.
2. Termination of this Agreement pursuant to paragraph 1 shall take effect
six months after the deposit of the notification of termination. Procedures
for complying with requests for surrender still pending at that date shall be
completed in conformity with the provisions of this Agreement.
Article 15 of the EU-US Extradition Agreement; that is, a general consultation duty, reads
as follows:
The Contracting Parties shall, as appropriate, consult to enable the most
effective  use  to  be made  of  this  Agreement,  including to  facilitate  the
resolution of any dispute regarding the interpretation or application of this
Agreement.69
68  [2006] OJ L292/2.
69  [2003] OJ L181/27.
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Article 17 of the EU-US Extradition Agreement provides for a specific consultation duty:
Non-derogation
… 
2.  Where  the  constitutional  principles  of,  or  final  judicial  decisions
binding upon, the requested State may pose an impediment to fulfilment
of its obligation to extradite, and resolution of the matter is not provided
for in this Agreement or the applicable bilateral treaty, consultations shall
take place between the requested and requesting States.70
There  is  a  termination  clause  in  the  contract.  Article  22  of  the  EU-US  Extradition
Agreement reads as follows:
Either  Contracting Party may terminate  this Agreement  at  any time by
giving  written  notice  to  the  other  party,  and such termination  shall  be
effective six months after the date of such notice.
Should any measures set forth in the EU-US Extradition Agreement create an operational
difficulty  for  either  one  or  more  Member States or  the United States,  such difficulty
should  be  resolved,  if  possible,  through  consultations  between  the  Member  State  or
Member  States  concerned  and  the United  States,  or,  if  appropriate,  through  the
consultation procedures set out in the EU-US Extradition Agreement.
The Explanatory Note on the Agreement on Extradition between the European Union and
the United States of America reflects understandings regarding the application of certain
provisions of the Agreement. The Explanatory Note on Article 18 reads as follows:
On Article 18
Article 18 provides that the Agreement shall not preclude the conclusion,
after its entry into force, of bilateral agreements on extradition between a
Member  State  and  the  United  States  of  America  consistent  with  the
70  [2003] OJ L181/27.
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Agreement.
Should any measures  set  forth  in  the  Agreement  create  an  operational
difficulty for either one or more Member States or the United States of
America, such difficulty should in the first place be resolved, if possible,
through  consultations  between  the  Member  State  or  Member  States
concerned and the United States of America, or, if appropriate, through
the  consultation procedures  set  out  in  this  Agreement.  Where  it  is  not
possible  to  address  such  operational  difficulty  through  consultations
alone,  it  would  be  consistent  with  the  Agreement  for  future  bilateral
agreements between the Member State or Member States and the United
States  of  America  to  provide  an  operationally  feasible  alternative
mechanism that would satisfy the objectives of the specific provision with
respect to which the difficulty has arisen.71
 6.  PNR and dispute resolution
Any dispute arising between the parties with respect to interpretation/ application shall be
settled  by consultation  or  negotiation,  and shall  not  be referred  to  any third party  or
tribunal. Article 10 of the Agreement between the European Union and Australia on the
processing and transfer of European Union-sourced passenger name record (PNR) data by
air carriers to the Australian customs service reads as follows:
Any dispute arising between the Parties under this Agreement with respect
to  its  interpretation,  application  or  implementation  shall  be  settled  by
consultation or negotiation between the Parties; it shall not be referred to
any third party or tribunal for resolution.72
There is a termination clause in the contract. Article 13 of the Agreement between the
European Union and Australia on the processing and transfer of European Union-sourced
passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers to the Australian customs service reads
71  Explanatory Note on the Agreement on Extradition between the European Union and the United
States of America.
72  [2008] OJ L213/49.
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as follows:
1. Either party may terminate this Agreement at any time by notification
through  diplomatic  channels.  Termination  shall  take  effect  ninety  (90)
days from the date of the other party being notified thereof.
2.  Notwithstanding  the  termination  of  this  Agreement,  all  EU-sourced
PNR  data  held  by  competent  Australian  authorities  pursuant  to  this
Agreement  shall  continue  to  be processed in  accordance  with  the data
protection standards laid down herein.
3.  This  Agreement  and  any  obligations  thereunder,  other  than  the
obligation under Article 13(2), shall expire and cease to have effect seven
years after the date of signing, unless the parties mutually agree to replace
this Agreement.
Article 5 of the Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America
on the processing and transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data by air carriers to the
United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2007 PNR Agreement) reads as
follows:
DHS  expects  that  it  is  not  being  asked  to  undertake  data  protection
measures in its PNR system that are more stringent than those applied by
European authorities for their domestic PNR systems. DHS does not ask
European  authorities  to  adopt  data  protection  measures  in  their  PNR
systems that are more stringent than those applied by the U.S. for its PNR
system. If its expectation is not met, DHS reserves the right to suspend
relevant provisions of the DHS letter while conducting consultations with
the  EU with  a  view to  reaching  a  prompt  and  satisfactory  resolution.
(…).73
There is a termination clause in the contract. Article 9 of the 2007 PNR Agreement reads
as follows:
(…) Either Party may terminate or suspend this Agreement at any time by
notification through diplomatic channels. Termination will take effect 30
73  [2007] OJ L204/18.
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days from the date of notification thereof to the other Party unless either
Party deems a shorter notice period essential for its national security or
homeland security interests. (…)
Attached to the (2007) PNR Agreement is the US letter to EU (DHS letter 2007),74 which
contains assurances provided by the DHS, and the EU letter  to US (EU letter 2007),
accepting the DHS letter (assurance of adequacy).75 Substantial provisions are included in
the letter exchanges. 
DHS letter 2007, Ch. IX. reads as follows:
DHS does not ask European authorities to adopt data protection measures
in their PNR systems that are more stringent than those applied by the
U.S. for its PNR system. If its expectation is not met, DHS reserves the
right to suspend relevant provisions of the DHS letter while conducting
consultations  with  the  EU  with  a  view  to  reaching  a  prompt  and
satisfactory resolution. (…)76 
The exclusive remedy if the EU determines that the US has breached the (2007) PNR
Agreement  is  the  termination  of  the  Agreement  and  the  revocation  of  the  adequacy
determination referenced in paragraph 6. The exclusive remedy if the US determines that
the EU has breached the (2007) PNR Agreement is the termination of the Agreement and
the  revocation of  the  DHS letter  2007 as  set  out  in  paragraph 8 of  the  (2007)  PNR
Agreement.
74  [2007] OJ L204/21.
75  [2007] OJ L204/25.
76  [2007] OJ L204/21.
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 7.  Schengen Association and dispute resolution
Article 9 of the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and
the  Swiss  Confederation  on  the  Swiss  Confederation's  association  with  the
implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis reads as follows:
1. Each year Switzerland shall report to the Mixed Committee on the way
in  which  its  administrative  authorities  and  courts  have  applied  and
interpreted the provisions referred to in Article 2, as interpreted, where
relevant, by the Court of Justice.
2.  If,  within  two months  of  being  notified  of  a  substantial  divergence
between Court of Justice case-law and that of Switzerland's courts or of a
substantial  divergence  between  the  authorities  of  the  Member  States
concerned and the Swiss authorities in their application of the provisions
referred  to  in  Article  2,  the  Mixed  Committee  is  unable  to  ensure  a
uniform  application  and  interpretation,  the  procedure  provided  for  in
Article 10 shall be initiated.77
If  the Mixed Committee is  unable to ensure a uniform application/  interpretation,  the
procedure provided for in Article 10 is initiated. Article 10 of the Agreement between the
European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss
Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of the
Schengen acquis reads as follows:
1. In the event of a dispute about the application of this Agreement or
where the situation provided for in Article 9(2) occurs, the matter shall be
officially  entered  as  a  matter  of  dispute  on  the  agenda  of  the  Mixed
Committee, meeting at ministerial level.
2. The Mixed Committee shall have 90 days to settle the dispute, counting
from the date of adoption of the agenda on which the dispute has been
placed.
77  [2008] OJ L53/52.
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3. Where the dispute cannot be settled by the Mixed Committee within the
90-day  deadline  provided  for  in  paragraph  2,  this  deadline  shall  be
extended by 30 days with a view to reaching a final settlement.
If no final settlement is reached, this Agreement shall be terminated six
months after the expiry of the 30-day period.
Disputes  about  the  application  of  the  Agreement  between  the  European  Union,  the
European  Community  and  the  Swiss  Confederation  on  the  Swiss  Confederation's
association  with  the  implementation,  application  and  development  of  the  Schengen
acquis, or where the situation provided for in Article 9 (2) occurs, are entered as a matter
of dispute on the agenda of the Mixed Committee, meeting at ministerial level. 
There is a termination clause in the contract. Article 17 reads as follows:
1. This Agreement may be terminated by Switzerland or by decision of the
Council  acting  by  unanimity  of  its  Members.  The  depositary  shall  be
notified  of  termination,  which  shall  take  effect  six  months  after
notification.
2.  This  Agreement  shall  be  considered  to  have  been  terminated  if
Switzerland terminates one of the agreements referred to in Article 13 or
the agreement referred to in Article 15(4).
The Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of
Iceland  and  the  Kingdom  of  Norway  concerning  the  latters'  association  with  the
implementation,  application  and development  of  the Schengen acquis  also  provides  a
dispute settlement mechanism with respect to application, or in a case where the situation
provided for in Article 10 (2) occurs.
The second paragraph of Article 10 of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the
European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the
latters' association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen
acquis reads as follows:
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If the Mixed Committee, within two months after a substantial difference
in the case law of the Court of Justice and the courts of Iceland or Norway
or a substancial  difference in application between the authorities of the
Member States concerned and those of Iceland or Norway in respect of
the provisions referred to in Article 2 has been brought before it, has not
been  able  to  ensure  the  preservation  of  a  uniform  application  and
interpretation, the procedure in article 11 shall apply.78
If the Mixed Committee is not able to ensure the preservation of a uniform application/
interpretation, the procedure in Article 11 applies.
Article 11 of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the
Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latters' association with
the  implementation,  application  and  development  of  the  Schengen  acquis  reads  as
follows:
1. In the case of a dispute about the application of this Agreement or in a
case where the situation provided for in Article 10(2) occurs, the matter
shall  be officially  entered as  a  matter of dispute  on the  agenda of  the
Mixed Committee at ministerial level.
2.  The Mixed Committee  shall  have  ninety days  from the  date  of  the
adoption  of  the  agenda  on  which  the  dispute  has  been entered  within
which to settle the dispute.
3. In a case where the dispute cannot be settled by the Mixed Committee
within the period of ninety days envisaged in paragraph 2, a further period
of thirty days shall be observed for reaching a final settlement.
If no final settlement is reached, this Agreement shall be considered as
terminated with respect to Iceland or Norway, depending on which State
the dispute concerns. Such termination shall take effect six months after
the expiry of the thirty day period.
The Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of
78  [1999] OJ L176/36.
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Iceland  and  the  Kingdom  of  Norway  concerning  the  latters'  association  with  the
implementation,  application  and  development  of  the  Schengen  acquis  provides  for
denunciation. Article 16 of the Agreement reads as follows:
This  Agreement  may  be  denounced  by  Iceland  or  by  Norway  or  by
decision  of  the  Council,  acting  by  the  unanimity  of  its  members
representing  the  Member  States  which  participate  in  the  closer
cooperation authorised by the Schengen Protocol. Such denunciation shall
be  notified  to  the  depositary.  It  shall  take  effect  six  months  after
notification.
The period following notification is six months. The consequences of denunciation are
mentioned in Article 17:
The consequences of denunciation of this Agreement by, or its termination
with respect to, Iceland or Norway shall be the subject of an agreement
between the remaining Parties and the Party which has denounced this
Agreement or with respect to which the termination is to take effect. If no
agreement can be reached, the Council shall decide after consultation of
the  remaining associated  Contracting Party on the  necessary measures.
However, these measures shall be binding upon that Party only if they are
accepted by it.
272
Descriptive Repository
To  conclude,  the options  are  manifold.  They  range  from calling  for  negotiations  to
binding judicial proceedings. Dispute resolution clauses tend to take one of three forms:
First,  procedures  involving  the  contracting  parties  themselves.  Second,  procedures
involving a third party. Third, binding dispute settlement. E.g. the Agreement between
the European Union and  the  Russian  Federation  on  the  participation  of  the  Russian
Federation in the European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the
Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA).79
According to Koutrakos,80 a number of agreements were silent on this issue.81 Interesting
aspect  of  the  international  agreements  is  the  reference  to  the  Joint  Coordination
Committee. A small number of international agreements provide for a Joint Coordination
Group composed of representatives of the mission and the competent authorities of the
Host Party.82
79  [2008] OJ L307/16.
80  See Panos Koutrakos (n 39) 179.
81  E.g. EU-Albania  Agreement  on  the  activities  of  the  European  Union  Monitoring  Mission
(EUMM) in the Republic of Albania [2003] OJ L93/50; EU-FYROM Agreement on the activities
of  the  European  Union  Monitoring  Mission  (EUMM)  in  the  Former  Yugoslav  Republic  of
Macedonia [2001] OJ L241/2; EU-Yugoslavia Agreement on the activities of the European Union
Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [2001] OJ L125/2; EU-BiH
Agreement on the activities of the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in BiH [2002] OJ
L293/2;  EU-Georgia  Agreement  on  the  status  in  Georgia  of  the  European  Union  Special
Representative  for  the  South  Caucasus  and  his/her  support  team  [2006]  OJ  L135/15;  EU-
Seychelles Agreement on the Conditions and Modalities for the Transfer of Suspected Pirates and
Armed Robbers from EUNAVFOR to the Republic of Seychelles and for their Treatment after
such Transfer [2009] OJ L315/37.
82  See Article 15 (1) of the EU-Congo Agreement on the status and activities of the European Union
police mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUPOL Kinshasa) [2005] OJ L256/58;
Article 14 (1) of the EU-Georgia Agreement on the status and activities of the European Union
Rule of Law Mission in Georgia, EUJUST THEMIS [2004] OJ L389/42; Article 15 (1) of the EU-
FYROM Agreement on the status and activities of the European Union Police Mission in the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL Proxima) [2004] OJ L16/66; Article 14 (1) of
the  EU-FYROM  Agreement  on  the  status  of  the  European  Union-led  forces  in  the  Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [2003] OJ L82/46.
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The more recent ones provide for joint examination.83 That is, issues arising in connection
with the application of the agreements are to be examined jointly by representatives of the
mission and the competent authorities of the Host Party. As for the interpretation of the
agreements, they shall be settled exclusively by diplomatic means between the Host State
and EU representatives.
Sloss and Murphy have argued that the establishment of dispute settlement mechanisms
can be seen as a presumption against the recognition of direct effect.
As  Sloss  has  described,  domestic  courts  should  not  enforce  a  treaty  that  expressly
precluded  domestic  judicial  enforcement.  Similarly,  if  a  treaty  created  an  alternative
mechanism for private parties to vindicate their treaty-based primary rights, a court might
reasonably conclude that  the treaty drafters implicitly had precluded domestic judicial
enforcement. (However, courts should not infer an implied limitation on domestic judicial
enforcement  if  the  alternative  mechanism  was  accessible  only  to  states,  not  private
parties.) Finally, the right to a remedy for treaty violations was subject to limitations in
cases  where the private party waited too long to seek a remedy,  failed to follow the
83  See, for instance, Article 16 (1) of the EU-Seychelles Agreement on the status of the European
Union-led forces in the Republic of Seychelles in the framework of the EU military operation
Atalanta [2009] OJ L323/14; Article 16 (1) of the EU-Djibouti Agreement on the status of the
European Union-led  forces  in  the  Republic  of  Djibouti  in  the  framework  of  the EU military
operation Atalanta [2009] OJ L33/43; Article 8 (a) of the EU-Kenya Agreement on the conditions
and modalities  for  the  transfer  of  persons suspected  of  having committed  acts  of  piracy  and
detained  by  the  European  Union-led  naval  force  (EUNAVFOR),  and  seized  property  in  the
possession  of  EUNAVFOR,  from EUNAVFOR  to  Kenya  and  for  their  treatment  after  such
transfer  [2009] OJ L79/49;  Article  18 (1)  of  the EU-Georgia  Agreement  on the  status of  the
European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia [2008] OJ L310/31; Article 17 (1) of the EU-
Guinea-Bissau Agreement on the Status of the European Union Mission in Support of Security
Sector Reform in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau [2008] OJ L219/66; Article 16 (1) of the EU-
RCA Agreement on the status of the European Union-led forces in the Central African Republic
[2008] OJ L136/46; Article 16 (1) of the EU-Chad on the status of the European Union-led forces
in the Republic of Chad [2008] OJ L83/40; Article 16 (1) of the EU-Cameroon Agreement on the
status  of  the  European  Union-led  Forces  in  transit  within  the  territory  of  the  Republic  of
Cameroon [2008] OJ L57/31; Article 16 (1) of the  EU-Gabon Agreement on the status of the
European Union-led forces in the Gabonese Republic [2006] OJ L187/43; Article 17 (a) of the
EU-Indonesia Agreement on the tasks, status, privileges and immunities of the European Union
Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia) (Aceh Monitoring Mission — AMM) and its personnel
[2005] OJ L288/60.
274
Descriptive Repository
prescribed procedure, or was otherwise at fault for the failure to obtain a remedy that the
legal system made available.84
As Murphy has described, if the treaty itself provided a mechanism for private individuals
to vindicate private rights, then an alternative mechanism (access to national courts to
vindicate a treaty norm) should not be implied. Certainly that was the case when the
international agreement both created an alternative mechanism and expressly precluded
the pursuit of actions in national courts, as occurred under the 1981 Iran-United States
Algiers  Accords.  In  that  instance,  the  two states  had  created  an  international  arbitral
tribunal in the Hague for the resolution of commercial claims, had provided access to that
tribunal for individuals with large claims, and expressly had foreclosed U.S. Nationals
whose claims had fallen within the scope of that tribunal from pursuing actions in U.S.
Courts. To imply that the agreements obliged the United States to allow individuals access
to U.S. Courts would fly in the face of the express terms of the agreements.85
According to a different view, the establishment of dispute settlement mechanisms is in
principle neutral – with respect to the question of direct effect.86
In Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Chiquita Italia SpA the Court held:
26 As regards the GATT, the Court has consistently held, most recently in
Case C-280/93  Germany v Council [1994] ECR I-4973, paragraph 106,
that the GATT, which according to its preamble is based on the principle
of  negotiations  undertaken  on  "the  basis  of  reciprocal  and  mutually
advantageous arrangements", is characterized by the great flexibility of its
provisions, in particular those conferring the possibility of derogation, the
measures to be taken when confronted with exceptional difficulties and
the settlement of conflicts between the contracting parties. 
84  See David Sloss (n 26) 60.
85  See Sean D. Murphy (n 26) 107.
86  See Beatrice I. Bonafé (n 27) 230. 
275
Descriptive Repository
27 The Court stated (at paragraph 107) that those measures included, for
the  settlement  of  conflicts,  depending  on  the  case,  written
recommendations  or  proposals  which  are  to  be  "given  sympathetic
consideration",  investigations  possibly  followed  by  recommendations,
consultations  between or decisions of the contracting parties,  including
that of authorizing certain contracting parties to suspend the application to
any others of any obligations or concessions under the GATT, and, finally,
in  the  event  of  such suspension,  the  power  of  the  party  concerned  to
withdraw from that agreement. 
28 It also noted (at paragraph 108) that where, by reason of an obligation
assumed under the GATT or of a concession relating to a preference, some
producers suffered or were threatened with serious damage, Article XIX
gave a contracting party power unilaterally to suspend the obligation and
to  withdraw  or  modify  the  concession,  either  after  consulting  the
contracting parties jointly and failing agreement between the contracting
parties concerned, or even, if the matter was urgent and on a temporary
basis, without prior consultation (see the judgments in Joined Cases 21/72
to 24/72 International Fruit Company, cited above, paragraphs 21, 25 and
26;  Case  9/73  Schlueter  v  Hauptzollamt  Loerrach [1973]  ECR  1135,
paragraph 29; Case 266/81  SIOT v Ministero delle Finanze [1983] ECR
731, paragraph 28; and Joined Cases 267/81, 268/81 and 269/81 SPI and
SAMI [1983] ECR 801, paragraph 23). 
29  Consequently,  those  features  preclude  an  individual  from invoking
provisions of the GATT before the national courts of a Member State in
order to challenge the application of national provisions. 
(...) 
31  In  that  regard,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  Fourth  ACP-EEC
Convention,  like  the  ACP-EEC Conventions  which  preceded  it  or  the
Conventions of Association between the European Economic Community
and the African States and Madagascar, is not of the same nature as the
GATT, as follows from paragraphs 26 to 29 above. 
(...)
36  That  conclusion  is  not  affected  by  the  argument  of  the  Italian
Government to the effect that the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention lays down
a special procedure for settling disputes between the contracting parties;
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Article  53  of  the  Second  Yaoundé  Convention  also  contained  similar
arrangements and yet, in the judgment cited above, the Court recognized
that some of its provisions had direct effect.87 
That  is,  the  CJEU  has  provided  no  clear  answer  as  to  whether  the  existence  of
international dispute settlement mechanisms plays a role in the recognition of direct effect
to international agreements.
87  Case C-469/93 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Chiquita Italia SpA EU:C:1995:435,
[1995] ECR I-4533.
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